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Abstract
The thesis traces the development of transportation policy
formation at regional and local levels of government in the
Detroit region since 1945. Three postwar transportation
policy climates are identified. The first, to the early
sixties, was marked by a reasonable degree of regional
consensus on freeways as the basis of regional transport-
ation policy. The second, covering the period to the
1970's, saw this consensus begin to break,d~. The
subsequent period to the present has been marked by an
almost total c2l1apse in regional consensus on transport-
ation policy. Within the maintenance of a sensitivity to
the dangers inherent in structuralist Marxist theorizing,
the hypothesis is explored that class relationships have
been of primary influence in accounting for this "macro
dynamic" of transportation policy formation. The role of
physical planners and implications for planning theory is a
particular focus of study. The research concludes that, at
a time when "grand" Marxist theorizing is coming under
criticism, the primacy of class relationships as an
explanatory variable can be sustained in the case of Detroit
but in terms of the development of a more adequate theory of
planning the research points to the need for supplemental
theory'construction on the discretion and influence of
planners within the class pattern (as opposed to
determination) of events.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
(a) Scope of the Research
Cb) Planning Theory - An Overview
(c) Epistemological Considerations
Cd) The Marxist COncept of Class
(e) Marxist Theories of the State
Cf) .Detailed Methodology
(a) Scope of the Research Task
This thesis is concerned with understanding the dynamics of
transportation policy formation at regional and local levels of
government in Detroit in the postwar period. The general hypothesis
or proposition is advanced that class relationships in the Marxist
sense have been primary in influencing policy changes but that
government or "state" policy cannot in a deterministic way be "read
off" from particular conjunctures of economic forces. Within the
limitations imposed by a fairly macro level approach to the analysis
of policy over a forty year period the thesis seeks to draw some
conclusions concerning the role of planners in the policy formation
process with consequent implications for a theory of planning.
Introducing a personal note, the case study approach had its genesis
in a dissatisfaction with the rational procedural theory of planning
(still dominant during the writers enrolment in British and American
planning schools in the mid-seventies) in explaining what it was that
planners actually did. The dissatisfaction was heightened during
subsequent involvement as an urban planner working for the State
government in Michigan in many policy issues affecting the Detroit
region. The justification of a search for answers within the Marxist
paragigm will be considered shortly. Suffice it to say at this stage
that this dissatisfaction coincided with a major upsurge in attention
given by Marxist scholars to "urban" issues especially upon the avail-
ability in English translation in 1976 and 1977 of work on "the urban
question" emanating from the French structuralist Marxist tradition
influenced in particular by the French philosopher Louis Althusser.(1)
A major well-spring of the research undertaken here has been an
attachment to the view (to be examined in Section 3 of this Chapter)
that a Marxist mode of enquiry does offer.much potential for under-
standing policy formation but that a structuralist type methodology
through its extraction of individual human agency from societal
processes leads to overly simplistic and erroneous conclusions
regarding state policy making and is nstiffling" as far as the
construction of a more adequate prescriptive procedural planning
theory is concerned. Various nstructural pitfalls" that several
writers on the Detroit scene have fallen into have, therefore, been
examined in the course of the research. Before I can more fully
1
elaborate the research task (undertaken in the final section of this
chapter) it is necessary to outline and justify the particular
theoretical approach adopted. As a first step in this the following
section will review the current status of planning theory focussing on
the planning issues to which the research is in part directed. The
treatment is indicative rather than exhaustive pending a return to a
consideration of recent developments in planning theory in the light
of the research in the concluding chapter.
(b) Planning Theory - An OverView
As shall be indicated later the very nomenclature "planning" has come
under increasing attack in recent years(2) as being vacuous in its
breadth without a substantive prefix - town and country planning,
economic planning etc. Jumping ahead slightly this is a view which
has been accepted and which circumscribes the present overview. I
have focussed on the role of urban planners in regional and local
government in Detroit as defined by the substantive knowledge or
expertise which such actors (whether designated as '~lanners" or
otherwise) have brought to bear in government policy making upon the
production, design and spatial articulation of the physical
environment.' Transportation planners, more particularly the focus,
a~e seen as occupying a specialist field within urban planning, one in
which government itself is to a large extent responsible for
implementation and provision of the resources to meet the objectives
for which planning is taking place. It has not been sought to delimit
the boundaries of those engaged in a certain generic form of decision
making which is seen as "equatable" between various policy areas. I
will retum later to the question of how the'relationship of planners
to others involved in transportation policy formation has been
conceptualised. Attention is turned now to a review of debates within
the terrain of "planning theory".
Excluding what McConnell(3) calls "theory in planning" - "the
substantive theories used in planning which are derived from many
disciplines" (emphasis original) there would seem to be three broad
2
groups of theories which attempt to explain what it is that physical
planners actually do ie. theory of planning:-
1. Explanatory and normative procedural planning theory
2. Planners as urban managers - the neo-Weberian view
3. Planners as state agents - the neo-Marxist view
These theories stand in various relationships to theories of political
power. Following Kirk(4) who argues that 'any conception of planning
is clearly intimately bound up with a conception of the role and
nature of the state" I will, before concentrating on planning theory
proper, consider three distinctive views on the nature of political
power:-(S)
1. Pluralist models
2. Elitist models
3. Class models.
Wolff distinguishes two interpretations of pluralism. Firstly the
"vector-sum" or "balance of'power" interpretation'in which "the major
groups in society compete through the electoral process for control
over the actions of the government.·- Politicians are forced to
accommodate themselves to a number of opposed interests and in so
doing achieve a rough distributive justice.,,(6) Secondly, according
to the "referee" version of pluralism, "the role of the government is
to oversee and regulate the competition among interest groups in the
socrety", (7) , This body of theory in the liberal democratic tradition
.,
traces its origins back to J.S. Mill, Rousseau and Greek models of
democracy. Its major exponent in the United States in recent years
has been Robert Dahl 'drawing upon an empirical analysis of power which
he conducted in the town of New Haven and recounted in his book "Who
Governs?" i01961.(8) 'Dahl's work (and that of colleagues such as
Nelson polsby)(9) has emphasised the balance of power 'position with
government agencies seen as "one set of pressure groups among many
others • • • (where) government both pursues its own preferences and
responds to demands coming' from outside interests". (10) Dahl's
position does not state that power is equally distributed rather as
Miliband puts it "that power in Western societies is competitive,
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fragmented and diffused; everybody, directly or through organized
groups, has some power and nobody has or can have too much of it".(11)
As Ham and Hill state: "the importance of pluralist theory is
demonstrated by the fact that, implicitly if not always explicitly,
its assumptions and arguments now pervade much Anglo-American writing
and research on politics, government and the state",<12)
Marxism is not the sole challenger to pluralist theory. There exists
a well established tradition of elitist theory dating back to the
classical elite theorists, Par~to and Mosca(13) and represented
perhaps most strongly today by the relatively. recent writing of c.
Wright Mills.(14) These writers point to the concentration of
political power in the hands of a minority of the population or
"political elite". The work of Bottomore,(15) for exmaple, ~stulates
elites rising to the fore in many areas of social life based on
wealth, knowledge, heredity, expertise etc with these individuals
forming the recruiting ground for the political elite. Unlike in the
Marxist view, which will be considered in a moment, political power is
not ultimately necessarily derivative of economic power. Mills in his
study of political power in the US in the 1950's thus identified a
quite coherent "power elite" occupying key positions in government,
business, corporations and the military with much movement between the
various spheres.(16) .web~rian analysis of political power also
emphasising the importance of institutional position as a political
resource, may also be said to fall into the elitist camp. Weber
recognized in modern state bureaucracies "the possibility of power
being vested in officials who were accountable neither to the public
nor politicians".(17) As Saunders points out in critique of the work
of Lambert et al who characterize Weber as a democratic pluralist of
the "referee" school (the states interest being one among many that
are reconciled), Weber's political sociology analysed "the limited
role of elected assemblies and the virtual impotence of elected
leaders in relation to the power of the burea~cracy."(18) pahl,(19)
drawing on Weber's notion of the autonomy of state bureaucrats,
provides a possible avenue for t~e construction of a planning theory
which I shall consider. Before moving to this and other planning
theories, and bypassing the question of where pluralism may be said to
end and elitism begin(20) one must ,introduce the Marxist view of
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political power - an approach which, because adopted in this research,
is explored more fully in subsequent sections.
There is not one homogenous Marxist paradigm but as a generalization,
in an approach which both strives to uncover underlying essences
rather than phenomenal appearances and to "totalize" or provide a
holistic understanding of social reality (concepts discussed in the
consideration of epistemology in Section 3), Marxism attaches special
importance to the form of economic organization or mode of production
in understanding social systems in their entirety. This is especially
so under capitalism. In all societies characterized by class
exploitation in the sphere of production there are, Marxism argues,
inherent limits and constraints derivative of this operating on the
social system as a whole. The economic system is not just one part of
some Parsonsian system of mutually influential parts but" rather has a
special importance or weight. Under capitalism, however, Marxist
analysis asserts that the economic system is more than an important
framework of constraints but is "dominant" within the social system as
a whole. As Harrington (21) puts it: "it is only under capital ism
that economics as such plays the leading social part in its own name"
and to borrow from Marx becomes the "pervasive lighting" in which the
rest of the social system is "bathed". And at the core of capitalism
is the process of capital accumulation and the particular nature of
class conflict associated with it. Class struggle and accumulation
are what Harvey( 22) calls "different sides of the same coin -
different windows from which to view the totality of capitalist
activity".
Marxist theory posits that capitalist society is dominated as a
structure by conflict between two basic classes- CAPITAL and LABOUR.
This conflict, while taking many forms and permeating the society as a
whole, is centred around the process of capital accumulation. To
quote Harvey(23} further:
"The class character of capitalist" society means the domination
of labour by capital. Put more concretetely, a class of
capitalists is in command of the "work process and organizes that
process for the purposes of producing profit. The labourer, on
the other hand, has command only over his or her labour power
5
which must be sold as a commodity on the market. The domination
arises because the labourer must yield the capitalist a profit
(surplus value) in return for a living wage."
Profit is the basis from which additional capital can be accumulated.
Capitalists are driven to accumulate not just out of greed but because
they are compelled to do so by competitive market forces. To quote
Heilbroner(24) "one accumulates or one gets accumulated".
Embedded in these social relationships the state in capitalist society
is more truly described as the capitalist state.. The political realm
is not seen as autonomous of the economic realm but is very much
derivative of it. While the exact characterization of the relation-
ship between economic power and political power remains the subject of
much debate within Marxist scholarship and indeed is at the nub of
understanding state policy from a Marxist perspective (to be examined
in Section 5) in general terms Marxism asserts that the capitalist
state is ultimately run in the interests of the capitalist class. In
the Communist Manifesto Marx expressed the view that "The executive of
the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of
the whole bourgeoisie".(25). Recent Marxist analysis of the state
.(capitalization as Faludi caustically points out is usually insisted
upon(26» attributes capitalist control to three sources. These are
summed up by Ham and Hill as follows:
"First, there is the similarity in social background between the
bourgeoisie and members of the state elite, that is those who
occupy senior positions in government, the civil service, the
military, the judiciary and other state institutions. Second,
there·is the power that the bourgeoisie is able to exercise as a
pressure group through personal contacts and networks and through
the associations representing business and industry. Third,
there is the constraint placed on the state by the objective
power of capital. Another way of putting this is to say that the
freedom of action of state officials is limited, although not
eliminated, by their need to assist the process of capital
accumulation, which stems from their dependence ona successful
economic base for their continued survival in office.
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Seen in this way O'Connor,(28) therefore, has distinguished two basic
functions which a capitalist state must perform by virtue of being a
capitalist state. These are on the one hand the facilitation of the
process of accumulation and on the other the maintenance of social
cohesion and legitimacy. O'Connor has suggested a typology of state
expenditure corresponding to these functions. Thus "social
investment" expenditures such as transportation infrastructure
increase labour productivity and "social consumption" expenditures
lower the cost to individual capitalists of reproducing labour power
obviating the need for private pension plans, for example. Together
these expenditures facilitate the process of accumu Lat.Lon, Social
expense outlays such as law and order and welfare expenditures
correspondingly ensure social "harmony" and legitimacy. That this
dichotomization of state activities can, however, only be a starting
point to analysing the role of the state in specific instances (as
involved, for example, in the formation of transportation policy) has
been stressed by various writers in recent years(29) who point to the
danger of a functionalist Marxist interpretation of state actions ie.
the pitfall of concluding that by definition what the state does must
be in the interests of capital. This is a subject to which I return.
One is now, however, in a position to consider planning theory in
relation to the various perspectives on political power which have
been out1ined.
Attention is turned firstly to procedural planning theory undoubtedly
the most influential over the past two decades in urban planning
ed~'cation in both Bri tain and the United sta tea, (30) Cooke has this
to say:
"The planning theory which first began to be widely.discussed in
planning education in the 1960's was almost exclusively American
in origin. Although it contained many different facets which, as
in the case of the disagreements between rational-comprehensive
planning theorists and incrementalists or the later rejection of
the former by adherents of advocacy planning it shared certain
key assumptions • • • • firstly, that whatever form planning took it
should strive to be rational in the sense that clear objections
should be identified and then achieved, either by large steps
(comprehensive plans), small steps (incrementalism) or popular
7
will (advocacy). Secondly, it was accepted that planning should
seek social goals by assisting market processes to function more
smoothly. Thirdly, it was accepted, even by the most centralist
of comprehensive planners, that plans should primarily provide
opportunities which individuals and organizations could exploit
without transgressing basic principles of a capitalist
society.,,(31)
In 1962 Davidoff and Reiner had offered a "Choice Theory of Planning"
in what is now a major marker in the literature. They had defined
planning as"~ process for deteimining appropriate future action
through a sequence of choices".(32) Systems theory( 33) and corporate
planning theory(34) could also be added to the list of other attempts
- both prescriptive and explanatory - to define an activity of
planning in relation to a particular process or set of procedures -
what Healey et.al. call "developments of the procedural tradition,,(35)
My discussion will primiarily focus, however, on what IRA Robinson in
1972 identified in the Reader "Decision-Making in Urban Planning" as a
"commonly accepted" set of.procedures which make up the "now familiar
and well-established model of the rational planning process,,(36)
"1. (Goal-Setting) Identify the problem or problems to be solved,
the needs to be met, the opportunities to be seized upon, and the
.
goals of the community to be pursued, and translate the broad
goals into measurable operational criteria;
2. (Plan-Formulation) Design alternative solutions or courses of
action (plans, policies, programs) to solve the problems and/or
fulfill the needs,· opportunities or goals, and predict the
consequences and effectiveness of each alternative;
3.· (Plan-Evaluation) Compare and evaluate the alternatives with
each other and with the predicted consequences of·unplanned
development, and choose, or help the decision-maker or decision-
making body to choose, that alternative whose probably
consequences would be preferable;
4. (Plan~Implementation)' Develop a plan of action for
effectuating or implementing the alternative selected, including
budgets, project schedules, regulatory measures, and the like;
5. (Plan-Review and Feedback) Maintain the plan on a current
and up-to-date basis, based on feedback and review of information
8
to adjust steps 1 through 4 above."
Hemmens,(37)writing in the American literature, pointsout thatwhile
there has been increasing criticism of this "ruling planning theory" -
the rational action model which has as its central idea the notion
that "planning is essentially a technical activity characterized by
the task of fitting means to ends" - it "remains in force because no
competing set of ideas has attracted sufficient support to supplant
it". Thus one finds, for example, a relatively recent workon health
service planning in the United states, using the phrase "professional
planners irrespective of their particular discipl ines" and accepting
the view that "the workof town planners • • • is one branch of a family
of disciplines and activities which plan and use planning methods eg.
administration,
analysis". (38)
management, budgeting, engineering and systems
The American Journal of Planning Education and
Research" carries in recent issues articles from this varied "family
of disciplines".(39) In Britain, Healey et.al. in 1981did go so far
as to state that "in the 1970's we saw the collapse of the dominance
of the procedural planning theory position" but also "the failure of
any other theoretical position to establish dominance".(40) This
vacuum, partially filled with "theoretical pluralism and collective
ignorance,,(41) was the reason, therefore,for a major British
conference on planning theory in the sameyear~
t' will consider criticisms of procedural planning theory from a
number of writers. All are concerned with its explanatory
deficiencies. Healey et.al. in the position paper for the above
conference, link the past dominanceof procedural planning theory to
an underpinning consensual/pluralist view of political power:
"• • • ideologically procedural 'planning theory is based on a
'particular socio-economic and political viewpoint which bears a
strong resemblance to the American "end of ideology" theorists
(eg. Bell). It rests upon a consensus view of society where
major conflicts over values and interests and consequently over
'social distribution are absent., Its operating values are
technicist and conservative and deny the political nature of
planning practice. Furthermore, procedural planning theory
assumes that society wi1 L" experience economic growth and that
9
this will ensure that political and social harmony will be
maintained."(42)
Healey et.al. see this view as appealing to planners in Britain in the
early seventies according as it did to some of the dominant tendencies
of the time - the tendency to depoliticize decision making, to
emphasise technical expertise and corporate management. Procedural
planning theory "provided an apparently appropriate operating ideology
for the profession.._(43) Things, however, have changed:
.....the premises of procedural planning theory meant that it
could not cope with any breakdown of political and social
consensus, with economic stagnation, with challenges to the
structure and processes of decision-making. Consequently as the
seventies progressed and the economic crisis and fiscal crisis of
the state intensified, procedural planning theory could neither
explain what was happening nor provide a suitable mode of
operation for planning activity.(44)
Healey, herself,(45) admits to being"disabused early on of the notion
that there was any value in identifying planning as some kind of
generic phenomenon,that could be abstracted from a specific
institutional existence" (ie such theory does not adequately explain
what planners do). She leaves open the question as to how much the
theoretical focus must be narrowed to give a valid theoretical object
for study (should planning schools really be concerned with
definitions of planning as broad as "societal guidance ..?)(46) and
pragmatically chooses to restrict her own theorizing to the
substantive field of land policy.
Cooke links the ascendancy of rational planning theory not just to the
idealistic strain in plannings normative tradition(47) but primarily
to postwar settlements between Capital and Labour in Britain and the
United states.(48) With this consensual/ pluralistic basis,' he
argues, it has been imbued with a strong dose of structural-
functionalism~ Cooke defines functionalism as "an over-arching
epistemological position in which telelogical as distinct from causal
explanatory.forms are stressed ",(49) Structural functionalism is
functionalism writ large at the societal level. Tb quote Cooke:
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n(it) has the professed aim of producing a theoretical account of
a total social system, itself represented as a structured whole,
each of whose institutional parts is integrated to the others to
meet the functional needs of survival and evolution for the
system as a whole. Central to the methodology of explanation in
this project is a functionalist teleology employed to account for
system and sUb-system integration and for linking individual
motivations to system requirements".(50)
In general terms Cooke criticizes structural functionalism for "its
over-emphasis on values, its failure to consider the historical
sources of ideas and institutions, and its neglect of the importance
of the analysis of power for purposes of explanation".(S1} More
particularly Cooke refers to a "basic weakness of the structural
functionalism which has been applied as a normative model for
planning. From its earliest adaptations by Foley, Webber and Chapin
to its more general diffusion into the planning process as
unreflective, goal setting • • • it has represented narrow particular
interests as generalizable ones". Concerned as it is with analysing
and explaining the bases of social order,
"theoretically it is assumed that any functioning institution,
social sub-system or set of norms has some useful purpose other-
wise it would have ceased to function. Its usefulness to the
continued functioning of the social system is therefore taken as
a justification for its continuation, and, by implication, its
reproduction in parts of the system undergoing renewal. Thus if
two sets of values co-exist in a system, even where they are
contradictory, they are seen as functionally important to its
continuation.,,(52)
The charge of structural functionalism is an important one to which
attention is addressedin the case of plan-making in Detroit in the
concluding chapter. Other writers loosely from a Marxist vantage
point have criticized the depoliticizing role of procedural planning
theory. Thus Paris refers to the "cent.raL ideology of planning" -
"(it) obscures by definitional exclusion, the relationship
between the practice of planning and its social, economic and
political context • • • the activities of planners and the
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apparatuses of planning present the appearance of a (potentially)
rational system of decision-making and resource allocation which
helps to obscure the real workings of the space economy.,,(53)
Likewise to quote Fainstein and Fainstein:
"Planners depoliticize, that is, cast in technical terms, the
planning activities of the state. They further universalise the
legitimating ideology by bolstering justification in the name of
the public interest with arguments ostensibly based on scientific
rationality. ,,(54)
Thomas, in turn, lays the accusation against Faludi who "probably
stands at the high point of rational procedural theory" that he
"contributes to the attempts to depoliticse politics as well as
planning".(55) In a rejoinder to Thomas, Faludi, while admitting of
"an attempt to reach out beyond my own initial position and to
encompass an awareness of others",(56) has defended general procedural
planning theory. This is done largely through an attack on the
deficiencies of the grander and more general level theorizing of
Marxist analysis and the assertion that the decision making paradigm
is useful in understanding decision making at the more mundane day to
day political level. While criticizing the political economy approach
for too cavalierly assuming that "organizations and procedures have no
significant impact on the outcomes of planning" and that "planning is
completely circumscribed by the political and economic processes in
the. society of which it forms a part", (57) Faludi puts forward his
more modest research task - an "emphasis on procedural questions" in
"the belief that questions internal·to.the process of planning do form
a valid field of study".(58) Rather than accepting Thomas' criticism
that his work is premised upon a pluralist/consensual view of
political power Faludi asserts on the contrary that it is compatible
with a Marxist perspective and that convergence is both possible and
desirable:
"Theories which follow the political economy and the decision-
making paradigms of planning may not be necessarily exclusive.
My work is being undertaken in this belief, the emphasis being on
the decisions and actions of participants in the 'planning
process' but.with the awareness that these are set within a
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framework which is determined by macro-level forces and which
frequently limits their freedom of action. One might even think
in terms of a combined paradigm. Certainly for the purpose of
explaining the reality of planning, both should be drawn upon• • •
Only for the purpose of theory building does it seem possible to
isolate particular aspects of planning such as the organizations
and procedures of decision-making. But then, isolating
particular aspects of reality, catching them in the net of
specific theories, is a precondition of theory-formation anyway.
Obviously, there are nets of various types catching fish of
various sizes. Thomas and his like seem to aim for the big
catches, ie. the structural conditions in society which set the
parameters of planning. I am quite content with the small fry of
decision-making theories, knowing that they will be of more
immediate application to the practice of planning. But there
seems little reason why we should not sit side by side.,,(59)
The limitations inherent on "meta" Marxist theorizing have influenced
my research approach. Reade(60) has, however, recently offered a
critique of procedural planning theory which, while not from a main-
stream Marxist standpoint, gives reason to doubt that Marxist analysis
will be enticed to move towards the combined paradigm approach
suggested by Faludi. Analysing,what he calls the purported
"const.Ltuent;Ideas" of procedural planning theory Reade divides them
into two groups. On the one hand he identifies ideas (the idea of
commitment to a pre-stated outcome, of trading-off present
satisfactions for future well being, of according a greater role in
decision making to experts, of monitoring and forecasting) which while
Uintellectually credible,,(61)are far from being the prerogative of
professional "pLanner s" and are not indissolubly linked together in
some way ~ one can take.~ome of these ideas without the others and
planners' attempts to wrap them up into a package is seen by Reade as
!'ideologicalu• Planning is, therefore, "not an analytically distinct
method of informing or making public policyu(62) and by implication a
discipline of general procedural planning theory along the lines of
Faludi is in danger of being hopelessly normative and lacking
correspondence to the real world of policy making. Marxist analysis
would be better forming links with policy analysis generally. (This
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is in fact happening and is discussed in the concluding chapter). The
other constituent ideas of planning, also not the prerogative of
planners, (the ideas of comprehensiveness, scientific method,
rationality and public interest - "the ideas most stressed by
planners")(63) are regarded by Reade as worse than too exclusively
normative. They "lack credibility because in the planning literature
they are merely asserted and not explained."(64) Reade makes the
accusation that town and country planners have "avoided theory in the
true sense of explanation of practice":
"Physical planners • • • have shown relatively little interest in
the explanation of their own activity ~ in the theoretical
explanation of governmental interventions in the processes
whereby property development is carried out. Instead • • • they
took up the notion of planning as a generic method. This
encouraged the development of a literature of procedural planning
theory, consisting of highly elaborated notions of rational
decision making, largely divorced from any specific empirical
context • • • • Its divorce from reality, however, is reflected in
its ignoring almost completely the entire corpus of pre-existing
knowledge yielded by such disciplines as political science and
political philosophy which show us how government is informed • • •
those called planners might consider abandoning this title,
together with the notion of planning as method, and instead
concentrate upon clarifying the effects of the specific
governmental interventions with which they are involved.,,(65)
I move onto consider neo-Weberian and Marxist approaches to the
explanation of urban planning practice - approaches in contrast to
procedural theory involving much less prescriptive content. One turns
firstly. to the "new Weberian urban sociology,,(66)which developed in
Britain in the late sixties and into the seventies and most closely
associated with the work of Rex and Moore(67) and Ray Pahl.(68) Since
the. writings of Pahl and his urban managerialist thesis are of
particular interest in theorizing the role of urban planners
attention will be concentrated there. Williams, however, sounds a
much needed cautionary note:
"Urban' managerialism is not a theory, nor even an agreed
perspective. It is, .Inst.ead a framework for study.,,(69)
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Drawing on the review and critique of Saunders(70) I will consider
Pahl's ideas chronologically. Pahl defined the "urban" as a distinct
obj ect of study in its own right. Following the Weber ian
epistemological procedure of breaking social reality down into
manageable sub-areas for analysis by the use of ideal type
methodological constructs, Pahl made urban inequalities (as distinct
from general economic inequalities) the focus of his concerns. The
study of the production of differential access to "urban" resources
(housing, recreational facilities, transport etc) all with a major
locational dimension, struggles by groups for access to such resources
and the allocati ve role of ''urbanmanagers" in the process provide the
framework for Pahl's study. Urban planners thus formed a constituent
part of those managers or urban "gate keepers" in both public and
private sectors who controlled access to key urban resources. Pahl
suggested the following research task:
"The crucial urban types are those who control or manipulate
scarce resources and facilities such as housing managers, estate
agents, local government officers, property developers,
representatives of building societies and insurance companies,
youth employment officers, social workers, ,magistrates,
councillors and so on. These occupations and professions should
be studied comparatively to discover how far their ideologies are
.consistent, how far they conflict with each other and how far
they. help to confirm a stratification order in urban
situations.,,(71)
Again with a Weberian epistemology embodying a "rejection of any
attempt to explain social phenomena as a result of anything other
than subj ecti ve Iy meaningfu I human actions" (72) a focus on the
subjectively meaningful actions of urban managers is legitimate. Also
along Weberian lines an overlap between economic and political power
is not assumed. The study of local state officials leans towards a
bureaucratic elitist view of political power.
Saunders identifies the two major problems (within its own terms of
reference) with Pahl's initial formulations - the problem of how to
come up with a more precise theoretical definition of urban managers
to guide research (thus avoiding a rag-bag collection of studies) and
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the problem of theorizing the autonomy of urban managers - just how
independently as variables for research can they be treated?(73)
Addressing these criticisms Pahl's later work has advocated a research
concentration on local state officials only, the latter's autonomy
constrained by capitalist economic relations and by an increasingly
corporatist central state.(74)
Corporatism, maintaining the theoretical autonomy of the economic and
political realms, "is principally defined by one particularly
important qualitiative change, the shift from a supportive to a
directive role for the state in the economy .~;.(it is) an economic
system of private ownership and state control".(75) Rather than
standing as independent variables urban managers within this
perspective are seen as "intervening variables mediating between, on
the one hand, the contradictory pressures of private sector
profitability and social need, and on the other the demands of central
government and the local population.,,(76)
Pahl's corporatist thesis (which has been challenged itself on its own
terms)(77) while a step forward in theorizing the role of urban
managers (ie they are more properly regarded as intervening
variables), still in the opinion of Saunders~ falls short of what is
required.(78) The problem of theorizing autonomy and discretion
remain. Since within a Marxist perspective I have been concerned
with problems involved in theorizing the relationship between the
state and capital Saunder's critique of 'Pahl's attempt to
theoretically "locate" the role of urban managers is of considerable
interest. Saunders in essence argues that Pahl has taken a non-
Weberian approach in launching out into a study of the wider political
economy while still inadequately theorizing the role of urban
managers. The approach is non-Weberian because it departs from
Weber's argument that "total sociological explanations were impossible
a~d that research must progress by selecting partial aspects of the
social world for study on the basis of ideal type constructions".(79)
And the role of urban managers is inadequately theorized because:
i'Theproblem with Pahl's view of urban managers as mediators
between the central state authority, the private capitalist
. se~tor and 'the social needs and demands of the local population
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for state services is that it remains unclear how far managers
enjoy some discretion in discharging their role. That they enjoy
some autonomy from the dictates of central government and the
constraints imposed by the operation of the process of capital
accumulation is taken as axiomatic, but how far and in which
situations does this autonomy extend? Pahl's answer appears to
be that this is an empirical question, but such an answer is
inadequate given that empirical research, even if conducted
. .
comparatively across different types of local authority (or even
different types of society), will be unable to identify the
sources of particular policies unless .it is grounded in a
theoretical framework that specifies the sorts of situations in
which managers are able to exercise discretion as opposed to
those in which they are not. If we start out merely on the
assumption that they are constrained to some extent, then we lack
any theoretically informed criteria for determining where in the
economic and political organization of society to being looking
for the explanation of any given policy. Quite simply, Pahl's
recent work leads empirical research into the familiar problem of
the receding locus of power.,,(80)
In contrast to Pahl who "continually emphasises that the state, both
at national and local levels, cannot be studied merely in terms of the
'needs' of capital",(81) Marxist approaches to theorizing the role of
urban planning which have developed since the 1970's emphasise the
importance of the process of capital accumulation, and of under-
standing planning as intervention undertaken by a capitalist state.
Castells, in particular, has been concerned with defining a specific
"urban" theoretical obj ect for analysis (akin to the enterprize of
Pahl) in the light of the preceding two factors.(82) MCDougall(83)
identifies David Harvey as the first to try to establish a Marxist
tradition within planning thought. Harvey has argued that physical
pla?ning has failed to come to grips with an understanding of the
forces producing the public and private goods of the built
environment. Concentrating on capital accumulation, class relations
and the role of the capitalist state this is a task which he has
undertaken. (84) The recent wozk of Harvey is considered in Chapte~
Two. Other writers concerned to locate urban planning within "the
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development process of the built environment,,(85) include Scott,
Preteceille, Lam~rche, Broadbent, Massey and Catalano.(86) It is
perhaps, however, the work of Castells which has occupied centre stage
in Marxist debate on "the urban question". Castells has argued that
the "urban system" performs a "significant and specific function"
within the total social system - it is increasingly the sUb-system
within which labour-power is reproduced.(87) More specifically
Castells concentrates on the urban system as a spatial unit for the
provision of collective consumption goods by the state. Urban
planning is regarded, within this perspective, as performing a state
- management function in relation to collective·consumption.(88) As
part of the state in the discharge of this function, urban planning
performs a mediating and necessarily ideological role:
, ?
"Urban planning is a privileged instrument for the ideological
formalisation of interests of classes, fractions and groups ie.
by developing the capacities for social integration to the
maximum, which is the primary function of dominant ideology• • •
the political role of urban planning is its ability to act as an
instrument of negotiation and mediation for, on the one hand, the
dominant classes and their demands for the realisation of their
-
common interests, and on the other hand the pressures and
protests of the dominated classes.,,(89)
castells' use of the concept of collective consumption in defining
. .
"the urban" has been cr iticized .for lacking any necessary
correspondence with localized spatial units (welfare payments, for
example) and for ignoring other important urban processes. (90)
Lojkine(91) has argued" that "capitalist urbanization cannot be
understood in terms of consumption processes alone since the city
simultaneously reproduces 'labour-power and supports capital
accu~ulation • • •t.hrouqh investment in necessary but non-profitable
economic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications,'ports and
so ~n". While Saunders(92) points out that Castells only c~ncentrates
on collective consumption in his efforts to define a distinctively
~ .
urban theoretical object to facilitate research (abstracting,
therefore, from the very great diversity of processes found in
cities), Lojkine's comments have guided my approach to
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conceptualizing 'the urban' for the purpose of understanding
transportation policy formation in Detroit. This is elaborated upon
in Chapter Two. For my purposes Castells' definition of urban
planning seemed too narrow. More generally, Reade has criticized neo-
Marxist explanations of planning and urban phenomena based, as many of
them are, on an Althusserian epistemology which "tends to a rather
abstract form of theory construction, which tends to run ahead of
empirical evidence".(93) Pointing to a relative dearth of empirical
research Reade makes the rather damning criticism that "the neo-
Marxist interpretation of planning simply has not added to our
knowledge".(94) -Reade also makes the point that some neo-Marxist
writers "tend to use the term 'planning' in a very vague and ill-
defined way, even, apparently, often describing any governmental
intervention or initiative as 'planning,,,.(95)I will deal with these
comments in the consideration of epistemology and further examination
of,Marxist theories of the state. For the moment it seems appropriate
to consider why one has chosen to locate the research within a Marxist
framework.
There are a number of reasons. Reade despite his strong criticism of
the results of Marxist theorizing on planning admits that "the neo-
Marxist interpretation of planning concerns itself above all with
precisely those questions which planners themselves most neglect". In
particular it "asks the most fundamental question of all: Why does
government attempt to plan the physical environment anyway?"(96)
While this question need not necessarily be approached from a Marxist
standpoint there is likewise no reason why it sh~uld not. Paris
points to the unfortunate perjorative connotations associated with the
wide ranging use of the label "Marxist".(97) Academically Marxism has
been open to the charge of dogmatism but this can be answered and is
considered in the'following section on epistemology. The literature
on the concentration of wealth in the United states is quite
extensive.(9a) An exhaustive review of this, considering also the
relationship between economic and political power, has led Lundberg to
conclude that "while one might balk at assenting to the propositon
that government is the executive committee of the ruling class, it is
a demonstrable fact that it is peculiarly at the service of the upper
economic class which accordingly is warrantably regarded as in effect
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a ruling class.,,(99) It is probably Domhoff,(100) however, who has
done most in the American context (paralleling work undertaken by
Miliband in Britain)(1 01) to examine from a Marxist perspective the
instrumental ways in which the federal state is controlled by the
country's economic elite ie. asserting the position that there is not
a separate political and economic elite in the United states. One is
not theorizing in other words in a vacuum. As Healey puts it in
justifying her own use of a materialist approach:
"In the end one has to choose along which line of research and
theorizing one wishes to proceed. Ultimately, I think this
choice will relate to one's values and to one's one perceptions
of the credibility of explanation which may of course change over
time.,,(102)
(c) Epistemological Considerations
Since general epistemological considerations will arise in the
consideration of Marxist epistemologyI , will proceed immediately to
the latter. Summing up the recent debates dating back to the sixties
on the possibility of a value free social science, Saunders states:
"Social scientists have increasingly come to recognize that the
traditional assumption behind positivist research that 'facts'
can be assembled through direct experience of the social world
must be treated with some caution. It is now generally agreed
that knowledge cannot be the product of unmediated experience
through the senses, but that the way in which we come to 'see'
the world is in some way dependent upon'the theoretical
assumptions and conceptual framewo~ks that we 'apply to it.(103)
Whilst there is disagreement within Marxism over the ways in which
experience should be mediated there is general agreement on two other
aspects of the Marxist epistemological position. The first is an
, .
insistence that parts of the social system, while open to abstraction
from the rest of the social'system for purposes of analysis, must be
reintegrated with the totality to arrive at their true nature. This
contrasts with Weberian analysis, which because of the complexity of
. ,.
human relations, insists on the isolation of parts of that reality for
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study with the interrogative device of ideal type constructs.(104)
Secondly, Marxism eschews superficial empiricism in the distinction it
draws between the.level of appearances or of phenomenal forms and the
level of essential reality. It maintains that "the essential reality
that science attempts to discover may be obscurred by the phenomenal
forms through which this reality is represented in our everyday
experience. The task of science is to penetrate the realm of
appearances in order to discover the essential relations that give
rise to these appearances.,,(105) Again this contrasts with Weber's
"rejection of any attempt to explain social phenomena as the result of
anything other than subjectively meaningful human actions.,,(106)
The key question, of course, is the strength of Marxist method in
delivering the goods. In this regard, in recent years, it is the
particular epistemology of the French structural Marxist philosopher
Louis Althusser(107) around which debate has tended to center. It is
this epistemology which formed the foundation for the early work of
castel Is. One approaches the kernel of Althusser's thinking, through
- .
a comparison with Thomas Kuhn's characterization of scientific
knowledge in the physical sciences. In the physical sciences,
according to Kuhn, (108) the normal situation is. the ~dvance of
scientific knowledge on the basis of the progressive articulation of a
basic paradigm. Kuhn defines paradigms as:
"• • • universally recognised scientific achievements that for a
time provide model problems and solutions to a community of
.practitiOI~ers."(109)
The paradigm colours the conceptual universe of the scientist. It
gives him/her the framework inside which scientific problems may be
posed and solutions sought. Most of normal scientific activity
consists of "puzzle sol ving" inside the framework of the paradigm.
Hypotheses are formed and tested but as Kuhn points out - the range of
outcomes from an experiment is narrowly limited - the solution to
scientific problems falls within narrow ranges.
"Sometimes, as in a wavelength measurement, everything but the
most esoteric detail of the result is known in adv~ce.,,(110)
Normal scientific activity consists, then of the logical working out
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of a paradigm - the following of the logic and implications of already
existing theory. The resul t is a set of structures which represent
our understanding of the real world.
The Althusserian position is that Marx, in founding the science of
historical materialism, did for history what, say, Einstein did for
modern physics (even more so, in fact, because pre-Marx there was no
science of history at all). Marx provided the basic paradigm, the
basic categories, that made the science of society and·its
transformations possible. The science of historical materialism is
the progressive development of the Marxist paradigm. Theory is
developed in accordance with the logic of the paradigm and is tested
against the "real world", the facts.· Facts have no independent
existence from theory and can only be treated theoretically. The
paradigm in other words very much determines what are considered
facts. Behind the epistemology is the assumption that the social
world can be studied in similar fashion to the physical world.
Marxism for Al thusser is the science which uncovers the structures
which govern the social world and in which individuals as role players
are located. Thus castelIs' "The Urban Question,,(111)is replete with
structures of circuit diagram-like representations of how the urban
system functions.
The comments of Reade on structural type Al thusserian analysis havebeen
noted already. Glass has shown that despite a quite elaborate
structure diagram in "The Urban Question" of the processes at 'work in
the British New Towns policy, Castells gets the story quite
wrong. (112) Satre some time ago, referring to mechanistic and
deterministic Marxist analysis in general(113) crittcized "lazy
Marxists who constitute the real, a priori • • • • The proof is the fact
that they know in advance what they must find.,,(114) Al thusser's
schema can be seen as falling into a strain of Marxist theorizing
which has at its core the idea that a determining mode of production
or economic base can be isolated in a particular society and upon
which is erected an ideological superstructure of politics, ideas and
so forth. This line of argument elicits the comment from Lefebvre
that "for some Marxists, the mode of production is the answer to
everything".c11S) Lefebvre is no less critical of Althusser's attempt
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to "carefully toughen up" the concept of modeof production "in the
name of the perfect science". (,116) The "rigidification" of the
concept is still there and Althusser's attempt from his "Reading of
CAPITAL"to define degrees of relative autonomyfor other "levels" in
the social formation in relation to the modeof production Lefbvre
sees as "going through ideological contortions" which "needs to be
dealt with in the ironic mode, that is to say as farce". (117)
The reaction against Althusserian Marxism has now firmly set in.
Cooke, referring to castel Is' past work, has recently argued that "the
problem which undermines his theoretical approach most of all is its
affinities with structural functionalism". (118) He quotes Mingione:
"castells disregards essential social connections and relations
and, worse, he reduces some important social relations to
mechanical roles and functional links. The dominating interests
of the monopolistic sector of the bourgeoisie appear to determine
every social event.,,(119)
Saunders(120) argues that the epistemology advocated by Althusser and
santified with reference to Marxwas in fact not Marx's method at all
but confuses Marx's mode of exposition with that of his analysis.
Marx's abstract categories, Saunders argues,. were always worked up
from an analysis of concrete situations and do not represent a
pri vileged "scientific" starting point • . Marxism, therefore, cannot
cavalierly dismiss other approaches to analysis because they are
epistemologically unsound because "no general epistemology can be
sel-f-justifiable". (121), One.must choose between different approaches
on the basis of what one judges to be their relative explanatory
power. While this can involve no independent appeal to "the facts"
(since facts are theory dependent and'theory must also be judged
according to its own logic) in social science Saunders insists,
expressing criticism of overly general Marxist interpretations in
particular, theory building must descend to the level of concrete
appearances and make specific statements which can be empirically
tested.(122) Castells in hda-Lat.es t; work (City and the Grassroots,
1983) admits to having divested himself of the mantel of
Althus serianism, and points to the need to build on the "ruins of the
Marxismtradition,,(123) through the development of theory grounded in
23
particular case studies - the need, in relation to the study of state
activity, for a "theorized history of states".(124)
'rheresearch conducted here has
_been guided by the rebuttal to
Al thusser provided by the English historian E.P. Thompson and
published in 1978.(125) While other rebuttals of Althusser date back
to this time, Thompson's intervention (writing from the tradition of
British Marxist historiography which includes such names as Eric
Hobsbawn, Christopher Hill and Raymond Williams) while polemical, was
probably the most extensive • . For this reason it is somewhat
surprising, despite past accusations from others on the Left of
''pseudo-empiricism''and "vacuity",(126) that scant or no attention is
paid to Thompson's ideas in more recent anti-AIthusserian works.(127)
It is the more surprising since these works seem to borrow unabashedly
from Thompson. I will return to this again in my concluding chapter
and will turn .the attention now to a sketch of the research method
advocat.ed by Thomspon.·
Williams writing within the same tradition echoes Thompson's rejection
of any objectification of the Marxist notions of "base" of
"superstructure":
"A persistent dissatisfaction, within Marxism, about the
proposition of 'base and superstructure', has been most often
expressed by an attempted refinement and revaluation of 'the
super-structure'. Apologists have emphasized its complexity,
substance and 'autonomy' or autonomous value. Yet most of the
difficulty still lies in the original extension of metaphorical
terms for a relationship into abstract categories or concrete
areas between which connections are looked for and -complexities
or relative autonomies emphasized.,,(128)
Rather Williams puts forward his interpretation of Marx's statement
that "the mode of production of material life determines the social,
political and spiritual life ..processes in general".(129) Marx,
Williams maintains, was asserting the propositon that the organization
of "productive activities" in any society has a determining effect in
the sense of "the setting of limits" and the "exertion of pressures"
on the social system as a whole.(130) Further:
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"Determination of this whole kind - a complex and interrelated
process of limits and pressures - is in the whole social process
itself and nowhere else: not in an abstracted 'mode of
production' nor in an abstracted 'psychology'. Any abstraction
of determinism, based on the isolation of autonomous categories,
which are seen as.controlling or which can be used for
prediction, is then a mystification of the specific and always
related determinants which are the real social process - an
active and conscious as well as, by default, a passive and
objectified historical, experience,,(131)
(ie. an approach which does not loose the agency of human action in
structures but recognizes, nevertheless, that people act under
conditions. which are given).
Turning to Thompson(132) proper, Thompson argues, in common with
Saunders, that the structuralist Althusserian interpretation was
fundamentally not Marx's method at all (although Marx did display such
a tendency in parts of his work). He rejects the assertion that the
epistemology appropriate to the study of the physical world is the one
appropriate to the social world. Althusser in his opinion represents
a perversion of Marxism. It is a perversion because it assumes that
the social world/history can be understood as the working out of a set
of structures. Rather, history for Thompson is the study of men and
women who under conditions which are given struggle and make decisions
and choices - and in the process change those conditions. Althusser,
fo£ Thompson, ignores the consciousness and experience of the
individual or rather totally incorporates them within structures.
There is thus no room with Althusser for empathy with people in
history. . Al thusser's model Thompson argues is a cause and effect one.
It maps out antagonisms but is "undialectical" in that it does not see
contradictions as "a moment of co-existent opposed possibilities,,(133)
but abstracts the agency from human actions. For Thompson there are
no laws/rules to history, to the social world. History consists of
men and women in many different situations living their lives and
making choices. No one paradigm, however elaborately articulated, can
neatly encapsulate such diversity. That does not mean to say that we
cannot generalize and talk at a relatively high level of abstraction
about the "lessons of history". "History", while not exhibiting laws,
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or while not consisting of structures, is nevertheless not
unstructured. History, for Thompson, consists of structured process -
with an emphasis on process. It is open-ended, indeterminate. It
does show tendencies (and Marx in concentrating on class highlighted,
of course, a crucial variable in the structured process of history) -
and one can refer to such tendencies as constituting a paradigm of
sorts - but what is absolutely inexcusable, in Thompson's view, is the
conversion of such tendencies into laws, into closed structures, and
then proceeding to make logical inferences from them which are then
superimposed onto individual situations with a corresponding
constricting selectivity on the evidence which is considered relevant.
This is to misunderstand the nature of Marx's categories. They cannot
and were never meant to be fine tuned and refined to the degree of
sophistication which Althusser seems to think and moreover they cannot
be refined in the abstract which is what Althusser tries to do. They
can only be increasingly articulated with reference to individual
historical situations from which they have been generalized in the
• first place. By imposing concepts on the evidence of individual
situations through a prior idealist rationality, Althusser fails to
treat, Thompson argues, Marx's concepts as historical concepts.
Thompson argues in other words that Al thusser's method leads to the
invention of theory which is not properly worked up from evidence.
What Thompson puts forward as method is a much more "messy", if you
like, approach. It is a more interactive relationship with data and
evidence .- a "dialogue" as he calls it with the evidence.(134)
Althusser, Thompson argues, fails to understand the distinction
between "empiricism" and "the empirical mode of analysis". There is
no substitute for confrontation with the evidence, but this is not a
naive confrontation in which the evidence "reveals" its secrets. The
historian interrogates the evidence. In doing so, helshe is not
"naked" before the "facts" nor, if the Althusserian system is
rejected, is helshe inevitably swamped by ideology. Rather, and this
is the backbone of Thompson's method, the historian brings concepts
and theoretical notions to the evidence as expectations, not as rules
(and, of course, the selection of the evidence is influenced, but not
rigidly determined by, theoretical expecations). Thompson puts it
thus. He talks of:
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"• • • concepts generalized by logic from many examples, brought to
bear upon the evidence, not so much as "models" but rather as
"expectations". They do not impose a rule, but they hasten and
facilitate the interrogation of the evidence, even though it is
often found that each case departs, in this or that particular
form, from the rule... The evidence (and the real world) is not
rule-governed, and yet it could not be understood without the
rule, to which it offers its own irregularities. This provokes
impatience in some philosophers (and even sociologists) who
consider that a concept with such elasticity is not a true
concept, and a rule is not a rule, unless the evidence conforms
to it, and stands to attention in one place • • • Historical
concepts and rules are often of this order. They display extreme
elasticity and allow for great irregularity - historical
materialism employs concepts of equal generality and elasticity -
"exploitation", "hegemony", "class struggle" - as expectations
rather than as rules.,,(135)
'~roof" of the argument in Thompson's schema takes two forms.(136)
The first is an "evidential appeal". "Concepts, hypotheses as to
causation" are brought into a "disciplined dialogue with the
evidence". Through interrogation "inconvenient evidence" may be
discovered and ones initial concepts modified or discarded. The
resultant is a theory which ''hasbeen shown to 'work';that is, it has
not been disproved by contrary evidence (emphasis original)":
"While any theory of historical process may be proposed, all
theories are false which are not in conformity with the
evidence's determinations. Herein lies the disciplinary court of
appeal. In this sense it is true that while historical knowledge
must always fall short of positive proof, false historical
knowledge is generally subject to disproof" (emphasis
original)(137)
The second form of "proving the argument" invol ves a "theoretical
appeal to the coherence, adequacy and consistency of the concepts, and
to their congruence with the knowledge of adjacent disciplines".(138)
In this characteristic Marxist call for holism one finds a
companionship with Mannheim'scall in his essay on the sociology of
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knowledge for a "synthetical approach", of a "viewpoint further back
from which the partiality of other viewpoints is seen"(139) and with
the call of C.W. Mills for the "sociological imagination".(140) But
the cautionary note of Saunders(141) that theorizing purporting to
discover underlying essences should be specific enough in going beyond
the hypothesing of major "tendencies" to the development of counter-
facutal statements (statements as to the circumstances under which
major tendencies will be counteracted) which allow of the possibility
of disproof would seem consistent with Thompson's methodology. Indeed
the Marxist method of social science inquiry in general finding
sympathy with SaUnders approximates closely that advocated by Thompson
for historical inquiry. Saunders endorses an interpretation of Marx's
method as a retroductive conjectural one. He quotes Sayer:
"The "logic" of Marx's analytic is essentially a logic of
hypothesis formation, for what he basically does is to posit
mechanisms and conditions which would, if they existed,
respectively explain how and why the phenomena we observe come to
assume the forms they do."C142)
Saunders continues:
"The· logic of retroductive explanation involves the attempt to
explain observable phenomena by developing hypotheses about
underlying· causes. It cannot support any conjecture, since the
hypothesized causes must be able to explain evidence at the level
of appearances, but it is equally a weak ,form of inference since
the hypotheses can never be directly tested. In other words, it
is never possible finally to demonstrate that a posited 'law' of
capitalist development is actually true since such a law refers
to processes which, even if they do exist, remain hidden.
Furthermore, it is never possible to demonstrate that the
essential relations posited by the theory are the correct ones
since there is always the possibility that other essences could
be put forward which could explain phenomenal forms equally as
well.
Marx's method, understood as a method of retroduction, thus
carries no guarantees of truth and no privileged insight into the
inner workings of society. There is no warrant in this method
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for dismissing alternative theories that can also explain
phenomenal appearances, nor for claiming a monopoly over the
'correce scientific mode of analysis. Equally, of course, it
makes no sense to attack this method on the grounds that its
results cannot be directly tested against experience, since its
very purpose is to theorize processes that by definition cannot
be amenable to direct observation. The results of the
application of such a method must be evaluated on its own terms
(for example, does the posited essence explain phenomenal forms?
are the predictions - as opposed to the prophecies - that arise
out of this method borne out historically? how well does the
theory explain comparative variations between societies? and so
on)."(143)
To this interpretation of Marxist research method Saunders does add
what he considers to be the necessary requirement of the development
of "counterfactuals". Theory must be capable of disproof (but not in
a "naive falsificationist,,(144)way) and must, therefore, specify how
disconfirming instances which would contradict the theory may be
identified. It will not do, Saunders argues, for Marxist enquiry to
hide behind the fail-safe reasoning that if things are not as
predicted by theory then they must be different due to counteracting
forces. While the specification of and testing for counterfactual
conditions is likely to be an easier task in social science as opposed
to historical enquiry, Thompson's own work certainly is not lacking in
specificity. This is a subject to which I shall return in the
concluding chapter. One turns for the moment to a consideration of
the Marxist concept of class, central to the research task, and upon
which the epistemological considerations discussed 6avea major
bearing.
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(d) '!heMarxist Concept of Class
Marx never wrote systematically about classes. Volume Three of
Capital breaks off just where he is about to do this. McLellan(145)
recounts how Marx's usage of the term varied and that often he used it
in common with the usage of his time as a synonym for a faction or
group. In more methodological usage, however, it is clear that Marx
did not consider classes as income groups, status groups or, even
though conflict was basic to his conception of class, as conflict
groups. Cboke(146) provides a useful overview of the current state of
Marxist theorizing on class. The basic dichotomy is between
structural type definitions based on occupational structures and
approaches which Cooke links particularly to Gramsci.
Falling into the former camp have been most notably the writings of
Nico poulantzas(147) and'Eric Olin wright.(148) Poulantzas introduces
the term "economic ownership" as distinct from formal legal ownership
of the means of production.' It is thus real control of the means of
production, the power to assign them to given uses and to dispose of
the products obtained, which defines the dominant class in modern
capitalism. It is the basic factor lying behind class conflict with
an economic'surplus extracted from a subordinate class of direct
producers who are excluded from control of the productive apparatus.
Added to this poulantzas conceives of another major group which he
labels "the new petty bourgeoisie"and merges with the traditional
petty bourgeoisie to form a single class. This group is characterized
at the economic level by differing locations with respect to and
varying degrees of participation in the basic relation of domination.
It bears a close resemblance to what is generally referred to as the
new "middle class" - white collar workers, technicians, bureaucrats
etc. More exactly Poulantzas includes in the new petty bourgeoisie
the following: non-productive ,workers who by his definition lie
outside the basic relationship of exploitation between capitalist and
productive laborers (direct producers) who produce surplus value;
supervisory labOur'which though its direction of labour participates
in the domination of the working class; and mental labourers, experts,
who lie outside' the working class because they participate in
ideological domination by making it appear natural to workers that
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they are incapable of organizing production themselves. Poulantzas
conceives of the petty bourgeoisie and various components of the "new
petty bourgeoisie" while standing, therefore, in different
relationships to each other on the basis of economic criteria,
nevertheless, forming a single class because they are united by
political and ideological factors (more specifically at the political
and ideological "levels"). The appeal is overtly to Al thusserian
structuralism in an attempt to break out of the more simplistic
structuralism of a base/superstructure model ascribing strictly
secondary importance to political and ideological factors. Wright was
led to criticize this theorizing arguing that Poulantzas in-fact
"undermined the economic basis of the theory of class". He thus
disagrees that the unproductive/productive distinction represents a
significant division of class interests:
"...the question is not whether divisions of immediate interests
exist between productive and unproductive workers, but whether
such divisions generate different objective interests in
socialism. Many divisions of immediate economic interest exist
within the working class - between monopoly and ~ompetitive
sector workers, between black and white workers, between workers
in imperialist countries and workers in the third world, etc.
But none of these divisions imply that the 'privileged' group of
workers has an interest in perpetuating the system of capitalist
exploitation. None of these divisions change the fundamental
fact that all workers, by virtue of their position within the
social relations of production, have a basic interest in
socialism. I would argue that this is true for most unproductive
workers as well.,,(149)
Regarding the mental/manual labor distinction Wright says the
following:
"• • • it is never clear exactly why the mental/manual division
should be considered a determinant of an actual class boundary,
rather.than simply an internal divison within the working class.
And it is also not clear why this particular ideological
dimension was chosen over a variety of others as the essential
axis of ideological domination/ subordination within the social
division of labour. For example, sexism, by identifying certain
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jobs as 'women's work' and of inferior status to men's work, is
also a dimension of ideological domination/subordination within
the social division of labour. This puts ]len as a whole in a
position of ideological domination, and yet this hardly makes a
male worker not a worker. The same can be said of racism,
nationalism and other ideologies of domination. All of these
create important divisions within the proletariat; but unless
they correspond to different actual relations of production, they
do not constitute criteria for class boundaries in their own
right.,,(150)
Wright puts forward an alternative view of class relations - a notion
of "contradictory class locations" - contradictory in the sense of
being located between classes. He takes up Poulantzas' concept of
"possession" or "economic ownership" - the capacity to put the means
of production into operation involving both control over the physical_
means of production and control over ~abour power. The bourgeoisie is
defined by full economic ownership. However, in the capitalist mode
of production as a whole Wright conceives of contradicoty locations
defined by partial participation in and degrees of freedom from, these
relations of domination. On the boundary of the bourgeoisie are the
top and middle managers and technocrats. On the boundary of the
proletariat are the line supervisors, for example, foremen and bottom
managers. The petty bourgeoisie is a small but separate class.
"Semi-autonomous employees" (craftsmen and public sector workers) with
sufficient residual control over their immediate means of production
are placed in a contradictory position between the petty bourgeoisie
and proletariat. For Wrighi ideology and class struggle play a
crucial role in determining how close contradictory locations
gravitate in outlook to the class poles.
While the work of Poulantzas and Wright is certainly suggestive as far
as understanding the formation of class behaviour is concerned(151)
Cooke points to a major underlying weakness in both approaches.(152)
Even Wright is guilty of "heavy overtones of economism and
reductionism involved in deriving classes simply from occupational
structures". "Classes cannot be thought of as being uniquely set in
motion asa result of being assigned places in the social structure".
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Here Cooke points to the recent work of Przeworski derivative of
Gramsci which argues firstly that classes, arising out of production
relations, can only be defined dynamically in the process of conflict
with other classes and secondly that all political behaviour cannot be
reduced in some simplistic way to conflicts arising out of the sphere
of production. Cooke, therefore, agrees with Przeworski in the
interposing of the Gramscian concept of "civi 1 society" between the
state and the productive sphere. It is the recognition of a "realm in
which individuals are capable of becoming conscious of a certain
commonality of experience with others,,(153)but not in any mechanistic
way derivative of production. The state fhouqh,.however much we open
up the realm of politics to determinants having a more peripheral
association with the economic roots of class behaviour, must be an
"instrument for conforming civil. society to the economic
structure"J154) I will turn to Marxist conceptions of the state in
the following section. For the moment it is interesting to note the
affinity of these ideas, although unacknowledged by Cooke, to the work
of Thompson whose own debt to Gramsci,' admittedly as Johnson(155)
points out, has only been partially acknowledged.
The essence of Thompson's view of class would seem to be the
acknowledgement that whether the concept is used heuristically or to
refer to aggregates of people with "class consciousness" (the notion
of class, as Hobsbawn(156) says, in the "fuller sense"), classes and
class behaviour only exist in a dynamic sense. More specifically, it
is .only because occupants of locations within the economic structure
engage in conflictual behaviour related to those locations that we can
talk of class behaviour. Classes cannot be identified a priori
independently of a consideration of behaviour. One brings even the
lofty concept of class to "the evidence" as an expectation not as a
rule. This is in contra distinction to "static concepts of class" and
concepts derived from '~ prior theoretical model of a structured
totality" which lead one to "suppose that class is instantaneously
present (derivative, like geometric projection, from productive
relations) and that hence classes struggle,,(157)(emphasis original).
And class in the fuller sense, in Thompson's opinion, cannot be
totally conceived as behaviour derivative of production relationships.
It is not divorced from other areas of social life which people
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experience and interpret. To quote:
"• • • people find themselves in a society structured in determined
ways (crucially, but not exclusively, in productive relations),
they experience exploitation (or the need to maintain power over
those whom they exploit), they identify points of antagonistic
interest, they commence to struggle around these issues • • • •
Class (here Thompson is talking of class in the fuller sense - my
addition) eventuates as men and women live their productive
relations, and as they eXperience their determinate situations,
within the ensemble of the social relations, with their inherited
culture and expectations, and as they handle these experiences in
cultural ways" (emphasis origin~l).(158)
In "The Making of the English Working Class", Thompson points out
fundamentally "that class is a relationship, and not a thing":
"If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes
but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of
experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period
of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships,
their ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men as
they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only
definition.,,(159) .
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(e) Marxist Theories of the state
Emanating also from a reaction against the distortions of
structuralism, recent years have seen Marxist theorizing on the
capitalist state undergoing a period of critical reevaluation.(160)
The starting point for a consideration of this debate must still be
the series of seminal exchanges which took place between Miliband and
Poulantzas in the pages of the New Left Review(161) following
publication of Miliband's book, The State in Capitalist Society, in
1968.(162) Poulantzas accused Miliband of concentrating too
exclusively on the control of the state apparatus by members of the
capitalist class or their representatives (an "instrumental" view of
the state) and thereby ignoring the structural constraints, derivative
of class struggle as a whole, within which the state operated.
Poulantzas in Althusserian fashion argued in fact, that the state was
a structural relationship between classes with state occupants
conceived as carriers of structurally determined roles. Miliband in
turn accused Poulantzas of ignoring the fact that the state, in order
to discharge its function in protecting the long term interests of the
capitalist system as a whole, needed a degree of "relative autonomy"
or independence from any particular class interest or fraction ie.
that Poulantzas was emptying the state of a necessary discretionary
role for state officials. Poulantzas replied that relative autonomy
can only mean "relative in relation to the classes and class fractions
in a given society". (~63) The .state as a relation between classes
could not have discretionary power but represented the balance of
class forces at any particular time:
"• • • the very principles of the Marxist theory of the state, lay
down the general negative limits of this autonomy. The
capitalist state, in the long run, can only corrrespond to the
political interests of the dominant class or classes • • • • Yet
within these limits, the degree, the extent, the forms etc. (how
relative, and how it is relative) of the relative autonomy of the
state can only be examined with reference to a given capitalist
state, and to the precise conjuncture of the corresponding class
struggle, the specific configuration of the power bloc, the
degree of hegemony. within this bloc; the relations between the
bourgeoisie and its different fractions on the one hand and the
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working classes and supporting classes on the other, etc.,,(164)
The reaction against Althusserian structuralism has had its impact on
approaches to theorizing the capitalist state. There seems no reason,
however, why the basic notion of Poulantzas of the state as expressing
a relation between classes (interpreted in the sense of being subject
to class constraints and pressures) cannot coexist comfortably with
instrumentalist ideas. This is in fact the approach which I have
taken. As recent writers(165) have pointed out, however, while the
concept of "relative autonomy" may still be useful, there is a danger,
even in non-Althusserian structuralist usage, of employing the term in
a structural functionalist way as a substitute for real analysis. The
temptation is to analyse state policy formation in terms of its
effects and from there to argue backwards in order to establish
causality. Adopting an Q'Cbnnor(166) like typology of state functions
policy can all too easily be seen as by definition in the long term
interests of capital. To quote Saunders:
"It is in fact, a characteristic feature of the political economy
literature that it tends to regard the effects of class struggle
as secondary to the effects and requirements of capital
accumulation • • • (the) problem is that much of the literature too
readily deduces the causes of state intervention from an analYSis
of its subsequent effects". (167)
Likewise Cooke criticizes the "reading off of state and other
ins_titutional functions from the imputed needs of capital".(168)
While at one level Saunders suggests the concept of relative autonomy
'~oes at least provide a reasonable description of what the state
does, 'its problem is that it fails to explain how it does it".(169)
A recognition of the need to move beyond crude economic reductionist
notions in theorizing the capitalist state has been a characteristic
feature of recent writers sympathetic to a Marxist approach. The
charge of "revisionism" would no doubt be made in more doctrinaire
quarters. Saunders points to the need to complement Marxist analysis
with a Weberian attempt to understand behaviour in terms of
subjectively meaningful human actions.(170) Ham and Hill likewise
point to the need to integrate various levels of analysis.(171) The
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implication is the one suggested by Faludi that "there are nets of
various types catching fish of various sizes". (172) Fainstein and
Fainstein write:
"the capitalist state is not monolithic and has sufficient leeway
to respond to non-elite interests if pressed, provided that the
concessions granted are not so great as to threaten overall
bourgeois hegemony. A less than deterministic conception of
state actions views them as responsive to the character of state
officials, on the one hand, and to the forces making demands, on
the other.,,(173)
Miliband has rejoined the fray acknowledging that "the tendency to one
form or another of 'economic reductionism' has had a marked influence
on the Marxist discussion of politics and the state, even when the
deformation has been acknowledged and pledges made to correct it".
Referring to the ground covered by the concept of relative autonomy he
continues:
"It is only in very exceptional cases that those who make the
decisions are left with no range of choice at all. Much more
often, there is some degree of choice: even where governments are
subjected to the imperative will of other governments, they are
usually left with some freedom of decision in relation to matters
which directly and greatly affect the lives of those whom they
govern. ,,(174)
Ref.~rring to state officials Miliband states:
"Capitalist interests are in no danger of being overlooked, but
they are not the sole or primary concern of these office
holders.,,(175)
And Cooke, ashasbeen indicated already, has introduced the mediating
concept of "civil society" standing between production relations and
the state thus allowing for determinants of state behaviour less
directly linked to class. I will return to such ideas in the
conclusion. One must say something, however, about recent Marxist
attempts to theorize "the local state".
One can distinguish three different approaches. Cockburn's original
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study of the "local state" in the London borough of Lambeth published
in 1977 provided the original reference point for debate in
Britain,(176) This has been criticized for failing to deal with the
question of the specificity of the local state. To quote Boddy:
"Theoretically, the local state is identified by mapping out which
functions, established in Marxist theory of 'the state in general' are
performed by local authorities • • • the local state is interpreted very
much as 'the state at the local level",.(177) Saunders terms this
approach one of assuming that the local state is "the national state
writ small".(178) Saunders in turn has suggested an ideal type model
for analysing state behaviour involving a dualism between national and
local levels. The national state, where social investment decisions
dominate, is primarily under the influence of Capital. There is a
"corporatist" relationship between the state and capital.(179) At the
local level where consumption issues are primary, following Dunleavey,
Saunders sees the concept of class as less useful in terms of
understanding state behaviour with pluralist ideas as more
appropriate. To quote:
"• • • local government in Britain is typically concerned with
provision of social consumption through competitive modes of
political mediation and organised around the principle of
citizenship rights and social need. Central and regional levels
of government, on the other hand, are typically the agencies
through which social investment and fiscal policies are developed
within a relatively exclusive corporate sector of politics
organised around the principle of private property rights and the
need to maintain private sector profitability• • •
Given its primary function, it is apparent that tne political
forces which are mobilized around the 'local state' cannot be
analysed in class terms at all, for the social bases on which
they draw are defined not by relations of production but by
differential patterns of consumption. Following Dunleavy, I find
it useful to refer to such groupings as consumption sectors.(180)
Saunders hypothesises therefore that:
"Local political processes can to a large extent be explained by
a pluralist theoretical perspective which recognises that
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political-outcomes are likely to reflect the relative weight of
effective preferences as articulated through shifting political
alliances between different consumption sectors in the
population. National political processes, on the other hand, may
best be explained through a theory such as that offered by
Miliband according to which the interests of capital generally
prevail due to the personnel occupying top state positions, the
privileged access enjoyed by big business to central government
policy-making, and the recognition by government that its primary
objective must always be to maintain the conditions for capital
accumulation in the private 'sector.,,(181)
Of Saunders' thesis, albeit put forward as an ideal type construct,
Martlew (not-insignificantly coming from a background in public
administration) has recently observed:
"While the dual state thesis points to the important conclusion
that 'the local state is not simply the national state writ
small' it nevertheless does tend to reduce both local and central
state to undifferentiated monoliths without recognizing the
diversity existing within each category. There is no such thing
as 'central government'; rather, a series of functional
departments whose attitudes to, and interests in local government
vary considerably. The same point can be made about local
government whose departmental boundaries are often even more
clearly drawn as a result of_ professional domination.
Furthermore, the dual state thesis underplays the fact that the
central/local relationship is in reality characterized by strong
vertical linkages between levels and ascribes little importance
to the problem of financing state services.,,(182)
The third approach to conceptualizing the local state (like Saunders a
reaction against the non-specificity of Cbckburn) is that represented
by Duncan and Goodwin and supported by Cooke with the reservation that
it is articulated without a Gramscian theory of civil society ''within
which to ground an otherwise important conceptualization". (183) .I
will return to Cooke's ideas more fully in ~e concluding chapter.
The basic notion, however, is the "derivation of the specificity of
the local state from the uniqueness of local class relations".(184)
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Cooke, in fact, broadens this to a "derivation of specificity from the
form of its loca I social rela tions"(185) recognizing as do Saunders
and Dunleavey that local state actions cannot always be linked
directly to "the effects of struggles in the sphere of production
relations".(186) The derivation of the sepcificity of the local and
regional state in Detroit from the specificity of local class
relations is in fact the path which my own research has followed. It
has not been without its problems and these are discussed in the
concluding chapter.
(f ) Detailed Methodology
~e __is in a position to restate more specifically the research task.
The hypothesis is put forward that postwar transportation policy
formation at regional and local levels of government in the Detroit
region can be primarily understood with reference to class relations
over the period. On the assumption of the veracity of this
connection, and within the limitations imposed by the macro-level of
analysis involved, the research has the subsidiary aim of considering
the role of urban planners and transportation planners in particular
in the formation of the transportation policy agenda.
An awareness of the pitfalls of structuralist Marxism forms a starting
point of the research with an effort made to consider the limitations
of such approaches in the specific case of Detroit. The method is,
therefore, one of conjectural interrogation of the evidence of the
sort found legitimate by Saunders (although without the explicit
generation of "counterfactuals" - a subject for the- concluding
chapter) and practiced by Thompson. ,The hypothesis and other related
general concepts such as the notion of the "reproduction of labour.
power" are put forward as expectation not a rigid rule to which the
evidence is made to conform. The substantiation for this, albeit
requiring a degree of acceptance on faith, is the process of
maturation involved in the development of the argument. Thus the
intertwining of transportation policy formation with the "regionalist"
and economic development dynamics explained in the text emerged as the
resul t of "engagement" or a "working up" from "the evidence" (being
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theory laden rather than determined) over quite a long period of time.
While there is a danger of a retrospective idealization of method it
is fair to say that the criticism of overly simplistic structural
interpretations warded against the ignoring of "awkward" evidence.
As previously stated, the local and regional state has been theorized
in terms of the uniqueness of local class process. This uniqueness,
in relation to the object of study, has been presented in particular
as manifesting itself in the associated economic development and
regionalist themes of a metropolitan area fractured along inter and
intra class lines. The class influences on state behaviour have been
approached through a considera tioin of "instrumental" factors (are
classes and class fractions exerting direct or ''handson" influence on
state policy making) and also the influence of more "structural"
factors in terms of the framework of class constraints and pressures
within which the state operates. While one is concerned with why and
how planners make plans, following the view expressed by Reade that
"planning is not an analytically distinct method of informing or
making public policy,,(187) I do n6t define planning as based on a
distinctive methodology. Rather within the overall concern with
transportation policy formation one has attempted to focus in
particular on those who consider themselves to be transportation
planners or planners involved with transportation issues and on those
who considered themselves to be involved in transportation planning.
This is a pragmatiC approach but one for the purposes of research
regarded by Healey et aI, for example, as valid.(188) Research
precedes common agreement on what a substantive definition of urban
planning should be. Importantly also, I have not attempted to
establish rigid boundary lines between the activity of planners and
transportation policy formation in broad terms. The work of planners
is located within the latter and inevitably touches upon aspects of
policy formation which are more centrally (but not exclusively) the
preserve of policy agents other than urban planners. As
Underwood(189) has pointed out planning by its very nature, concerned
as it is with the various processes producing the physical
environment, cannot avoid interjecting itself into many policy areas
affecting that production.
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A critical appraisal of the research approach awaits consideration in
the concluding chapter. Attention is turned finally in this chapter
to some detailed methodological matters as follows:
(a) Consideration of relevant academic research
(b) The use of interviews in the research
(c) Libraries consulted
(d) Other organizations and government agencies supplying information
(e) Newspaper sources.
A nationwide computer search, using the library service of Michigan"
State University, was conducted to ascertain relevant PhD research.
The time period considered was 1925-1981 with the following "key
words" applied in the search. "Michigan", "Detroit" and "SEMCOG"
(acronym for Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments) provided
the initial "filter". PhD research titles generated included at least
one of the geographical designators in addition to at least one of the
following: city, economic, economy, fiscal, freeway, highway,
metropolitan, race, region, regional, road, social, subway, transit,
transportation, urban. The net cast was deliberately wide with
approximately 600 titles generated many of an engineering type
background. The fifteen or so of significant interest had their
origins in one or other of Michigan's three major universities (the
University of Michigan, Michigan state University and Wayne State
University) and the material was borrowed directly from the libraries
concerned without recourse to the nationwide service of University
Microfilms in Ann Arbor, Michigan. It was to be expected that most
pertinent research would center around these universities and contact
with the following individuals was designed to ensure-that to the
extent possible nothing of major significance was overlooked:
Professor Bernard Klein
Professor of Political Science
Wayne State University, Detroit
Professor R. C. Hill
Sociology Department
Michigan state University, Lansing
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Professor Paul Ray
Department of urban and Regional Planning
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
The survey of academic research confirmed a more initial impression
that while there are accounts of specific highway projects in Detroit,
no previous study had considered the broad sweep of transportation
policy in Detroit - the "Motor City" - let alone from a class
perspective.
Interviews with policy agents as a research tool was chosen over a
survey questionnaire approach. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, an adequate response rate to a questionnaire from key policy
agents seemed highly unlikely. Secondly, and related to this, a
questionnaire could not deal with the qualitative nature of the
.information which was being sought. An attempt at drafting a
questionnaire revealed too plainly its crudity. A questionnaire
cannot adequately anticipate answers in what is a learning situation
for the researcher or deal with the range of possible human responses
over a broad subject matter. The question was rather one of whom to
interview, what to ask, how to ask it and how to record it. Taking
the first of these the following criteria were employed in interviewee
selection:
(a) The range of substantive policy areas to be covered and the
organizations, and government agencies associated with them.
This was a broadening out process in practice from a narrow focus
on transportation policy to an additional concern with economic
development and regionalist issues. One third of the
interviewees (see Appendix II) had transportation matters as
their primary responsibility.
(b) Organizational position of the individual. An effort was made to
achieve a balance between those involved or previously involved
in governmental agencies at top and middle levels. The actual
split is SO/50 (see Appendix II) While t.hoseat higher levels
can be expected to know more of the "bigger picture" those at
lower levels, it was expected, might be less Lnhfb Lt.ed, While
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this was not always the case the contrast of perspective was
considered worthwhile in any event. Only one politician (of
senior rank and with a long term perspective on the Detroit
region) was interviewed. The views of Detroit politicians,
however, are not lacking in the local press.
(c) Experience of the individual of the Detroit scene. A
particular effort was made to interview those with longer term
experience of transportation matters in Detroit. It is quite
unsurprisingly easier to obtain informed views on transportation
policy formation in the seventies and eighties than on the
fifties and even sixties. Fifty percent (ie 17) of those
interviewed had experience of the Detroit scene extending beyond
twenty years (Appendix II). Seven of these were invol ved at a
top level in transportation policy and associated policy
formation in the fifties and sixties. Inevitably, however, the
more one goes back in time the more one is thrown back onto
published sources. It was not possible, for example, to
interview Dr Douglas Carroll Jr., Director of the Detroit
Metropolitan Area Traffic Study in the 1950's.
(d) The involvement of the individual in a planning role.
As indicated, a particular interest of the research concerned the
role of physical planners - those bringing a certain substantive
knowledge to bear upon the production, design and spatial
articulation of the physical environment. Our interest was in
those who considered themselves to be planners and also those who
considered themselves to be involved in planning activity. The
title "planning" in a particular organization or job description
proved to be.a reliable guide to this. In other cases the
substantive nature of the work "spoke for itself" eg. the
selection for interview of the director of the Detroit
Transportation and Land Use Study. In total just less than 40%
of interviewees considered themselves involved in planning work
(Appendix II).
(e) Recommendations of other interviewees. In practice
interviewee selection was aided by advice and leads from
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interviewees themselves. Through a process of exploration and
within the above guidelines the decision on whom to interview
developed over time.
Before moving on to consider the conduct of the interviews themselves
a note is in order concerning business sector under represenation in
the interview sample. While representatives of organizations funded
primarily through business support are included, influential
businessmen on the Detroit political scene (Hendry Fords and such
like) proved to be impossible to bring into the research net. This
was an unavoidable constraint. One is left with their actions, public
statements and second hand reports.
Most interviews were conducted face to face excepting where this was
impossible either through excessive distance or the time that the
interviewee could make available. The interviews focussed on the
respondents perception of the factors influencing policy formation -
what was the policy at the time (?), why was it adopted (?), what was
the attitude of the respondent and other actors towards the policy
(?), what other options were considered (?). Respondents were
encouraged to range over broader constraining factors and pressures to
matters of organizational relationships and perceptions of individuals
involved. In terms of conducting the interview the manual of
Schatzman and Strauss on "Field Research" was quite invaluable -
especially the chapters on interview tactics (Chapters 5 and 6).(190)
Asj:he authors point out, the interview can give the "variation and
the nuance lost in questionnaire construction". (191) The guidelines
of Schatzman and Strauss on qualitative social science research need
not be reproduced here. The following comment, however,' conveys the
frame of mind in which one approaches an interview:
"The researcher believes 'everything' and 'nothing'
simultaneously... Specifically, what the listener is after are
the expressed "is's" and "because's" of his subjects. The "is"
reveals their designations of the things, people and events - the
objectified content of these people's reality. The "because"
reveals. the presumed relations among all the designations, the
why's and wherefore's, the causes, processes, and reasons - in
short, the very logic of their thinking about the content of
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their reality... To grasp the shared and variable properties of
this symbolic universe, the researcher must be a good role-taker;
that is, he must "stand" with each respondent in the latter's
relationship to the universe, and view it and its associated
vocabulary from that perspective. The role-taking process is the
first stage of understanding, requiring systematic listening
without applying one's own analytic categories. In a second
stage, the listener performs a simple comparative analysis of
what he is hearing now, against what others (in this universe) in
like or different positions have been telling him. Only then
does he engage in a third stage - applying his own initial and
developing framework. In the normal course of listening, these
three stages occur almost simultaneously; but we distinguish them
to emphasize their separate importance, and particularly to high-
light the first stage - the need to "listen" in its most literal
sense, to take the role of the other.,,(192)
On the method of recording, the advise of Schatzman and Strauss was
again followed:
"• • • notes will be very brief - mere words, phrases, possibly a
drawing. Their purpose is to provide stimulation for recall done
within a matter of hours. A single word, even one merely
descriptive of the dress of a person, or a particular word
uttered by someone usually is enough to "trip off" a string of
images that afford substantial reconstruction of the observed
scene.,,(193}
Such "reconstructions of the observed scene" resulted in an unhealthy
intake of caffeine in innumerable Detroit restaurants. Other details
of.the interview process are given in Appendix II.
The following libraries, in addition to those of universities, were
consulted and found useful in the course of the research:
the library of the Citizens Research Council of Michigan,
Detroit.
the library of the city government of Detroit (not to be confused
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with the Detroit Public Library)
the former Resource Library of the State of Michigan, Office
of Intergovernmental Relations, sadly falling between the cracks
of bureaucratic reorganization.
the library of SEMCOG (the Southeastern Michigan Council of
Governments), Detroit.
the library of SEMTA (the Southeastern Michigan Transportation
Authority), Detroit.
the library of the State Government of Michigan, Lansing.
the library of the Wayne County Road Commission.
In addition to the above library sources (all of which are internal to
the organizations concerned and to which access was facilitated by
being an employee of the state of Michigan) the following agencies
were particularly helpful in making available relevant material:
The State of Michigan, Department of Transportation
The City of Detroit Planning Department
The City of Detroit Department of Community and Economic
.Development
- __Metropolitan Fund Inc.
To conclude, a note on newspaper sources. The Detroit region is
served by two major daily newspapers recognized nationally for
"quality": "The Detroit Free Press" and "The Detroit News".
Clippings files from these newspapers on transportation and a range of
issues relating to the Detroit region kept by the former State of
Michigan, Office of Intergovernmental Relations, proved extremely
helpful and enabled a degree of cross corraboration between the two
sources. In addition access was obtained to past issues of the
"Gongwer News Service Report". This is an independent daily
journalistic news-sheet on the activities of the Michigan Legislature
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and its relations with the Executive. Few Detroit issues of major
importance escape its reportage.
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CHAPl'ER 2
THE POSTWAR MODEL OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
IN DETROIT - SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Overview
(b) Three Postwar Transportation "Policy C1:imates"
(c) The Region - Location and Definition
(d) Detroit - Economic Context 1945-1960
(1) "Motor City" - Detroit and the Automobile
(2) Capital/Labour Relations
(3) Racism
(e) Suburbanisation
(1) A Theoretical Framework
(2) Suburbanisation in Detroit
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(a) Overview
This chapter considers some general characteristics of the postwar
model of metropolitan development in Detroit, primarily concentrating
on the period up to 1960 when the basic framework was established.
This will provide some basic reference points to which subsequent
analysis of transportation policy formation can be related.
The basic analytical concepts employed are those of "accumulation" and
"class struggle" (cf. Ch.• I )i the major phenomena studied are the
regional economy and the dynamics of suburbanisation. Prior to this,
however, it is helpful at the outset to place transportation policy in
Detroit in a more longitudinal perspective. -.
(b) -Three Postwar Transportation "Policy Climates"
The broad sweep of transportation policy in the Detroit region (to be
defined shortly) is divided throughout into three reasonably distinct
"policy climates". The first, the subj ect of the next chapter, was
characterised by general enthusiasm for freeways in the region. Free-
ways were seen by city of Detroit politicians and planners as the
solution to many of the city's problems (eg.-congestion, lack of
attraction as an economic location). _ Freeways were seen as
complementing the Detroit urban renewal agenda. The period was one of
increasing economic competition between Detroit and the emerging
suburban political jurisdictions, but there was a reasonable degree of
regional consensus on transportation policy issues.
The following period, the subject of Chapter Four, roughly covering
the time from the early .1960's to the assumption of control by
Detroit's first black Mayor in 1974, saw this consensus begin to break
down. /The freeway agenda, it is argued, was part of a model of
metropolitan development that in this period was subject to developing
crisis of which the "riots" or "rebellion" in 1967 were the most
dramatic manifestation.
The third period, dealt with in Chapter Five, brings us up to'-the
present. It has been marked by an almost complete absence of regional
consensus on transportation policy. Freeways have been characterised
by politicians and planners as the cause of many of the city of
Detroit's problems - a volte face in a mere 15 to 20 year period.
Public transportation, in particular a rapid transit system, has now
been heralded as the key to the city of Detroit's economic
regeneration.
, ,
(c) The Southeastern Michigan Region - Location and Definition
The object of study is transportation policy formation by units of
government within the south-eastern Michigan region. This
geographical area covers the seven counties of Wayne (in which is
located the city of Detroit), Oakland, Macomb, st. Ciair, Livingston,
Washtenaw and Monroe (Maps 1, 2 and 3). These counties comprise the
present South-Eastern Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). This
,
broad region covers about 4.5 thousand square miles and during the
period of study has contained about one-half of the population of
Michigan - a regional total of 4.7 million in 1980 (Table 4). Most of
these people, however, have been concentrated in the regional "core"
counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb (85% in 1980, Table 4), which
comprise about 40% of the total land area and which have always
contained the bulk of the region's and inde~d.the State's economic
activity. The city of Detroit with 1.2 million people (1980 - Table
4) is now about 25% of the SEMCOG total and covers 140 square miles.
The basic analytical.concept employed to define the Detroit region is
that of the region as a locale of accumulation and class struggle
whose "distinctiveness" can be defined on the basis of a number of
properties (environmental, ~ultural, governmental, the particular
nature of the economy, etc., or a combination of these),.many of which
are subject to change overtime. My focus is Detroit as an economic,
and governmental entity. This regional "definition" is admittedly
vague but it seems advisable to avoid too rigid a separation between
"regional" or "city" space and the rest of capitalist space.
castells,(1) for example, in his desire to avoid any ideological
connotations associated with the term "urban", defines "the city" as
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"in the last analysis • • • a residential unit of labour power • • • a
unit of collective consumption corresponding more or less to the daily
organization of a section of labour power." This holds the problem
that regional and local governmental bodies (the analytical focus of
this research) deal with more than "collective consumption" and the
"reproduction of labour power"( 2) (they deal with, for example, the
direct facilitation of accumulation itself). Besides, collective
consumption can be organized from far (eg. state and federal police
services) or near (city police forces) ie. to fully understand goods
and services consumed, one must go beyond the boundaries of the city
or region.
The following characterisations of "the city" by Marxist writers
(which seem interchangeable with "region") are useful even if
suffering from a certain, perhaps inevitable, indistinctiveness from
the rest of capitalist space. Mollenkopf,(3) for example:
"First and foremost, cities must be analyzed as the main
physical, and more importantly social and political, setting in
which production, distribution, and the accumulation of weal th
take place. Cities mobilize the economy's basic ingredients.
They are the places in which basic infrastructural investments
(public and. private) are located, and in which an organized
labour force is concentrated. Above all, cities are a social and
political device for creating the cohesive, ordered environment
necessary for combining labor and capital effectively."
And Hill,(4) who makes the proviso that "a particular city cannot be
divorced from the encompassing political economy within which it is
embedded and through which it manifests its,particular functions and
form":
"The capitalist clty is a production site, a locale for the
reproduction of the labour force, a market for the circulation of
commodities·and the realization of profit" and a control center
for these complex relationships."
'.
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(d) Detroit - Economic Context 1945-1960
The regional economic context is considered in aspatial terms here.
In fact this is for purposes of exposition only. The spatial
articulation of the postwar development process in the region is
crucial to an understanding of the process as a whole and the place of
transportation policy within it. A spatial consideration which
focuses on suburbanisation is the subject of the following section
(Section (e) of this chapter.
(1) "Motor City" - Detroit and the Automobile
Harvey(S) provides a useful theoretical starting point:
"The geographical pattern in the circulation of surplus can be
conceived only as a moment in a process. In terms of that
moment, particular cities attain posi tions with respect to the
circulation of surplus which, at the next moment in the process,
are changed. Urbanism, as a general phenomenon, should not be
viewed as the history of particular cities, but as the history of
the system of cities within, between, and around which the sur-
plus circulates • • • • The history of particular cities is best
understood in terms of the circulation of surplus value at a
moment of history within a system of cities."
Detroit during the period in question enjoyed a favoured location with
respect to the geographical circulation of the surplus. There was a
good base on which to build. Looked at in broad aggregative terms,
Detroit since the turn of the century had seen Capital and Labour
combine to make it the "heart" of the Mid-western industrial belt - an
area heavily tied to basic manufacturing industries (automobiles,
steel, ~chine tools, rubber, electrical machinery). The broader mid-
western region has been sketched as follows:
,
"Beneath the soil of this region lie coal, iron ore, and lime-
stone for the production of steel - the structural fabric of an
industrial society. Lacing this region is an extensive system of
rivers and lakes which provide relatively inexpensive transport-
ation for the heavy produce of the region's factories • • •'.'Since
the 1920's the Midwest has largely functioned to transmit raw
materials and semi-finished products into the heart of the
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industrial monolith - the automotive realm.,,(6)
Building on Detroit's early metal working base, particularly in rail-
road equipment and shipbuilding, the early automakers proliferated
here. While by World War II the "Big Three" - General Motors, Ford
and Chrysler - clearly dominated the field, in 1910 there were a
documented 58 corporations assembling motor vehicles in Detroit.(7)
In 1914, Michigan produced almost 80% of the over half-million cars,
trucks and buses made in the United States.(8) Since these early days
there has never been any doubt as to Detroit's reliance on the auto-
mobile industry. In World War II-Detroit's ability to "bend metal"
was turned to war production and the Detroit area became known as the
"Arsenal of Democracyll. In the intervening years, Detroit had seen in
addition to the Depression, the continuing inflow of immigrants from
Europe, Southerners and Midwestern farm families attracted by the
prospect of relatively high wages'(9) In 1940, almost half of the
over 850,000 people employed in the Detroit "tri-county" core area
(Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties) were employed in manufacturing.
65% of these were engaged in the manufacture of transportation
equipment (Table 1).-
In the pre-World War II period relations between (Zapitaland labour
were antagonistic and often violent.(10) The struggle by Labour for
the right to organise had ensured, however, that in 1945 a large
United Autoworkers Union henceforth sat down with the large
autocompanies in institutionalised collective bargaining. Solidarity
House, world headquarters of the UAW, on Jefferson Avenue in Detroit,
symbolised Detroit as a major centre of the American union movement.
And the world headquarters of the IIBigThree" automakers iilthe region
symbolised Detroit as the centre of the United States and world
automobile industry. Over the latter part of the 1950's, for example,
the United states was turning out roughly half of the motor vehicles
produced in the world with about 30% of these coming from Michigan -
primarily the Detroit region, and nearby Lansing and Flint.ell)
Detroit, in addition to vehicle assembly and world management
functions, was also for the Big Three a major centre of parts
production, design and proving. And independent suppliers, both large
and small, were tied into the automotive network, producing everything
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from nuts' and bolts to steel and contract tool and die services. In
1960 the Detroit region, in relation to national employment, displayed
a location quotient of 2.27 for durable goods manufacturing and a
quotient of 13.58 for motor vehicle manufacture,(12) The tri-county
region in 1960 employed over 40% of its total of almost 1,330,000
employed persons in manufacturing. Almost half of these worked in the
manufacture of transportation equipment (Table 1).
The postwar to 1960 period had seen the intensification of the
national and international decentralisation of the American automobile
companies, as new assembly plants catered to df.sper'sedregional and
overseas markets. Until 1955, when U.S. production of motor vehicles
reached a peak of over 9 million, Michigan.losses in percentage terms
were more than offset by increases in postwar production levels. The
lag in new car sales, however, after 1955 and the severe recession
which hit Michigan in 1958 (sending unemployment in the Detroit region
to 15%, more than double the national rate - Table 12) brought home
the heavily pro-cyclical nature of an economy so dependent on durable
goods; and in particular the evidence, if further evidence was needed,
of the direct dependence of the region's prosperity on the auto-
mobile.(13) It was a point, as shall be argued,not lost on the
transportation policy makers. For at the end of the fifties, the
Detroit regional economy faltered. In a "rehearsal" of events to
follow in the 1980's, concerns were expressed over the employment
effects of the decentralisation of the auto industry, automation, the
sh~~t in federal defence expenditure away from wheeled vehicles, in
which Detroit dominated, toward aircraft, electronics and missiles and
the Michigan "business climate" as a whole,(14)
(2) capital/Labour Relations
While manufacturing in general and the automobile industry in
particular 'underlay the relatively high income levels in the Detroit
region, O'Connor(15) sees this as based on a deal struck between Big
Capital and Big Labour in the united States of the postwar period - an
agreement made at the expense of workers in competitive and non-
unionised industries (more likely in Detroit to be black). Gains in
productivity were to be shared with auto workers,'for example, through
higher wages, not through lower prices, in which all workers would
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have participated. There was a "bifurcation" involved in the labour
market but one which provided a certain stability in class relations
necessary for sustained capital accumulation.
More recently, Marxist writers have used the tenn "Pax Americana,,(16)
to refer to "the heyday of modern American capitalist growth • • •
during which US-based companies dominated the international economy"
and which underpinned this "settlement" between Capital and Labour.
In Detroit this settlement must be seen in conjunction with the
phenomenon of racism.
(3) Racism
Stable and profitable though in general as this period was for
accumulation in Detroit, racism formed an integral part of its
structure. June 20, 1943 had seen, in the city of Detroit, the worst
racial riot up to that time in American history (the city had at that
time about 150,000 blacks). In the wartime tension of the influx of
people to Detroit's war industries and the resulting competition for
city resources, fist fights between blacks and whites escalated into
full scale rioting as rumours swept through the city of dead women and
chi ldren of both races. By the time federal troups restored order,
25 blacks and 9 whites were dead. (17)
A strong link can be made between racism and the structure of
capitalist production relationships. There is strong evidence that
thEL auto. companies in Detroi t "deliberately culti vated and
institutionalised racism in order that white workers and black workers
would .face their workaday. lives in racial conflict with one another
rather than in class solidarity".(18)
In the mid 1930's most of the blacks employed in.the Ford Motor
Company's·River Rouge complex were "in the dirtiest and most dangerous
jobs, as in the foundry". In the mid 1960's at the Chrysler
corporation's Dodge Main plant "all the better jobs were
overwhelmingly dominated by whites",(19)
The interpretation of racism, however, in a capitalist system is not a
settled matter within Marxist theory. Hill(20) refers to the
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relationship between class and race as "a 'Gordian knot' ,of Marxian
theory and an 'Achilles heel' of Marxist practice". He draws on the
work of Bonacich on split labour markets. A split labour market
occurs when the "relative surplus population" or unemployed and those
at the bottom of the economic heap coincides with a group whose race
or ethnicity differs from that of the majority of the working
class,(21) In these circumstances Bonacich sees discrimination
against blacks and other minorities as primarily rooted in the short
term material interests of the white working class. In a caste-like
manner higher priced workers reserve certain jobs for themselves and
make it difficult for capitalists to use cheaper labour to displace
them.
Undoubtedly there is truth in this argument. It sits comfortably with
O'Connor's concept of a Big Capital/Big Labour "pact" and has been a
fundamental impulse in the pattern of suburbanisation in Detroit. For
many year's after World War II white workers in Detroit did stage
walkouts whenever a factory or a particular department hired its first
blacks.(22) It is perhaps too simple, though. Hill considers that it
"severely underestimates the benefits that racial discrimination
bestows on various fractions of the capitalist class as well as the
roleplayed by discrimination in reproducing the capitalist system as
a whole". Hill suggests that "discrimination fosters super-
exploitation of black workers through the medium of a segregated
reserve army by enforcing lower wages, poorer work conditions, more
frequent speed-up, less attention to health and safety standards,
etc., in job categories,"plants and industries where work is primarily
performed by black labour". (23) But there is no reason why both
. -
tendencies should not be present together as causes of racism in
capitalism.
I turn now to a general 'consideration of the spatial development of
the Detroit r'egion during the postwar period to 1960, but' some
continuities will be traced into the 1960's.'" .one is brought up
against 'the phenomenon of suburbanisation, an understanding of which
is necessary to locate the dynamic of regional and local transport-
ation policy: The following section considers, firstly, a recent
comprehensive theoretical contribution to the understanding of sub-
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urbanisation. Given its comprehensiveness and usefulness it is
presented in some detail. An attempt is then made to interpret sub-
urbanisation in Detroit in terms of it.
(e) Suburbanisation
(1) A Theoretical Framework
Walker(24) has pulled together various Marxist strands of analysis to
present a more holistic theory of suburbanisation from a geographical
point of view. He considers suburbanisation in"terms of three major
defining characteristics:
(a) Spatial differentiation
(b) Decentralisation and
(c) The relationship of suburbanisation to cycles of capital
accumulation.
Spatial differentiation: This is broken down into business and
residential spatial differentiation. Concerning the former, Walker
relates it fundamentally to the basic capitalist drive (which led to
the division of labour in the workplace) to rationalise production,
consumption and circulation in cost and revenue terms. This is the
subject of conventional location theory which is easily incorporated
into Marxist analysis. The latter, however, is better able to deal
with factors which fall less neatly into models focusing on
com~etitive efficiency; eg. spatial segregation by capital to avoid
concentration of militant workers. Walker points to research showing
how the territorial form of local government in the U.S. has been
useful to Capital in enabling it to seek out,,"friendly"jurisdictions
and escape central city political controls.
-- ..
Transportation and communication networks have played a facilitating
role in spatial differentiation - not a simple causal ~~e. Along with
other factors (eg. improved financial networks, 'more flexible energy
sources) they have broken, down. spatial barriers and increased
locational freedom - they have enabled the "spatial generalisation of
capital" but they have.n?t created it. Transportation and
communication, Walker points out, have "developed to a large degree
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directly in response to emergent demands for putting space between
activities • • • • " (emphasis original).(25)
Residential differentation is considered by Walker in terms of:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
the spatial linkage between work and residence;
the pursuit of consumption; and
the reproduction of labour power - "ie. the necessity of
returning each day and each 'generation a workforce
appropriate to the needs 'ofproduction and circulation".(26)
The employment linkage, with the development of auto transport,
multiple workplaces within the family and so forth, has become "more
tenuous" - "producing the we II-known complexity of criss-cross
commuting patterns and making the consumption factor more important in
housing than in the past".(27) Picking up a Marcusian theme, Walker
argues that "social differentiation in consumption is sought because
it enriches and even defines the individual" - while in Europe
vertical space has been a stronger indication of class position, in
the United states the horizontal dimension (the idea of a single
family detached house in the suburbs) has been dominant. Walker links
this to "the sheer promotion of a consumerist way of life by capital
out of its own realisation problem".(28)
Allied to the psychological need to express relative exclusivity of
individual consumption patterns in space, the balkanised form of local
government in the U.s. metropolis owes much, in addition, to the
desire to enforce exclusivity in the' provision of collective
consumption goods by government and the desire to ensure that state
, -
regulation of private activities is in the interests of the
collectivity. Deep seated Jeffersonian traditions are often called
upon to explain metropolitan fragmentation. Walker states, however:
"While the fragmented form of local government rests on the
unique basis of American federalist tradition, it cannot simply
be ascribed to this 'cause' of a mythical' continuity with past
New England town meetings. The specific form of metropolitan
fragmentation' was a specific construction of the twentieth
century, which was nurtured in connection with the logic of
spatial differentiation as a whole, by a 'selective use of
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traditions' • • • " (myernphasis).(29)
The argument pulls in the role of consumption in the reproduction of
labour power. To quote:
"Spatial differentiation aids in the reproduction of the widely
divergent types of people needed to fit the various slots in the
division of labour by creating differential access to social
resources, from school to health care, and reinforcing very
different experiences, behaviours and ideologies among sectors of
the population.,,(30)
Walker recognises that spatial differentiation cannot just be under-
stood in terms of the demand for "use" values, but rather that supply
side forces concerned with the "exchange" value of land and property
must also be explicitly brought in. Property capital in its efforts
to increase sales, for example,has engaged in the promotion of
residential discrimination. Simply because people have a major
financial investment (housing as an exchange value) wrapped up in
their homes, they are forced to take a conservative view of land
values and change within their neighbourhood. And the federal
government has tended, over the years, to respect discriminatory
market processes. Likewise, those capitalists concerned with develop-
ing non-residential land and property are interested in spatial
differentiation-as a means of maximising exchange values through the
clustering of high-value functions.
Decentralisation: This is closely allied to spatial differentiation.
As a general statement Walker says:
"Decentralisation of uses arises partly out of the'dissolution of
forces of aggregation (ie. diminishing restraints on location)
and partly out of repulsion from the center (and attraction to
the opposite, the fringe)."C31)
He points out that while residential suburbanisation, by the new
middle class of managers and professionals around the turn of the
century, played a historical leading role (and was followed before
World War II by lower middle and working class suburbanites riding the
trolley,cars), it was only with employment dispersal and the general
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availability of the automobile that mass suburbanisation was possible
after 1945. This he maintains was "rather closely allied to paths of
industrial dispersal".(32) Walker describes the "logic of industrial
decentralisation" as it got under way in the first decade of this
century:
"What is involved is • • • the historical process by which capital
becomes more 'generalised', or universal, in space. As it does
so, it frees itself progressively from the constraints of
locating in anyone spot, but particularly from the traditional
locus of production in the city center,(33)..
Walker relates decentralisation to the beginnings of the corporate
stage of capitalist development which made, through greater control
over resources and market, a new generation of large factory complexes
possible. He relates this in turn to the "facilitating" nature of
technological developments - development of the telephone, the
developing railway network's role in opening up urban space, the
trolley system making reverse commuting by inner city workers
possible. And a significant propelling factor in this was capital's
desire to escape the class tension in urban cores that had developed
by the turn of the century.
Walker recognises that ;"the kind of mass suburbanisation of today is
strongly mutually reinforcing, and would not be possible without a
whole ensemble of uses moving outward together".(34)
It is apparent that there is some difficul ty invol ved in the
attribution of leading and lagging factors. Walker attributes a
leading role to industrial decentralisation., As we shal-l see, this
was certainly a leading factor in Detroit. However, the conception of
postwar suburbanisation as involving successive waves of industrial
concentration, improvements in transportation-communication networks,
and rapid extension of the general urban infrastructure, and
intensified class conflict, followed by waves of-factory dispersal, as
Walker suggests, would seem an unnecessaryover-simplification. As far
as the state and federal role in this are concerned, Walker sees "a
conscious effort to sustain a budding suburbanisation process • • •
eagerly greasing the wheels of. suburbanisation" but not any
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"procreative" role,(35) Again this is probably an exaggeration, at
least as far as transportation policy is concerned. Freeways in
Detroit, as will be apparent, are best conceived certainly as
primarily facilitating a dispersal process which had other roots (and
indeed in a very narrow sense can be seen as strictly facilitative in
that they only made possible phenomena which had other impulses), but
as linked to the federal interstate programme (cf. PP94f) must also be
seen in sheer scale as promotive or "creative" of suburbanisation
through deliberate policy choice.
-
Walker also considers decentralisation from the··exchange value side.
The land market is not justa passive sorter and arranger of uses,
spreading users out according to their ability to pay, involving the
pull of cheaper land at the periphery and the push of dearer land at
the centre. Active speculation by property capital is also at work at
the centre and periphery propelling the suburbanisation process.
The general point is clear,·however. Suburbanisation can be convinc-
ingly conceptualised in terms of the articulation of Capital and
Labour in space based on changing inter and intra class relationships
and dependent on the technological possibilities available - the
latter not "autonomous" causative factors (ie. freeways did not
"cause" suburbanisation), but their production and "take up" arising
out of the fundamental class relation between capital and Labour.
Relationship of Suburbanisation to Cycles of ACcumulation: Walker
makes the following statement:
Progressive accumulation • • • practically demands that the city
expand to keep pace, else a crisis of accumulation develops."
(emphasis original).(36)
By "crisis" Walker means a tendency within capitalism towards "over-
accumulation" or "under-consumption". This idea is most closely
associated with the postwar writings of Paul Baran and Paul sweezy(37)
and vies in its attempt to come to terms with the "laws of motion of
capitalism", with theory concentrating on "rising"costs" to
capitalists, in particular the "wage squeeze on profits" thesis. The
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relative importance of these tendencies is again a matter of some
debate in Marxist theory. Since both have implications farone's
ability to understand suburbanisation and the political economy of
postwar Detroit I will briefly summarise the respective arguments•
.The wage squeeze on profits thesis argues that Labour increases its
bargaining power as a "reserve army" of workers is depleted during
economic expansions leading to higher unit labour costs for the
capitalist. Profit margins are squeezed. This results in a
contraction of business activity, once again an increase in the
reserve army thus restoring the basis for another profitable
expansion. Full employment is thus incompatible with profit maxim-
isation. Economic downturns perform the curative function of
disciplining Labour by creating unemployment.(38) Considered in
relation to this argument, the reserve army or "relative surplus
population" in Detroit has been less likely to participate in the full
benefits of the Big Capital/Big Labour pact, and has been disprop-
ortionately concentrated, in the postwar period through the suburban-
isation process, within the city of Detroit.
In contrast, under-consumptionist theory focuses on the problem of
inadequate demand. There are a number of different strands, but
Weisskopf(39) summarises the basic idea very well:
"The essential tenet of under-consumption theory is that there is
a secular (ie long-run) tendency for aggregate demand to fall
short of potential output in a capitalist economy. This tendency
results from the inequality of income inherent in capitalism,
which concentrates a large fraction of total purchasIng power in
. .
the hands of people (eg. capitalists) who use only a fraction of
it for their own consumption purposes and who save the rest of
it.
To maintain a level of aggregate demand equal to potential
output, it is necessary to find non-consumption sources of demand
sufficient to offset the level of saving that occurs when the
potential output is actually produced. The prime source of non-
consumption demand is investment demand. But investment demand
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itself is ultimately dependent on the growth of consumption
demand, since investment increases the capacity to produce
commodities that must be sold on the market. Given the limits on
consumption demand inherent in a capitalist economy, it is
questionable whether the investment demand of private capitalists
will be high enough to sustain a level of aggregate demand equal
to potential output."
Walker(40) sees in government efforts to encourage suburbanisation an
effort to stave off a crisis of over-accumulation (or inadequate
demand in relation to productive potential)~ This is surely a
"procreative" role. Harvey(41) likewise states:
"The dilemmas of potential over-accumulation which faced the
United states in 1945 were in part resolved by the creation of a
whole new life style through the rapid proliferation of the
suburbanisation process."
The under-consumptionist thesis has been criticised for lacking
sufficient empirical demons_tration.(42) It is especially difficult to
"prove", however, that major government intervention to encourage
suburbanisation (such as the interstate programme, pp.9if) arose out
of an attempt to stave off a crisis of over-accumulation as opposed to
simply being responsive to Capital seeking profitable investment
opportuni ties in general.
Walker takes the thesis further, however, and perhaps does run the
risk of an over-theoreticism. (43) He makes a link between the
dynamics of accumulation and the "property circuit" of capital .:..the
latter a part of the "secondary ci.rcuit" of capital. The secondary
circuit is distinguished from the primary circuit (that devoted to the
production of commodities) in being lithe overall process of fixed
capital formation and the creation of the built environment". Walker
hypothesises that "over-accumulated" capital pushes (or switches) into
the property circuit in the hope of staving' off crisis.· Mutually
reinforcing but false expectations are at work (a "speculative bubble"
atmosphere) leading to an overly extended city in terms of use value.
This theorising parallels work being done by Harvey.(44) While it
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provides much grist for fruitful intellectual speculation, there is,
as Cookfl45) points out of Harvey, a danger in it - the danger of too
"mechanistic an account of the accumulation process" and the danger of
producing "a rationalistic conceptual logic which succeeds mainly in
producing ideal systems devoid of the agency and ambiguity of
struggling groups and classes in capitalist society".
There is certainly a tension in Walker's analysis between a
theoretical approach on the one hand and on the other a recognition of
the inevitable openness of action where human agency is involved. In
recognition of the latter point, Walker states for example:
"Without over-stating the importance of this, it must nonetheless
be admitted that to some degree there is no logic whatsoever to
suburbanisation: it was just the road down which society and
economy headed."(46)
Achieving a balance in analysis between theory and empirical reality
is something which, as Thompson has pointed out, Marx did not always
manage either. (47)
(2) .Suburbanisation and the Local state in Detroit
This section deals with some broad characteristics of
suburbanisation in Detroit and the associated nature of local
government structure on which it was based. The treatment is somewhat
general. Other important characteristics (eg. the failure of the
region to put in place a rapid transit system before or during this
period) are considered in relation to transportation policy proper in
the following chapters. 'I' consider in turn business and-residential
decentralisation and spatial differentiation.
,(a) Business suburbanisation: That manufacturing decentralisation
was a major pull factor on other forms of decentralisation is borne
out in Detroit.(48) Automobile assembly plants' played a major role.
Until World War II such plants were concentrated in the.outlying city
of Pontiac and in the contiguous cities of Detroit, Highland Park,
Hamtramck, Dearborn (location of the major Ford River Rouge plant - in
pre-war days the most integrated freestanding industrial complex in
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the world) and the Canadian city of Windsor. These plants, built in
the 1910-30 period, were constructed adjacent to rail facilities on
the periphery of the existing built up area. Subsequent wartime and
postwar assembly plants were again built on the existing periphery and
tied to rail transportation - plants in Warren, Ypsilanti, Wayne, and
Wixom (Maps 3 and 4 are helpful here). Such plants were not always
served by freeways at the time of construction. The first was the
Ford Willow Run aircraft assembly plant ,(converted later to auto
production) constructed in the early 1940's on the outskirts of
Ypsilanti and subsequently followed by construction of the Detroit
Industrial Expressway linking it to the labour pool of the city of
Detroit. In the mid 1950's a series of industrial corridors could be
traced following the major railroads into the city of Detroit and
feeding into an industrial belt ,within Detroit, roughly following the
boundary between the "middle aged" city (residences built 1904-1933)
and the "new" city (residences built after 1934 - see Maps 5 and 6).
In the growing metropolitan area the share of tri-county manufacturing
jobs located in the city of Detroit fell from just over 60% in 1948 to
just over 40% in 1962 (Table3A). The retail business sector also
underwent a major decentralisation in the Detroit region in the
1950's. Between 1954 and 1961, 29 new one-stop shopping centres
opened in suburban locations outside the City of Detroit.(49) These
included two large regional shopping centres - Northland and Eastlane
- just outside the northern and easternmost limits of the city of
Detroit in Southfield and Harper Woods respectively. The former was
built without the assurance of freeway access to start with (although
necessitating a widening of eight mile road, the City of Detroit's
northern boundary line).(50) The latter was held to be dependent by
the developer (the J.L. Hudson Corp.) on freeway access to the Detroit
market being available, and this was expedited by t~e State Highway
Department.(S1) It is difficult not to conceive of such centres as
both causes and consequences of the residential decentralisation which
we will examine in a moment.
Between 1948 and 1962 the proportion of tri-county employment in the
retail sector accounted for by the city of Detroit fell from 73% to
43%. The proportion of wholesale employment fell from 90% to 69% over
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the same period (Table3A). Large scale office decentralisation (which
Walker attributes primarily to the attraction of cheap female labour
in the suburbs) - especially the growth of Southfield and Troy as
suburban office centres - was a phenomenon of the sixties and
seventies (Table 14). The decision by the Ford Motor Company in the
mid 1950's to build its new world headquarters in suburban Dearborn,
while influenced by a family attachment to the area, was a sign of
things to come,
(b) Residential Suburbanisation and the Local state: I turn to
residential decentralisation and differentiation"and the nature of the
local state on which it was based. By 1930,with an area of 139.6 sq.
miles and with 50 of those annexed in the 1920's, the city of Detroit
reached its present day boundaries.(52) From 1940 onwards in a
context of overall regional growth from natural increase and inward
migration, the population growth in the balance of the tri-county
region (ie. Wayne, oakland and Macomb minus Detroit) far outstripped
in absolute numbers the growth of the city of Detroit. The population
of Detroit, in fact, started to decline in the mid 1950's (Table4A).
The 1950's was an explosive decade for suburbanisation. The balance
of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties, with a 1960 population of
almost 2.1.million, had grown by over 925,000 people between 1950 and
1960 (Table4d. While over the same period the population of the city
of Detroit fell by approximately 179,000 to 1,670,000, the black
population of the city increased by almost a corresponding amount,
fr9!1lover 303,000 to over 478,000.(53) In the 1950's the population
of the suburbs went from being substantially less than the city of
Detroit to being substantially more (Table 4B and 4C).·
In 1960, 64% of those living in the suburbs (the balance of the tri-
county region) worked in the suburbs (Table 5). Given the scale of
suburbanisation during the 1950's and the fact that one-third of those
in the suburbs still worked in Detroit in 1960, it is difficult not to
conceive of residential decentralisation as being a major "pull"
factor in its own right. While industrial decentralisation would
indeed seem to have taken the lead in postwar suburbanisation in
Detroit, Walker would still, in relation to Detroit at least (perhaps
due to a bias in favour of attributing too much motive force directly
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to capital), seem to underplay the pull factor of the generalisation
of consumption and labour reproduction in space as facilitated by the
automobile. The attribution of leading and lagging factors is indeed
difficult.
The explosive suburban population growth is disaggregatred on Map 7'
and for selected cities in Table 6. Many of the areas in the
immediate vicinity of Detroit's boundary (Livonia, Dearborn Heights,
Southfield, Taylor, Southgate, Roseville, etc.) grew by over 150%;
others by over 100% - Warren, East Detroit, Westland, Wayne, etc. By
the mid 1950's (Map 4) residential development had followed the main
arterials (Woodward Ave., Grand River, Gratiot, West Jefferson,
Michigan Avenue, and M53) out of the city of Detroit, and already the
area between the spokes was beginning to fill in. That this suburban-
isation was an overwhelmingly white affair is revealed by a glance at
column 4 on Table 6, which shows the percentage minority population
for selected local governments in 1960. Only the older political
jurisdictions in the seven county region - Detroit, Ecorse, Hamtramck,
Highland Park, Inkster, River Rouge, Pontiac, Mt. Clemens, Ann Arbor,
Ypsilanti, Port Huron, and Monroe - show percentages of over 1.5%.
This brings one to a consideration of the fragmented and racist spatial
structure which emerged associated with the process of suburbanisation
- in particular the character of the local state. While there is
stark evidence of the role of property Capital in promoting racial
separateness to increase the total exchange value in housing (the
practices of the Detroit Real Estate Board were notorious in the
1950's), (54) it is Walker's conceptualisations of differential con-
sumption and labour reproduction in space that go furtnest towards
explaining racial exclusion and the fragmented nature of the local
state in Detroit.
The postwar structure of local government in the region did grow out
of past historical traditions. While it is beyond presentscopeto trace
these traditions to past class contexts, one must say something about
both Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism.
Michigan, in common with other north-east and mid-west states, did not
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have a tradition of strong county government in relation to more local
units of government.(55) County powers have been closely associated
with public health matters and welfare provision, the administration
of justice and law enforcement, and the work of the County Road
Commissions. And County administration has traditionally been very
fragmented with the existence of a large number of independent
elective executive offices and many semi-autonomous executive boards
and commissions. This high degree of executive fragmentation has its
roots in the Jacksonian tradition of distrust for concentrated
executi ve power. (56) This tradition, making to begin with, for weak
-
county government, fed into a Jeffersoqian tradition which is more
important for the phenomena under present study. The Jeffersonian
tradition carries a presumption in favour of vesting governmental
powers where possible at the most local level. This represents, in
Jeffersonian terms, the most "direct" form of democracy.(57) It is
this tradition which the emerging pre and postwar suburban
jurisdictions tapped into in Michigan or, as Walker puts it, made
"selective" use of. And this was reflected back at the county level.
In Wayne County, for example, until 1969 the legislative body
consisted of 130 members appointed individually by the constituent
local governments.(58)
The Jeffersonian tradition has strongly influenced the two most basic
kinds of local governmental entity in Michigan: the township and the
city. Both are constitutionally creations of state government. Town-
ships as geographical entities date back to 1787 and the Northwest
Ordinance, when boundaries, usually encompassing an area of 36 sq.
miles, were arbitrarily drawn on maps to facilitate the surveying and
selling of land• . As political entities the concept of -Jeffersonian
"pure and elementary republics" dates back to early settlement in New
England. Settlers from there and other eastern states brought the
geographical and political dimensions together in Michigan as else-
where. The orientation of township government has traditionally been
towards a rural economy with fewer enabling powers and a more basic
governmental structure than necessitaterlby more "urban" needs. But
during the rash of City incorporations in the 1930's and onwards,
townships had major and comparable powers to cities in'the matters of
infrastructure provision (sewers, water, though excepting roads),
79
local service provision (lighting, fire service, etc., including the·
power to organise township police departments) and land use.(59)
Most cities in Michigan are organised under the 1909 Home Rule Cities
Act.(60) This allowed, until 1968, city incorporation by areas with a
density of 500 persons per square mile and a population of 2,000 (from
1931 as low as 750). Cities have traditionally had greater powers
than townships. Of particular interest here is the fact that they
have complete responsibility for all roads within their jurisdiction
excepting state highways and interstate freeways, where, while control
is shared with state government, cities must· still assent to the
construction of all roads. Under the 1909 Act, cities have the power
to choose their own "home rule" local government structure or
"charter". Significantly again . home rule cities under the
1909 legislation are protected from annexation and other incorporation
initiatives. They cannot have territory annexed by an adjoining
jurisdiction without their consent and are protected from being
included, without their consent, in any wider attempt at
incorporation. The 1909 legislation had its origins in the genuine
problems thrown up by urban as opposed to more rural administration
and in the municipal reform movement of the time. Prior to this, city
powers and organisation rested on individual state charters which were
the object of state level influence by special interests with power in
the state legislature. Jeffersonian influence is apparent in the
title of the act itself. It is overly simplistic in Marxist terms, to
in1;~rpret,·as Markusen has done; the origins of such legislation, ..in
particular its annexation provisions, as representing the imposition
of suburban interests over and against those of the central City.
Referring to the passage of such legislation in state l-egislatures
before 1930, Markusen(61) says:
"In general, it put the decision to join or.not to join the
central city in the hands of the residents of the annexable area,
Leav Lnq the parent who had spawned the child helpless to
.participate in determining their joint future."
Incorporations, as they took place especially in the postwar period,
were based on a strong sense of suburban interest versus central city
interest, but incorporating jurisdictions, at least in the 1930's,
could legitimately claim that they needed city status to deal with
problems of urban administration in a situation where the city of
Detroit was reluctant to assume the expense of providing municipal
services to outlying areas through annexation.(62} Detroit was not a
"helpless parent" in 1930 and was content to see some children go
their own way. Walker's concept of "selective use" more accurately
reflects the way tradition and law were used in postwar suburban-
isation. I will now say something about this.
In the opinion of the Executive Secretary of the present State
Boundary Cornrnission:(63}
"City incorporations in Michigan since WorId War II have almost
completely been a product of defence against annexation and/or
competing incorporation efforts and fears."
In a phenomenon that has be~n widely condemned,(64} the resulting
suburban jurisdictions (Table 7 and Map a),' often operating under a
non-partisan managerial -form of government reflective of their
homogeneity (Table a), have been able to include within their
boundaries what suits.them (tax base assets and preferred ethnic and
income groups) and to exclude what is unwanted (other ethnic and
income groups, undesirable business tax base in wealthy residential
locations). School districts, in parallel to the political fragment-
ation in general units of government, were also strictly segregated
and drew upon widely divergent local tax bases for their support.
Whil~ school districts in Michigan consolidated at a rapid rate in the
postwar period due to economy of scale factors, this was entirely
voluntary. (65)
The residential exclusionary practices in South East Michigan have
been openly admitted to in a report by the present Regi9nal Council of
Governrnents(66}- local zoning laws requiring large residential lots
have tended to "effectively exclude lower-income households especially
blacks and other minorities proportionately heavy in low-income house-
holds, from whom many upper and middle income white hornebuyers are
anxious to separate themselves". In the late 1940's and 1950's,as
mayor, Orville L. Hubbard openly campaigned that he had kept the
negroes out of DearbornJ67~n 1960 a sensation was created by the
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revelation of the techniques used in the wealthy Grosse Point suburbs
to control the land use, life styles, and ethnic composition of that
area.(68) In 1980, the Mayor of Birmingham stated that those who are
to live in Birmingham should "earn their way" into Binningham.(69)
The predatory attitude towards business tax base is exemplified by the
following description of incorporation in Wixom: (70)
"Wixom didn't exist as a governmental unit when Ford Motor
Company officials began looking for a plant site in the area in
the 1950's, bringing with them the stimulus to waken the drowsy
hamlet• • • •
Now Wixom is Ford's largest assembly plant in North America and
easily one of the largest auto industry plants in the world.
John Lyon, the plant manager • • • thinks Wixom officials have been
"prudent" wi th their industrial windfall (Ford pays 82% of the
City's taxes).
Seeing the tax bonanza with Ford's arrival, leading citizens
successfully promoted incorporation as a village in April 1957,
and cityhood.13 months later."
In like fashion, the city of Dearborn had incorporated in 1927,
cutting off the property tax revenue from the Ford River Rouge complex
from the city of Detroit. And until very recently, Dearborn has
consistently under-assessed residential property for tax purposes,
drawing upon the income from the Ford plant.
Map 9'shows the broad grain of the spatial variation in the
distribution of income in the tri-county region for 1959. Table 9
ranks selected jurisdi~tions based on 1969 data. One study(71) ·has
shown for the Detroit region a high degree of internal homogeneity
within such suburbs (measured by deviation from mean per capita
income). Another study has criticised the Tiebout assertion of the
allocative efficiency of metropolitan fragmentation specifically in
relation to Detroit. Charles Tiebout, twenty years ago, in an article
which has become a classic in the field of public finance,(72)
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suggested that the consumer in "shopping" among different communities
which offered varying packages of local public services and in select-
ing as a residence the community which offered the tax-expenditure
programme best suited to his tastes, was ensuring a tendency towards
optimality in local government services. The model can be objected to
on the grounds that it takes income distribution for granted. The
study which has attempted to apply the model in the Detroit region(73)
found that it was inadequate "in that the mobility which it (the
Tiebout model) postUlates is not a general phenomenon but appears
limited to upper and middle income groups".
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CHAPTER 3
TRANSPORTATION POLICY FORMATION IN DETROIT
1945-1960
(a) Overview
(b) The "Politics" of Detroit
(c) The Freeway Agenda
(d) The Urban Renewal Agenda in Detroit
(e) The Regionalist Dimension
(f) Public Transportation Issues
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(a) Overview
In exploring the proposition that the broad postwar dynamic of trans-
portation policy formation in Detroit is primarily related to class,
Chapter Two developed a Marxist based perspective on economic
relations within the Detroit region and argued that spatially the
region can be strongly interpreted as primarily an expression of class
relationships. This Chapter takes the analysis a stage further. It
seeks at a certain level of abstration (it being outside the research
agenda to consider every concrete expression of policy) to examine the
pressures and constraints of a class based nature and within federal
and state contexts, shaping transportation policy formation at local
and regional levels of government in Detroit in the postwar period to
about 1960. Chapters Four and Five adopt the same approach for the
two other "policy climates" subsequent to 1960. Chapter Six then
considers the overall strength of class as an explanatory variable in
accounting for transportation policy formation and just how far a
macro class analysis such as this can go in contributing to a planning
theory which informs practice.
I consider transportation policy to 1960 around four major related
themes. These are as follows:
(1) Freeway planning and construction - the general domination of the
transportation policy agenda by this and the broad consensus it
commanded.
(2) The urban renewal agenda of the city of Detroit conceived as·
complementary to the city's freeway agenda.
(3) The growing need to plan transportation and other activities on a
regional scale conflicting with local government fragmentation
and autonomy.
(4) The decline in public transportation and the failure of rapid
transit to be seriously consider9d as part of a regional trans-
portation-plan.
(b) The "Politicsn of Detroit
Before proceeding, some comment on the political composition of
Detroit city government over the period is helpful. Here the non-
partisan nature of local politics, deriving from the endeavours of the
municipal reform movement in the united States during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, is most important. In 19f8, Detroit
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adopted, under the 1909 Home Rule Act, a new city charter, abolishing
the aldermanic ward system and establishing non-partisan at large
elections and a strong Mayor form of government. This replaced former
"Boodle City,,(1)where "Detroit's ward houses were its saloon keepers
and their masters were the brewers, competing private utilities and
corporations lacking social responsibility". Other major Detroit
business interests, however, endowed with "social responsibility", led
a local reform movement to change a situation which was not in the
interests of Detroit business as a whole. The city was henceforth to
be "managed" along "civic" lines where partisan politics had no
place'(2) (An ideology subsequently picked up by many of the emerging
suburban jurisdictions.)
This has had important implications for the ability of organised
Labour to influence city elections. During the 1940's, the Confeder-
ation of Industrial Organizations (CIO) made three major attempts
(1943, 1945, 1949) to elect a Mayor of Detroit, failing each time.(3)
While Detroit voted 70% Democratic, Mayors between 1940 and 1957 were
conservative. Organised Labour's attempts to elect candidates were
branded as efforts at "labour domination" - of constituting a limited
and selfish interest trying to run the government of "all the
people".(4) An observer in 1960 noted that since the 1940's the steam
had gone out of Detroit municipal politics. No longer were ideolog-
ical conflicts fought on a local scale. "Above all", he suggested:(5)
"• • •it may be that the structure of non-partisan politics in
Detroit has 'disciplined' or 'taught' the labour movement to
conform to the peculiar rules of the non-partisan game. This has
meant less aggressive behaviour, less overt attempts to control
the government. ;It seems possible that labour .has learned
through repeated defeats to select its candidates carefully,
making sure that they have a publicized record in government and
, .
that they fit into the non-partisn pattern of city politics".
<.c) The Freeway Agenda
Attention is flCM turned to regio~l highway planning. As early as the
mid 1920's, this was perceived generally in the region as a
"necesaity", A Master Plan of Thoroughfares" was agreed to in 1925 by
the City of Detroit, Wayne and other surrounding counties.(6)
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Already the old street system of Detroit was congested with auto-
mobiles. The 1925 plan forecast and planned for a dominant role for
motorised transport in the region's Circulatory system. This involved
a major programme of right of way acquisition and street widening,
much of which was carried out. MapIO shows the basic radial and grid
system proposed in the 1925 plan. Roads constructed included the 204
ft. wide Superhighways such as the expansive sections of Woodward,
Gratiot, Grand River, Schoolcraft, Southfield, and Eight Mile Road.
Elsewhere, where it was too expensive to widen the streets to 204 ft.,
store fronts were cut off and streets widened t0120 ft.
Twenty years later, this system of thoroughfares was under acute
strain. In 1946, the Detroit City Plan Commission (appointed by the
Mayor) published, as an integral part of the first Detroit Master
Plan, a "proposed System of Trafficways" for the city. The over-
whelming "reality of everyday life", which fonns the context for the
plan, was that the city of Detroit was being strangled with
automobiles. To quote from the report:(7)
"• • • the automobile is chained to a medium that has never kept
".
pace with its own development - it must gear itself to a system
of roads largely inherited from a by-gone age, inherited and
, "
adapted piece-meal in a never-ending series of futile attempts to
solve traffiC problems • • •
Recognition of the deficiences of the 1925 proposals resulted in
the trafficways plan of 1946. Developed as part of the Master
Plan for Detroit the new scheme eliminates the defects of the
older one and projects for Detroit the most advanced thoroughfare
system in the w~rId."
The proposed expressway,system (Map 11), which was substantially
unchanged 8.years later (Map 12), in addition to a major upgrading of
. ,
the major and secondary thoroughfare system, was to be "no make-
shift":
"It serves the entire city, providing easy access to the business
centre, residential districts, and most of our major industries,
besides carrying through traffic across the City quickly and
safely".(8)
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MAP10
DETROIT MASTER PLAN OF THOROUGHFARES 1925
SOURCE: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF MOTORWAYS FOR DETROIT~·I
MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY DEPT. 1941
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Already by 1946 expressways were making their mark on the region. The
Wayne County Road Commission (the road building arm of Wayne County
government with funding coming directly from State gasoline and motor
vehicle taxes) and the state Highway Department had completed two
projects. The first, the Davison Limited Highway stretching east-west
for one-and-a-half miles through the enclave city of Highland Park,
had alleviated one of the most serious bottlenecks for Detroit
traffic. Started in the summer of 1941, it was rushed to completion
because of its importance to war industries and was opened in November
1942. The highway was hailed by the Wayne County Road Commission- as
one of the "pioneer highways of the world" and is "unique in that it
provides non-stop highway travel directly through a solidly built-up
and long established neighbourhood".(9) The second, the Detroit
Industrial Expressway, also rushed to completion in 1944 because of
the war effort, linked the border of Detroit and Dearborn with the
Ford aircraft factory at Willow Run, in the process running past the
Rouge Plant (Map 13). And in 1946, subsequent to the federal aid law
of 1944, which for the first time earmarked federal funds for
assisting highway construction within Cities, a cross-town expressway
(the Edsel Ford Expressway) and a north-south expressway (the John ~
Lodge Expressway) were in the process of being launched into
construction within the city of Detroit as the product of a tri-party
agreement between the City, the Wayne Road Commission and the state
Highway Department (Map 13).(10) By the mid 1950's, before federal
In!:erstate Highway funds became available, both these schemes were
well on the way to completion.
From the beginning of freeway construction in Michigan there was a
strong belief, in important quarters, that this was essential to the
general economic development of the state. It was .~ strong argument.
The Michigan state Highway Commissioner in 1944 made a pitch.to
Congressin.Washington for highways as "the basis of the ~ation's
development". The following exerpt from his speech illustrates the
key social investment(11) role highways were perceived as playing 'in
Michigan's production process:(12)
"One of the fundamental elements of the Michigan assembly line
method is highway transportation. The raw materials are
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fabricated in one plant, moved to another for the manufacture of
parts and sub-assemblies, and finally arrive on the assembly line
at the main plant to produce the finished product. The assembly
line cannot be supplied from large stores of bulky parts. These
parts must be transported on schedule to arrive just when they
are needed. The motor truck is the ideal means of transport for
this purpose. It can move materials from plant to plant even
though they may be located miles apart. It has permitted the
dispersion of the motor industry and the small subcontracting
plants to the numerous locations throughout the state • • • • It is
evident that Michigan industry depends on ..highway transport for
operation and for the transportation of labour."
The point was not lost on the Michigan Good Roads Federation - an
organisation representing those with an important interest in highway
construction, including the Michigan trucking and road building
industries and membership of the State Highway CommissionerJ13) A
1948 report of the organisation - "Highway Needs in Michigan" - states
quite directly:(14)If... highway transportation is a vital element in the automobile
production process• . The highway itself is as much a part of the
assembly line as the cranes that lift motor blocks onto chassis
at River Rouge or.the conveyor belts that carry piston rings and
gasoline tanks from stock room to production line at Pontiac."
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It continues
."Because a well-developed highway system throughout the nation is
essential to the economic health of the automobile industry, it
is apparent that ~ichigan has much ,to gain by setting the pace in
road development."
It is in the mid to late 1950's, however, that regional freeway
construction in Detroit really, took off. This followed passage of the
federal Interstate Highway Act of 1956 which provided 90% federal aid
for highways designated as part of the Interstate Highwar System.
Over the ensuing 25 years, over 40,000 miles of such freeways were
"
constructed, 7,000 of those miles in metropolitan areas.
The process leading up to the passage of this legislation is a story
in itself and has been documented elsewhere.(15) A strong case can be
made for interpreting it as an agenda formed primarily in ·the
interests of a major wing of Big Capital, namely the highway lobby -
the auto manufacturers, petroleum, concrete, asphalt and other allied
interest groups - that was not reticent in its efforts to "educate"
the American public through a massive publicitycampaign.(16) In
1982, a congressional task force pointed out that the reciprocal
relationship of the Interstate programme, housing construction, auto
sales and various ancilliary industries was the main engine of.postwar
economic growth.(17) This was id;ntified, in the general debate
surrounding passage of the Interstate programme, with the public
interest. As Davies points out,(18} the sheer scale of funding could
not help but colour the opinion of local politicians towards the
scheme:
"Local politiCOS, hard pressed to pay the rapidly rising costs of
government, joyously received the financing formula that would
have the federal government paying ninety percent of the urban
freeway costs, leaving the state government the remainder! It is
not every day that a financially troubled City can get a
:spanking-new transportation system virtually for free."
In 1955, Albert Cobo, Mayor of Detroit, came to Washington, described
the Ford and Lodge Freeways and recommended more of the same to cure
the congestion problems of Detroit and other cities.(19) The national
urban planning f~rnity was divided on the issue. Robert Moses, for
example, a nationally prominent planner from New York City at the
time, argued that freeways were~the key to the revitalisation of
blighted urban areas.(20) As early as 1941, the Michigan State
Highways Department had taken this line in arguing the need for,
motorways in Detroit:(21)
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"Slum conditions develop in the backwaters .left by unplanned
urban growth and inadequate street facilities. A revampled
street pattern will open up these blighted areas and fit them for
more productive uses."
other planners,. such as Harland Bartholomew (credited as one of the
foremost advocates of comprehensiveness in urban planning), argued
that mass transportation should be given first consideration in
cities.(22) The strongest dissenting planning voice, however, over
the '56 Act came from Lewis Mumford. He concluded:(23)
"The most charitable thing to assume about this (legislation) is
that they hadn't the faintest notion of what they were doing.
Within the next fifteen years they will doubtless find out; but
by that time it will be too late to correct all the damage to our
. .
cities and our countryside, not least to the efficient
organisation of industry and transportation, that this ill-
conceived and absurdly unbalanced program will have wrought."
Detroit politicians at this time, however, were quite firmly committed
to freeways. In 1953 the city of Detroit, State Highway Department,
Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Road Commissions, U.s. Bureau of Public
Roads, and the Detroit Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission had
co-operated in the preparation of the ~etroit Metropolitan Area
Traffic Study. (24) Under the direction ~f Douglas Carroll Jr., the
"carroll Plan" was completed in 1956 at a cost of three-quarter of a
million dollars. ;~t was one of the first major quantitative
transportation planning studies in the United States. It has been
described as "a highly signif~cant pioneering effort to develop a
highway plan by deriving patterns of travel from data on the traffic-
generating capacities of.various uses of land".(25) One of the major
part'icipants in these events sees in the impetus for i the study an
effort by the city of Detroit and the S.E. Michigan region generally,
to put pressure on the State Highway Department to build more express-
'ways in the region.(26) (At'that tim~ the,state Highway Department
was .undez the control of an' elected Republican sfate Highway
" '
Commissioner with strong support in the more rural areas of Michigan).
In any case it is clear that the Detroit highway agenda was not
foisted on the region from Lansing or Washington but carne from the
bottom up as well as from the top down.
. ,
The Carroll study was cleai as,to its intent. I~ took an almost
exclusive focus on highways for granted:
."• • • s~ecialfzed work and interchange of products are the'key to
i . ' ,o. ' .
the large metropolis,and a condition of its existence. This can
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occur only by means of the large dai ly movement of persons and
vehicles.
The purpose of this study is to insure effective functioning of
this movement by thoroughly understanding the nature of the
movement and then by devising the most effective highway plan to
serve it." (my emphasis) (27)
The report can be described as an example of "trend planning"
presented within an implicit structural functionalist conception of
society. By structural functionalist (cf Ch.1 pps.lO-ll) is meant a
view which underplays'the significance of conflict assuming its exist-
ence, if present, as functional to the existing social system as a
whole. Consideration of conflict, existing or potential, is nowhere
considered in the Carroll plan~ It did not.look beyond its taken for
granted.highwaygoals, derivative,as they must be seen, of the
dominant class pressures behind them. It accepted "the continuing
spread of people more thinly over the land with consequent higher car
ownership rates" and set about to facilitate the direction of the
trend. It accepted the basic concept 'of Detroit as "a spread out
city" in which "fixed facility'transit lines" were unsuitable. A
"review of the facts" led to the conclusion that a complete network of
,), .
express routes was necessary to effectively "drain" existing thorough-
fares and neighbourhood~ of through traffic.(28) The result was a
recommendation for the study area (an area taken to be a radius
varying between 20 and 25 miles from the CBD) of almost 260 miles of
expressways and 118 miles ,of connecting arterial routes (Map 14).(29)
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f
Following the election in early 1957 of a Democrat, John C. Mackie, to
the post of state Highway Commissioner on the strength of the urban
vote(30) and following the Interstate Highway legislation, freeway
, .
construction in Detroit got into full swing. Within four months of
, . .
taking office, th.enew Commissioner announced a'ten-year expressway
",. ~ -, _', '.
plan for the region involving 81 miles of new expressways, 73 of which
were classified as part of the Interstate system and thus eligible for
the "pot of gold" in the form of 90% federal aid.(31) This was
substantially based on the carroll study. The following year saw the
publication of another transportation plan, this time for a more
broadly defined Detroit region - a joint product of the DMRPC and a
recently formed Inter-COunty Highway Commission. This plan, I~egional
MAP14
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Highways", covering an area of 2600 sq.miles (the counties of Wayne,
Oakland, Macomb, Monore, and eastern Washtenaw), provided for more of
the same. It accepted the basic spreadout pattern of land use as "the
element to which all other physical factors must be keyed". It used
the Carroll recommendations as its "basic core" and added to it a
system of modified expressways and regional thoroughfares "to provide
an integrated highway system to serve the entire region" (Map 15).
The sprawling economic arteries articulated in this and the other
plans were rapidly taking shape by the early sixties. Map 16 shows
freeways constructed as of 1965. If implementation had one major
characteristic during this time, it was in gener~l its uncontroversial
nature. The State Highway Department in spear-heading implementation
could point to the "interest of the majority of citizens of the
metropolitan area".(33) The east side and the west side of the city
of Detroit competed to be first on the agenda of works to alleviate
their congestion problems.(34) Opposition tended to be localised to
those most immediately affected. Construction rode roughshod over
these interests in the inner city slum areas, and in this respect
Detriot is no different from many other U~S. cities. A more "careful
weighing of consequences" took place in middle and upper income
residential areas.(35) Typically, negotiations with neighbourhood
interests were led by political aides rather than planners; the
latter, along with highway engineers, playing an advisory role
(providing ideas on modified route locations, cantilevered structures
to economise on space, etc.) in facilitating construction.
Negotiators could wear down opposition with the "logic" of the freeway
agenda as a whole. Given the general acceptance of this 'logic, it is
hardly surprising to find regional capitalist interests (while taking
a keen interest in route determination where their specific interests
were concerned) taking a back seat at the regional level as far as the
highway agenda as a whole was concerned. It was not completely
absent, however. The presidents of Ford, Chrysler, and G.M. had
founded in 1941 the Traffic Safety Association of Detroit, with many
other companies joining subsequently. This body, recognising that
'~usiness and industry have an important stake in the safe and orderly
movement of traffic in the Detroit area", (36) lobbied for more and
better freeways, especially with regional and local government
officials, under the banner that they reduced traffic fatalities.
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(d) The Urban Renewal Agenda in Detroit
From the very beginning an urban renewal strategy went hand in hand
with the City of Detroit's commitment to a freeway agenda. It is
impossible to understand the city's support for freeways without
understanding its expectations from urban renewal. It is clear that
city policy makers were aware in the fifties of the potentially
detrimental longterm effects to "the City" of making the growing
suburbs more accessible by automobile. And freeways were also
directly removing property from the tax rolls. A 1958 City report
talks of "the relentless economic competition 'from newly developed
areas accessible to'the automobile".(37) But in the same year, in
response to the interview question - "In the long run, do you think
the city will gain or lose by the development of expressways?" - seven
out of the nine Detroit councilmen answered that on balance the city
would gain.(38) This response becomes understandable when seen
against the congestion problems of the City, the fact that people
(including Detroit residents) wanted to drive cars and Detroit made
them, and the fact that suburbanisation was happening anyway.
Detroit, in fact, actually constructed the water lines and, to a
lesser extent, the sewerage system which supplied a large proportion
of the growing suburbs (Maps 17 and 18). The alternative was to see
the suburbs construct their own less efficient systems. The suburban-
isation process (while perhaps not its degree) was a given for City
policy makers. In the fifties, downtown retail stores saw freeways as
making them more accessible to suburbanites. Mayor Cobo predicted
that the Detroit freeways - known in the fifties as "Cobo's Canyons" -
would bring people back into the city.(39)
This optimism, though, owed much to the city's urban renewal agenda -
the city's answer to suburban growth and competition. Since 1945, in
fact, to the present day, transportation and renewal (latterly
revitalisation and renaissance) have been inseparable policy issues.
The 1946 "proposed System of Expressways", published by the city
planning commission (Map 11), was accompanied in the same year by
publication of the "Detroit Plan,,(40)which actually embodied the
central feature of federal urban renewal legislation three years later
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- land clearance by cities and sale at knock down prices for private
development.
It is necessary to consider Detroit's renewal agenda against the
background of this federal urban renewal legislation - the Housing
Acts of 1949 and 1954 and subsequent amendments. This was in
substantial measure a generalised response to the problems faced by
cities such as Detroit. The federal programme was very much couched
in terms of serious concern for the problems of low income families
living in substandard accommodation (and this cannot be ignored), but
in the words of one reviewer, was "ineffecti.ve and possibly even
harmful" in so far as its stated purpose was concern~d.(41) This
record has been well documented elsewhere_(42) There were clearly
other motives behind the legislation and these are not that
mysterious. At the national level big City mayors and local officials
were concerned with stopping the spread of poor neighbourhoods,
putting the brakes on white flight and protecting the City's property
tax base. Slum areas were a net drain on the city treasury. Shoring
slum dwellers up in public housing was one way of stopping the spread
of "blight", but the basic approach embodied in the federal
legislation (given the "strong resistance to and lack of support for
any form of shelter subsidy for low income groups") (43) was to
subsidise private redevelopment of slum areas. These concerns fitted
well with business concern for threateneq central business district
property values. Residential blight was often most acute in the early
developed downtown areas. But given the pre-Kennedy conservative
interpretation of an appropriate federal role (ie notions concerning
the appropriate separation of public and private sectors), the
rhetoric understandably tended to focus on the housing .needs of the
slum dweller. It was only gradually over the history of the federal
renewal programme that the predominantly residential emphasis was
relaxed in favour of greater concern for general "city betterment".
Business interests were "increasingly in favour of restructuring
blighted business and industrial properties".(44) Cities were given
greater flexibility in protecting and enhanCing commerCial, industrial
and institutional areas (espeCially universities and hospitals).
Mollenkopf, (45) in presenting a Marxist analysis of urban renewal,
argues that it represented:
"Big Capital's progam of expansion of the suburban periphery and
reorganisation and more intense development of the urban core (in
order to) reinforce the command and control functions of the
central city over the metropolitan area, the surrounding region,
and even overseas territories."
He sees a "pro-growth coalition" composed of central-city politicians
and bureaucrats, large corporations, CBD real estate and merchant
interests, and the construction trades,pushing nationally for a
strong renewal programme and likewise co-operating locally on downtown
redevelopment.
Pittsburgh, as Mollenkopf describes it, provides a particularly
striking example of corporate led urban renewal.(46) In that city,
R.K. Mellon led regional capitalist interests in forming the Allegheny
Conference on Community.Development in 1943 to develop plans for what
became the Golden Triangle, Pittsburgh's new CBD. Nearly every major
city, as Mollenkopf points out, did develop during the fifties a
corporate-based planning body interested in urban development. But
there is a danger of applying an over-generalised structuralist logic
here. Mollenkopf includes.Detroit's renewal efforts as part of this
pattern. But this in'fact over-estimates the strength and cohesive-
ness of Big Capital support there around the agenda of bolstering the
central business district. What is significant in Detroit's case, it
is argued, is in general the relative weakness, in terms of invest-
ment, of Big Capital attachment to the central business district - an
altogether different context for planners and policy makers.
Looking generally at the urban renewal agenda as it established itself
in Detroit during the forties and fifties, the lead seems to have been
taken by the city administration with the private sector playing an
important but strictly secondary role. This is in contrast, as
shallbe seen,to the post 1967 situation, when the private sector - when
more than the central business district was threatened - was to playa
more dominant role in the formation of a broader economic development
agenda.' But it is still·against the city of Detroit's expectations
from renewal - protection of the tax base, stemming the tide of middle
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class flight, and enhancing the economic and service functions of the
city (particularly in relation to the CBD) - that its embrace of the
logic of the freeway agenda, strong in any case, must be seen. But
the city of Detroit's urban renewal agenda, while strongly shaped by
class processes, cannot be interpreted as standing rigidly to
attention in the face of large corporate interests as suggested by
Mollenkopf. I will consider separately the following aspects of -~-
Detroit's renewal agenda during this period:
(1) Housing renewal
(2) Commercial, service and "civic" renewal
(3) Industrial renewal.
(1) Housing Renewal: This was,the focus of Mayor Jeffries' "Detroit
Plan" of 1946, already mentioned, which was subsequently incorporated
into a broader official Master Plan (the first such plan in Detroit),
adopted by the city council, in 1948. The expectation, held in the
Master Plan and by city officials generally through the fifties, was
that through renewal (whether full-scale clearance and/or redevelop-
ment or through more moderate conservation measures), neighbourhood
stability (ie containment of the black and poor, under the best
proposals in improved housing conditions) and the containment of white
flight could be achieved (the activities of the Detroit Real Estate
Board not withstanding).
A 1958 City Plan Commission report(47) divides Detroit into three
different housing areas - the old, middle and new city (see Map 5).
The characterisation of Detroit renewal in this report, which was a
major policy document, supports the above assessment. The middle-aged
city (built between 1904 and 1933, covering 63 sq.miles with 180,000
dwellings - one-third of the city total) was determined to be
"deteriorating". To quote:
"It is these middle-aged neighbourhoods that are in need of both
major public improvement and private rehabiliation to prevent
them from turning into blighted areas. They are now undergoing
racial change or will soon undergo this change: some of the
white families are abandoning them for newer outlying
neighbourhoods as the Negro families move into them from the
older central core of the city.,,(48)
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The report talks of the "paradox" of the middle-aged city that "can
now offer its residents many of the advantages which the suburbs will
not have for many years". But the "continued spread", it says, "of
the physical deterioration in these areas is a menace to adjacent
stable neighbourhoods" (myemphasis).(49)
Of the new city, containing 150,000 houses built after 1934, the
report says:
"Conservation in the form of minor improvements is the keynote to
preservation of stability and improvement of living amenities
..(50)
• • • •
The old city, a compact area of 12 1/2 sq.m. built prior to 1904 and
surrounding the CBD,'was slated for more drastic renewal. It was
originally built without the benefits of building codes and
subdivision regulations - 21,000 dwellings in it were determined in
the 1950 Census to be either badly dilapidated or to lack"indoor
plumbing. The report says:
"Drastic action of wholesale clearance and rebuilding is needed
in the community interest if the Old City is again to become a
desirable place to live."CS1)"
A brief review of one major housing renewal project in the old city -
the Gratiot renewal project - is illustrative of some of the dominant
issues surrounding the reconstruction of urban space by the renewal
and freeway agendas. In this project, protection of the CBD can be
seen 'as blending with the goal"of arresting the spread of "the slum".
Gratiot, an area of 129 acres just to the east of the CBD, was 95%
black in 1950.(52) It had been the area focused on in Mayor Jeffries'
"Detroit Plan". Of Gratiot and the "Detroit Plan", Mowitz "and
wright(S3) concluded at the time:
"What is clear is that those with the greatest economic stake in
the downtown area's future - the banking, investment, retail-
business, real estate, and building interests - took an active
""part along with city officials in developing this strategy for
eliminating slums "and for stemming the tide of public housing
. '
with all of its feared consequences for each of the groups
involved in the decision."
I .
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The "Detroit Plan" favoured private redevelopment of the Gratiot site
with government underwriting land acquisition and clearance. Some who
worked on the plan foresaw private redevelopment for low rent housing
as containing the black population and preventing them from migrating
within the city. Other options which received consideration during
the early discussions on Gratiot, were containment through provision
of public housing on the site, combined with private redevelopment
with the intention of attracting middle and upper income families to
the site, thus curbing suburban flight.
Under the conservative minded Mayor Cobo (elected in the autumn of
1949), opposed to public housing, the proposal that first won through,
was private redevelopment for a mix of middle-income and low-income
families. The concerns of racial integration and provision of better
housing for lower-income families were on the agenda along with
containment and the desire' to protect the CBD - they may have been
secondary considerations (asshall be seen,they lost out in Gratiot),
but it is misleading to ignore them. Mollenkopf,(54) for example,
sums up the federal urban "renewal legislation as follows:
"Urban renewal was to throw a wall around a creeping blight, that
is, the growing social problem of the minority urban poor, in
order to preserve and enhance central city land values and
contain poor neighbourhoods' LnfLuence,"
Federal housing officials working with Detroit on the Gratiot project,
were concerned to provide low rental accommodation for blacks. (55)
Gratiot, however, shows' how' this goal was eclipsed by the other
motivations behind the renewal project which Mollenkopf describes.
But from the standpoint of understanding state policy formation, it is
important not to ignore the housing goals of renewal altogether.
Contrary to what one Marxist writer has suggested,(56) Gratiot was not
conceived by the city administration as an effort to simply remove
poor people and promote'lta land grab to provide big business with
subsidized property on which to bui.Ld", There was no pent-up private
sector'demand for the Gratiot site as a location for commercial' or
ind~strial activity, even if the city had been considering the site
. -
for this purpose in the first place (which it was not). The use being
considered by the city was residential. Overly simplistic and struc~
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turalist Marxist theorizing it seems, can wrongly characterize the
environment of planners, erroneously "reading off" deterministic out-
comes to the class pressures and constraints shaping planning inter-
vention. The history of the Gratiot project indicates that within
such a context planners were still not without influence or discretion
concerning the eventual resolution. The brief for the Gratiot
redevelopment plan was the responsibility of the City Plan Commission
and its staff (the nine Commission members appointed by the Mayor),
the Commission at that time being under the chairmanship of Willis
Hall, Secretary of the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce and a strong
proponent of measures to protect the tax base of the city. The
following comment has been made by Mowi tz and Wright on the role of
professional planners on the Commission staff:
"They recognized the goal of rehousing former residents, but they
wanted to accomplish this in a way which would maintain 'good
planning' standards. These standards seem to defy explicit arti-
culation, but they include population-density criteria as well as
engineering and aesthetic considerations. The commission itself,
which included by law an architect, civil engineer, structural
engineer, real estate dealer, builder, attorney and physician,
did not share all of the professional planners' values, but they
tended to defend them."(57)
Two attempts to market the mixed development proposal (in 1952 and
1953) produced nothing which satisfied planning standards, and on the
first bid there was actually no developer response at all.(58)
Problems involved skepticism by builders over the chances of selling
or renting to blacks and whites in the same area, and a c~rtain amount
of "idealism" by professional planners and architects with the Plan
Commission in the face of the developers' need to cut corners and
scale down construction costs to potential rents. In what can be seen
as a precursor to many subsequent public-private development organis-
ations, Mayor Cobo in 1954 appointed a Citizens Redevelopment
Committee (to become a non-profit Redevelopment Corporation the
following year) which took on the responsibility for planning and
marketing the Gratiot site. Walter Reuther of the UAW, Walter Gehrke,
Chairman of First Federal Savings and Loan, and Foster K. Winter, vice
president of the J.L. Hudson Comapny, were members.(59) Contributions
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were received from a wide spectrum of regional corporations. Reuther
had sent a telegram to the Mayor urging formation of such a
corporation. The following is an excerpt:
"It is economically stupid and morally wrong for an industrial
community with the wealth, the power and the know-how of Detroit
to tolerate the social cess-pools of our slums, which breed crime
and disease.,,(60)
In the projected physical reconstitution of the metropolis, it seems,
the existence of slums was an embarrassment to important sensitivites
in those, the greatest benefactors of the "pact" between big capital
and Labour, ie. there was even pressure to eradicate slums for reasons
other than protecting central business district property values or
even protecting the general city tax base. In the event, the corpor-
ation, after attempting to market a plan for Gratiot as an integrated
community with a range of income levels, ,was forced to accept a pro-
posal from a developer that was geared towards those of upper-middle
income. The majority of Gratiot residents were dispersed and ended up
"living under slum conditions equal to, if not worse than, those they
left".(61) The goals of containment (through improved private sector
housing) and protection of the CBD proved to be incompatible.
(2) Commercial, Institutional, and "Civic" Renewal - the Central
Business District: The Gratiot urban renewal project provides a
useful bridge to the other major thrust of the city's renewal. efforts
during this period, which centred on bolstering those functions in
which a comparative advantage was perceived over the growing suburbs.
Linked to expressions of civic pride, embodying a notion of the
"symbolic" importance of the city (factors too easily ignored in an
overly deterministic analysis), this involved a concentration on
enhanCing the status of the central business district but stretching
out also to include the proximinous educational~ cultural and medical
centre, clustered around what is now Wayne state University. Freeways
to serve these areas were to come right into the heart of the city and
make the maximum use of centrality (Map 19).
One can trace the principles of the scheme back to the City Master Plan
of the immediate postwar period. Ladislas Segoe, nationally known
planning consultant, was given the task of advising the Plan
106
Commission staff and aiding in the plan preparation.(62) Here he drew
on his former work in Cincinnati in proposing a structural form for
Detroit along the same lines.(63) In Cincinnati, as Segoe explained
in 1947,(64) the plan was based on a "complete diagnosis of existing
conditions, needs and future requirements of the whole metropolitan
area and of each part, and the location of necessary facilities - for
housing, shopping, industry, motorways, schools, recreation areas etc.
- which were found to be most appropriate • • •", Segoe "viewed the
fundamental problem as that of refashioning a structural form
'essentially of the last century' to fit the highly mechanised mode of
Iiving of the twentieth century • • •".(65)
In the fifties, the renewal agenda began to take shape. A major
programme of downtown public investment going back to the 1948 Master
Plan came to fruition. Mayor Cobo's Civic Center Complex on the
riverfront, at a cost of over $100 million, "was designed to
stimulate private investment in the deteriorating downtown area and
bring about a revitalisation of the heart of Detroit".(66) This
complex included a new City-County Building and a massive Exhibition
Hall and Convention Arena (Cobo Hall and Arena). Approximately $6
million of the total $54 million cost of the Hall and Arena was
contributed by business and industrial ists.(67) An additional $2.5
million was provided by the Ford family for construction of the Henry
and Edse 1 Ford Audi tor iurn - home for the Detroit Symphony
Orchestra.(68) Willis Hall, Secretary of the Greater Detroit Board of
Commerce, headed up a Civic Center Development committee composed of
"influential citizens" to help promote the Civic Center projects'(69)
The following excerpt from a City Plan Commission report, concerning a
CBD renewal site, gives an indication of the general thinking by the
City on the "revamping" of the CBO:(70)
"A high percentage of single persons • • • and the resulting desig-
nation of "Skid RoW" are one indication of the character of the
Central Business District No.1 site. Studies showing the many
transients in the area, low economic level, and low value of
residential property have led to the decision that redevelopment
is necessary. The location is ideal for general business use and
will be further enhanced by expressway and civic center
construction now under way."
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other urban renewal funds were spent in bolstering the "Universi ty
Cit y"/Cultura I Centre area including the provision of cheap land for
expansion.(71) AMedical Centre plan was designed to renovate an area
in which manyof the region's hospitals were located in order to stem
the flight of hospitals to the suburbs.(72)
Business - and Big Business - in particular was certainly involved in
the commercial/civic aspects of the renewal agenda. But it is
important to put the nature of the invol vement in perspective. The
Civic Center DevelopmentCommitteewehave mentioned. Invel vementwas
also through a number of other organisations~' In the mid-fifties,
Mayor Cobo had formed a Detroit TomorrowCommittee charged with
"responsibility for saving the core city".(73) It was composed of
representati ves from business and organised labour and "the standard
roster of distinguished citizens", (74) but it has been criticised for
being too large to be effective and of being composed of '~ere
representati ves of interests" rather than forming a body of decision
makers geared for actionJ75)
Around this time also, Walker Cisler, Chairman of Detroit Edison (a
major regional utility company), pulled together a Mayor's Committee
for EconomicGrowth• . This included in its ranks Walter Reuther, Henry
Ford.II, and Joseph L. Hudson Jr. of the major Hudson's retailing
company. (The title is perhaps slightly ironiC, given that at this
time the corporations of the latter two individuals were vigorously
expanding their investments in the suburbs.) A judgement on this
organisation by one close to the events is that it was "more
ceremonial than substantial".(76)
In addition, under the Miriani administration a Committee on
Commercialand Industrial Developmentwas formed by Mayorand Council
which pulled in business sector talent for the job of promoting the
city - but generally from the lower corporate ranks.(77)
The picture in Detroit is not one of joint vigorous and united leader-
ship by regional capital around a renewalstrategy focusing on the CBD.
CBDinterests were certainly involved in the formation of the "Detroit
,., .
Plan" which focused on the Gratiot project as has been seen. There was
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corporate financial' support for "civic" projects. The President of
the Burroughs corporation, Ray Eppert, with headquarters nearby, took
a major interest in the medical/educational and cultural centre
projects.(78) But on the whole, the lead in the "downtown agenda" was
taken by the public sector concerned with the erosion of economic
functions (jobs for city residents), tax base loss and a concern for
civic image. The latter in particular was· endorsed by the corporate
sector. But while selective elements of regional capital (primarily
banks and utilities) had some financial and economic stake in the CBD
and an interest in protecting this, regional capital was not united
behind a vigorous programme, carrying the city' administration behind
it, to promote the Detroit downtown through urban renewal. The lead,
in general, was with the public sector, trying to drag private invest-
ment behind it. Despite the fact that with the Civic Centre complex
and associated developments Mayor Coho succeeded in "bonding the city
to the 1imits of its capacity",(79) the investment response from the
private sector was relatively weak and did not live up to city expect-
ations. The $100 million of Civic Center public capital expenditure
in the CBD was paralleled up to 1962 by $100 million worth of private
expenditure on new banking, office, and utility company buildings, not
forgetting a new bus station.(80) Thisisanere 1:1 ratio. It included
the Michigan Consolidated Gas Building completed in 1962. The utility
companies, with major fixed investments in the city of Detroit, can be
seen as having a particular interest in the viability of the City. As
Vernon(81) pointed out, writing of the time, financial institutions
gravitated towards central locations because of the importance of face
to face contact in business negotiations. The National Bank of
Detroit (traditionally handling G.M. business) did complete a new
building in the CBD for its own use in 1959. A new Detroit Bank and
Trust building (traditionally Chrysler's bank) was opened in the CBD
in 1962 along with a new home for the First Federal Savings and
Loan.(82) In the words of the present property manager of the latter
bank:
"Bankers and major law firms like to have their fingers on the
pulse. They like to be close to the deal making and to rub
shoulders in downtown restaurants and the private clubs."(83)
But this notwithstanding, the new structures which arose in Detroit at
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this time (with the possible exception of the First Federal Building)
were not the towering symbols of corporate hegemony found in other
American cities. They exude the atmosphere of functional operations
centres. The dominant building on the Detroit skyline at this time -
the Penobscot Building - while occupied by the City National Bank,
was (and continues to be) owned by an outside investor(84) - not a
sign of symbolic committrnentby regional capital to the Detroit CBD.
But more importantly, there was no private building surge in Detroit.
No speculative offices were constructed in the city at this time.
Apart from the fact that the office building surge did not take place
in the region as a whole till the sixties, two other factors are
. important in understanding this. Chicago is the financial centre of
the mid-west, not Detroit, and regional corporate branch offices have
tended to go there• . Secondly, Vernon pointed·out the insensitivity of
many offices to the cost of space, embodying as they do the "prestige
center of the enterprize". But the Detroit CBD was not a prestige
commercial location. Detroit, a blue collar factory town, did not
have a Riverfront Drive to match Chicago's Lake Shore Drive. Henry
Ford completed his prestige World Headquarters in 1956 in Dearborn.
And the strength of the CBD was not helped by the fact that the G.M.
and Chrysler World Headquarters were buil t in the 1920's in the New
Centre area two miles north of downtown and in Highland Park,
respectively• .
(3) Industrial Renewal Agenda: The main impetus for a programme of
industrial renewal in the city of Detroit likewise seems to have come
from the City administration, concerned especially with the
maintenance of the tax base to finance services and with the
preservation of jobs for city residents. (But the major economic
development emphasis on jobs, even at the expense of tax base revenue
through concessions, was to cornelater in the seventies, when the city
became increasingly a repository for the unemployed.) The City was
well aware of the fact that "large scale industry was interested in
large sites composed of hundreds of acres which could only be found
outside the city limits".(85) It decided to participate, at least in
part, in this compe~ition anyway. The major industrial renewal
proj ects are shown on Map 19. One such proj ect was centred on the
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Corktown neighbourhood just west of the CBD. Here, for example,
despite protestations from residents that it was not a slum, it was
sacrificed, even through it was 'by no means the worst housing area in
the city. Mayor Cobo had argued that the land was needed by whole-
salers who would be forced to move to accommodate the Civic Centre
project.(86) But certainly Corktown was not part of a regional
Capital programme for the reorganisation of urban space in the core,
and there were no commercial interests straining at the leash to
develop the site.
(e) The Regionalist Dimension
Given development trends within the metropolis over this period,
transportation policy demanded consideration at a regional scale. Yet
given the emerging fragmented governmental structure of the region,
this was something fraught with potential for conflict. This was to
plague regional transportation planning espeCially in later years,
when transportation policy became wrapped up with regional
governmental issues generally, but it has its roots in this period.
Plans, and those responsible for them, were sensitive to the latent
danger. For example, from the City of Detroit, Master Plan Report,
1946:(87) ,
"It is perfectly obvious that, in many instances, expressways and
thoroughfares originating in Detroit will have to cross Highland
Park, Hamtramck, and Dearborn, all independent municipalities.
The co-operation of responsible officials is being sought to
ensure continuity of the routes across these three cities."
The state Highway Commissioner in presenting his 10-year expressway
plan for the Detroit region in 1957:(88)
"The greatest single danger to the success of this program, as I
see it, will be internal squabbles within communities themselves
about legislation, or conflicts between neighbouring communities
which are unable to agree on route selection."
'~egional Highwa~s", Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning
Commission, 1958:(89) -
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"Co-ordinated, long-range planning is essential if the Detroit
region is to avoid the uneconomic, piecemeal growth of the past.
Such planning is particularly necessary in developing a future
highway network. With the rapid outward spread and decentralized
pattern of industrial and residential growth, major traffic
desires and highway needs are not limited by muniCipal boundaries
but must be dealt with on a broader, region-wide scale."
In tracing the history of regional approaches to governmental problems
in Detroit, one notes the strong invol vement from the beginning of
major regional captialist interests. One ~an single out June 25, 1918
as an important date in the early beginnings of "regionalism", when
the voters of the city of Detroit adopted a new charter, among other
things abolishing the parochialism of the ward system and instituting
~at large" city elections. The reform movement which led to this
culmination had been spearheaded by the Detroit Citizens League,
founded in 1912 by the automobile pioneer Henry M. Leland.(90}
The Detroit Board of Commerce as early as 1924 began pushing the
concept of co-operative planning amongst the governmental
jurisdictions in the emerging Detroit region, but the Board was, in
the words of Ledyard Blakeman,(91} Executive Director of the postwar
Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, "the voice
cryl~g in the wi1de~~ess". The Board succeeded in getting a law
passed by the State legislature in 1929, permitting two or more local
governments to join together to form a Regional Planning Commission.
However, in Blakeman's opinion:(92)
"Nothing came of this because over the years the communities who
most needed to get together had built up local animosities that
prevented their seeing the light."
This was a sign of things to come.
One mode of regional governmental organisation, dating from the 1930's
was to set a precedent for postwar organisational forms - namely the
creation in the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority (1939) of a
special purpose regional authority with the mission of providing for
regional recreation needs. A product of state enabling legislation
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and local referendum, this organisation was headed by a board composed
in the main of appointees of the participating counties (Wayne,
Oakland, Macomb, Washtenaw, and Livingstone), and also, through the
specific nature of the delegated powers, was doubly cautious in the
preservation of local governmental authority.(93) Other special
purpose authorities were formed along similar lines in the postwar
period, including, for example the Paop Le+s Community Hospital
Authori ty and the S.E. Oakland County Rubbish and Garbage
Authority.(94) In addition, voluntary co-operative contractual
agreements between local jurisdictions were popular (eg. concerning
fire services).<95) But it was more than specfaL purpose authorities
and agreements that took their cue from the Huron-Clinton Authority.
The general purpose regional governmental organisations that emerged
were also structured such as to protect local autonomy by way of
limited powers and the fore-closure of the option of region-wide
elections. The two relevant organisations were:
(1) The Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission;
(2) The Supervisors Inter-County Committee.
I will consider them in turn.
In 1945, the Detroit Board of Commerce took a leading role in
advocating passage of State legislation enabling the designation of
areas in which there could be regional planning (Public Act 281 of
1945).(96) An organising committee was subsequently set up, headed by
Ed Gushee of Detroit Edison, "including representatives of the various
sections of the region plus labour, management, retail trade and other
economic and sOCial groups". With'the injection of funds from State
government and from a solicitation of Detroit area businesses, the
DMARPC began operation in'1947. It was made up of 46 memhers, drawn,
according to the rules established by the Gushee committee, from
public officials (23) and from "civic, ~conomic and social fields".
It was no threat to any established interest. It has been described
as:(97)
"... something of a 'cross between an official agency and a
"citizen's council... it- appointed technical committees of
experts; some from official agencies, others from private
businesses and educational institutions, to study problems of
land use, transportation, water supply, drainage, pollution, and
113
community services. The staff conducted research on the
population, economy, and physical development of the region as a
basis for the preparation of a long-term plan. But this
commission laboured under two serious handicaps: it depended
entirely upon the voluntary contributions of local governments
and private corporations to finance its operations, and like
other metropolitan planning agenCies,'public as well as private,
it could rely only on voluntary co-operation to carry out its
plans."
Another study in 1960 endorsed this view:(98)
"• • ~ the commission lacks real power. Its only weapon on such
matters as water priorities, zoning, and so forth, is its
informal network of contact with officials in city and county
.agencies • • •
Some observers feel that Regional Plan's (abbr. for DMARPC - my
addition) influence is being challenged by the formation of
county and even township plan commissions, jealous of their
jurisdictions and prerogatives."
The same writer refers to the frustrating situation faced by planners
on the RPC staff:(99).
"• • • the planners over-intellectual, impatient refusal to face
political realities • • • They have the ideas but they rely on the
hard sell much too much. You can't sell something to independent
localities and their officials unless these people playa part.
Technical brilliance is not enough."
As opposed to "planning" as the raison d'etre of the RPC, the
Supervisors Inter-County Committee (SICC) was conceived as an "action"
organisation. (100) The. instigators here were Ledyard Blakeman,
Executive Director of the RPC and Edward Connor, a Detroit Councilman
and Chairman of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors - both in
positions requiring them to struggle with regional level problems.
Discussions between Wayne, Oakland,Macomb, Monroe and Washtenaw
counties led to the constitution of the Sloe in 1954 (st. Clair joined
in 1955 and legal status was given by the State in 1957). Seven
members from each county made up the committee itself which was
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serviced by a small staff. The idea was that the SICC would make
recommendations to each individual County Board of Supervisors which
would implement their segments of SICC plans. The RPC was conceived
as the planning arm of the organisation. Sub-committees were
appointed on various topics - sewage and waste disposal, water,
recreation. The roads sub-committee was in fact constituted as the
S.E.. Michigan Inter-County Highway Commission made up of
representatives of the RPC, County Road Commissions, the County Boards
of Supervisors, and the State Highway Department. Deliberations here
led to the "Regional Highways" plan in 1958 (cf. p, 97f). But while
there was reasonable agreement on the need for a region-wide freeway
agenda (with the State Highway Department there to prod this along),
the relative weakness of the SICC in general was a pointer to future
problems in gaining consensus'on regional transportation policy. The
following assessment of the SICC was made in 1960:(101)
"• • • quite frankly the SICC avoids issues which are too contro-
versial and which might endanger the carefully established
working relationships in the six-county area. No effort, for
example, has been made to reduce the present multitude of police
departments. The certain opposition of the Sheriffs Association,
.local police departments, and suburbanites who want their own
police department, would obviously be too strong • • •
~All observers concede its accomplishments, but they argue that
for an action organisation, its major achievements seem remark-
ably concentrated in studies, sponsoring legislation, improving
relations within the region, and making recommendations. As one
observer noted, there have been endless studies about an airport
to the north-east of Detroit, but the whole area-may well be
-,- built up before anything is done. Another critic stressed that
the region lacks any institutional operating mechanism to solve
most of its problems. There is no certainty that any county will
:do its, share on a project. It is possible that it will do
nothing at allor, taking advantage of its knowledge of the
overall plan for regional development, will act to further its
own interests at the expense of others."
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One can see the friction, in other words, between the need for
reasonably efficient management and planning of the emergent
metropolis and the local class based interests of the constituent
local governments.
While the issue was one of efficiency, more so than stability (which
emerged in the sixties), and some sort of muddling through seemed
possible, it seems that business interests were content to more or
less accept the fragmented local government framework while nudging it
in the direction of regionalist approaches (approaches made necessary
on pragmatic grounds anyway). A brochure of ·the Area Development
Division of the Detroit Edison Company said in the late fifties of the
SICC:(102)
"...there is no desire to superimpose another governmental layer
on top of existing governments. Rather, the purpose and the
unique value of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee is to
fully utilize all the inherent strength of existing tools and
.agencies of government - to devise a means for putting them to
work to their fullest capability." (emphasis original)
In 1958, however, with the formation of the S.E. Michigan Metropolitan
Community Research Corporation, the groundwork was laid for a more
interventionist approach by regional Capital in the sixties. SEMMCRC
(mercifully renamed Metropolitan Fund Inc.) must be seen as a clear
expression of the 'interest~of'regional Capital' in regional planning
and organisation. It was originally a product of a $900,000 grant
from the Ford Foundation but broadened its financial support to
include many ~ther regional businesses. Funded primarily by business,
it was governed by a board drawn from business, labour, government and
uni versi ty. Its staff in the beginning undertook research dea ling
with specific problems of the region, requiring co-operation among
local governments. This role was subsequently to broaden out
considerably. (103)
Given that the bas i swas being laid in these years for 'major future
problems in regional organisation (including transportation), it seems
appropriate to consider the reasons for the absence of federal and
state intervention with respect to the "regionalist" issue in this
period. The overriding reason, of course, was that at this stage
regional fragmentation was not causing major problems. The state
Highway Department did not have much trouble in mobilising regional
support behind a Detroit area-wide highway agenda. Polarisation
between Detroit and the suburbs was to come later. At the federal
level, concern with metropolitan development had been apparent in the
Kestenbaum report to the President in 1955. This had advocated "the
need for metropolitan-wide planning as a basis for future development"
and challenged government and academia to provide "political
invention" which might fill the void.(104) But, in general, the
postwar period to 1965, Ghere has labelled as the "voluntary" period
for regionalism, during which 'the federal role was limited.(105)
Further reasons for the absence of state intervention (which is of
particular significance given the constitutional subordination of
local government to state government) would have to be sought in a
number of factors. One of these is the weakness of the state party
system where a strong separation of executive and legislative powers
at state level militates against the imposition of party diSCipline,
resulting in the replication of strong local interests in the state
legislature. Rural dominance in the state legislature prior to
reapportionment in the sixties undoubtedly contributed to a neglect of
, '
urban issues, not to mention the absence of focus which resulted from
-,.. ..,
fragmentation within the executive branch of Michigan state government
, '
itself before constitutional revision in the sixties. These are
matters to which I shall return later in considering the more inter-
~entionist state role in regional:ist issues in the sixties and the
limitations within which it occurred.
v 'f<
Public transportation was to move towards the centre of the policy
stage in the sixties and to move full centre in the seventies. In.this
period it was very much eclipsed, however, by the highway agenda
linked as it was to the broader dynamic of suburbani satdon, It will be
cons Ldered. here in' relation to: (a) Mass Transit: (b) Rapid
Transit.
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By way of background it is worth stating that between 1947 and 1970,
while the federal government spent $58 billion on highways, it spent
merely 795 million dollars on urban mass transit - and most of this
was in the sixties.(106)
Various private public transportation companies had merged in 1901 to
form the Detroit United Railways Company. This monopoly proceeded to
operate electric trolleys and railway cars, serving the city of
Detroit itself and the sur.rounddnq tri-county area. (107) During the
days of the old "inter-urban" system, it has been suggested that the
concept of the city of Detroit as the centre of a three-county
metropolitan region was in fact born.
"Just as electrification and extension of the old horsecar lines
made it possib~e for Detroiters who worked downtown to make their
homes in outlying subdivisions, the interurbans made it possible
to expand this trend to bedroom suburbs beyond the city
limits.,,(108)
Following a long, drawn-out debate over municipalisation, the city
portion of DUR (renamed Detroit Street Railways) was brought under the
public ownership of the city of Detroit in 1922. The issue was one of
. .
the deleterious effects of monopoly control - poor service and high
fares- voiced by passengers and major business interests alike. It
- .
had split major Detroit business interests - many being opposed to
public ownership in prinCiple.(109) There is a slight touch of irony
- .
in the support given to the municipalisation by Henry Ford, given that
by ,the mid-twenties his Model T was having its own deleterious effects
on public transport across the country. The legacy, however, was a
. .
city-run public transportation service.
Moving to the postwar period, the last Detroit streetcar was replaced
by a bus ·on April 7,.1956.(110) _The DSR had in fact long since staked
its future on a bus system. In reply to rapid transit advocates, the
DSR in August 1945 had submitted a report to the mayor and council,
entitled: .> ;'DSRModernization progr~".. It st~t~d:(111)
. .
,"Theultimate form of rapid transit will be by modern motor buses
. .
operating over the express highway network"(r~lating t<?the plan
of expressways endorsed by the City Plan Commission the previous
118 .
year)•
streetcar lines were paved over in the city and have now virtually
disappeared. The DSR (headed by a Commission appointed by the Mayor)
fell strongly in behind the highway agenda, and by 1960 had built up a
fleet of over 1,000 buses, providing the bulk of public transit
service in the region. However, a strong gap was opening up between
the city and the auto-dependent suburbs, which was to take on maj or
significance in the sixties. The DSR operated in Detroit, but only in
a few of the neighbouring jurisdictions. A number of private bus
companies did operate in the suburbs and transported commuters to and
from specified major points in the city, but the level of service was
-10wJ112) Moreover, the overall importance of public transportation
in fulfilling the region's needs was declining rapidly. In 1953 only
17% of all daily trips within the study area of the Detroit
Metropolitan Area Traffic Study were made b¥ means of mass
transi t.<113) In 1944 over 69% of passengers entering the downtown
business district were carried by mass transit. Just twelve years
later this percentage had declined to less than 40%. correspondingly,
during the same period, the percentage of passengers carried by
private autos and taxicabs rose from just under 34% to over 60%.(114)
Given the city's commitment to freeways and the dynamic of suburban-
isation generally, these statistics hold no surprises.
What is perhaps a little surprising is that in the midst of the
strength of the freeway-,agenda the city of Detroit did in fact have a
Rapid Transit Commission (of between four and six members appointed by
the-Mayor and a director chosen by the Commission) which argued
strongly for a rapid transit system for the City. One must go back
somewhat in time to pick up the background to this~- The first major
consideration of rapid transit in Detroit actually dates back to 1914,
when a.proposal for subway construction on three principal routes
(Woodward, 'Michigan, and Gratiot Avenues) was considered by the
Detroit Council.(115) The Rapid Transit Commission was established
with charter functions approved by Detroit voters in the early
twenties.(116) While this indicates that rapid transit was being
seriously considered, not much happened. The most concrete result was
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the allocation of a central space in the "superhighways" which were
constructed at this time for future rapid transit lines.(117)
Rapid transit in Detroit in the pre World War II period moved further-
est towards actualisation in the 1930's. (118) The inferences which
can be made concerning what happened are instructive in understanding
the special circumstances pertaining to rapid transit as a policy
issue in the postwar period. Following the release of funds for
municipal projects by the federal Public Works Administration, the
Detroit Rapid Transit Commission, with city administration approval,
pre-sented to the Detroit electorate in November 1933 a proposal for
two rapid transit subway/surface routes in the city - a Woodward Ave
and a n East-West Crosstown 'link. Thirty percent of the cost was to be
borne by outright federal grant, the remainder to be loaned by the
federal government and repaid over a thirty year period from transit
revenue. The construction and operational costs of the system were
not, therefore, to be borne by the city taxpayers • . The electorate
approved the scheme by a better than 2/3 majority. However, this is
as far as the scheme progressed. The state of Michigan Advisory Board
to the PWA disapproved the subsequent application disputing its
technical sufficiency regarding cost and revenue estimates. This
refusal could stand further investigation. The question of taxpayers'
.liability for the loan in the event of a shortfall in transit revenue
would have been an obvious consideration, but given the purpose of the
PWA perhaps not an overriding one. The decision would have to be
considered against other public works applications in Michigan which
were approved. It is the opinion of a later director of the Rapid
Transit Commission, however, that the project was "simply killed by
the auto companies in Washington"J 119) Given the purpose of the PWA
(job creation) and the strong support,for the project in Detroit, this
view seems plausible. The coolness, if not overt opposition, of the
Detroi t auto companies to rapid transit in Detroi t is in fact, as we
shall see, supported by other evidence.
In 1953, Mayor Cobo revived the Rapid Transit Commission and made new
appointments. In the opinion of the new director(120) the Mayor did
serious ly want to keep the option of rapid transit open for the city
and had in mind a balance between the auto and mass transit - but he
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did not have strong views on the matter of rapid transit and allowed
the Commission to take the lead. It was the Commissioners who were
outspoken on the issue. This was the time of the preparation of the
Carroll transportation study. Mayor Cobo did not insist on an
integration of rapid transit planning and highway planning, and in
fact, there was none. The balance in terms of momentum and of
resources for planning was unquestionably in favour of highways. The
Commission produced a report and rapid transit plan in 1958, based on
,a monorail system which in sheer scale (Map 20) represented an alter-
native and challenge to highways in the city of Detroit rather than an
attempt at balance.(121) In ,the late fifties it had the air of a
voice crying in the wilderness. As the director recognised, by this
time when a spread-out pattern of settlement was strongly establishing
itself, it was more difficult to argue for rapid transit, which
requires (and'promotes)a more compact pattern and/or a strong feeder-
-line bus service to transit stations. And bY,this time, the
. -,
Interstate Highway, Act had increased the momentum for freeways
further. ,By this time,' too, Cobo had been succeeded as Mayor by
Miriani,who 'was "downright cool" on the idea of rapid transit,
putting his faith, as cobo had come to do, in "Cobo's Canyons". (122)
The~958 rapid transit report, however, was so prophetic in its
,forecast as to the consequences'for the city without some form of
rapid transit in place, that it bears some further reflection. To
wit:(123)
"The trend to private vehicles and away from mass transportation,
in view of the great distance to be covered and the great need
for speed, is bound to continue and result in depreciating
, '
effects in the ~owntown area nad other shopping centres along
maj or streets. The need ,forrapid transit is incontrovertible
here• • •
Decentralisation of industry and commerce can b9 maintained at an
acceptable economic and planning level by rapid transit. Other-
wise, the entire property tax base of the city of Detroit will be
,vitally affected with the tax loss suffered in the downtown or
other commercial areas to be spread among the remainder of the
,
.taxpayers. Rapid transit will, of course, increase property
121
1958 RECOMMENDED RAPID TRANSIT PLAN
DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA
+
CITY of DETROIT
RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION
PRIMARY SECTION
............ SECONDARY SECTION
WIL' 5
? r , I •
values along its route in addition to the central district.
Rapid transit will also serve to help develop the metropolitan
area along certain generally desired patterns of land use. The
alternatives to rapid transit appear as a greater delcine in
business and tax values within the city of Detroit, and the
possible use of either an increased property tax levy or an
income or payroll tax on residents or workers within its bound-
aries in the future. However, the factors described above seem
sufficiently compelling to impress one with the real need that
exists for rapid transit at present in the Detroit Metropolitan
Area. To delay unduly may result in irreparable loss• • •"
Without a doubt, the preservation and stimulation of important
property values for the sake of the entire community and the need
for rapid transit become most vividly apparent in an examination
of the downtown business district."
In view of such a strong warning, at the risk of repetition, it seems
appropriate to ask again why the city administration during this time
did not take more heed. There were, it seems two major competing (if
unequal) views on the effects of freeways on the central city and CED
in particular. The first, represented by the views of the Detroit RTC
(or at least the director as author of the report) just expressed,
harkened to the view of Lewis Mumford (cf. p. 96). The second was
bound up with the general attractiveness and dynamic of the freeway
agenda as hasbeen discussed as the basis for regional development. In
this model the continued viability of the CBD necessitated service by
the freeways. But there was an element of faith involved, certainly
in the case of Detroit. Urban renewal in Detroit was based on a large
dose of "faith". A report of the Michigan state Highway Department as
ear ly as 1941, for example, in arguing for "a comprehensi ve plan of
motorways for Detroit", asked:(124)
"Will for.instance, the provision of high'speed, high volume
motorways encourage and further the outward migration of
population and values to fringe areas?"
The answer was uncertain: (125)
"The answer to .thatquestion is that the provision of such
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arteries in themselves will not prevent such migration any more
than the lack of them has prevented it in the past. The fact
remains that if people are to reside within the city in
sufficient numbers to support its institutions and services the
intra-city areas must be made sufficiently convenient and
attractive to induce them to stay there."
One should not, however, overlook the fact that, while at the national
level there was in the fifties, as Mollenkopf points out, agreement by
major corporate and municipal interests on the need for the Interstate
Highway programme and urban renwal as the two basic instruments for
transforming urban space, this came on top of major rapid transit
systems a~ready in place in many cities or completed in the fifties.
There was not a universal reliance on freeways to service CBOs alone.
The systems in Manhattan and Brooklyn, Philadelphia and Chicago had
gone in around the turn of the century. Chicago completed a major
additon in 1951 and Cleveland completed a 13 mile extension of its
rapid transit system in 1955,(126)
The failure of rapid transit to establish itself in Detroit in the
fifties, even in the face of dire warning, can be attributed, it is
suggested, .in particular to two factors:
(1) The relative weakness, as I have already noted, of the Detroit
CBD (cf.PP• .l09f; Clevelandas one raayal.sonote,has always sprouted major
corporate headquarters - most notably Standard Oil - in its downtown
business district.) This undoubtedly made the case for rapid transit
less pressing, and made the argument that freeways were the priority
and would in fact, combined with urban renewal, be enough to bolster
the CBD without rapid transit more convincing to Detroit politicians.
(2) Oivision amongst CBO interests and regional capital on the issue.
This is slightly more speculative. The Central Business District
Association in Detroit had actually been formed in 1922 with one of
its major aims being to lobby for a Detroit subway.(127) In the
fifties, important downtown interests were represented on the RTC
(Michigan Bell, Bank of the Commonwealth, E.J. Harris - owner of the
Guardian and Book buildings).(128) But in the opinion of the RTC
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director,(129) G.M. and Chrysler were opposed to rapid transit in
Detroit. (The Ford Motor Company, which did have a representative on
the RTC,was "sitting on the fence and hedgingits bets", given that at
this time it was experimenting itself with rapid transit development.)
The relationship between these corporations and their respective banks
in the CBD (Manufacturers and Detroit Bank and Trust) also comes into
play. The Detroit RTC did submit in 1961 a proposal to the newly
created federal Area Redevelopment Administration (later Economic
Development Administration) for a Woodward Avenue Rapid Transit line.
In the opinion of the RTC Director, major reasons for the proposal's
rejection were not only the lukewarm support of Mayor Miriani, but
actual lobbying against by G.M. and Chrysler in Washington. Such
behind the scenes 'maneuvering is difficult to trace, but the idea of
opposition from the major auto companies to a subway as a mode of
transportation in the Motor City is intuitively very plausible, given
the possible symoblic impact on the demand for automobiles. Certainly
as we shall see, the Big Three have never publicly come out in favour
of rapid transit in Detroit. It is certain in any case that city of
Detroit politicians at this time, before the economic demise of the
city really set it, and when the prosperity of the region was so
. ,
obviously tied to the auto industry (brought home painfully in the
1958 recession), would have a natural bias in favour of endorsing
Detroit's own product.
..
. ,
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(a) Introduction
In 1961 Jerome Cavanagh with 85% of the black vote defeated the
incumbent Mayor of Detroit, Louis Miriani, who enjoyed the strong
support of both business and Labour groups_(1) Cavanagh had
campaigned on the issue of the decline of the city of Detroit's
fortunes in relation to the growing suburbs (including an expression
of interest in rapid transit for the city)(2) and had tapped into "the
discontent generated by the backwater of the urban economy,,_(3) In
the 1969 mayoral election in a racially charged atmosphere, Roman
Gribb won an extremely narrow victory over his black opponent drawing
on the last of the white majority within the city.(4) And in January
1974, Coleman Young, almost inevitably, took office as Detroit's first
black Mayor. It is thus particularly in relation to the dynamics of
the move to black control that one must considerthe transportation
planning and policy framework from the early sixties to early
seventies.
(b) The Riots of 1967
Standing out in the landscape of this period are the riots in Detroit
in the summer of 1967. ' Since the potential for discord, which was
actualised in extreme form in these events, was to influence
subsequent transportation and related policy in the region rather
dramatically and had even influenced it prior to the eruption itself,
I will, therefore, pause for a moment to consider these events. The
details have been chronicled elsewhere:(5) The inunediatelegacy in
what the New York Times described as "the most costly Negro riot in
American history,,(6)'included 41 dead, 347 injured, 3800-arrested and
5000 homeless. Damage estimates settled around the $45 million mark.
The 1967 conflagration could not be written off as an aberatory blip
caused by the tensions inherent in the resource scarce (particularly
as regards housing) conditions of war time Detroit. In any case the
black populati6n'in the city had more than quadrupled since its
150,000 mark in 1943 and represented approximately 40% of the city
total as opposed to under 10% in 1943.(7)'In 1951 an urban historian
~
wrote'of Detroit that "in no other urban community does the fact that
he is a negro so little determine for him his residence, 'occupation,
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recreation or educational opportunity",(8) Events in 1967 put paid to
any such remaining illusions. Mollenkopf(9) has linked the wave of
urban riots in America between 1964 and 1968 very strongly to the
disruption caused by urban renewal projects and more generally the
coalition of forces which supported the physical restructuring of
urban space. While this was certainly an aggravating factor (the
riots in Detroit started in the Twelfth street area, part of the Wayne
state University urban renewal project),(10) there is a danger in
conceiving the dynamiC of change too narrowly. The causes of the
urban revol ts were wide and deep. In summarising them the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders said afterwards:(11)
"Race prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now
threatens to affect our future. White racism is essentially
responsible for the explosive ~ixture which has been accumulating
in our cities since the end of World War II. Among the
ingredients of this mixture are:
1. Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment,
education and housing, which have resulted in the continuing
exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefits of
economic progress.
2. Black in-migration and white exodus, which have produced the
massive and growing concentrations of improverished Negroes in
our major cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating
facilities and services and unmet human needs.
3. The black ghettoes where segregation and poverty converge on
the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime,
drug addiction, dependency on' welfare,' and bitterness and
resentment against society in general and white socf.ety "in
particular are the result.
At the same time, most whites and some Negroes outside the ghetto
have prospered"to a degree unparall~led in the history of
civilisation. 'Through television and other media, this afffuence
has been flaunted before the eyes of the'Negro poor and the
jobless ghetto youth."
The Report mentions other "catalytic" factors including the "great
judicial and legislative victories of the Civil Rights Movement,,(12)
(on July 23, 1963, a massive civil rights march led by Rev.'Martin
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Luther King took place in Detroit) and the police which had "come to
symbolize white power, white racism and white repression" (13) (the
Detroit revolt was sparked off by a police raid on an inner city
''blindpig" illegal bar).
(c) Federal and state Context
I will return,to the impact of the riots and the dynamic of
transportation policy and its wider context shortly. Given the marked
increase, however, of both federal and Mich~gan State government
intervention into issues of metropolitan development and social policy
which again reverberated in important ways on the dynamiC of trans-
portation policy in Detroit, it seems appropriate to make some general
comments here at the start. Taking the federal role first, to quote
from a report of the influential Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
menta I Relations (ACIR):(14)
"The period since about 1960 has been an era of dramatic, even
drastic change in American federalism. The key fact, in a host
of fields, has been the emergence of the,national government as
an important - sometimes even the senior partner in determining
domestic policies, providing funds, or setting administrati ve
standards".
.
Castells, (15) in attempting to ascertain the fundamental political
impulse behind this development, sees the most enlightened fraction of
the establishment coming together in the sixties to support a new
reformist strategy which would "help to preserve the most precious
advantage of U.S. capital: the stability of the exploitative social
order"•
"... in, the late fifties, the most enlightened sector of the
ruling class realised that the model of deveiopment required
social reforms and that they had the political strength to carry
their ..reforms out·without,any trouble. The purpose: to enlarge
their social base, to increase their political and ideological
legitimization, to modernize the economy by rectifying mechanisms
of overexploitation that were only required by backward sectors
of capital.... Yet the whole rationality of this strategy did
not convince a significant proportion of the American rulers, the
implementation of their policies was not a structural necessity
but the resul t of a political struggle (the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy
election) that gave a narrow victory to a man who was at the same
time the candidate of the Establishment and the hope of the over-
exploi ted against short-sighted "middle America".(16)
It was an outlook and vision that can be seen as conducive to more
widespread criticism of the model of metropolitan development, even
before the eruption of urban violence which testified to the validity
of the fears behind it. The inner cities, BS Castells puts it,
through the "Great Society" and "War on Poverty", became the "battle-
ground of th~ new reformers".(17) The outlook came to e~brace the
symoblic importance of cities to "the most enlightened sector of the
ruling class", to use Castell's term.(18) President Johnson
proclaimed that 1966 could be the year that "set in motion forces of
change in great urban areas which will make them the masterpieces of
our civilisation".(19)
Echoes of this feeling - combining both a social and physical
conception of "the city" - could be seen in a special issue of the
journal of the National League of Cities - "Nation's Cities -
published in April the ,following year,(20) It represented the
thinking of a panel,of 33 urban experts (including Mayor cavanagh of
Detroit and other Mayors, the Ford Foundation, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, representatives from universities, the American Institute of
Planners and government generally). To wit,
on the social,side:(2~)
"All our urban institutions must work together to make tomorrow's
City a place where each citizen will have a chance to achieve his
own full potential in an atmosphere of freedom, opportuni~y,
openness, community, and, let us hope, culture • • • • ,
There is no reason why our central cities should be abandoned to
the poor and the disadvantaged, or why they should be stuck with
so much more than their share of the problems of poverty and
segregation."
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Andon the physical side: (22)
"• • • there is no earthly reason whyAmerican cities should have
to be dull or ugly or dirty or polluted or traffic-choked or
expensive to live and work in.
There is no reason whycities should sprawl far out beyond their
boundaries to blight the countryside with leap-fragging and
premature subdivision."
The AIP President added:(23)
"Sprawl city... is too wasteful because you duplicate your
services, your streets, your·utilities, all the civic functions
people pay for in taxes. You spread them out thin; you use up
your land. In the process you destroy the countryside and waste
our heritage."
Lewis Mumfordhad pointed out the potential for such problems with the
emerging metropolitan form ten years previous ly.c24) And in 1957 the
editors of Fortune Magazine (which usually takes an enlightened Big
Capital outlook on issues of the day), had actually sponsored a book
on the aesthetic', environmental and efficiency problems of the
"exploding metro~olis~(25) But only in the sixties with chickens
coming hom~rto roost and with a more liberal political climate were
such views more fashionable (even if not strong enought to undermine
the freeway agenda in cities).
J> turn now to somegeneral considerations of Michigan State govern-
ment and politics over this period. Until recently state governments
in the U.s. have been relatively neglected as objects of study.(26)
With the rise 'of a national economy'and the expansion in the role of
the federal government, especially since the NewDeal, through its
de 1ega ted consti tutiona 1 powers over' intersta te commerce,
international affairs and "the general welfare", attention has
focussed there. But in matters of domestic managementstate govern-
ments have major powers.(27) As O'Connor(28)points out, however, at
the state level one finds absent the far reaching avenues of
collective monopoly capitalist power and influence present at the
federal level: .
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"Businessmen, labour officials, professional groups, lobbyists,
visit the State capital not to represent an abstract 'social
order as a whole' but rather to advance the interests of
industry, trade, or corporation."
The Michigan Manufacturers Association and Michigan Chamber of
Commerce tend to restrict their interest in Lansing to matters of a
fairly direct impact on business.··The closest to what might be termed
a more broadly socially conscious monopoly capitalist organ of
infIuence is the Citizens Research Counci1 of Michigan which ·\·,illbe
touched onlater.
In general terms the tenor of Michigan politics can be characterised
as derived from the definition of problems and issues thrown up by a
heavily industrialised and moreover highly unionised economy.
Michigan has been the most heavily unionised state in the country.(29)
In the postwar period, conservative rural and Republican party bias in
the State Senate until reapportionment in the sixties not with-
standing, the centre of Michigan politics swung sharply to the left.
Envigorated by strong union input - in particular from the UAW - G.
Meenen Williams won the Governorship for the Democrats in 1948. He
has been credited wit~givingrespectability to SOCially activist
government "pulling Michigan and despite all the screaming and yelling
of the o~-cart era legislature - into the twentieth ceritury".(30)
When George Romney won the Governorship back for the Republicans in
;,., • I
1962 he pulled the Republican party ~ heavily dominated by big
business and the auto companies in particular - into the centre with
him. In the 1964 pre~identi~l election Romney "accepted" but did not
endorse" Goldwater as'the Republican candidate.(31) Governor Milliken
on taking office in 1969 continued. the mode rat;e,m~ddle of the road
approach for the Republicans and James Blanchard, a moderate Democrat,
defeated a Republican candidate considerably to the right of Milliken
to win gubernatorial office in 1982. Roots in the automobile industry
have been common to both parties:(32)
"Both Republican and Democratic party organisations, from
pr~cinct to county to state level, were to a considerable extent
staffed, and on key issues guided, by men prominent in the auto-
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motive industry, with Republicans drawing heavily from management
ranks and Democrats similarly supported by labour. This was
unique to Michigan."
The degree of moderation in Michigan politics, however, should not be
overstated. Organised labour cannot get too ahead of the attitudes of
its members. In 1972 George Wallace won a 51% victory in Michigan in
a racially charged campaign heavily coloured by anti-busing hostility
espeCially in Detroit.(33) In the words of one reviewer of the
Michigan political scene:(34)
"In a sense, the UAW is a victim of its own success • • • most UAW
workers are property owners, own homes in suburbs, snowmobiles,
vacation land in northern Michigan • • • its not certain that the
UAW's one million plus members, many of them comfortably middle
class, really want a program of militant political action for
social change • • •"
The relationship here at the State level to the political fracturing
I have described inS.E. Michigan, is an important one as regards
understanding the policy milieu surrounding transportation issues (and
many other issues) in Detroit. S.E. Michigan accounts for one half of
the population represented in the State legislature - and that
fracturing is projected to the State level with the Michigan
legislature being.in important ways a legislature for S.E. Michiga~
The projection of regional level antagonisms to the state level is
accentuated by the fact that in Michigan, State legislators rely
heavily on their own staffs and fund raising to obtain office. Thus
when elected to a large extent they_ feel independent of party
diSCipline, which is difficult to maintain.(35) A survey of Michigan
legislators has led to the following assessment:(36)
"A few of the legislators indicated that responding to the needs
of the state, rather than limiting themselves to their own local
constituents, was of greabimportance; however, that view was
..rare. Essentially, the legislators focused their efforts on the
passage of good legislation and on meeting the needs of their
constitutents."
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According to the same survey of legislators, the major conflicts felt
in the legislature were liberal versus conservative allegiances,
conflicts between cities and rural areas, cities and suburbs, Detroit
and the rest of the state and between the legislature and the
Executive.(37)
The view has been expressed that since reapportionment in Michigan in
the mid sixties,(38)the city of Detroit has traded rural indifference
for suburban hostility - that while the rural legislator may have been
ignorant of city problems, the suburban legislator represents those
who have often left the city as an act of choice and resent inner city
problems.(39)
Some other general points in relation to state government require
appreciation in order to understand its role in relation to the
dynamic of regional transportation policy in Detroit during this time.
They all relate in one way or another to problems of co-ordination in
state policy making. Firstly, although this has diminished in the
last 20 years, there is the matter of fracture within the Executive
function itself~ Before adoption by the electorate of a new
constitution in 1963 there were over 120 agencies and departments
making up the Executive branch. The new constitution established a
limi~of-20 departments.(40) In addition, before constitutional
revision, in the Jacksonian tradition, the Governor shared executive
authority with a large number of elected officials including the
Director of the Michigan Highways Department. While the new
constitution much strengthened the position of the Governor, necessary
to manage a much expanded State role, the Governor still has only
- , -
indirect appointive power through Commissions in the-important state
departments of Education and Natural Resources (in addition, the
Attorney General and 'Secretary of State continu~ to be elected
independently). The Governor only obtained the authority to appoint
the director of the renamed Michigan Transportation Department in
1978. Even more significant for this research focus, is the bias
against comprehensi ve ph~~ical planning by state government in
Michigan - comprehensive in both the sense of supra-local areawide
approaches'imposed by state government on local governments without
th~ir consent and, linked to this, difficulties in co-ordination
-
13
between various dimensions of physical planning in Michigan (sewers,
transportation, housing, land-use etc.) by State government. When in
october 1962 the state of Michigan accepted a $752,000 grant from the
federal government to engage in limited comprehensive physical
planning, it was only after the Governor's staff had creatively
juggled with existing statutory authority to enable the executive
branch to accept and spend the grant. Governor Swainson knew that a
request to the legislature for broader legislative authority would be
turned down.(41)
- In 1937, in the New Deal days, the Michigan legislature had
established an official Michigan Planning Commission, not only to act
as a screening committee for federal aid programmes but with broad
powers concerning the co-ordination of physical planning in the state.
It was, as laid down in the legislation (PA218 of 1937), "to act as
the State's official agency for co-ordinating agencies and programs
relating to public works, land, water control and other areas". The
Commission was abolished in 1947 and replaced by a Department of
Economic Development. The legislation accomplishing this is
interesting because it exhibits the strength of hostile feeling that
the Commission had engendered. It says (PA302 of 1947):
"... this act shall in no way re-establish the work of the
Michigan Planning Commission.,,(42)
Roman, in reviewing the evidence, casts the 1947 decision in the
atmosphere of "anti-planning hysteria" linked to a "strong reaction
against the New Deal • • •Legislators whose philosophy was basically
against state and federal planning used the opportunity to kill
planning per se".(43) Staff members of the new Depar'tment;of Economic
Development were instructed by their Director to avoid even the
mention of "planning". Free market ideology can be seen combining
here with strong local interests united behind the notion of local
autonomy. In that stronger comprehensive physical planning powers
would increase executive power in'relation to the legislature,
Jacksonian ideas regarding the over-concentration of power also come
into play. Jumping ahead slightly, the strength of "localism" and the
suspicion with which th~ legislature can look upon accretions to
executive power were certainly factors in the unravelling, within 3-4
•
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years, of the Programme Budget Evaluation System introduced by
Governor Milliken in 1973.(44)
(d) Economic, Demographic and Spatial Change
In exploring regional transportation policy proper during this period,
it is useful to start by locating it with respect to €conomic,
demographic and spatial changes in the region during the sixties and
early seventies. A central question to keep in mind here is why, when
the hoped for beneficial effects of freeway construction on the city
of Detroit did not materialise (this was a period of large-scale
construction), was a more active stance against freeways not taken by
city policy makers?
The overriding economic feature of this period was economic growth in
the "affluent" or "consumer" society. Between 1961 (the year of
cavanagh's election) and 1973 (the year of Young's election) the total
of wage and salary income in Michigan in real terms had increased by
78%. Per capita income in Michigan in real terms had increased by
52.5%.(45) And per capita income levels in the Detroit region in the
early seventies were considerably above that for Michigan as a
whole. (46)
The economy of the Detroit region was, despite strong growth in
service employment (Table 1), still heavily tied to manufacturing
(37.4% of the workforce versus 27.3% for the u.s. - Table 1) and
especially to the manufacture of transportation equipment where
Detroit, compared to the nation as a whole, had a 'location quotient of
12.97 in 1970,(47) In 1973, U.S. production of motor vehicles
.,~
achieved a record level of over 12! million vehicles. This was up
drastically from levels hovering around the six and seven million mark
in the late fifties and beginning of the sixties.(48) Table 10 shows
, '
the distribution of 1973 motor vehicle production in the United
\' .. , :',., . > •
States. Michigan accounted for one third of the total (three times
that of its nearest rival Missouri) and the Detroit region itself for
. :' .i , ~
almost one-quarter divided amongst the Big 3 automakers. Despite the
far flung multi-national interests of the Big 3'(Table 11), Detroit
rdeserved its title of "the Motor City". The unemployment level in the
Detroit region tended to fluctuate considerably more than the national
average (Table 12), given the volatility in demand for major consumer
goods, but it is not difficult to appreciate how it could be generally
accepted that the surge in prosperity in the Detroit region (and
indeed in the nation as a whole where one job in six has been linked
directly or indirectly to the automobi Le industry) (49) was closely
bound up with the success of the auto industry.
The physical focus of the region's economic growth, however, was in
the suburbs. The city of Detroit suffered a massive decline in its
economic base over this period. The city proportion of regional
employment declined dramatically in the manufacturing, retail,
wholesale and service sectors between 1962 and 1972 (TablelN and this
represented not just a major increase in employment in the suburbs but
a major reduction in the absolute number of both firms and persons
employed in these sectors within the city itself (Table3B&3C).Table 13
shows the change in the real value of taxable property in the city of
Detroit and balance of Wayne County between 1959 and 1969. The
figures are quite staggering. The balance of Wayne County's taxable
base increased by 82% moving from being considerably less than half of
that of Detroit to being somewhat more. Meanwhile the taxable base of
Detroit declined in real terms by well over $2 billion - a decline of
31%. The decade of the sixties did see the construction of almost 3
million sq.feet of office floorspace in the city but this was out-
stripped by the over si million sq.feet that sprang up in the suburb
of Southfield (Table 14). Unemployment in the city of Detroit tended
to be higher than in the rest of the region - in fact inflating
regional statistics (which include Detroit), leading-to an under-
statement of the divergence in official statistics (Table 12). It has
been estimated that in 1967 the unemployment rate for whites within
the city of Detroit was 2.7% while for blacks it ;'as9.6%.(50)
Table 4 and Map 21 provide a summary of percentage population change
in the Detroit region 1960-1970. While the 7 county region grew by
approximately 700,000 most of this was concentrated in the balance of
the core counties (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb but excluding the city of
_.
Detroit) which grew by almost 600,000 - an increase of over 28%. The
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population of the city of Detroit fell by another 150,000 to give a
1970 figure just over the 1.5 million mark (Table4A). White exodus
and black in-migration had increased the minority population of
Detroit from 29% in 1960 to 44.5% in 1970 (Table 6). And black
suburbanisation had made no major inroads (Table 6, column 7). The
sixties saw fourteen more city incorporations (Table 7) and by the
beginning of the seventies this particular form of defensive ploy had
more or less run its course. Sterling Heights in Macomb County, which
incorporated in 1968 (Table 7) particularly stands out, in that from a
population base of 14,600 it added over 46,700 people in 10 years -
the fastest rate of growth (320%) of any jurisdiction during this
time. In doing so, it still registered a minority population of only
0.5% in 1970 (Table 6). Many more people in 1970 were living and
working in the suburbs, and significantly the percentage of people
living in Detroit but working outside the city jumped to over 31% from
17% between 1960 and 1970 (Table 5). And in terms of the spread of
the bui 1t environment in the core area during this time, by the mid
and late sixties development from the Detroit area was merging with
development from Pontiac and Mount Clemens. The areas between the
"spokes" or corridors which are identifiable on the 1955 land use map
(Map 4) were "filling up" and forming a solid mass around the city of
Detroit and much of the outlying area.(51) By the mid sixties quite
an elaborate network of freeways was taking shape in the region (Map
16). It is specifically to an examination of the transportation
policy agenda during this time that I now turn. The broad nature of
the argument advanced is that, particularly, given the rift that was
opening up between Detroit and the suburbs, the agenda can only be
understood in relation to a "regionalist" agenda being pushed
especially by Big Capital in the area and also in rel~tion to the
economic development agenda of the city of Detroit in tandem with
various federal and State programmes of "relief", problematic in
nature, aimed at the City and its inhabitants. The agenda must be
seen as cast in this broader light before the riots but especially so
afterwards. It is inside this context thatone must locate the work of
planners. I will consider the freeway agenda and public transport-
ation agenda in turn.
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(e) The Freeway Agenda and Rapid Transit
I start with a simple inventory of construction over the period.
Maps 14 and 16 provide a comparison of the operational network in 1955
and 1965. Given the long lead times in major construction projects of
this sort, much of the actual construction took place in the early
sixties. Maps 22 and 23 indicate construction in the region and in
downtown Detroit 1965-69.(52} The major additions within the city of
Detroit during the sixties were completion of the I-75 segments north
through the city to Pontiac (the Chrysler freeway), northeast from
the city's border to the Ambassador Bridge (the Fisher Freeway), and a
connection looping the CBD and joinging the Lodge and Chrysler free-
ways (also part of the Fisher freeway). By the beginning of 1974,
when Young took office, the freeway system in downtown Detroit was
largely complete. The last link in I-75, from the Ambassador Bridge
and tying into the CBD loop, was in service by .1970 (Map 23).
Construction in 1970 was well advanced on the Jefferies freeway - I-96
- a 22 mile stretch northwest and west out of Detroit through Livonia
into western wa~e County.C53} About half of the I-96 mileage within
the city of Detroit was open by 1974 with work well underway on the
rest (Maps 23 and 24).
The rationale behind the freeway agenda in Detroit in the sixties can
be seen through an examination of the major transportation planning
study which took place during those years - the Detroit Transportation
and Land Use Study (TALUS). The actual organisational form which the
study took, indicated problems inherent in regional planning and
organisation generally in Detroit - no regional planning body existed
with sufficient resources and organisational .ability to take it on•
.The study, which officially got under way in July t965,(54} was
technically carried out under the auspices of the Detroit Metropolitan
Regional Planning Commission but was structured as a self-contained
project with/its own staff, accounting system and policy making body
drawn from County Road Commissions and Boards of Supervisors, the city
of Detroit, State and federal government and from the big Capital
..organisation Metropolitan Fund Inc. The major organisational impetus
came from the state Highway Department responding in particular to the
,"
Federal Highway Act of 1962, which required a "continuing,
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comprehensive transportation planning process" as a condition of
continued receipt of Federal Aid Highway funds for urban and
metropolitan highway projects. Interim funding was provided by the
Metropolitan Fund, with the actual $3.6 million budget for the study
proper (lithemost ambitious planning project ever undertaken in the
Detroit region")(55) relying on a combination of federal, state and
local sources (the counties and the city of Detroit).
The TALUS Study Design(56) stated that the project was designed to:
"1. Produce a coordinated plan to guide future land use and the
development of a balanced transportation system - including mass
transit, highways, rail, water and air facilities - to serve the
needs of the 1990 Metropolitan Region, and
2. Develop a planning process and structure which will assist in
the implementation of the plan and continue to make the
evaluations, refinements, adjustments and projections necessary
to keep the plan current." i
The TALUS study was driven by the concept of growth - both in terms of
population and the economy. It had the confidence to state when
published in 1969:
"As our productivity rises, distribution, rather than production
of consumer goods, becomes the problem"(57,)
It forecast a 57% increase in the 7 county SEMCOG regional population
from 4.4 million to 6.9 million in 1990. This would be accompanied by
a projected 66% increase in jobs, a doubling of total trips and a
trebling of total household income.(58) The study, on the basis of
assumptions and a plan making procedure which shall be -examinedin a
moment, accepted the trend towards a "spread out" region. It called
for an addition to the 1965 network of 153 miles ~f new freeway by
1975 (which included existing commitments of the state Highway
Department - Map 24) and an additional 194 miles between 1975 and
1990. ,The recommended 1990 freeway network is shown on Map 25. This
was in addition to improvement and construction of 670 miles of major
regional arterial roads by 1990.(59)
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TALUS argued for the development of 9 "metrocenters" in outlying parts
of the region. These would be:
".... Deliberately conceived and carefully planned communities
ranging from 25,000 to 100,000 in population, providing
commercial, cultural and educational activities within or close
by, and offering a variety of housing types to accommodate a wide
range of households in different life cycle, income and ethnic
groupings.,,(60)
The report recommended a major upgrading of the region's public
transit system'(61) It supported the consolidation of the region's
existing bus systems (paralleling a major initiative here by
Metropolitan Fund). It recommended that "detailed and serious
consideration" be given to an 81 mile rapid transit system (Map
26).(62) But public transportation was not seen as competing with the
automobile:(63). .
"The recommended (public) transportation improvements are
designed to provide increased mobility for those people who are
either primarily or entirely dependent on public transportation.
The recommended system is designed to provide access from low-
income and high unemployment and sub-employment areas to places
where jobs exist now and where jobs can be expected to be located
in the future; .to provide better access to recreation and
regional facilities from areas such as those, and to provide
increased mobility for the young and the old • • • • However, the
extent to which trips will be diverted from the automobile is
speculative, and it is unrealistic to try to justify a major
investment in public transportation on the basis of pro,viding
significant relief of highway congestion or substantial reduction
of highway demands."
While transit travel constituted 5% of total trips in-the region
according to TALUS calculations, this was forecast as falling to 3% of
total trips in 1990.(64) Other recommendations concerned the
provision of other infrastructural investments (water, sewers) and
recreational open space. 'The report contains many statements alluding
to the special importance of the problems of Detroit:(65)
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"• • • the most critical problems are those of the people who live
in Detroit and other central cities of the region".
It refers to the goal of the
"... achievement of an integrated society, which provides
residential opportunities throughout the region for people in
differential racial, social and economic groups".
The plan aimed
"to be reasonably sensiti ve to what is happening in the region
and to what people want".(66)
It stated:
"The general goal is 'to improve the quality of the environment'.
Somewhat less generally, it is our goal to enable the individual
to fulfill himself, to enable individuals and households to
select from a variety of residential locational and housing type
alternatives, to provide a region which is characterized by
diversity, difference, opportunity; a region which increasingly
becomes a more attractive and satisfactory place in which to
live, work, recreate and visit".(67)
There was no question, however, that a major expansion of the regional
freeway network was taken as a given. The following extract is again
taken from the goals section of the report:(68)
'~he first requirement in order to meet total travel demands
within the Detroit Metropolitan'Region is an extensive and
effective highway system. This requires a complex of freeways,
maj or arterial s, and collector and distributor roads.
Construction, programming and planning of regional freeways in
the Southeast Michigan area is already well advanced. The plans
to carry these to completion and supplement the system must be
strongly supported."
As far as the plan making methodology can be inferred from the report,
it invol ved the feeding of transit demand assumptions via computer
modelling into four or.five stylized land use and transit plans which
could be subsequently refined, based on such results. This formed the
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basis of discussions especially at the county level with planners and
with "citizen involvement".
"...sectoral decisions on the land use directions were based on
the most relevant combinations of public policy that were
applicable and relied heavily on county level critique and
feedback".(69)
Successive refinements followed, using "evaluation and feedback". The
process used
"• • • the planners knowledge and judgement to create desirable
land use configurations and supporting transportation systems,
given the goals which the region's policymakers chose to pursue."
The planner had the
"• • • role of interpretation between generalized goal statements
and the specification of preferred spatial distribution of
activities".(70)
Whatever the social idealism of the planners who worked on TALUS
happened to be (significantly the project was started before the 1967
riots and finished afterwards), there can be little doubt that the
actual impact of TALUS was to provide a rationale for freeway
construction and little else - this was the only aspect tied to the
assurance of substantial implementation, supported as it was by the
County Road Commissions, State Highway Department and backed up with
,
federal interstate funding. TALUS represents the last carte blanche
given to highway planners in the Detroit region. On implementation
generally TALUS stated (despite the explicit emphasis on
implementation as inherent to the project in the Study Design):(71)
"• • • there mustbe a program designed to assure implementation of
the plan. Otherwise, TALUS will have been an expensive exercise
in futility".
The racially balanced "metrocenters" never developed. Concerning the
downtown Detroit "core", the report stated:(72)
"A variety of environments are to be provided within the core. A
system of neighborhoods would be developed whereby the individual
will be able to effectively identify with their surroundings. A
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system of quiet parks and open spaces are planned where residents
can find solitude within their intense environment precluding a
need for escape."
Such "empty" recommendations are typical of the report which assumed
tha t with enough resources and wi 11 (a1though not speci fying where
they were to come from) the interests of Detroit and suburbs were
reconcilable in a consensual whole which included first and foremost a
major expansion of the regional freeway agenda. The report contained
no fundamental reappraisal of Detroit's relationship to the suburbs in
the actual model of development which was unfolding, as opposed to an
but without
The weighty
. .'
idealized one which planners held up as possible,
specifying the concrete steps to getting there.
responsibility of implementation was primarily allocated to the newly
created Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments (pp.157f):
"Implementation of the Plan requires that SEMCOG staff and
.officials have the information required to respond to regional
issues; and that they be wi lling to take positions where
appropriate. A lengthy and expensive process has been required
to get from an awareness of the need for regiona 1 planning to a
regional Plan. Unless the point of view which the Plan
represents is articuilated, there is not much likelihood that it
will be implemented to a significant degree.,,(73)
Al though a massi ve rapid transit system, as has been indicated, was
advocated, it is hard not to regard this as yet another piece of
elaborate, i.dealisticwindow dressing to make the basic.freeway agenda
more palatable, espeCially to the city of Detroit. The TALUS director
was not a strong supporter of the proposal. He is careful in inter-
. • . ...
view to point out that TALUS only said that "detailed and serious
consideration" be given to a rapid transit system. This it does. Yet
in other sections of the report, rapid transit is referred to as an
integr".al.part of the total' transportation .plan.(74) The report
. .
expresses ambivalence, to say the least. On balance, it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the proposal was put forward simply as
the TALUS director says, as an idea for consideration - that if the
affluent society could afford it then "what the heck". The decision
belonged elsewhere:
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"A public investment of this magnitude, however large a
proportion might be borne by Federal and State grants, requires
careful eval ua tion. At some point in time, if these
recommendations are to be carried to implementation, the
electorate will make the decision and will weigh the anticipated
benefits against the predicted costs."(75)
Ultimately.the report said, "the decision will depend on the avail-
ability of funds".(76) The former Director of the Detroit Rapid
Transit Commission certainly did not take the reference to rapid
transit in TALUS too seriously:(77)
"It is my impression that rapid transit was incorporated into the
TALUS report simply because of the '67 riots. The real objective
was highways".
The structural functionalist packaging then of TALUS must be seen as .
even more stark than in the Carroll plan. While conflict is recog-
nised it is simply swept into the spurious harmonious whole of the
plan which thus provided a mantle of legitimacy for those interests
which were capable of realization. The structural functionalist
underpinning of TALUS must besought, it is suggested, not in any
deliberate attempt to deceive but in the ability of dominant interests
to present themselves as generalizable ones thus framing the cont~t
for planning action and in the idealist strain in planning which lends
itself to an uncritical acceptance of such generalization.
It is understandable that the city of Detroit would not wish to be
excluded from participation in such a major planning exercise as
TALUS, the bias towards freeways notwithstanding. But why did the
City administration not take a more active stance against freeways in
the city of Detroit during this time and in favour of some form of
rapid transit as mentioned in cavanagh's electoral campaign in 1960?
In the words of the city controller in the Cavanagh administration,
the mayor was "sour on freeways".(_78)He points out that much freeway
construction in Detroit was "programmed in" and contracts signed
before Cavanagh took office. Yet the right of way acquisition for the
Jefferies freeway - 1-96 - took pl~ce primarily after the 1967 riots,
in the latter part of the cavanagh administration and the early part
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of Gribb's tenure.(79) Rapid transit was not totally ignored by
Cavanagh's administration.(80) While the Rapid Transit Commission
became defunct, the former director acted in an advisory capacity to
the Mayor. Ideas were presented to the City Council, before 1967, on
one occasion for a rapid transit line in the "downriver corridor" to
serve the Rouge complex and other industrial areas and on a later
occasion for a Woodward corridor line. Both schemes could have been
expected, in varying degress, to attract and bolster commercial
functions within the city and to keep more Detroiters living in the
city. But such efforts did not get past the preliminary discussion
stage and nothing happened. The issue of rapid transit was to
languish until taken up by Mayor Young early in his administration.
The link between the City of Detroit's acquiescence in freeway
construction in the sixties' and "Great Society" optimism before the
riots is an important factor in this. In addition a certain "loss of
the reins" or "policy drift" has been remarked of the Cavanagh
administration after the riots of 1967.(81) One can but speculate
,whether a push for rapid transit by the city administration at this
time, supported by the rhetoric of TALUS, might have had some chance
of success in Lansing or Washington. It was a time, for bold
gestures. But the overriding fact of life faced by the ci ty was the
strength and overall success of the model of metropolitan development
which incorporated freeways as an integral part of its dynamic. The
riots did not change this but led, to an increased effort to find ways
to preserve it. Other factors to bear in mind include the fact that
in the sixties the spread out pattern of development was well
established and downtown business interests were even weaker. It was
harder to justify rapid transit on revenue grounds and to argue its
necessity in servicing the commercial functions of the city. The
relative lack of federal and state resources still pertained and the
, . ,
city of Detroit's own financial position had considerably worsened.
Some of these factors will be touched on again but attention is now
, , ,
turned to the non-rapid transit public transportation issues of the
time and especially to the establishment of SEMTA - the Southeastern
Michigan Transportation Authority - which was to figure strongly in
regional transportation policy in the seventies.
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( f) Public Transportation and the Establishment of SEMTA
In the establishment of SEMTA one can discern a very clear lead taken
by regional Capital in Detroit in structuring the region's transport-
ation system - a lead which was more "progressive" than the "state of
play" at federal and State levels generally. In April 1966, the
Metropolitan Fund Inc. contracted with a well known New York City firm
of engineers and planners to inquire into the future role of mass
transportation in the Detroit region. The main recommendation in the
subsequent report was the need for a regional governmental transport-
ation agency "empowered to plan, finance and operate (or contract for
the ~peration of) a mass transit system".(82)··A Metropolitan Fund
policy statement on the report published in July 1967 said:(83)
"The most reasoned thinking throughout the nation is currently
that a 'balanced' transportation system balanced between both
private and public transportation facilities is necessary to most
efficiently utilize a region's economic and human resources and
reduce the costs of the high individual mobility so necessary to
our way of life".
If the backbone of the region's transportation system was highways
(the main thrust of TALUS) it was being clearly recognised by MF that
it was not enough. TALUS, written after the riots, in arguing for a
major upgrading in public transportation, made a strong link to the
matter of regional "equity" and implicitly stability:(84)
"Public transportation, can be a key element in resolving a basic
problem of the region-inequity in the distribution of income by
increasing accessibility to employment opportunities. Public
transportation can also aid in improving the quality of life for
people by providing access to regional and local facilities 'and
~ervices for people who are dependent on public transportation
. .. , '. ,__
for their mobility. The r~c~mmended transportation improvements
are designed to provide increased mobility for those people who
are either primarily or entirely dependent on public transport-
ation".
The main factors behind the initiative taken by MF wou Id seem to be
, .
based on narrower economic grounds. Rea 1 concerns were being
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expressed in the mid-sixties to the Detroit Chamber of Commerce from
employers simply concerned with the ability of their employees to get
to work. Employers were dependent on many workers without access to a
car, both where the family had no car, or one car only and two or more
workers.C8S) The reverse commuter from Detroit to the suburbs had
grown in importance and, compared to the inward commuter, tended to
have less access to an automobile.(86) And transportation between
suburban locations was also a problem. The bulk of public transit in
the region was by bus.(87) This included the city - owned Detroit
Street Railways CDSR) which carried 88% of the total public transport-
ation'passengers, three major private enterprise suburban operators
CGreat Lake Transit, Metropolitan Transit, and Lake Shore Coach
Company) and a number of smaller private operators serving the fringe
of the city and some outlying cities and towns.(88)
Both the adequacy of existing service and its financial stability were
in question. The DSR had suffered an all time low passenger volume in
1964 and since then had suffered recurringdeficiis.(89) The
condi tion of the private companies was mixed. DSR had few suburban
" • I
destinations, and suburban operators, such as they were, mostly
provided service from the residential areas to the Detroit CBD and to
suburban commercial locations. The result'was particularly
disadvantageous for those with low skills and/or unemployed living in
the city:C~O) .
"• • • nearly all suburban workplaces and even a few City work
places are not accessible from the core by bus within one hour
and/or less than two transfers. In fact, nearly one half of all
low skill jobs within the SMSA are inaccessible from the core by
-,
bus within one hour, the majority of which are located outside
. . .
the City.... For nearly one-third of the core resident black
male unemployed, access to the vast majority of suburban work-
, . .
.places and many City workplaces is ,limited by their dependence on
public transportation;,thus,;these workers find themselves cut-
off from the supply of jobs they need."
The Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority established by
Public Act 204 of 1967 was a response to these concerns. It was
charged as follows:(91)
IS3
"To plan, acquire, construct, operate, maintain, replace,
improve, extend and contract for public transportation services
and facilities".
The initial draft of the legislation was in fact the work of the
Detroit Chamber of Commerce which carried the thrust of the lobbying
work in Lansing.(92) (The MF by virtue of its tax exempt status under
the IRS code was prohibited from such an overtly active role).
Initially the authority was governed by a 9 member board - 6 appointed
from lists submitted to the Governmor by member counties(93) and 3 by
the Governor direc~ly. In 1971 the newly created SEMCOG acquired the
right to appoint six of the board members - regarded as important by
MF to encourage a co-operative regional outlook.(94) At the beginning
the organisation has been described by its present General Manager as
somewhat of a "paper tiger".(95) SEMTA's total budget from federal
and state sources from inception in July 1967 until June 1969 was
slightly over $200,000.(96) The organisation did not make a major
claim on state and federal transportation resources until after the
acquisition of private bus lines in the early 1970's. Part of the
delay was, of course, organisational but until that time, with the
environmental issue becoming much more prominent, major state and
federal resources did not exist. The dominance of the auto-complex
led monopoly capitalist highway agenda may be seen as still paramount,
but with the "cracks" and initial responses (at least in Detroit)
appearing at the regional and local le~els. Public transporation in
Detroit was to take centre stage in the seventies and into the
eighties, and I will consider later the changing nature of State and
federal transportation policy in that context. But one comes now to
broaden the focus somewhat. In like manner, asI related regional
transportation policy to the wider context of "the regionalist agenda"
and the urban renewal or "economic development" agenda of the city of
Detroit in the fifties, I will pursue the same,themes in this period.
They are themes, in relation to which the dynamic of regional
transportation policy in Detroit (and particularly the policy stance
of the city in relation to the dynamic) must be understood. The
matter of regionalism will be considered first.
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(g) The Wider Regionalist Dynamic
The major intervention by regional capital which resulted in the
establishment of SEMTA illustrated in a major way problems involved in
regional functioning due to the spatial distribution of inequities in
access to transportation resources. The regional scope of SEMTA was
an attempt to deal with this problem. The Detroit riots of 1967
illustrated the more serious problems associated with the existence of
major inequities in the region and their concentration within the city
of Detroit. In March 1971 there were 130,088 recipients of Aid for
Dependent Children (ADC) in Detroit compared to ..67,330 in the balance
of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties, an 8.6% rate in Detroit
compared to 2.5% in the rest of the SMSA. While Detroit had only 36%
of the population of the tri-county area, it had 71% of all those
recei ving welfare.< 97) And adding to the "flight" of business and
people to the suburbs, according to the attitudinal surveys in the
city and region, was the crime problem attendant on the spatial
concentration of relati ve disadvantage. The overall crime rate in
Detroit in 1968 was 6,024 crimes per 100,000 population, compared to
the suburban tri-county rate of 2,079 - a Detroit rate nearly triple
that of the suburbs. In 1970, Detroit recorded 550 homicides - one
every sixteen hours. In a 1969 city-wide survey of Detroit house-
holds, one out of every five families claimed to have been a victim of
one or more crimes during the preceding year.(98)
The worsening budget situation of the city from the mid sixties
onwards (a deficit in fiscal year 1967 of $11 million with a
projection for 1968 of $20 million)(99) demonstrated the growing
fiscal inequities in the metropolitan governmental structure. ,But
perhaps nothing illustrated more the potential for conflict in the
formation of regional level policy (arising out of labour divisions in
the consumption and reproductive spheres) than the furore over
federally ordered school busing in the region in the early seventies.
This wasta make regional governmental policy formation even more
difficult.(100)
In 1970, when blacks represented 64% of Detroit students, the Detroit
School Board (covering just the city of Detroit itself) had adopted a
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plan to increase integration by redrawing attendance areas. A furious
reaction occurred and the state legislature killed the plan, holding
that all students be sent to schools nearest their homes. This was
followed by the intervention in 1971 of us District Judge stephen Roth
who ruled that Detroit area schools had been intentionally segregated.
He ordered busing not only within the city of Detroit but cross-
district busing for Detroit and its predominantly white suburbs. In
giving this decision, Roth observed that during the years following
the 1967 riot, the city of Detroit suffered the most rapid and
dramatic exodus of whites of any large northern city school system.
In July 1974 the us Supreme Court struck down Roth's cross-district
busing order. The court held that while de facto segregation was a
reality, intent to segregate had not been proven. A Detroit only
desegration plan was set up and busing started within the city of
Detroit in January 1976. But for three years the spectre of cross-
dLstrLct; busing hung over the Detroi t region. In the opinion of the
former executive director of Metropolitan Fund, this "had more impact
on the perception of 'regionalism' than anything in memory. People
made a connection between regionalism and regional cross-district
busing".(101) Livingston and Lapeer counties, both outside the area
covered by the Roth busing plan, experienced major population growth
between 1970 and 1975 - 32% and 17.7% respectively - much above any
other S.E. Michigan county.(102) The former MF director attributes a
good deal of this to the Roth Plan.·
Attention is turned now to the nature and limitations of attempts to
moderate the problems inherent in the metropolitan fracture °I have
described. Whilst within "sympathetic" federal and state contexts,
the lead was taken directly by regional capital in Detroit itself. -r-
will consider the overall federal context firstly, followed by tne
regional and state level responses.
By the mid sixties; as Ghere puts it,(103)
"The impact of specific Federal programs which placed relevance
upon areawide planning activities on the metropolitan regional
levels/had begun to vitalize the feeble condition of the
voluntary regional council.
In short, national legislation and programs were being designed
156
to induce metropolitan areas to plan comprehensively through
establishing areawide planning procedures as mandatory
prerequisites for Federal program funding".
And in the decentralisation thrust of the "New Federalism" of the
Nixon administration,(104) when it was becoming apparent that the
country could not be run from Washington, the structure and perform-
ance of state and substate government took on added significance. The
structure of metropolitan government was a subject in which, at the
federal level, the influential big capitalist Committee for Economic·
Development took a major interest. In a 1966 report which introduced
the term "New Federalism" (to emerge three years later in a speech by
President Nixon), CED noted that,local government was ill-equipped to
fulfill its role in the federal system and recommended the reduction,
through consolidation, of the number of conflicting jurisdictions and
competing tax units:(105)
"The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative,
overlapping local jurisdictions cannot cope with the staggering
difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs. The
fiscal effects of duplicative suburban separatism create great
difficulty in provision of costly central city services
benefitting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are
to function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have
sufficient size and authority to plan, administer, and provide
significant financial support for solutions to area-wide
problems".
Picking up on these themes, regional capital in Detroit had disclosed
tentative proposals for metropolitan government in the Detroit area
the previous year - an intervention which resul ted in 1968 with the
creation of the present Southeast Michigan Council of Governments
(SEMCOG). Two bodies instrumental in this endeavour were Metropolitan
Fund Inc. and the Citizens Research Council of Michigan which, as I.
have mentioned already, have come closest to representing collective
large capitalist interests in Michigan and the Detroit region along
the lines of, for example, the Committee for,Economic Development and
Council on Foreign Relations at the national level. ,Metropolitan Fund
was reconstituted from the former Southeastern Michigan Metropolitan
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Community Research Corporation in the early sixties. It was energised
by a renewed concern for regional issues. It drew about 80% of its
funding from big business - 10 to 15 corporations; the UAW was a major
contributor and small business contributions made up most of the
rest_(106) The 65 member Board of Trustees included "the principal
leaders of the educational, governmental, industrial-commercial and
labour segments of the community". (107) The organisation described
itself in the following terms:(108)
"Metropolitan Fund, Inc~, is directed by the top private and
public leadership of Southeast Michigan to accomplish, through
research, the physical and social goals for a better metropolitan
way of life • • •
The functioning of the Fund involves three basic processes:
1. The financing of research to identify metropolitan needs and
aspirations and to suggest necessary alternative policies
and action probrams.
2. The communicating with citizens concerning these research
endeavours and resultant findings to assure and strengthen
the democratic process necessary for actio~
3. The assembling of leadership support to implement action
programs to attain approved community aspirations."
The Citizen's Research Council has had virtually the same contributors
and high powered board members as Metropolitan Fund. Whereas
Metropolitan Fund openly lobbied for certain poliCies, CRC
characterises itself as a research organization first and foremost.
In the words of CRC it is "an independent, non-partisan, privately
supported governmental research organisation founded in 1916. The aim
of the organisation is to promote the choice of sound policies in the
field of public affairs; their effective and economical administ-
ration; and responsive and responsible operations at all levels of
government"• (109)
On the occasion of the 11th annual meeting of the Supervisors Inter
County Committee on June 10th 1965, the Metropolitan Fund formally
disclosed its ideas for the future of metropolitan government in
Detroit. With a $1 million grant secured by Henry Ford II from the
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Ford Foundation,(110) the MF over the previous year had contracted
with the Citizen's Research Council for the production of a research
report entitled "Governmental Organisation in Metropolitan S.E.
Michigan". A MF policy committee then made recommendations based on
this "objective" research. Several months were spent in individual
presentations of the recommendations and refinement of their content
with "literally hundreds of knowledgeable experienced leaders in every
segment of the region's society".(111)
In general terms the problem addressed in the exercise was the basic
stability and efficiency of the metropolitan.region as a locus for
accumulation. Thomas Reid, Director of Civic and Governmental Affairs
for Ford Motor Company and a Trustee of MF, presented the MF plan to
the SICC group as one which would "enable the local units of govern-
ment in our six-county region to meet the regional needs of the people
of the area, and to meet them in an effiCient, economical and
responsible manner". (112) In the words of Kent Mathewson, President
of MF, to the same meeting:(113)
"Few, if any, major problems affecting our public sector today
can be resolved by individual local governmental units working
independently of one another. Metropolitan Fund believes that
the governments of our six-county region must make a concerted
effort to come to grips with a host of area-wide needs such as
mass transit, crime, poverty, sewage and refuse disposal, more
effecti ve education for all and the equitable distribution of
fiscal resources to meet these opportunities for greater economic
and social development in our region."
Existing organisations - the SICC and DMRPC - were tOQ weak. SIce
represented only one type of local government,· the county. And
planning activity vested in the DMRPe was divorced from SIee, the
action oriented organisation. There was no regional agency with
authority to co-ordinate the activity of special purpose area-wide
authorities. (114)
The programme outlined by MF was composed of 5 elements: (115)
1. The creation of a state boundary commission which would examine
future petitions for incorporation and annexation and provide "a more
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rational basis for incorporation and annexation decisions". As Reid
of Ford put it:(116)
"True, the creation of a boundary commission at this late date
would not do anything to repair the damage that has already been
done in fracturing the governmental structure in southeast
Michigan. It would, however, be of great help in preventing
further fragmentation and proliferation of governments and in
insuring that future incorporations and annexations will not
result in governmental units too small in size or too inadequate
in tax .base to be able to carry their governmental
responsibilities."
2. The limitation of special purpose authorities "so that further
fracturing of local government may be avoided".(117)
3. The passage of state legislation to enable county home rule in the
region. The executive fragmentation in county government I, have
discussed. County home rule (ie determination by the county electorate
of the organisation of county government) was seen by MF as "a device
designed to structure county government so that counties can success-
fully provide regional or at least sub-regional services as popularly
based, responsible municipal-type governments".(118)
4. The expansion of,co-operative agreements among local governments
and the voluntary functional transfer of responsibilities, where
necessary. (In 1966 the responsibilities of Detroit's Welfare
Department were transferred to Wayne County. Without this in the
words of state Representative William Ryan, "Detroit would have been a
welfare caseitself".)(119) In the words of Reid again,·regarding
interlocal agreements:(120)
"Here we have an unfettered opportunity to demonstrate that
intelligent men, aware of the benefits of joint and co-operative
action can put aside the obstacles created by lines on a map and
can work together for their mutual benefit."
5. The creation of a voluntary metropolitan council of governments
with direct representation from each of the areas taxing jurisdictions
- cities, townships, villages and school districts in addition to
counties. Metropolitan Fund saw the purpose of the new body as
follows:(121)
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"• • • the primary purpose of the council of governments is to
serve as a forum for discussing, evaluating and proposing, or
initiating solutions to the problems of the metropolitan area.
In carrying out this purpose, the council might involve itself in.
three types of activity, namely regional planning, promoting of
legislative programs, and providing technical assistance
necessary for co-operative local government action".
It is clear that Metropolitan Fund in formulating and lobbying for its
proposals made the basic decision to work through the existing local
governmental structure. MF did not believe that a new metropolitan
government was "politically practical". It regarded a "compulsory
union" as an "unlikely eventll_(122) It was careful to point out that
its proposed new council of governments was not envisioned as
rendering line services of government or of being "coercivein any wayll.
liltshould be a voluntary association of local units of government and
not itself be a unit of government. Its power should be persuasion
and technical staff assistancell_(123}
Metropolitan Fund continued to take the leadership role in carrying
the idea for a new council of governments through to fruition. In co-
operation with the SICC, by September 1965, a IICommittee of 100" -
composed of elected and appointed officials from local governments in
the region had been appointed to hammer out a proposal· for the
structure of the new organisation. MF provided staff support and the
CRC research back up. The consensual backing'forthe proposal was
being carefully put together. A 'detailed proposal was forthcoming in
June 1966 covering the counties'of Wayne, Oakland;· Macomb, st. Clair,
Washtenaw, and Monroe.(124} Subsequently elected leaders of the
approximately 400 local\j~risdictions involved were contacted and
encouraged to support the proposal.
'., .".;
prospecti ve members. of the new
organisation convened on May 4, 1967 and b3gan the process of moving
from proposal to actual organisational structure. liThestructure
ultimately developed and adopted by the interim group was basically
similar to that found in the"report of the Committee of 100.,,(125)
The Southeast Michigan Council of Governments' (SEMCOG) was formally
created on January 1, 1968. IIUntil that time the Metropolitan Fund
had done all the work".(126) The SICC was disbanded and the Detroit
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Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission became the SEMCOG
planning division.
SEMCOG's powers were limited. It could not legislate, tax or bond and
did not provide direct services to citizens. Its structure was care-
ful to be deferential to the sovereignty of member units, and strove
to mould a "regional" organisation out of a membership of local
governments as opposed to elected regional representatives'(127) A
General Assembly met four times a year and an Executive Committee met
monthly. Most governments had one vote in the General Assembly.
(Detroit and the counties had additional seats ~.Detroit had two seats
for example, and Wayne County had six). Under certain circumstances
voting would take place on the basis of four voting blocs comprising
delegates from counties, cities and villages, townships, and school
districts. The system was "designed to assure that representatives of
anyone or two segments of SEMCOG cannot dominate the
organisation".(128) Membership of the thirty-one member Executive
Committee was by designation for the City of Detroit and the counties
and from election by the respective voting blocs for the rest. Wayne
County was automatically entitled to four members, for example, and
the city of Detroit to two. The Chairman of SEMCOG was elected by the
entire General Assembly for a one-year term.
Under an Executive Director, five major divisions were established
(later abolished in favour of a programme structure) in the areas of
Planning,Public Safety, Education, Social Services and General
Government Services.(129) I will consider SEMOOG's record later. one
may note, however, certain early problems faced by the organisation
which give insight into its general operation. These concern member-
ship and financing. SEMCOG failed to achieve the level of membership
originally antiCipated. As of.June 1970, 105 governments had chosen
to become members ~ less than one-third of those eligible.(130) While
with county membership SEMCOG could claim to cover most of Southeast
Michigan, "partiCipation by medium-sized cities in the region was
particularly weak".(131) Macomb County (1970 pop. 625,309) in
particular was a problem - it formally;withdrew from SEMCOG in
February 1972.(132) Its major jurisdictions Warren (1970 pop.
179,260), sterling Heights (1970 pop. 61,365), st. Clair Shores (1970
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pop. 88,083) and East Detroit (1970 pop. 45,920) had never jOined.
Essentially a newly developed blue collar county, Macomb was
suspicious of SEMCOG. Of the decision by Macomb County to withdraw
from SEMCOG, a Detroit News editorial writer said:(133)
"There is a fundamental reason why. Within 1-1acombCounty is a
widely held fear of takeover. By whom? Well, perhaps by
Detroit, 'the blacks, the poor, somebody. If we let Them tell us
how to build our sewers, the reasoning goes, next they'll seize
our schools and eventually rule our lives." (emphasis original)
Mel Ravitz, SEMCOG Chairman, had described in May 1970 how the
regional organisation was subj ect to considerable "cross
criticism".(134)
"A large and very diverse group of citizens in the region
erroneously believe that SEMCOG is another governmental layer,
designed now, or for the future, to smother the autonomy of the
cities, townships, villages and counties. It is ironic that
there are two opposing segments in this group of SEMCOG critics.
One segment consists of suburbanites who condemn SEMCOG for
being, 'or seeking to be, the instrument of the central city,
Detroit, in maintaining dominance over the region • • •
The other segment critical of SEMCOG is a number of inner city
black leaders, who believe that SEMCOG is an instrument of white
suburbanites insidiously conniving to assume control of Detroit
just at that point in history when black city political
leadership is about to emerge."
In the face of such underlying suspicions, the SEMCOG strategy under
its first executi ve director, Robert Turner, and under Chairman Mel
Ravitz, was to proceed with 'caution and sensitivity.' Turner's (who
resigned May 1972) 'approach was to "smooth out controversies". (135)
Ravitz was described as "as anxious to a~oid c~nfront~tions as
President Buchanan was".(136) Of SEMCOG in general the same critic
said:(137)
fl• • •the people who created SEMCOG keep ducking the hard issues.
They want to smooth ruffled feathers and they fear the rumor-
mongers. They prefer to talk in the'planning idiom of surveys,
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computer printouts and demographic trends."
Despite State and federal and considerable private sector support for
SEMCOG (in June 1968, for example, the Ford Foundation made a $150,000
grant to Metropolitan Fund for regional programmes including SEMCOG
activities and in conjunction with the Greater Detroit Chamber of
Commerce $75,000 was raised from the private sector in 1971 to match a
federal grant for the development of a regional solid waste disposal
plan),(138) the lagging membership problem caused a serious cash
shortage for SEMCOG in 1971. Whi Le this was overcome for 1972 by a
substantial increase in ~ounty contribution~, bringing the local
contribution for 1972 up to $367,000 from $200,000 in 1971, (139) the
immediate cash crisis was resolved by an injection of $200,000 in
private sector funds. A private sector solicitation followed a break-
fast meeting to discuss SEMCOG's needs on July 29, 1972 which was
hosted by Walker Cisler, Chairman of the Board of Detroit Edison.(140)
Forty business leaders were in attendance. The group was supportive
and by mid-August letters signed by Cisler, Ravitz (SEMCOG's chairman)
and Edward Cole, President of General Motors, were sent to 167 major
firms in S.E. Michigan. The raising of the money ill ustra tes again
the interest of regional capital in the need for regional governmental
structures and planning. SEMCOG's budget, however, remained heavily
tied to state and espeCially federal support. Of the total $1.7
million budgeted for 1972 approximately $1.25 million was projected to
corne from federal and state sources.(141)
The admitted failure in Detroit of a regional private sector response
to the events of the summer of 1967 had added an impetus to the search
for regional governmental solutions by the priv-ate sector.
Immediately following the riot, Mayor Cavanagh and Governor Romney had
called upon the major power holders in S.E. Michigan to respond to the
crisis. The result was the formation of the New Detroit Commitee
(later New Detroit Inc.), an essentially Big Capital organisation
(despite nine black committee members out of 39) drawing in support
from organised labour, political leaders and other important community
figures (churches, universities, etc.). ,The presidents of the Big
Three automakers were all on vthe .board as was Walter Reuther,
President of the UAW. Joseph Hudson Jr., president of the regional
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department store chain bearing his name, was the chairman.(142)
Hudson was also at the time chairman of the Board of Trustees of
Metropolitan Fund which acted as a co-ordinating agency for the New
Detroit Committee until it got on its feet. This was a power group of
the first order. After at least symbolically taking up the cudgels to
rebuild a New Detroit out of the ruins of the riot (through hard core
employment programmes, inner city recreational and educational
activities, etc.), a Progress Report,(143) however, as early as April
1968 made it clear that the main responsibility for dealing with the
situation lay with the public sector. "The private sector" in the
assessment of one reviewer,(144) "decided to ..take a limited, less
ambi tious and more circumscribed role • • • • They did not leave the
local scene, but they structured for themselves a 'limited posture' ".
Further:
"This limited and circumscribed role should be understood as
essentially peacekeeping. New Detroit from the corporate
perspecti ve, is a powerful adjunct to the public order system.
They make the Black 'militants' a part of that peacekeeping
machinery" •
A $10 million annual budget was reduced to $2.9 million in 1970 and
$2.5 million in 1971.(145) This was despite the fact that in the
Committee's own assessment: "In no respect has a single urban problem
or a single basis for alienation and bitterness been completely over-
come. In no respect has a single opportunity for future improvement
been fully exploited".(146)
The Progress Report pointed to the need for massive federal assistance
targeted to the city of Detroit, (147) but the other main- platform in
the report was the advocacy of regional or metropolitan wide solutions
to "urban" problems. To quote:(148)
"Local government structure in southeastern Michigan - as in all
other metropolitan areas - is a patchwork of entirely dissimilar
constituencies in which parochialism ~nd independent action
continue to frustrate full cooperation in coping with problems
which affect the entire region. Thus, one unit of government is
powerless to end discriminatory practices in another despite the
fact that it may suffer seriously from the discontent and the
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hatred which such practices breed.
Most urban problems can be defined more accurately as regional
problems. Pollution, congestion, crime, poverty, blight, all
ignore the boundary lines of individual communities and affect
all of the people in the metropolitan area. It follows that a
regional approach is essential to the solution of these ills and
that a regional agency - such as the newly formed Southeastern
Michigan Council of Governments- is therefore necessaryll.
In 1970 the Metropolitan Fund and the Committee··for EconomicDevelop-
ment joined forces to promote the idea of metropolitan government
IIwith teethll in the Detroit area. In 1970 CEOhad.published a report
entitled "ReshapLnq Government in Metropolitan Areas".(149) A two
tier system of government for metro areas was recommended in which
truly IIregional" responsibilities would be assigned to the upper tier.
"uncoordtnated area-wide special districts, fragmented by functionll,
were described as "no better than governments fragmented
geographically. They do not permit a genuine regional approach to
problems that are genuinely regional; nor do they create a system of
decision-making and power sharing capable of dealing with political
conf Lf.ct.s", (150) The report questioned the degree to which federal
and state aid and programmes could be effective in dealing with the
problems of cities operating as they were, within the confines of the
existing local governmental system.
On October 29, 1970, the CEObrought its prescription for metro·
governmental reform to Detroit. A seminar on the subject of the CED
report, jointly sponsored by Metropolitan Fund and CEDi was held in
Detroit's Cobo Hall.(151) Local trustees of CEOwho were closely
involved in the endeavour included Walker Cisler, Chairmanof Detroit
Edison and Metropolitan Fund Trustees, Richard Gerstenberg, a Vice
Chairman of General Motors, and Robert Semple, President of Wandotte
Chemicals Corp. The seminar, largely an educational exerCise, went
over, by this time, well trodden themes. John Dempsey,the Governor's
Special Assistant for Urban Affairs, was in attendance and stressed
. ,
the over-riding need for the one ingredient that would make CEDs
proposals work - a sense of "community"in S.E. Michigan. He pointed
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out that the State of Michigan would not (more truly could not) impose
a solution unless there was a "movement from below". He was not
optimistic: (152)
"CED has told us one way they think we might go. The problem is,
they haven't told us how to get there. I don't think Washington
is going to tell us and I don't think Lansing is going to tell us
and I know the City of Detroit is not going to tell us and I even
fear that SEMCOG is not going to tell us".
Given the reproduction of regional divisions in the State legislature
which we have discussed, Dempsey had reason to be cautious concerning
the ability of State government to impose or even encourage stronger
regional government in Detroit. Liberal Republican gubernatorial
administrations since the mid sixties, however, with a broader
electoral base, have attempted to nudge the Detroit region in this
direction, but with limited success. In the present period under
consideration, it proved impossible, even in the crisis atmosphere
following the 1967 disturbances, to obtain enabling legislation in the
State legislature for SEMCOG considered satisfactory by the
Metropolitan Fund. SEMCOG, in fact, ended up operating under the
relatively weak legislation for regional planning commissions.(1S]
The same special session of the Michigan Legislature in 1967 which
refused broader operating legislation for SEMCOG did pass two laws
facilitating increased intergovernmental co-operation at the local
level: the Urban Co-operation Act (P.A.7 of 1967) and
Intergovernmental Transfer of ~unctions and Responsibilities Act
(P.A.aof 1967). However, the Governor's SpeCial Commission on Urban
Problems, reporting in January 1968, pointed to the obvious weakness
of reliance on voluntarism:(154)
"A basic weakness of joint agreements is that they are practical
only when the immediate local interest of each participating unit
is not 'likely to be in conflict with the broader area-wide
interest. Since the agreements are voluntary, when such
conflicts! appear likely, governmental units probably would not
choose to' partiCipate in an agreement, or if already
partiCipating would withdraw".'
Public Act 191 of 1968 established a State Boundary Commission which
followed a report by a study commission set up by Governor Romney.
MF, as has been seen, advocated this two years previously. The
Boundary Commission is more noteworthy for what it cannot do rather
than for what it can do. Under PA191 the Boundary Commission looks
more comprehensively at requests for city mco~poration and
consolidation. (previously this was a relatively automatic decision
based on population and density). It considers, for example, the
probable future need for services. But in S.E. Michigan the major
post World War II wave of defensive incorporations had largely run its
course. The Boundary Commission was given no authority to recommend
changes in the existing configuration of political boundaries.
The controversial issue of annexation was avoided in the 1968 Boundary
Commission legislation - no compromise had been possible by Governor
Romney with town-ship interests anxious to protect their local
autonomy against state level intervention. That the state should have
the power to decide annexation issues between cities, overriding any
local objections, did not even make it on to the agenda. PA219 of
1970 gave the BC limited power to decide on annexation proposals,
over local objections from a township losing territory, when the area
to be annexed contained less than100 people. In other cases, a
favourable vote in the township losing territory was a prerequisite
for any change. Cities were still completely immune from any
annexation without their consent and the city of Detroit by this time
was almost completely surrounded by cities. Measured against such
limited powers, the title state Boundary Commission was almost a
misnomer.
Relying on Executive power only, Governor Romney in 1968 by Executive
Directive (No1968-1), designated a statewide set· of geographical
planning regions. The intent was to encourage a regional approach to
policy making by local governments in Michigan generally (this was
becoming increasingly important in securing federal funding for
various activities) by directing state agencies to adopt the regional
boundaries (not all of which were served by a Council of Governments
orRegionalPlanningAgBncy)iribothplanning and programme management. The
idea was to lead by example. The SEMCOG area was the designated
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region for S.E. Michigan.' 155) It seems that there was a feeling in
the Executive office of the Governor that a certain degree of state
administrative efficiency could be traded off for a strengthening of
regional problem solving at the local level in general. A 1970 report
by the Office of Planning Coordination in the Executive Office (which
had the main responsibility for developing the state "regionalist"
policy) stated:(156)
"...it should be noted that the use of state regions will not be
an unmixed blessing. The regions are not ideally suited to every
•
regional service delivery system and some inefficiences may
result from their use."
SEMCOG was keen on the idea and was to "strongly urge that state
departments and agenCies observe the designated regional area in their
various programs and planning". (157)
However, without a truly "regional constituency", a regional approach
to planning and administration faced an uphill battle. An ACIR
investigation in 1972 concluded that Michigan State departments, faced
with the choice of "thinking regionally" and fulfilling their
functional responsibilities, preferred to work with substate
administrative districts of their own creation or with their local
general purpose counterparts. To quote:(158)
"State 'agency officials interviewed did not reflect a strong
commitment to use RPDAs (Regional Planning and Development
Agencies) for administrative or service delivery purposes • • •
Most state line agencies use their own substate districts or
regions. state agencies have not made significant use of the
SPDR (State Planning and Development Regions) -for policy,
planning, programming, and administrative purposes. Nor do they
have a policy to guide their relationships with general purpose
RPDAs. Some agencies do rely upon RPDAs to help satisfy Federal
planning requirements. However, the general preference is to
rely upon functional agencies of local general purpose government
or special purpose multi-jurisdictional entities".
Indeed Governor Milliken, on coming to office, conscious of the need
for pragmatism, refused to designate SEMCOG as the official
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comprehensive health planning agency to receive federal dollars for
S.E. Michigan. Neither was a direct linkage required between SEMCOG
and the new heal th planning agency which was established outside of
SEMCOG's frarnework.(159)
Efforts by Michigan Governors to obtain state funding for regional
councils during this period proved equally difficult. Governor Romney
had first raised the idea in 1966. Included in his 1967/68 Executive
Budget was $150,000 to "initiate a program of grants to support multi-
county p.Lannfnq.bodies for the purpose of devising areawide develop-
ment programs which will complement local and state programs". But
even this modest proposed appropriation was turned down by the
legislature.(160) The legislature in 1972, at the request of Governor
Milliken, did appropriate $750,000 for regional councils with the
understanding that this financial support would be on-going. Milliken
had added to the strength of his case, it seems, by appointing a
Governor's Commission on Local Government in October 1970 to recommend
changes in the Michigan local governmental system.(161) The Committee
report in March 1972(162) argued in addition to the strengthening of
county government for strong general purpose regional planning
organisations receiving state funding. In the opinion of one
·Commission member, Kenneth Verburg of Michigan State University, the
Lieutenant Governor, James Brickley, as Chairman of the Commission and
John Dempsey, also commission member and Director of the State Bureau
of programs and Budget, were "given their marching orders by Governor
Milliken to come back with a strong rationale for regional planning
organizations. This was the main agenda.,,(163) The Milliken proposal
as moulded by the legislature contained the proviso that there would
be a forfeiture of State grant funds:
"• • • for failure to approve a Federal or state grant to a local
unit of government on the basis that the local unit • • ~ is not a
member of said,regional or planning organisation". (164)
The Appropriations Act restrictions, according to the ACIR
investigation, were necessary to counter fears of legislators who did
not want to be associated with any effort that could be construed to
foster "super or metro' government". (165) The spectre. of state
administered regional organisations had been held out by Governor
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Milliken as a threat; for example:(166)
'~cal units of government have been encouraged to establish, and
participate in, multi-county general purpose planning
organizations. The alternative to deal with concerns that
transcend local boundaries is to have state government (the level
of government with authority beyond local boundaries) attempt to
solve areawide problems, with perhaps ad hoc consultation with
affected local units. This alternative, however, would weaken
local government by centralizing more authority in state
government."
But in the context of Michigan politics the idea of State imposed
"regionalism" is almost a complete non-starter. A State report in
1970 was quick to dismiss the option. state administered regional
organisation, it stated, would have a fatal disadvantage. They ''would
have no policy or political ties to the region served and could not
effectively represent the regional interest • • • Direct administration
of regional programs by the state or federal government is neither
desirable nor feasible".(167)
Issues concerning inequities in regional fiscal resource distribution
in Detroit inevitably surfaced at the level of state government during
this period. (The State is the level of government with constitut-
ional power to deal with such matters.) Despite "progressive" guber-
national leadership, the limits on the possible were still severely
constrained by growing tension between Detroit and its suburbs. In
1962.Governor Swainson vetoed a bill sponsored by a suburban Detroit
legislator which would have prohibited the city of Detroit from
levying its newly enacted city income tax on suburban'commuters
working in the city. This decision was to depri ve Swainson of much
needed votes in oakland, Macomb, and Wayne County outside Detroit in
the election which he lost to Republican George Romney later that
year.(168) Later in 1964 the opportunity was taken by the legislature
with the adoption of a general law permitting selected Michigan cities
to levy an income tax (PA 284 of 1964) to reduce the Detroit non-
resident rate to 0.5%• . And in 1968 through the State legislature (PA
307 of 1968) the resident rate was raised to 2% but the non-resident
rate was kept at 0.5%.(169) The legislature, in other words, was
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giving to Detroiters the privilege of taxing themselves but was not
keen to extend the tax burden to the suburbs. The same principle was
apparent in 1970 when the state legislature (Public Act 198) pennitted
the city of Detroit to adopt a tax on the users of electricity, gas
and intrastate telephone service.(170)
A study in 1972 calculated per capita local taxes paid as a percentage
of median income for Detroit and the suburbs. This demonstrated a
figure of 2.44% for the suburbs and 4.15% for Detroit residents,
yielding a tax equity gap of 70.1%.(171) Not only was there a growing
relative concentration of disadvantage within the city of Detroit in
the sixties with consequent higher demands on municipal fiscal
resources, but to compound this, a study using 1966 data quantified
net subsidies to various suburban jurisdictions from the city of
Detroit.(172) The Detroit Institute of Arts and Detroit Public
Library, for example, while supported by Detroit funds, provided
substantial services to non-residents. The study showed that most
suburban jurisdictions received annually from $6 to $9 of net subsidy
from Detroit per capita. (Birmingham $12.58, Dearborn $6.72, Grosse
pointe Park $6.78, Allen Park $6.52.) And while Detroit was taxing
itself more heavily, a study of the Detroit region by the Survey
Research Centre of the University of Michigan concluded that "intra-
urban tax differentials do make a significant difference in location
decisions of businesses". (173)
An effort by Governor Milliken early in his administration to ease the
problem of regional inequities in access to education resources met
with only mixed success. Milliken's initial proposal was to make the
. .
finance of primary and secondary education a totally state
responsibility. Despite the fact that the state had been making
funding contributions to local school districts for some time, this
was to a major extent based on a dollar amount per pupil in all
districts with only some allowance made for the financial health of
the various school districts. primary and secondary education was
based primarily on the local property tax. The inequity caused by
different amounts of property tax base was as much as $400 per pupil
between districts exerting the same amount of local tax effort'<174)
In a November 1972 election, a constitutional amendment on the issue
of state financing was defeated (1.8 million to 1.3 million)_(175)
This was a year when school ,integration and busing were also major
issues. In 1973, however, under directions from the Michigan Supreme
Court to alleviate financial inequities for school finanCing, Governor
Milliken secured passage of what he called "the most significant
school aid bill every adopted in Michigantr.(176) While rich school
districts could choose to pay more for education, every district was
guaranteed a certain minimum funding per pupil.(177)
One cannot leave the "regionalist" theme without a brief consideration
of two major planning studies (at least in terms of effort) which took
place during this time. Both are notable in the degree (one more
conscious of it than the other) to which the model of physical, social
and economic development which they proposed was divorced from the
limitations on action inherent in Detroit's metropolitan government
structure and the actual model of metropolitan development in Detroit
generally. They will.be considered in tum.
1.Regional New Town Design - A Paired Community for S.E Michigan 1971
In 1970, Metropolitan Fund sponsored a "Paired New Town" feasibility
design study for S.E. Michigan.(178) Additional funds were provided
by the federal government and the Kresge Foundation. A team of
planning consultants worked intensively to produce a proposal for a
"patred" new town in the region. An trout-town"component, 20-40 miles
outside the city of Detroit and comprising about;75,000 people, would
be linked by rapid transit to a smaller in-town component," within the
city of Detroit, of 25,000 people. This new town would share a cornmon
local government with delegated powers and responsibilities from
existing local governments, although this relationship ~s only out-
lined at a very conceptual level. The new town components would
share, in addition, common design principles, amenities, services, and
community facilities and a common educational system. The goal was to
"deal forthrightly and honestly with the issues of race and economic
class" and with the "myth of urban - suburban independence".(179) The
proposal looked forward to balanced and integrated "wholetrcommunities
as part of a planned urban growth strategy.(180) A public development
authority was envisioned as constructing the new town or at least that
part for which private investors could not be found. The "vLsIon"
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behind the concept is illustrated in the following:(181)
"Citizens would have the choice of living "in-town" if they
prefer a more vibrant urban experience, or "out-town" on a more
wooded, pastoral setting. In either setting however, residents
would be inhabitants of one community, sending their children to
the same school system, voting for the same town officials, using
the same recreational facilities, and most of all, sharing the
same values and aspirants for the achievement of the good life."
The Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund at the time saw the
project as an attempt to lead or at least influence public
opinion.(182) As such it is important to point to this constraint on
the brief given to the planning consul tants predisposing them to a
superficial structural functional view of society and the tendency
towards "unreflective goal setting" substituting for analysis
identified by Cooke (cf ppsIO-ll). One suspects that the idealist
strain in planning theory would have reinforced this tendency.
Mel Ravitz, Chairman of SEMCOG, in criticising the report, brought a
sense of reality • . In addition to pointing out that the plan "would
have to be duplicated many times locally to resolve our basic
problems", he pointed out that:(183)
"• • • under existing conditions of strong suburban hostility to-
ward black people and a deep condescension toward poor people, I
consider the "new town" concept unrealistic and impractical.
.Neither the majority of white people residing in the suburbs want
or will permit the creation of racially and class balanced "new
towns", nor do the majority of black people residing in central
cities want to diffuse their political strength by entering into
a "new.town" agreement that would remove them from even a small
amount of their developing power base in the central city.
Indeed, until we end racism and our negative attitudes toward the
poor, our urban growth will unfortunately continue to be shaped
by these factors, rather than by a rational determination of.what
is best for all people in terms of space, social relationships
and economics."
The same Executive Director of the Metropolitan Fund, in retrospect,
in fact, thinks the project led to "a net loss of consciousness
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raising - some suburban communities reacted very strongly to being
considered as potential sites for the out-town component of the
scheme".(184)
2. Emergence and growth of an Urban Region - The Developing Urban
Detroit Area. Vols 1-3, 1966-1970.(185)
In January 1965, a five year planning study, which demands attention
due to its sheer scale, got under way to "research into the growth
patterns, potentialities and future requirements of the Urban Detroit
Area".(186) It was sponsored by the Detroit Edison Company under the
chairmanship of Walker Cisler and the main work was carried out by the
Greek planning consultancy of Doxiadis Associates. Cisler, as an
administrator of the Marshall Plan, had known Constantinos Doxiadis,
by then an internationally known planner speci~lising in ekistical
analysis, since post war reconstruction days in Europe.
The impetus for the study undoubtedly had its roots to a large extent
in the economic stake which Detroit Edison, as the main supplier of
electrical energy in the area, had in the region. Utilities are one
of the least mobile of capitalist enterprises. There was a clear
material interest in growth but also in the protection of existing
fixed investments. (The area utility companies - Michigan
Consolidated Gas, Bell Telephone and Detroit Edison - all have their
headquarters downtown.) The study was intended to provide a framework
" ,"
for future planning by the major utility. The quite grandiose nature
of the objectives, however, can be traced to the "visionary" zeal of
Cisler who envisioned an urban way of life "conducive to human
happiness ~nd fulfillment".(187) As put by Doxiadis, the project was
concerned with the "grave" que~tions: ''Whereis our city-going, what
, .
can we do for it?" It was seen as part of an endeavour to "try to
create a better future for oetroit".(188)
~ ".'-
Defining the research area as broadly to reach across into Ontario,
. ~ .
down into Ohio and north and east to Lansing, Saginaw and Port Huron,
the study:located Detroit as part of an "emerging G~eat Lakes megalo-
polis' with two other focal points in Chicago and Clev~land -
Pittsburgh. While'admitting that megalopolitan deve lopment invol ves a
-
"functional interconnectedness involving multiple-ties of transport-
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ation, communication, economic and social links and contacts",(189)
the study based its tentative definition of the Great Lakes megalo-
polis on the cartographical plotting of various types of data -
population density, median value of owner occupied houses, percentage
employed in manufacturing, aggregate income by SMSA, etc. This is
illustrative of the project's whole approach. It is static in the
sense of considering discrete "snap shots" in time and it is based on
the implicit assumption that bringing the maximum information and data
together will lead to mastery of "the problem". The 3 volume study
comprising almost 1200 pages proceeded from an inventory of existing
conditions and their analysis through projections of future alter-
natives to the elaboration of .~ final best alternative for the
physical development of the area,,(190) (alternative 120 out of 140
considered). This al ternati ve proposed a new twin urban centre to
Detroit on the st Clair River in the vicinity of Port Huron. It was
seen as growing to 1 million in population. It "would relieve the
pressures now exerted on Detroit and permit revitalization and
remodelling of its suffering and declining central areas..(191) The
analagous comparison of the region to an "organism" is one repeated
throughout. It is beyond presents~o comprehensively critique
ekistic methodolgy. However, some things, in the context of the
Detroit study, are apparent. The study was completely divorced from
the real dynamics of the region's economy and.political structure. No
new town was ever built or seriously contemplated. The data presented
are always "snap shot" manifestations of underlying phenomena which
are related to the central but superficial concept of "spatial needs"
("the forces which create human settlements"). (192) The region, a
manifestation of these "spatial needs", is regarded as an organism
which can be related to ideal notions of desirable urban form. From
this perspective, areas of "disease" can be plotted in the city of
Detroit which represent deviations from the ideal spatial pattern.
The study was not taken very seriously by the city of Detroit. In the
words of the city comptroller of the time, Mayor cavanagh regarded it
as "somewhat of a boondoggle,,_(193) Ewen, from a Marxist perspective,
engages it must be suggested, in top down structuralist theorizing in
arguing that the Doxiadus plan be seen as a corporate blue print with
Fascist undertones for the future physical development of the Detroit
region. ThiswUl be considered in Chapter Six when the pitfa 11 s of
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structuralist theorizing in general as applied to Detroit are
surnmarized'(cf pps288-9~. Onenotes here, however, that while it seems
unlikely that planning methodology was determined by the needs of
capital in this case (ie. there is still a place for the
eccentricities of ekistical analysis) the framing of the context and
brief by capitalist interests (the vision of Cisler interpreting
capitalist interests as generalizable,ones)made only certain types of
methodology appropriate.
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(h) Compensatory Policies and the City of Detroit's Economic
Developnent Agenda
In the previous chapter! considered the transportation policy of the
city of Detroit in the 1950's in relation to the city's physical
renewal and economic development agenda. This relationship is
important again in the sixties • . But it must be seen in conj unction
with the core of federal and state "urban policy", as the term emerged
during this time, ie. various compensatory policies designed to
ameliorate economic inequity and in particular its spatial
concentrationwithincities such as Detroit as the post-war model of
metropolitan development unfolded. Such policies merge with more
general "Great Society" attempts to "rectify mechanisms of over-
exploitation", as Castells puts it(194) and it seems unnecessary,
even impossible, to draw too rigid a boundary between "urban policy"
and more general social policies introduced during the sixties and
which had this intent (AFDC, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.). Attempts by
state government in Michigan to effect redistribution in regional
resourcesmve been touched on already. Given the inequities then in
the model of metropolitan development and the limitations on the
regionalist agenda of State and federal government and Big Capital
locally, the city of Detroit's expectations from its economic develop-
ment and renewal agenda during this period, while important, are not
enough to explain its tacit approval (while not outright promotion as
in the fifties) of freeway construction within the City.
The period must be considered pre and post the riots of 1967. It has
been remarked that the experience of the Cavanagh administration was
one of dashed hopes.(195) A close aide of Cavanagh considers that
after the riots "the mayor lost heart". (196) But the Cavanagh
administration started out with optimism that the federal programmes
and reforms of the "Great SOCiety" combined with the economic growth
of the sixties· "liftingall·boats" (including the city and its
residents) would secure acceptable modifications to the postwar model
of regional development including as it did a major commitment to
freeways. Cavanagh, an' Irish catholiC, had close links to the Kennedy
Whi te House and was a close advisor t.oi t.he President on "urban
policy". He was a "ground floor" shaper of federal policies such as
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Model Cities which were to target federal assistance to cities like
Detroit.(197) Other causes of optimism at the start of the Cavanagh
administration were the fact that the imposition of the city income
tax had temporarily alleviated Detroit's fiscal strain,(198) And,
planned during the Miriani and Cobo years, a number of new buildings
did open in the Detroit CBD in 1962 - the American Natural Resources
Building,the Detroit Bank and Trust Building, and First Federal
Savings and Loan.(199) It should also not be forgotten that cavanagh
as Mayor still sat atop a fluid electoral base in the city made up of
a majority of whites who, while perhaps having to pay higher city
taxes,were not that disaffected from the model of metropolitan
development which included the commitment to freeways.
The events of July 1967 brought home the depth of disaffection among
blacks from this model. The Report of the National Advisory
Commission on the disorders (cfp~33)supportssuch a view. A pessimism
concerning the way forward is reported to have descended upon cavanagh
from this time on.(200) The city's economic development agenda had
been a disappointment. The Cavanagh administration inherited the
previously designated urban renewal areas, but, given the general lack
of demand for central city sites, there was an absence of major new
designations. cavanagh continued the Mayor's Committee on Commercial
and Industrial'Development organised by Miriani. This drew in lower
level participation from the business sector and the committee at
maximum had four staff people. This contrasts with the large scale
city development organisations of the seventies whichare discuss=din
the following chapter, but the legitimacy for a more direct public
sector relationship with the private sector in economic development
was established during these years. Of particular importance here was
the creation by Cavanagh of the Detroit Metropolitan Industrial
.
Development Corporation (DEMIDCO). This was subsequent to passage of
federal legislation in 1961, supported by Kennedy, establishing the
Area Redevelopment Administration (to become the Economic Development
Administration in 1965). The ARA was empowered to make loans and
grants to eligible areas (determined on the basis of unemployment) for
economic development. Federal dollars were not to be given
indiscriminately to firms meeting certain criteria and locating in
these areas as in British regional policy, but in a programme more
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limited in scope, were to be channelled through Local Development
Corporations. LDCs were to be non-profit "quasi public" bodies with
major representation from the private sector. They were to use their
discretion and promote through financial assistance specific develop-
ment projects. DEMIDCO was the Detroit LDC,(201) With board member-
ship including Walter Reuther, the Ford and G.M. presidents, and top
executives from major utility companies (the Co-ordinator of the
Mayor's Committee on Commercial and Industrial Development was also
one of the 25 board members), DEMIDCO may be seen as a federally
encouraged pre orrsoz in Detroit of the "public-private partnership"
ideas of the seventies.- Many Detroit banks were "lukewarm", however,
in support of government intervention in the private loan market - an
impediment which DEMIDCO had to face.(202)
The main project of DEMIDCO was a relative disappointment. DEMIDCX>
participated in the financial arrangements for the Pontchartrain Hotel
- the city of Detroit's first new downtown hotel in 35 years.
Situated on a prime site opposite Cobo Hall and originally planned as
two towers with approximately 1,200 rooms, the hotel, when completed
had only one tower with 427 rooms.(203)
The general record of office construction in the city from the mid-
sixties to early seventies in comparison to the growth in suburban
Southfield (Table 14) was quite anemic. (204) The State of Michigan
and Detroit Recorders Court opened new buildings. The Manufactures
Bank opened a new headquarters building of unassuming character in
1969 and a headquarters building for Michigan Bell Telephone got
underway in the same year. In 1971 the Burroughs Corporation, having
decided to remain in the City, opened a large new World-Headquarters
building in the New Centre area north of downtown (surrounded by the
stable neighbours of General Motors on the north and Wayne State
. ,-'
University on the south and east) and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the
major health insurance company, opened a major new office building,
rising like a lonely outpost on the eastern edge of the CBD. 1971
also saw the opening of the Edison Plaza building on the'north-western
boundary of the CBD. Strongly encouraged by Walker Cisler, who
•
committed Detroit Edison to a 30 year lease with the development
, .
company, this was the first in any way speculati~e major office
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building in Detroit since World War II. And for a considerable time
after opening, the Edison Plaza was a "white elephant with many floors
standing empty". (205)
The general economic decline in the city of Detroit in the 1960s has
been.mentioned already. While corporations were joining New Detroit,
they were simultaneously pursuing developments in the suburbs. In the
latter part of the sixties the Budd Company decided to move its auto-
motive division headquarters from Detroit to suburban Troy. The
Kresge Company and Standard Federal Savings and Loan decided to do the
same.(206) The biggest planned suburban development, however, was by
Henry Ford. A realty arm of the Ford Motor Company - Ford Motor Land
Development Corporation - was formed in 1970 to develop 2,360 acres of
Ford owned land in Dearborn and Allen Park. The resulting develop-
ment, for which ground was broken also in 1970, is built around the
Ford World Headquarters. It has mushroomed into "a multi-faceted
community of office buildings, a major regional shopping centre,
headquarters for major national companies, restaurants and rental
apartments and condominiums".(207)
The period of the Gribbs administration in Detroit, covering the four
years from January 1970 to December 1973, was not one of policy
innovation but can be characterised as a holding period in·the
transition to black control. It was in particular marked by tough law
and order policies. In the mayoral election of 1969 voting took place
on very strict racial lines.(208) In a polarised city Gribbs
acquiesced in the further right of way acquisition for, and
construction of, the Jefferies Freeway.(209) It must remain an open
question, though, whether a policy stand by cavanagh for-some form of
rapid transit in Detroit after 1967 - an attempt to make a reality of
some of the rhetoric in TALUS - would have met with some success. The
Jefferies Freeway could have been a "bargaining chip" - a general
tactic used by Coleman Young in the seventies. Towards the end of his
administration cavanagh did request the former director of the Rapid
Transit COmmission to draw up another proposal for a Woodward Avenue
transit line. The director, however, did not know the nature of
cavanagh's motivation, which was not explained to·him, or in fact what
became of. the document which he prepared. (210) We can surmise,
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perhaps, that the thought at least was on the Mayor's mind.
By the time Coleman Young took over as Mayor in 1974 the city of
Detroit was becoming more dependent not just on federal but on state
assistance. This fitted into the decentralisation thrust of Nixon's
"New Federalism" which attempted to pull in state and local government
more solidly behind nationally established social goals. The
following assessment in 1967 by Richard Goodwin, advisor to President
Kennedy, goes to the heart of the matter: (211)
"The issues involved in decentralisation are remote from the old
struggle over states' rights and big government. Those struggles
centered on the question of whether any effort at all should be
made to solve social problems through collective action and
public resources. Decentralisation, however, assumes that this
question is resolved affirmatively, and sees the issue as one of
structure and organization."
In the same year the Committee for Economic Development strongly
critiqued the performance of state governments in relation to urban
problems:
"Federalism cannot operate successfully without competent and
effective government institutions at all levels (emphasis
original) • • • few state governments have sought to collaborate
with their major cities - or with other local units - in meeting
critical local necessities. Many states have been more active in
seeking new types and larger'amounts of federal aid than in
modernizing either their own revenue systems or those of their
local units.n(212)
The same report makes a thinly veiled threat by quoting Governor Evans
of Washington: (213)
"state'governments are unquestionably on trial today. If we are
not willing to pay the price, if we cannot change where change is
required, then we have only one recourse. And that is to prepare
for an orderly transfer of our remaining responsibilities to the
federal government.1I
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In January 1968, the "Governor's Special Commission on Urban
problems", established by Romney in December 1966 and chaired by James
Wright, President of Federal - Mogul Corporation, made its report and
admonished the state of Michigan for over-reliance on federal
government:
"In past years, the State's urban areas, lacking resources of the
magnitude necessary to deal effectively with their (urban)
problems, have turned primarily to the Federal government for
assistance.,,(214)
In 1967, as the culmination of a "battle" which had been going on for
many years, Governor Romney succeeded in piloting a state income tax
proposal through a recalcitrant Michigan legislature (the state had
previously relied on the sales tax and other revenue sources).(215)
The need to target financial assistance to Detroit and other
"distressed" urban areas may be seen as blending with the need to
finance growing state expenditure generally (in particular due to a
major absolute and relative increase in public welfare expenditures
from 10.7% of State expenditure in 1962 to 22.6% in 1972 - many of the
beneficiaries, of course, in the City of Detroit.)(216)
A portion of the new income tax receipts was earmarked (as "state
revenue sharing") for localities on a per capita basis. (217) This
provision, over the four Detroit fiscal years of 1968-1971, brought in
an additional $18 million to the City.(218) But it was not enough to
deal with a mounting Detroit fiscal crisis which thrust itself into
state level politics. In 1970 Governor Milliken persuaded the
legislature to make a $5 million grant to Detroit to be used for
police and fire protection. A serious problem was again in the
offing however, in that the soon to be released 1970 Census data
would show a major decline in Detroit's population which in turn would
translate into reduced state revenue sharing payments. The 1971
Revenue Sharing Act, which was pushed by Governor Milliken in the
legislature in the light of this impending fact, was hailed by his
administration as a major step forward in targeting state fiscal
assistance to Detroit. This introduced local "tax effort" as a
formula factor, in addition to population, in sharing the state income
tax and other revenues with localities. Since Detroit taxed itself
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heavily, its total state revenue sharing payment almost doubled
between 1971 and 1972 - from $22.8 million to $43.3 million.(219) The
principal of aid to local governments dependent on how hard they taxed
themselves was, however, rolled back somewhat by legislative action in
1972. "Tax effort" was supplemented by "tax burden" - a measure
including the property taxes of overlapping governments, the county,
school district and special districts. The main benefiCiaries of this
change not surprisingly were townships and suburban cities having
relatively low pro~erty taxes for their own muniCipal purposes.(220)
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(a) Introduction
Past chapters have presented the argument that the broad dynamic of
transportation policy formation in Detroit can be understood primarily
in terms of the development of class relationships. Derivative
concepts employed (the reproduction of labour power, intra class
cleavages etc) have been, therefore, at a fairly macro level of
analysis. The use of such concepts does not imply an insensitivity or
lack of appreciation to the fact that planners or other policy agents
can be subject to'other pressures and constraints with a less direct
relationship to class or that they behave in ways that are
subj ecti vely meaningful to themselves. We have been wary in
particular of top down structuralist Marxist theorizing as applied to
Detroit. At the present time, however, when structuralism has fewer
adherents (cf pps.282-83)and where studies of more l:imitedscope .are
the order of the day (cf page 30l) it seems necessary to stress the
continued usefulness of attempts to theorize the macro.level process
attempted by structuralism. The challenge would seem one of
susceptibility to recognising a class pattern to events (where perhaps
• <
more than one pattern would have been possible) rather than a simple
class determination. In this vein the present chapter presents a
. ~ '. . ~ .
continued class pattern to transportation policy formation in Detroit.
The latter it is argued, must be understood over the last ten years as
fundamentally related to two major factors:
1. Tensions inherent in the post-war model of metropolitan
'development leading eventually to a breakdown in consensus on
transportation'issues.
2. Significant underlying economic changes in the model of
. . -
development itself; most notably, heightened capital mobility
(the Sunbelt/Frostbeltcleavage and "the new international
division of labour") and a breakdown of the "Pax Ainericana" as
represented most starkly by "Reaganomics".
The two major themes pursued in considering transpo,rtation.policy
against the above ,factors are the "regionalist" dimension
(metropolitan governmental fracture) i~ an atmosphere of eve'nmore
intens~ e~onomic'-co~peti tion and the economic development agenda of
the "city'ofDetroit itself, in relation to which transportation policy
198
(most notably the commitment of the city to a rapid transit system)
has been conceived.
(b) The Changed National Economic O:mtext
This is dealt with firstly in general terms and then more
specifically in the next section in relation to Michigan and Detroit.
The general discussion is built around: (1) the pressure to curb the
growth of the federal budget even before the Reagan administration
(cities such as Detroit could not count on increasing federal
largesse) and (2) the breakdown in the seventies, with all that is
entailed in it, of the "Pax Americana".
As Brand(1) puts it, .....the 1970 recession had generated high
unemployment wi~tmoderating collective bargaining settlements -
proof that worker militancy is not in any mechanical sense deterred by
unemployment". The effect of an expanded "social safety net" was at
work here and was also, undoubtedly, directly a factor in greater
overall levels of unemp l.oymentiLnthe seventies as compared to the
sixties (Table l~. But more importantly, following the demise of the
wage-price controls initiated by President Nixon in 1971, during the
Ford and Carter administrations the control of inflation (ie. the
generation of confidence that continued investment would be
profitable) was pursued as a policy goal at the expense of employment.
The instruments were monetary policy and increasingly fiscal
restraint. Budgetary expansion was opposed in 1979 by President
Carter's Council of Economic Advisors on the grounds that it would
"heighten expectations of inf lation".(2) This is because- incurring
deficits to finance domestic or military spending was by the mid to
. .
late seventies, even with'much productive capacity lying idle, no
longer an easy'policy option - it had to be seen in relation to
\
possible expansionary effects on the economy, rise in employment and
consequent pressure on profits which again would fuel inflation. And
the expectation that this would occur was enough itself to fuel
inflation. Harrison(3) in this regard'~oints to the "limits of
Keynesianism" - that while it can alleviate difficulties in the
realisation of surplus value (through expansionary policy), "it can do
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nothing to ease problems in its production'. A policy report in 1979
by the Committee for Economic Development noted that the most
significant change in the pattern of federal expenditure over the
previous twenty years had been "the rapid increase in domestic
transfer payments and federal expenditures through grants-in-aid to
state and local governments". Noting in particular the "expansion of
social programs during the 1960's and 1970's", the report pointed out
that federal spending for domestic transfer payments and grants-in-aid
had increased from 5.4% of GNP 1957-1959 to 12.7% 1977-1979.(4) But,
as ACIR pointed out the following year, this trend was already
changing. Taking into account the Carter proposals for fiscal year
1981, the ..real purchasing power of federal aid to states and
localities would have declined for three successive years.(S) Given
the attention which has focussed in the seventies on the views of
James O'Connor ~oncerning state expenditure, it is appropriate to
consider thi~ for a moment• ..O'Connor(6) argues that there is constant
pressure on the state within present monopoly capitalism in the u.s.
to assume more and more "costs of production" (whether social cap!tal
or expense expenditures as he defines them).(7) This expansion of the
state (more infrastructure, more education, more R&D, etc.) in fact is
a condition for the expansion of monopoly capital. But because large
monopoly sector corporations and unions strongly resist state taxation
to finance this expenditure, O'Connor argues that there.is "a tendency
for government expenditures to outrace revenues" and hence a tendency
towards "a fiscal crisis of the state".(8) While O'Connor himself
recognises ~atthe-re' is no "iron law,,(9)involved, there would seem a
danger of interpreting this "tendency" too rigidly. The efforts by
the Carter administration to pare back growing budget deficits is
probably best interpreted as a need to control inflation (and its
deleterious effect on profit expectations and hence investment) - not
simply> in terms of the inability of government to finance the
expenditure per se (whether via taxes or indirectly through the burden
of inflation).
Other structural changes in the u.s. economy of the seventies and
eighties with a major bearing on the,context for transportation policy
formation in Detroit (integrated as it was more than ever for the city
during this time with an economic development programme) can be
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related to what Bluestone and Harrison have called the breakdown of
the "Pax Americana".(10) The competition between "Frostbelt" and
"Sunbelt", which matured in the seventies to the point where Business-
week in 1976 referred to the "second war between the states", was an
important first chapter in this.(11) A consideration of some data is
instructive here. Manufacturing employment in the u.s. increased by
only slightly over 1% between 1970 and 1977, but wi thin this
relatively stable national pattern, regional shifts were quite
substantial. Between 1970 and 1977 the Northeast and Midwest lost
742,000 manufacturing jobs ( a decline of almost 6.5%), while the
- South and West gained more than 958,000 (an increase of over 12%).
The real source of job growth in the U.S. in the seventies, however,
was in services Ca 32% increase of almost 3.7 million jobs). In this
the "Frostbelt" lagged substantially behind, with an increase of
approximately 1.4 million being eclipsed by an increase of 2.2 million
in the South and West.(12) While in 1970 more than half of all non-
agricultural jobs were in the Northeast and Midwest, by 1977 the scale
had tipped to the South and West,(13)
Behind this loeational shift (which took not so much the form of
physical relocation of eXisting plants, but rather a redirection of
new investment),(14) Bluestone and Harrison have argued in a major
study of-the phenomenon, has been two major and interrelated factors:
the desire to escape higher wage rates and the very presence of
unionization itself. They quote Donovan Dennis, Vice-President of
FANTUS corporation, a major plant-location consulting firm, who was
asked to name the single most important determinant of plant-location.
He responded: '~abor costs are the big thing, far and away. Nine out
of ten times you can hang it on labor costs and unionization".(15)
It is against this background that a consultant's report in 1977,
commissioned by the Michigan Department of Commerce and focussing on
the potential for co-operation between Mid-west states in economic
development, concluded that "all states devote substantial resources
to inducing industrial growth and there is considerable feeling that a
state of unremitting and irreversible competition exists in the
field". C16) Yet the harsh irony in this is that the mechanisms used
in the interstate economic '~arfare" - less stringent regulatory
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climate, more favourable workman's compensation and unemployment rates
but especially state and local government tax concessions - do not
figure strongly in the locational calculus of companies.(17) Based on
an extensive review of the evidence, Bluestone and Harrison conclude:
"Corporations first choose a site based on general economic conditions
and then attempt to manoeuvre the political climate to fit its needs"
(emphasis original).(18) The consultant's report to the Michigan
Commerce Department, mentioned above, could "not deny that state
efforts on occasion result in single plant locations that bring
several hundred (or thousand) jobs and considerable investment" but in
general concluded that~"there is little evidence that they (the
Midwest states studied) are inducing much of their growth from outside
their borders".(19)
In answer to the question then, why states engage in such competition,
Kanter comments that state officials are "afraid to be critical of
state business subsidies". Many of them, according to her experience,
believed that subsidies worked in an indirect manner, communicating to
the business community that a state is "pro-business". To be against
them was a gamble states were not prepared to take.c20) This becomes
even more understandable when one considers the attention and
publicity given by state level business associations to the '~usiness
climate". The poor Michigan "business climate" (taxes, regulation,
and other government. imposed costs of doing business in Michigan) has
been an ongoing rallying point of the Michigan Manufacturers
Association. Bluestone and Harrison in fact argue that the effort
spent by business in lobbying for improved business climates seems
"out of all proportion to the potential dollar savings",(21) and they
advance the hypothesis that what is primarily involved is a-direct and
indirect attack (through revenue reductions) on the "social wage" with
increased worker insecurity and hence malleability for the production
process (the "social wage" defined as "the package of non-wage
benefits which governments provide to workers in order to maintain
their health and purchasing power when they are unable to work").(22)
Markusen(23) makes the general point that the structure of American
federalism is well suited to the ability of business to playoff one
state against another:
"The intergovernmental allocation of responsibilities and
202
resources, especially in the areas of tax, welfare, and labor
policy, have allowed regional differentiation to flourish in ways
that are functional for capital. A labor policy that has left
questions like right-to-work, workman's compensation, and health
and safety issues up to the states has permitted the more
conservative dominated states to prevent unionization in the
South and to undercut Northern unions by attracting industry away
from high wage areas. Similarly tax and welfare policies left to
the discretion of the several states have resulted in competition
that tends to discourage high tax and welfare levels, with
industrial relocation among the states as the..disciplining force.
On the other hand, where competition among states would hurt
capital (eg. trade policy, banking policy) functions are
centralized at the federal level."
If the "war between the states" in the seventies was putting the post-
war "pact" between capital and Labour under strain, by the end of that
decade the relationship could be seen to be breaking down altogether.
The Iranian oil shortfall in 1979 and the subsequent switch in
consumer preference towards smaller, fuel-efficient cars, produced
especially by the Japanese, may be seen as bringing matters to a head.
The issue was one of the performance of the U.S.'economy in general.
Since 1973 there had been virtually no growth in real GNP per capita
in the U.S,(24) This could not be simply attributed to the rise in
energy costs. Other industrialised countries more dependent on
foreign oil had maintained better productivity and more rapidly rising
living standards during this period.(25) That the economic dynamic,
based on suburbanisation and the automobile, had lost some of its
momentum was recognised by a Congressional committee in 1982, (cf.
page9S)butas to the most fundamental factor behind the sluggishness of
the American economy there was general agreement among business
analysts (though by no means agreement on the solution): the failure
of the American economy to adequately respond to the challenge of
foreign competition. In a special issue in June 1980, entitled "The
Reindustrialization of America", Businessweek pointed to the
"precipi tous loss of competitiveness of the last 15 years, of which
this year's wave of plant closings across the continent is only the
most vivid manifestation".(26) It stated that "even business shared
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some of the blame for this decline". (27) But it was clear that Labour
would have to accept a new realism. The "illusion that the pie to be
divided up would never stop expanding"would have to be dispelled_(28)
The heightened "industrial restructuring" which has been taking place
in the United states over the past five years will be examinedshortly
in relation to the automobile industry which has particular
significance for Michigan and Detroit. But in general terms, integral
to the process, is the importance of "newtechnology" as embodied in
goods and serv ices produced and in the modeof their production. On
both these fronts the future for job creation is uncertain. Alvin
Toffler,(29) for example, foresees major future job growth in the U.s.
based on biotechnology, space and marine technology and the computer
industry. Goddard(30) points out that "the prospect of a
technologically led revival of employment opportunities where the
emphasis switches to the introduction of totally new products and
services" (a new impulse to the capitalist engine) cannot be
discounted. But the following recent assessment by Weiss of "high
technology" andrthe future of employment in the u.s. probably best
sums up the record so far: (31)
"• • • (the) commoncase is that of modest to substantial direct
job growth, but massive indirect job loss. The production of new
information-processing, communication, and other technologies is
leading to a virtual revolution in the organization of work and
society. Such changes involve a vast retooling and restructuring
. of all forms of employment(as' well as consumption) in terms of
both geographic location/organization and social division of
labour."
,
Weiss points to the Businessweek prediction in August 1~81 that 25
million current jobs would be eliminated in the U.S. in the following
two decades due to the introduction of newtechnologies.(32) In the
emerging restructured economyWeiss sees "an important segment of the
middle of the'U.S. job structure vanishing, in the sense of relatively
well-paid, st.ahLe, skilled manufacturing-related employment", and a
gulf emerging, with the "deskilling" effect of new technology,. between
two main categories of employment: top well-paid professionals versus
t ". " , ,J
much lower paid unskilled labour, which in manyinstances, especially
in manufacturing production, is vulnerable to competition from even
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lower paid foreig~ labour.(33) Indeed, heightened capital mobility,
facilitated by new technology, necessitates an understanding of
industrial restructuring at an international level. In this regard
Cohen refers to the
fl...new international division of labour • • • a system for
production on a world scale in which even greater numbers of
people are integrated into activities carried on by large inter-
national producers of goods and by international firms which
service these producers. Both the work process and the
facilities used to produce goods and services are organized
according to the demands of firms operating in a world market.
"... in perhaps its most profound impact, the NIDL has
integrated qualitatively different types of laborers with very
different levels of work experience, highly varied types of
social backgrounds and vastly divergent histories of labor
organization into corporate organizations which operate on a
world level.fI(34)
To be sure, Barnet and Muller(35) published their masterful account of
the "Global Reach" of multinational corporations ten years ago. What
is increasing, however, is the ability of such corporations to
integrate and control production at a world scale. As Bluestone and
Harrison put it:
. . - -
"Satellite-linked telex communcations and wide-bodied cargo jets
provide a technical environment that has allowed production to
become far more spatially 'footloose' than ever before. The
linking of communications systems to computers permits central
management to coordinate worldwide operations at lightening
speed• • • ,,(36)
And importantly they add:(37)
"The capital mobility option provided by the new technology has
shifted the fulcrum of bargaining power in favour of capital to
an unprecedented degree."
Gough,(38) in relation to the British context, has pointed to the
ideological content of flThatcherismflin mediating economic crisis. He
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warns against any "crudely functionalist interpretation",(39) Like-
wise "Reaganomics", it can be argued, must be seen as an ideological
response Ca possible response amongst several that have been
articulated) to the central problem of bolstering the profitability of
American capital in the face of foreign competition. Summing up the
Reagan economic programme, Bluestone and Harrison declare that
"capital has unilaterally ended even lip service to the great postwar
social contract".C40)
"To reindustrialize America, the federal government is insisting
on creating a 'good business climate' in the United States
through extreme cuts in corporate taxes, drastic reductions in
the government's guarantee of the social safety net, and the
virtual deregulation of the public sector."(41)
Bluestone and Harrison argue that only if ''Reaganomics''supply-side
tax incentives are seen in rel~tion to the cuts 'in social wage
expenditures with the aim of "discipling" labour and in relation to
deregulation, does the whole programme ''makesense". Tax cuts, they
point out, deprive the government of the means with which to finance
the social safety net.(42) The general approach had been articulated
in a major publication of the Committee for Economic Development,
entitled "Redefining Government's Role in the Market System", in July
1979. It concluded that "government is placing increasingly excessive
demands on the private sector'and that the results are decreased
productivity and increased inflation • • • The political system, with
its goals of improving public well-being and achieving greater
equality, is exerting more and more pressure on the economic process,
which emphasises efficiency."C43)
One platform in the ''Reaganomics''programme o<fparticular relevance to
present concemis the "New Federalism" agenda Cor more accurately "New
Federalism Mark II"), since it has'meant a drastic cut in'federal
grants-in-aid to states and localities,<44) As opposed to the Nixon
brand of'new federalism where the issue was essentially one of state
and local administration of programmes ~sed on federally established
goals and funding the Reagan philosophy, as announced in its fully
fledged form in 1982,(45)envisaged a major return of responsibilities
.(including AFDC and food stamp programmes) and their funding to states
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and localities. This prompted the major business journal "Fortune" to
ask: "Whowill care for the poor? Reagan's federalism would thrust
responsibility for them onto the states. But some things in our
society only Washington should do.,,(46) Likewise Businessweek, the
other major business journal in the U.S., had serious reservations
about federal cutbacks in aid to state and local governments at a time
when they were being "crowded out" of financial markets by the
borrowing demandsof the private sector and especially the escalating
demands of the federal government itself. Businessweek's concern,
expressed in a Special Report in October 1981, was that the Reagan
programme for economic growth would ultimately stumble because the
necessary public investments in physical and humancapital would not
be forthcoming to support it. Almost as if directly supporting the
thesis of O'Connor, the report stated:
"It is perfectly true that the private sector has carried the
responsibility for economic growth throughout the history of this
nation. But at virtually every stage of the nation's history,
growth was dependent on a balance between private and public
investment. • • • there is no reason to believe that this histocial
necessity for balanced investment has come to an end.,,(47)
Again, almost as if sounding the alarm, "Newsweek"in August 1982,
declaring that '~ur dams, bridges, and water systems are rapidly
falling apart", carried as its cover story the dramatic declaration:
"The Decaying of America".(48)
The Reagan economic programme has in other words spurred a major
debate over the principles of national economic policy in America.
The major "reformist" alternatives which have been articulated and
which are in the process of finding a home in the Democratic party,
are probably most closely associated with the prescriptions of
Businessweek,(49) and the writings of Reich,(50) Thurow,(51) and
Rohatyn.(52) It is beyond present SCOpe'ID consider these in depth. But
in general drawing particularly upon Japanese and Germanexperience,
they all involve the recognition of the interdependency of the public
and private sectors and the need to "hitch" government support very
directly behind the goal of improving the international
competitiveness of Americancapital. The vehicle is a new"industrial
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policy" incorporating a new "social contract" with labour based on co-
operation in industrial restructuring involving certain guarantees of
security rather than the conflict inherent in the disciplining
approach of Reaganomics. It is this debate over "Corporatism" and
Reaganomics that forms an important part of the context for economic
development and linked to this transportation policy in Detroit in
1985. Other major contextual factors necessary to "situate" economic
development and transportation policy formation in Detroit include:
(a) The current industrial ,restructuring in the automobile industry
as if effects Detroit, and
Cb) The economic development agenda of state government as it has
emerged over this period.
In the following sections these will be cons.i.deredin turn•
•
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(c) Detroit and Industrial Restructuring in the Auto Industry
The American automobile manufacturers since 1979, with the public's
major shift in preference towards smaller, fuel-efficient cars, have
been brought sharply up against the harsh reality of foreign
competition and the technology, organisation, and labour relations on
which it was based. Consequent industrial restructuring in the
industry is still very much in progress and it centres around:
(a) Major product changes, ie. more aluminium, plastics, and
electronics, a switch to front-wheel drive etC., and most
importantly increased standardisation at a world-scale; and
(b) The interconnection of new production technology (especially
automation and robotics) and new organisational relationships -
including the multi-sourcing of components, new inventory control
systems, competitive alliances between American and foreign
companies, and the use of the "new international division of
labour" with calls for more realism and responsibility (including
wage restraint and even "rollbacks") from American workers.(53)
Changes over the past five years have been dramatic. The U.S. auto-
industry lost $4.2 billion in 1980 and $1.3 billion in 1981.(54) In
1980, with over 11 million motor vehicles produced (as against just
over 8 million in the U.S.)Japan surpassed the U.S. in total vehicle
pr~duction.(55) Table 15 shows the'dramatic decline in motor vehicle
production in the U.S., Michigan and Detroit region between 1978 and
, .~ ~
1982. With the Japanese import penetration capturing 30% of the
American car market,(56) the 1.35 million fewer vehicles produced by
Detroit in 1982 was not simply attributable to any cyclical downturn
in the American economy. Most dramatic of the difficulti~s faced by
the American manufacturers were the troubles of the Chrysler
Corporation (which had suffered from a particular lack of foresight in
management)(57)'saved only from bankruptcy by major federal governrne~t
intervention in the form of a $1.5 billion loan guarantee in December
, ,
1979. Chrysler employment in Michigan actually fell by almost half
(from 80,000 to 42,500) between 1979 and 1981,(58) and the major brunt
c ~ 1.;.
of this, in terms of plant closures,'was borne by the city of Detroit,
where Chrysler had 15 out of its 21 facilities in the metropolitan
area in May 1980.(59) Excluding the major closure of the Chrysler
, ,
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assembly plant in the enclave city of Hamtramck in 1979, between May
1980 and March 1983, Chrysler had closed, or had scheduled for
closure, seven major facilities out of its total of fifteen within the
city of Detroit - including its Lynch Road assembly plant.(60)
Table 16 shows the dramatic fall in employment and rise in unemployment
in the Detroit region between 1978 and 1982. Wage and salary employ-
ment (excluding the self employed) declined by almost one-quarter
million - this overwhelmingly reflecting a decline in manufacturing
employment and especially declines in transportation equipment and
metals. Based on a review of structural change in the automobile
industry, a report from the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to the
President in January 1981 projected "the potential loss of roughly
500,000 manufacturing jobs in the next ten years, almost all of them
located in a handful of states and cities of the industrial Northeast
and Midwest". (61) At the beginning of 1981, the U.S.automakers were
planning to spend $70 billion in an investment programme over the
following five years to produce the smaller, fuel efficient cars
demanded by the market,(62) While G.M. with access to greater
resources planned a major programme of new plant construction in the
U.S., Ford and Chrysler have concentrated on the revamping of existing
facilities. Indications, so far, from the nature and spatial
allocation of these resources, while not entirely pessimistic for the
Detr10it region, indicate that the prediction of the U.S. Department
for Transportation may be reasonably accurate. Amongst the U.S.
automakers, Ford and G.M. are moving towards the concept of a "world
car" - a vehicle to serve all markets.' The advantages include
economies of scale due.to standardisation of components and the
greater flexibility and control provided over labour by the parallel
or multi sourcing of components.(63) U.S.-auto manufacturers, it is
predicted, will be importing 15% of their components from overseas in
1990.(64) Yet the American manufacturers. are not leaving North
America. About $50 billion:{70%) of the current $70 billion wave of
reinvestment by the auto companies will be located in North
America(6S) and the bulk of this is in the Midwest.(66), With the
exception of Chrysler, assembly plant closures and "mothballing" have
taken' place at the periphery of the automotive heartland - -in
California, New Jersey,' and Georgia.(67) The major reason for this
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locational emphasis lies in the continued existence of a vast auto-
mobile supplier network in the Midwest linked, as is happening, to a
swi tch by the U.S. auto companies to the "kanban" or "just-in-time"
Japenese inventory control system which cuts significantly down on the
need for working capital aggravated as it is by high interest
rates.(68) It is very likely, therefore, that Michigan's share of
U.S. vehicle production wi 11 continue to exceed 30%.(69) The
associated employment prospects, however, for Michigan and Detroit are
less encouraging. Vehicle downsizing is one factor which will result
in a permanent loss of demand for the products of Michigan's foundry,
steel, forgings, and stamping industries. And smaller engines will
shrink the market for piston rings, bearings, and other machine parts
made in Michigan.(70) The increased use of electronic components,
alumintum, and plastics will tend to favour southern suppliers.(71)
But perhaps above all is'the impact of automation. The investment by
the auto producers in the U.S. is highly capital intensive as opposed
to more labour intensive investments in locations such as Mexico and
Brazil.(72) Stonier(73) has advanced the interesting thesis that:
"One of the major questions to arise by the end of the 1980's
will be that the Third World whose competitive advantage was
enhanced by the availability of cheap labour, will find itself in
an increasingly disadvantaged position as the new capital
intensive, automated equipment produces goods more cheaply than
..the cheap manual labour of the Third world."
While this may be true , the impact of automation on job loss in the
U.S. auto industry will be substantial. Jobs may be kept in the U.S.
and Michigan, but there will be less of them. A major Delphi forecast
of the industry has estimated that total employment of the U.S.
vehicle manufacturers will permanently drop by almost20% (a loss of
200,000 jobs) in the decade of.the eighties. The loss in jobs among
u.S. auto suppliers was projected at :400,000.(74) The u.S. Department
of Commerce has estimated a permanent loss, from the 1978 peak, of
150,000 jobs involved in the manufacture of vehicles and components in
Michigan by the autumn of 1985.(75) Recent figures for employment and
unemployment in the Detroit region do not contradict this assessment
(Tables 12 and 16). On this basis many of the 115,000 jobs lost in
the region in metals and transportation equipment as measured against
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1978 will not be replaced (Table 16).
In 1984, with a national unemployment rate in July of 7.4%, the signs
were that Reaganomics was "working". From November 1982 through March
1984, the u.s. economy generated nearly 4 million new jobs'(76) The
stimulatory effect of tax reductions and large federal budget
deficits - part of the Reagan package - have given an obvious boost to
spending power. But ''Business Week" (July 1984) has pointed to a more
underlying factor:
"There are many reasons why the U.S. has surpassed Europe in
creating jobs, but they boil down to a single theme - European
rigidity. The American economy has shown a flexibility that has
yet to appear across the Atlantic • • •
America's adaptability manifests itself on many economic and
social fronts. Perhaps most important, wages in the U.S. have
proved they can go down as well as up. During the' 1980-1982
recession, union givebacks resulted in declining income. And in
the present recovery, wage hikes have been at historic lows.,,(77)
Other factors included by "Business Week" in greater American "adapt-
ability" consist of. the ability to fallow workers on a short-term
basis witout severance payments and especially lower unemployment
benefits which decrease the worker's ability to "hold out" before
taking a lower paying job.(78)
Data Resources Inc. in 1984 predicted that while total manufacturing
jobs in the U.S. would increase by approximately three-quarters of a
million between 1985 and 1990, the major growth would be in the
broadly defined. service sector,(79) .With the. arrival- of 1985,
however, the MiChigan and Detroit unemployment rates remain stubbornly
high and .the preponderance of new. job growth is located primarily in
the South Atlantic states and the Pacific Southwest.C80)
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(d) The State of Michigan - Economic Developnent Scramble
1973 - 1984
Transportation policy formation at the local and regional levels
during this time, linked as it was to economic development issues,
took place within the important context of state economic development
policy. ~One mustgive this some consideration.
·A general perception existed at the level of state government, even
before the "auto collapse" at the beginning of the 1980's, that,
firstly, all was not well with the Michigan economy and, secondly,
that something should be done about it. Concern went beyond the
traditional awareness of the pro-cyclical nature of an economy heavily
based on durable goods and the advantages which would accrue from
greater diversification. As the Michigan Economic Action Council,
established in the midst of a recession in 1975 as a joint effort
between Republican Governor Milliken and a Democratic legislature, put
it in its report in 1976:
"We must first of all see to it that the next dip in our economy
is not as steep as the one we just experienced, and we must see
to it that the Michigan economy grows over the long run. Even as
we begin to climb out of the recession, it is clear that there is
much unused human capacity available in the Michigan economy.
Unemployment, while recovered from the 14.4% that it reached in
February 1975, is still at 10.2% in April 1976".(81)
Michigan unemployment in the 1970's, as can be seen from Table 12, was
consistently above the national average. In 1976, the state actually
established, in the Commerce Department, an Office of Michigan's
Changing Economy. In defining the problem it set out to address, the
office referred to "a deceleration in long-term growth,,(82) in
Michigan. The automobile industry was becoming "mature",ie. suffer-
ing from a developing saturation of consumer demand, and technological
improvements were eroding jobs. But Michigan was not generating new
firms and new industries (particularly services) sufficiently to pre-
vent a secular rise in unemployment. Michigan between 1969 and 1974
lost considerably more jobs due to the closure of firms than it gained
consequent to the opening of newones.(83) In short the problem:
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"Michigan is not generating and nurturing the new firms that can
provide future· growth and diversification for the state's
economic base."
And, in short, the recommended solution:
"Michigan must seek to attract growth industries that will
complement its industrial base and that offer independent growth
opportunities and the potential to attract service
industries.,,(84)
Lest Michigan's status in competition with the "Sunbelt" and other
states be forgotten (an unlikely event), the FANTUS corporation, a
leading industrial location consulting firm, had published a report in
1975 ranking states according to their ''businessclimate". The report
placed Michigan last.(85) Figure 1 lists the major business financial
incentives of a direct nature initiated by the State of Michigan from
1973 to 1983. Only since 1973, in the words of Fantus, has there been
"a consistent effort to broaden the role of State government in
supporting business expansion".(86) The efforts of State government
in this regard are quite inseparable from the efforts of local govern-
ments. Suffice it to note in this context that many of the economic
development initiatives outlined on Figure 1 (property tax abatement
policy, local economic development corporations, tax increment financ-
ing) transpose the battleline in the economic development scramble to
the local level. The "battle" for jobs and tax base has been waged,
as shall be examinerlin conjunction with transportation policy
formation, in a most vociferous manner at the local level with
localities competing amongst themselves with ammunition provided by
the State. Since 1980 the economic development scramble in Michigan
has intensified.··The competition with the Sunbel t is far from over.
Business Week in June 1981 in yet another special issue, this time
entitled "America's Restructured Economy", pointed out that the South
,.
and West with its lower labour costs was still a favoured location for
new investment, especially in labour intensive high technology
industries such as computers and electronic components. It was
.concerned that with the South and West "winning the inter-regional
battle for economic resources" the American economy was "threatening
to create a nation divided into regions of haves and have nots",(87)
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In June 1981 a new director also took office in the Michigan
Department of Commerce. The following excerpt from an inspirational
memo to his staff gives a flavour of the mood which in general was
present in state government and which was no less to be found at local
level s of government.
"The mission of this department has always included economic
development in its broadest sense. In the past, our efforts to
encourage development have at times been frustrated because they
had to compete with other public issues for the attention of the
Legislature, the various departments and the Executi ve Office.
Today, and for the foreseeable future, 'economic development
(again, in its broadest sense to include community development,
consumer-oriented and regulatory activities) is accepted by all
as the first priority of state government. The structural
changes taking place in Michigan economy require this department
to take the lead in finding innovative and practical solutions to
the problems of job creation and job retention. We will not be
able to excuse our lack of performance on the grounds that other
issues - such as environmental protection - make it impossible
for our ideas to be heard., In many ways economic development is
the 'only game in town' • • • "(emphasis original)(88}
The response from state government in addition to simplifications in
the regulatory climate for business has been on two major fronts: on
the one hand cuts in the Michigan "social wage,,(89) (Figure 1 p.214f)
and on the other hand the rudiments of what might be called a'state
"industrial policy" involving a more particiPatory relationship with
the private sector. 'The latter consisting of direct pri vate sector
loans and grants (Figure 1), and the establishment of Biotechnology
and Robotics Institutes at Michigan universities(90) involves an
effort to pick economic "winners" but also has invol ved the bailing
out of po~sible "losers",(91) Given the modest scale of such
resources (the Michigan Economic Development Authority was capitalised
in 1983 with a bond issue of $50 million, the Michigan Small Cities
Program devotes roughly $20 million per annum to economic development
- measured against say the $500,000,000 required to construct and
equip" a modern auto as~~~bly plant independerit of site
'preparation)(92) and moreover the abs~nce'of a national industrial
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pol.tcy, aclirnateinv.hlchbusinessisstil.lab e to playoff state against
state, the potential for success of such initiatives, measured against
the seriousness of Michigan's economic problems, cannot be judged too
optimistically. Such is the state climate for local economic policy
making ~in Michigan in the 1980's.
(e) Intraregional Economic, Demographic, and Spatial Change
Going further to frame the context for regional; transportation policy
this section will consider intraregional Locattona l,' aspects of
economic ·change in addition to demographic and general physical
spatial change over the period. In particular I will consider this
in relation to the phenomenon of "exurbanisation". In 1980, the New
York Times observed that "the: nations population, industry and
commerce, once clumped together in the Cities, are being broadcast far
and wide 'in a movement that has called for the commitment of vast new
resources and has made the nation more dependent on automobiles as
energy becomes scarce and costly,,'(93)
In terms of industrial location, I have discussed the increasing
"generalization of capital", as facilitated by technology, at the
global level. At the regional level also, as storper points out,
capital also manifests its independence from any·one'spot.(94) There
is greater flexibility in locationaldecisions.' This flexibility has
resul t'edi~ general in the U.S.'(and in Bri tain) in greater absol ute
or relative manufacturing employment growth of peripheral non-
metropolitan areas relative to metropolitan core areas.(95) The
causes cited in the academic literature have been peripheral
deglomeration economies, land costs, and labour costs. Of these,
peripheral labour cost advantages are the most frequently
mentioned.(96) In looking at recent trends in industrial location in
the Detroit'region, one is hampered, at time of writing (February
1985), by the fact that the 1982 U.S. Census of Business has still not
been published. The 1977 U.S. Census (Table 3) shows a continuing and
,significant'decline in manufacturing jobs and firms within the city of
Detroit between 1972 and 1977 (declines of 15% and 18.5% respectively)
216
measured against increases of 10.5% and 18% in the balance of the
core counties. In the context of very modest increase in the region
as a whole, the city's share of regional manufacturing employment fell
from over 33% in 1972 to under 28% in 1977 (Table 3A). A study by
Mattila and Kurre in 1977 demonstrated that the city of Detroit was
not generating enough new industrial establishments to offset deaths
(establishments going out of business or leaving the region) and .the
migration. of establishments to other parts of the region.
Significantly, the latter overwhelmingly consisted of migration to
other parts of the core counties - Oakland, Macomb, and the balance of
WayneJ97) Substituting for the 1982 Business gensus, Table 17 shows
the real change in the value of industrial property in the Detroit
region between 1976 and 1982.' Inside a regional context of zero or
even "negative" growth, the city of Detroit and the balance of Wayne
County (which includes the older "downriver" industrial areas such as
Ecorse, River Rouge, and Wyandotte) have experienced sharp declines.
In the space of six years, Detroit has lost one-third of its
industrial tax base. Whilst Oakland and Macomb counties experienced
an increase in industrial value of $643 million (and subsequent
construction of a new General Motors assembly plant in Orion Township
illustrates the attractiveness of the periphery of the built-up area
here), this was outstripped by an increase of $882 million in the non-
core SEMCOG counties of which the growth in st. Clair is particularly
striking. In 1977, Mattila and Moor characterised the outlying SEMCOG
counties as performing a "primarily residential function for the
highly industrialized core".(98)··In the 1980's,.while 80% of the
region's industrial tax base is still in the core counties (Table 17),
such a characterisation is becoming more questionable.
Table 3 shows change in employment and number of firms in the retail,
wholesale and service sectors in Detroit and the region between 1972
and 1977. Across the board the story is one of dramatic decline in
the City and increase in 'the balance of the core area• . It is unlikely
that the 1982 Census of Business, when published, will· show a reversal
of this trend. Office construction in Oakland County in the seventies
(even allowing for the construction of the "Renaissance Center" in
Detroit) far outstripped, as Table 14 shows, construction in the City.
Indications are that this has. continued into the 1980's.(99) The
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extension of the Lodge and Chrysler freeways out of the city of
Detroit, in place by the end of the 1960's, and passing through
Southfield and Troy respectively, were followed by major office
building booms in these jurisdictions.(100) With the closure in 1983
of the major Hudson's department store in downtown Detroit, things
also looked no more optimistic for the city on the retailing front.
Turning to demographic trends, the decade of the 1970's saw a slight
decline in the population of the SEMCOG region (Table 3). The reasons
reside in a declining birth rate (a fall to less than two children on
average per wornan)(101)and increased net out-migration. The latter,
running at an average of 35,000 per year through the 1970's in the
Detroit SMSA,(102) can be attributed, in part, to job growth in the
Sunbelt - Itagradual reversal of the traditional pattern of young men
and women • • • migrating into Michigan in search of employment in the
automobile related industries .._(103) It can also be attributed to
exurbanisation within Michigan. In the u.S. generally, non-
metropolitan areas are growing faster in population than metropolitan
ones.(104) Michigan, espeCially with the strong population growth of
the northern lower peninsula, is no exception.(105) The causes of
this generalisation of labour in space are complex. It involves more
than the rural retreat of retirees and is certainly linked to the
-
generalisation of capital in space discussed previously. A general
dissatisfaction with metropolitan living in Detroit and romantic
attachment to the "pastoral pleasur~s of rural living" are factors
noted by demographers studying Michigan.(106) The relative stability
of the population level in the Detroit region, however, cloaks major
internal changes in its distribution. The city of Detroit's
population declined by over 310,000 between 1970 and 198U (Table~ to
stand at just over 1.2 million. If net migration only is considered,
Detroit lost almost 400,000 people over the decade,(107) This exodus,
while a small increase in black suburbanisation did take place, was
again overwhelmingly white, leaving Detroit a city with a two-third
minority population in 1980 (Table 6). As is also strikingly apparent
from Table 6 and Map 27, the 1970's saw a more general loss of
population in the older core metropolitan jurisdictions and major
growth of the regional periphery. The extent to which this can be
attributed to the increase in black suburbanisation in the core areas
- "
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bordering the city of Detroit rather than simply the attractiveness of
newer property in Detroit1s rural fringe, must be somewhat
speculative. However, as pointed out before, Livingston county, the
one SEMCOG county not covered by the Roth busing plan in the first
half of the seventies, has shown the strongest percentage growth over
the decade. Map 28 shows the extent of the continuously built up
urban core region in 1980 with suburban development forming a clear
and unbroken belt exceeding ten miles in girth around the city. The
broad grain again of Detroit1s fiscal and income disadvantage at this
time in relation to the tri-county core is illustrated on Maps 29 and
30 respectively.
(f) Transportation Policy Formation
So far in this chapter in attempting to locate transportation policy
formation with respect' to class I have concentrated on important
features of Capital/Labour relationships over the period with a
particular emphasis on the process of capital accumulation and
associated federal and state responses. While one must still consider
state and federal contextual factors pertaining more narrowly to
transportation policy, .attention shifts now to regional and local
level transportation policy formation proper. This section proceeds
to construct an overview of such policy, but for a full understanding
it is necessary to integrate this with the "regionalist" and economic
development'dynamics or themes within the region which are considered
in the final two sections of this Chapter.
As remarked earlier, the past decade has been marked by an almost
complete breakdown in regional, consensus between Detroit and the
suburbs over transportation policy. This has applied to freeways
(with a .strong'anti-positiontakenby the city to further
construction) but especially, with the major surge in construction
over anyway,'to public transportation policy issues. The period has
been marked by major conflict and even impasse over level, 'type,
organisation and location of public transportation service. This"has
been linked espeCially to considerations of finance (who Pays) and who
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wins and loses in the competition for economic development. Firstly,
however, the state and federal context.
Widespread critique of the auto-complex led highway construction
programme, as has been seen dates back to the characterisation
of "urban" problems in the 1960's. The federal Housing Act of 1961
had provided a very small amount of funding for local public transit
which was increased in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. But
it was not until the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 that
provided for $10 billion in capital grants over a 12 year period that
"real" federal dollars became available. And only in 1974 through the
National Mass Transportation Assistance Act, in the wake of the energy
crisis, did federal funding become available for operational costs of
transit systems.(108) The following comment by an analyst of the capital
grant 'progamme of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration
(created in 1965) in the early 1970's before the energy crisis, shows
federal concern for the "urban" problems of congestion, inequality, and
detrimental' effects (urban form and aesthetics) rooted in the post-war
model of metropolitan development. (109)
"The program was explicitly intended to produce certain external
benefits: reduction in traffic congestion and atmospheric
pollution, increased mobility for the poor, the young and the
elderly; and incentives for the creation of compact transit-
,'oriented urban patterns of the New York - San Francisco type in
contra-distinction to cities of the low density, automobile-
oriented sort, such as Los Angeles and Houston".
When the federal Department of Transportation under the Carter
Administration announced in November 1979 its explicit !'urban trans-
portation policy objectives", energy conservation stood alongside the
above more long standing concerns (fl • • •projects supporting energy
intensive or dispersed, sprawl development should be discouraged• • •")
in addition to a strong awareness of resource constraints.(110) With
more fuel conscious driving depleting income to the Highway Trust Fund
and with resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation ("3R work")
making increasing claims, it was becoming more difficult to justify
new freeway projects on simple financial grounds.(111) General
budgetary restraint was also a considration, but under the urging of
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Congress did not prevent increased funding for transit in the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1978.(112)
The Reagan Administration has not been able to entirely "roll back the
clock" in urban transportation planning. Under a non-interventionist
ideology and budget cutting drive, public transit was an initial and
major casualty with plans for the eventual elimination of operating
subsidies altogether,(113) As a major business journal put it, the
administration had "set out to put an end to the free ride in
America". (114) This ideological preference for the operation of
market forces in the field of urban transpor~ation may be seen as
linked to a wider repudiation of the role of government in addressing
the "urban" problems previously identified which in turn was linked
to the condition of American Capital at the beginning of the eighties.
While the Reagan Administration, however, may have a predisposition in
favour of highways (and has reinstated previously cancelled Interstate
projects),(115) public transit support in Congress in 1982 ensured
that roughly a 20% portion of the 5c increase in the federal gasoline
tax, effective in 1983, would be alJoc ated to transit and particularly
the continuance of a certain level of operating assistance after
all.(116) This "revenue enhancement" measure amidst general budget
cutting in 1982 was in fact necessary to bailout the Highway Trust
Fund suffering under the factors mentioned. The condition of the
nation's highways, the backbone of the nation's surface transport-
ation, could not be ignored. While public transit does in the 1980's,
drawing on the urban.considerations we have mentioned, have a strong
constituency which is represented in washington,(117) it is never-
theless true that public transit funding is much tighter under Reagan
and is likely to remain a target in future efforts to reduce the
federal deficit.
In considering transportation policy formation by the State of
Michigan over this period, it is useful to distinguish analytically
between the role of the State in its intervention into and mediation
of regional level transportation policy formation and more general
level state transportation policy. The latter is the focus here,':with
the former considered in relation to regional policy itself. In
general terms the period may be characterised as one in which a
221
liberal Republican Governor (latterly a Democratic Governor) pushed
for a "balanced" transportation system in Michigan but within the
constraints imposed by a state in which, with around five million
registered passenger vehicles and one million commercial
vehicles,(118) the road lobby is very strong. The most prominent
members of the latter include the Teamsters, the Michigan Trucking
Association, the Michigan Road Builders Association, the Associated
Petroleum Industries of Michigan, the County RoadAssociation, the
Michigan State Building and Construction Trades Council, the Michigan
Farm Bureau, the Michigan Townships Association, and the Michigan
Association of Counties.c119) The Michigan Departrnent; of Transport-
ation has traditionally reflected the interests of this lobby and in
fact was only renamedsuch - formerly being knownas the State Highway
Department - in 1978. Only in this year also, through constitutional
amendment, did the Governor acquire direct appointive power over the
Director of the Department. In 1976, the Detroit Free Press in an
editorial referred to the "near-total domination of this state's
transportation efforts by the highway interests". It continued:(120)
"The planners and the officials of the Highway Department,
dedicated though they may be, are infused with a bias that has
been built in over years of spreading asphalt and concerete
across this State."
AGovernor's Special Commission on Transportation reported in 1966
that: "Public transportation is an important part of an integrated
system in an urban area". (121) The Governor's Special Commissionon
Urban problems, reporting in 1968, recommendedthat the state should
"encourage public transportation improvementswithin urban and metro-
politan areas".(122) Up to January'1973, however, the total all-time
state expenditure on public transit ~~s $2.3 million.(123) The
''breakthrough'' cameafter heavy lobbying by Governor Milliken with the
state's road interests, who "knewthe public transit issue would not
go away",(124) culminating in PA327 of 1972. This "transportation
package" increased the state gasoline tax by 2c (from 7c to 9c per
gallon). Of this 25%of the increase in revenue was earmarked for
public transportation. The following commentby Milliken in March
1973, in describing the reform, echoes concerns for the environment,
inequality, congestion, aesthetiCS, and urban form found in federal
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government. (Had the speech been written after the Middle East oil
embargo in October of that year, no doubt it would have reflected a
concern for energy conservation also, as state policy subsequently
came to do.)(125)
"The demand for a balanced transit system is based on both the
inadequacy of the present day automobile/truck-oriented system
and the anticipated constraints that an environmentally conscious
society will place on its transit system. Almost one-fourth of
American households have no car available to them and many more
have access to an automobile for only a portion of the day.
Total reliance on the automobile for perso~l transportation not
only makes cities impassible for hours every day during peak
commuting times, but giVes over valuable land to streets and
parking structures; expressways, streets and parking lots
comprise almost three-quarters of Detroit's central business
district.,,(126)
The 1972 reform brought in $21 million for state-wide mass transit in
fiscal year 1973-74 of which 40% was allocated to operating grants for
the Detroit area's bus systems - part of what Milliken called "the
limping, run down system we found across the state in 1971".(127) The
$21 million was, however, regarded by Milliken as "relatively
insignificant: relative that is to the scope of the problem".(128)
Subsequent "transportation packages" in 1978 and most recently in 1982
have increased funding in Michigan but it remains a "poor cousin" to
highways. Piloted by Milliken through the state legislature, these
settlements have involved drawn-out confrontations between transit and
highway forces, with transit struggling each time to again claim a
greater share of the increase in funds accruing largely.from further
increases in the state gasoline tax.(129) Under pressure from
Milliken, but also due to shrinking revenues from greater fuel
efficiency and the demands of repair and reconstruction, the Michigan
Department of Transportation has since 1977 scaled back its plans for
;)
new highway construction. And this to an extent has defused the
freeway debate in Detroit,(130)
I turn now to regional and local level transportation policy
formation itself. In most general terms, regional transportation
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policy has become unstuck on the fragmented structure of the
metropolis (the regionalist dynamic) and linked to this the hitching
of city transportation policy by Detroit's Mayor to an economic
development agenda, the broad contours of which have been shaped by
regional Capital, and which is centered in particular on efforts to
bolster the service and commercial functions of the Detroit CBD. The
approach in the remainder of this section will be to firstly describe
the major regional transportation policy issues and cleavages and
secondly to consider more fully how these realities have affected the
'response of planners working for SEMCOG and SEMTA, the two
governmental bodies with region wide transportation planning
responsibilities.
Regional conflict during the tenure of Mayor Young has centred on the
issue of whether or not the city of Detroit should construct a rapid
rail transit system in the Woodward corridor - the so called "subway
issue". Linked to this has been the question of merger of SEMTA and
the Detroit Department of Transportation to create a truly regional
transportation authority. Mayor Young has made city agreement on a
merger conditional on construction of the subway, but apart from the
"bargaining chip".aspect, the issue highlights city concerns over the
allocation of regional public transportation resources, primarily bus
. .
related, generally. I shall return to these issues shortly, but
firstly onetakesup the matter of regional freeway construction.
Map 31 illustrates the present Detroit freeway system. A simple
comparison with Maps 24 and 25 shows that not only have TALUS' plans
for 1990 been unimplemented in rather dramatic fashion, but that parts
of the network which TALUS regarded as in the pipeline for 1975 remain
unbuilt today. The role of regional planners in thiswillbeconsideted.
presently. Two major factors, however, stand out. Firstly, tighten-
ing resource constraints and the demands of maintenance and
reconstruction, and secondly, the role of "urban" considerations in
federal and state policy seen in conjunction with a strong anti-
freeway stance by the city of Detroit on the grounds that freeways
facilitate sprawl, would drain further economic vitality from the city
and where constructed within the City, would involve unacceptable
social disruption.(131) Past freeway' construction is seen by
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Detroit's Mayor - all too obvious now with the benefit of hindsight -
as part of a dynamic which through economic and residential dispersal
and differentiation has led to preponderous regional concentration of
disadvantage within the city of Detroit. The City, in particular, has
thrown its weight against two major freeway projects which at the
beginning of the 1980's were still, with suburban support, under
consideration in one way or another by both SEMCOG and the State
Department of Transportation.(132) The first, strongly supported by
the Oakland County Road Commission because it would service develop-
ment already in situ(133) and which has led to much speculative land
purchases along its proposed route,(134) involves an extension of I-
275 north through Oakland County to join with I-75 in Springfield
township and a north-western extension of the Lodge Freeway to join
with the extended I-275 in Commerce township. (The project elements
as foreseen by TALUS for construction by 1975 are illustrated on Map
24.) In 1980, the Detroit City Council with the support of the Mayor
invoked the Carter Administration's Community Conservation Guidelines
requiring a federal analysis of the impact of the I-275 portion of the
project on urban sprawl and the central City.(135) It seems unlikely,
though, that the project will proceedJ136) A second major pr'oje ct
has, in the words of a state transportation planner, been IIstymiedllby
Detroit.(137) This is the Davison/Mound project - a proposed east-
west joining of the Jeffries and Chrysler freeways within the city of
Detroit through an extension of the Davison expressway and a major
extension north paralleling Mound Road through Warren and Sterling"
Heights to connect with M53. On economic development grounds the
latter two jurisdictions are strongly in favour.(138) The one
regional freeway project to which Detroit has given its eventual
blessing - a.completion of the major east-west regional- link in the
form of I-696 just north of Detroit (dotted line on Map 31) - has in
the words of the director of transportation'planning for Semcog been
used by Mayor Young as a IIpolitical football and bargaining
tool".(139) The latter was considerably helped by the fact that the
Detroit Zoo lay in the path of the proposed route. Detroit's agree-
ment in 1981 came in fact with an insistence ifrom the federal
Secretary of Transportation that the project "should be very closely
integrated with the proposed light-rail transit line linking the
northern" suburban communities with downtown Detroit". (140) Design
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features associated with the project were federally mandated to
accommodate a future light-rail system.(141)
I turn now to the major cleavages within public transportation policy
formation. Here there exist major and sharp splits along intra-class
lines over who benefits and who pays. To set this in"perspective, it
must be remembered that in America in the 1980's almost as many people
walk to work as use public transit. Despite the "euphoric boost in
ridership during the late 1970's" and before the effect of Reagan
funding cuts, in 1981 only 6% of American commuters took the train or
bus to work.(142) The dominance of the automobile in Detroit area
commuting is illustrated in Table 18c. "Around 95% of workers in the
two major suburban counties of Oakland and Macomb in 1980 used some
form of auto transport in their journey to work. In Wayne County,
which includes the city of Detroit, the figure is lower at 89%. Tran-
sit ridership in general can be seen (Tables 18a and 18d) to have
continued its decline in the mid-1970's, thereafter making modest
gains. Under a vigorous expansion programme (Table 18b) SEMTA rider-
ship has displayed consistent growth before being curtailed by a 20%
cut in service(143) due to federal operating subsidy cutbacks in 1982
(Table 18a). The bulk of regional transit passengers - approximately
85% in 1982 - are still carried by the Detroit Department of
Transportation operating about 800 line haul buses wholly within the
City limits and under a city ordinance preventing the pickup and
delivery of SEMTA passengers anywhere other than in downtown Detroit -
displaying a friction between Detroit and SEMTA to which we shall
return. The dominance of the auto, however, sets the tenor for
regional debates on transit. The increase in auto ownership has
continued (Table 18d) and the proportion of total daily transit trips
in relation to total daily person trips has most probably in 1980
(judged in relation to the increase in daily vehicle miles of travel
and decline in daily transit trips) declined from the figure of 4.6%
pertaining in 1965 (Table 18d). Most importantly, though, the transit
dependent; population is concentrated within the city of Detroit.; To
quote the SEMOOG regional transportation plan in effect in 1978:(144)
."The exodus of middle and upper income families from central
·cities has left areas with large concentrations 'of low income
people. Such people, often unable to afford automobiles, are and
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will continue to be, dependent on public transit."
In general terms, the Detroit suburbs have a strong disposition in
favour of improved roads over improved transit. A Detroit News
article in 1977, for example, reviewing suburban opinion, referred to
the "thousands of disgruntled citizens who hound Oakland, Wayne and
Macomb authorities because they're tired of bouncing into potholes,
pummeling ruts, splashing along poorly drained lanes and careening
along high-crowned, choppy streets and congested, unpaved roads.,,(145)
Again in general terms, this predisposition over the past ten years
has led to less than enthusiastic suburban support for public transit
to begin with. This has been reflected in the defeat of a ballot
proposal in 1974 which would have permitted the State of Michigan to
issue $1 billion in general obligation bonds to put public transit "on
its feet,,(146)and in the general difficulty which SEMTA has had in
raising local tax revenue for transit. The suburbs, however, have
been vocifer~us in demanding a "fair share" of whatever transit
resources are available and (and this is the nub of the Detroit/
suburban division) have 'been especially wary and outright hostile to
any scheme which would commit suburban resources (or entail the fore-
going of State and federal transit resources) to a regional public
transportation system perceived to benefit in the main the city of
Detroit. 'Since the Mayor of Detroit has insisted on a Detroit
"subway" as part of any future major expansion of regional transit and
since this is perceived as doing just that, 'it must dominate one's
attention.
Firstly, however, oneinot~the friction over the operation of bus
service in the regton as currently existing. Whi le SEMTA was
perceivedin'its legislative terms of reference as becoming the
regional p~blictra:nsportation authority, in actuality as has been
pointed out, the bulk of service is 'still'provided by the aepar'at.e
Detroit Department of Transportation providing service within the city
of Detroit. SEMTA, however; regarded by federal and State government
as the agency responsible for the overall organisation of regional
transit, votes through its Board transit funds to Detroit under a
"purchase of service" agreement. This Detroit allocation has been the
subject of sometimes bitter dispute between SEMTA and Mayor Young and
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illustrates Detroit's fears for its interests should its bus system be
taken over by SEMTA which has by virtue of population a built-in
suburban majority on its board. SEMTA moves to do just that dating
back to 1975 have been thwarted by Mayor Young. The city has
insisted, and this has been accepted by Governors Milliken and
Blanchard, that merger of its transportation system with SEMTA is
conditional upon the construction of a rapid rail subway system within
Detroit. It is this sticking point to which attentionis now turned.
The Young Administration in Detroit has since its earliest beginnings
in 1974 and 1975 linked the development of public transportation in
the city to an economic development or urban revitalisation agenda
which places major emphasis on increasing jobs and tax base
concentrating in particular on bolstering the commercial and general
vitality of Detroit's downtown. The two transit mechanisms, for
which Mayor Young has lobbied hard in pursuit of this objective, are
the construction of a "people mover" or fully automated monorail
system by SEMTA in the Detroit CBD and the construction of a rapid
rail subway system in the Woodward corridor running outwards to the
suburbs. The people mover project has admittedly been relatively
uncontroversial. The concept is to link the major activity centres in
the rather fragmented Detroit downtown and thus provide a measure of
cohesion. By improving circulation it is hoped to "stimulate economic
revitalization".(147) Construction, escaping Reagan budget cuts,
commenced in late 1983. The proposed route of approximately three
miles is shown in Map 32 and a diagrammatic representation of the
proposed "new look" Detroit CBO is shown in Fig.2. The origins of the
project can be traced to strong advocacy of the idea by the Detroit
Central Business District Association and support by Metropolitan Fund
in the early 1970,s.(148) A feasibility study by the state Department
of Transportation ensued in November 1973 and the project was
suggested, along with other possible regional people mover locations,
for consideration in the SEMCOG regional transportation plan adopted
in 1975. Following the strong expression of interest by the federal
Urban Mass Transportation Administration in 1977 in the concept,
indicating,that federal financial support for such a project in
Detroit might be forthcrnoing,the project was most actively pursued by
Mayor Young. By a vote of 12 to 1 in favour the SEMTA board in May
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1980 produced regional agreement on a plan. The people mover project,
however, represents a relatively small fraction of the regional
transportation resources to which Detroit's Mayor has laid claim. The
major demand for a Detroit subway on which regional consensus has
floundered and which has cost at least in excess of $500 million in
foregone federal regional capital transit assistance and probably
much more, has been costed at between 500% and 700% of the $114.5
million cost (1979 prices) of the people mover depending on the
balance between surface and sub-surface rail being considered.(149)
The suspicion must be raised that, especially given the fact that the
Detroit people mover is expected to be fairly self-supporting in
operating expenses from fare-box revenue, and given the animosity over
the subway issue, the people mover project is partially a palliative
offered to a particularly demanding and vociferous Mayor.
A chronologicalreview of the Deu-oit "subwaysaga" will be pr'esenced
followed by a consideration of the major issues. In December 1975,
when SEMTA began an "alternative analysis" of possible public trans-
portation futures open to the region to the year 1990, Mayor Young had
already made it clear that merger of the Detroit Department of Trans-
portation and SEMTA was conditional upon a rapid rail subway system in
the city. The idea of an elaborate rapid transit system in combin-
ation with a major expansion of the regional bus system, had in fact,
in general terms after almost two years of work before Mayor Young
took office, been advocated publicly in 1974 by SEMTA and SEMCOG but
in a document which did not deal in concrete terms with the actual
financing of projects or nature of transit technology.(1S0) (Hap 34J
How much this idealistic speculation of planners influenced the
Mayor's thinking at an early stage must in the absence of further
investigation remain speculative but it is difficult to imagine that
it did not have an impact. The "alternative analysis", however, was
to be specific and to deal with the harsh matter of financial
feasibility. The task was given an impetus by the commitment in 1976
of $600 million by the Ford Administration to a regional transit
system in Detroit if regional consensus on a plan could be obtained
and if such a plan contained as a major goal the economic revital-
isation of the city of Detroit. (151) That regional consensus might
well be an insuperable stumbling block was indicated by a change in
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the selection procedure for the SEMTA board also in 1976. Previously
with a total board membership of 9, SEMCOG had appointed to six
positions. Public Act 266 of 1976, however, in expanding the board to
15 members, reduced,in the face of opposition from SEMCOG's Executive
Director(152) (but not the actual member units of government) the
appointive power of SEMCOG to 3 members only. The future board was to
be appointed much more directly by city and suburbs.
In May 1977 the SEMTA board, by a vote of 9:4 of those present,
approved a "preferred" mass transit alternative for the region incor-
porating a light rail subway system (as opposed·to a more heavy rail
system favoured by Mayor Young) to run on Woodward and Gratiot
Avenues.(153) This attempt at compromise, however, soon fell apart in
a storm of suburban criticism.(154) The Oakland and Macomb County
Boards of Commissioners had already endorsed an alternative Oakland
County Road Commission plan placing its emphasis on expanded bus
service. Attacks on the SEMTA strategy were forthcoming from members
of all these organisations. The chairman of the Macomb Board of
Commissioners declared that his county would pullout of SEMTA "if all
that money is dumped into a subway".(155) On top of the commitment of
capital resources, the subway was projected to incur an annual operat-
ing deficit: in excess;of $100 million.<156) While the chief elected
official in Oakland County, the County Executive, had given an initial
tenative,acceptance of the SEMTA decision,(157),in November he had
reversed his position. Clashing publicly with Detroit's Mayor, he
stated:(158)
"We must demonstrate that our transit strategy is based on
realism, sound business judgement and a serious commitment to the
needs of all our citizens, not just those who happen to live
within the Detroit city limits. Detroit's subway plan over~
emphasizes subways and under-emphasizes the common sense goal of
;, moving people throughout our region".
t.
In March of 1978 it was Mayor Young, insisting on a minimum of8!
miles of subway on Woodward.but stopping short of Detroit's northern
boundary, who was publicly airing the idea of pulling Detroit out of
SEMTA.(159) This was followed in the sa~e month by a meeting,of23
state House Representatives whose constituencies fell within the remit
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of SEMTA which in the words o~ the experienced capitol correspondent
of the Detroit, Free Press "shook a figurative, but collective, anti-
subway finger in Mayor Young's face". Summing up the consensus of the
meeting, Representative John Maynard of st. Clair Shores stated:(160)
"If the thought is to shove that subway system down our throats,
there's not going to be any transportation system at all."
In April it was the turn of the Oakland County Board of Commissioners
by majority vote to threaten to withdraw from SEMTA - a move which was
averted by the intercess'ion of Govern~r Milliken.~161) SEMTA during
this.time,.was continuing an environmental evaluation of the previously
stated preferred option of the board in addition to equal consider-
ation of various other competing options. The board in other words
reserved the right to ,reverse its previous decision. Mayor Young
awaited ,the results of SEMTA's "scientific determination,,(162)while
by December the u.s. Transportation Secretary warned that if regional
agreement was not forthcoming the commitment of federal capital
support, in the face of competing claims from elsewhere, might be
lost. (163)
In April 1979 the SEMTA board for the second time reached a
compromise, by a vote of 10:5, on a mass transit plan for the
region.(164) While the dissenting suburban five would agree to no
sub-surface rapid rail at all, the compromise, as nurtured by Governor
Milliken,(165) i~volved 'a light rapid rail system f~om the Detroit CBD
to 6 Mile Road in Detroit (Highland Park's northern boundary line)
with only the section to Grand Boulevard to run sub-surface (roughly 4
miles up the Woodward corridor from the Detroit CBD and taking in the
! - '. •
commercial and institutiona,l hub of the city). The system would,
contrary to the, 1977 agreement, not run on Gratiot at all (federa I
funding constrailltsexerted their influence here) and w~uld stop
within the Detroit city 'limits with much slowe~ surface rail taking
over fr'omelevated rail at'6 Mile. Again, howeve~, this agreement has
proved transit~ryand has ~ome to nothing. In late 1979 and early
1980 city/suburban conflict again, ~easse;ted itself in the s'tate
legislature over the appropriation of State funds to carry out
preliminary engineering work on the subway proposal. Although, with
strong 'lobbying by Governor Milliken, the money was eventually
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appropriated, the suburban House Representative from Grosse Pointe
Farms perhaps summed up a good deal of suburban feeling in stating:
nThe subway is still a controversial question • • • We still can
say no to a subway once the engineering is done. This will not
end the question". (166)
In November 1980, the Detroit Free Press in an editorial noted that:
n• • • some of the old foes of underground rail have drawn renewed
hope from the election of Ronald Reagan • • • How many times does
this b~ttle ha~e to be refought?,,(167)
Whereas previously suburban interests were cognisant of the federal
emphasis on central city economic revitalisation in transit planning
and in federal urban policy generally, .the election of Reagan
undoubtedly removed a great deal of this pressure on regional policy
formation • . In January 1981 a SEMCOG review panel voted 5 to 4 to
withhold its endorsement of federal grant funds for preliminary
,. -I
engineering work on the subway. Voting against Detroit represent-
atives on the panel were representatives from the Monroe and st. Clair
County Boards of Commissioners, the City of Farmington Hills, Bloom-
field Township and Plymouth Township.(168) Mayor, Young subsequently
blamed the decision on "racism and bigotry by suburban politicians
seeking favour with their constituents".(169)
With federal budget cuts under, the Reagan Administration, the
prospects for a rapid rail system in Detroit remain pessimistic in any
, .
case • . Intimating that perhaps the ,moment had passed, the General
Manager of SEMTA.just prior to his resignation in October 1981 summe~
up his experience of the regional impasse over the subway and merger
of SEMTA and the Detroit Depa~tment of Transportation thus:(170)'
"It's been the most frustrating thing that I've ever had to deal
_' -,'
with in my life • • • the continual debate over the Woodward Avenue
. .
light rail system an~ the merger of the,two systems - and they
are .tied together • • • • ..The debate here is centered on: Do you
want to make an investment in a single corridor like Woodward -
that's several hundred million dollars - in a city that is
declining, that is depopulating? Or do you want to take that
,< -~
money and spread it around the region? And the debate goes on
...The outlook is not all that great."
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Reviewing the breakdown of regional consensus over the subway issue,
the division within the reproduction of labour power over
appropriation and allocation of resources to serve regional public
transportation needs stands out :quite clearly. Very much just below
the surface of suburban rhetoric, however, is also an awareness of the
economic development implications of a Detroit subway - the main
rationale on which the city of Detroit bases its case. A consultant's
study commissioned by Detroit and published in 1977 estimated that
between $1.2 billion and $1.9 billion of additional office, retail,
housing, hotel, and industrial development would be generated in the
city over a 12 year period depending on which rapid rail proposaI then
under consideration was in fact adopted. A follow-up study the
following year put the estimate at up to $1 billion over an 18 year
period for just a Woodward line.(171) In an increasingly competitive
intra-regional scramble for economic development, the following
conclusion of a consultant's report commissioned by SEMTA would not be
lost on Detroit's suburbs:(172)
"If the region is defined as the City of Detroit, the attraction
of growth to the transit corridors from the suburban areas of the
seven-county region would appear to be new economic development
responding directly to the effect of transit on the region's
attractiveness. In fact, these manifestations of'growth are
actually only land use impacts, changes in the intra-regional
location decision. (emphasis original)
It is quite appropriate to consider the impacts rail transit
.
might have on urban development within the city boundaries. If
the objective is to reinforce urban development patterns, based
on its impact on land use patterns regionally, transit may repre-
sent an important factor in an effective strategy. - It would be
.misleading to the regional constituency, however, to fail to
'indicate that transit's impacts may focus urban development and
concentrate the 'location of business and commerce, but it is
.unlikely to increase the entire region's share of the nation's
future growth.".
While the 'cityof Detroit.has staked its transportation future on the
economic development benefits of a subway system and while this has
been at the centre of the breakdown-in regional transportation
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consensus, there is no guarantee (despite the projections of
consul tants) that if implemented, a Detroit subway would bring the
success (in terms of ridership and spin-off development) hoped for by
the city. Absent radical restrictions on automobile and parking
within the city (almost inconceivable in the prevailing competitive
regional economic environment and with the absence of effective state
and regional land use policies) the argument has been made by Oakland
and Macomb county officials that "few suburbanites will want to drive
to Eight-Mile Road (Detroit'snorthern boundary), leave their car in a
parking lot and then take a subway to downtown Detroit, when they can
get there faster by car over Detroit's freeway network". (173)
Detroit suburbs are, therefore, against a subway because it might
succeed and also because it might fail. The possibility of the latter
is further attested to by the fact that in 1980 only about 16% of
those living in the suburbs actually worked in the city of Detroit
(Table 5).
Commenting on the concept of subway construction in Detroit, Melvin
Webber (Director of the University of California's Institute of Urban
and Regional' Development) commented in 1976:
"There's no question that Detroit would be a poor area for such a
system.· Detroit is very much laid out like Los Angeles; spread
out on a grid. Most of the destinations are scattered. Detroit
hasn't got a big downtown like Chicago, and it isn't about to get
one • • • "(174)
And the equity effects of a subway are not that clear cut. City of
Detroit legislators in Lansing have openly recognised that a subway
will, in.the main, not provide transportation for city residents but
serve suburban commuters going from their homes to work in the city.
William Ryan (the longest standing state Representative from Detroit),
while supporting a subway on economic development grounds, has
commented.that his·constituents would likely use a subway only to go
t
to the state Fairgrounds (situated on the northern Woodward
Corridor).(175) In general then, given,the problematic nature of the
benefits to Detroit residents there is reason to suspect that the
advocacy of a subway by Detroit's mayor is less directlyrelated to
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class pressures (ie there are other processes at work exerting
influence) as compared to Mayor Cobo's advocacy of freeways in the
1950's when class pressures were quite overwhelming. To take this
speculation further, to inquire for example, if planners could
possibly have persuaded Mayor Young to seek instead a dial-a-ride
system for the city, would require a more micro level of analysis -
one that is complementary to more macro type analysis in the
construction of a theory of planning. This is a theme which is taken
up in the concluding chapter.
Attention is now turned .to a consideration ·of the production of
transportation plans associated with the regional conflicts so far
described. I will consider both SEMCOG and SEMTA ~ the two regional
agencies with area-wide transportation planning responsibilities, the
former responsible for strategic level transportation planning in
general, the latter concerned with the specifics of public transport-
ation planning.' I will firstly examine SEMCOG.
In June 1975 the SEMCOG General Assembly adopted a "Regional
Transportation Plan for Southeast Michigan" with a time horizon to the
year 1990.(176) The plan differed considerably from TALUS with more
emphasis on the need for public tranportation (a projection of 7.5%
for transit trips as a proportion of the region's total trips by 1990
as compared to 3.6% from TALUS forecasts)(177) and a major scaling
back of planned highway construction. Publicity for the draft version
of the plan stated:(178)
"SEMCOG's Transportation Plan says, in essence, that'our present
regional road network - in terms of new rights-of-way - is
virtually fully developed. We need few new roads: Rather, a
regional highway development program must emphasize expanding,
rebuilding, maintaining, and improving existing freeways and road
networks."
Cl'·
The plan proposed the addition of only 65 miles of new freeway added
to the existing'regional system of"670 miles. .Emphasis shifted to the
'~pgrading of nine arteries (117 miles in all) to the status of
regional majors". On the public transportation front the plan
proposed five ''highLeve L" transit corridors (rapid surface rail and
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subway) comprising 62 miles and 186 miles of "intermediate level"
transit (rapid bus service on bus only lanes). This would connect
with a much expanded local "feeder" transit network (comprising 3287
route miles) and with five people mover locations.(179) The freeway
network and high level public transit lines proposed in the plan are
illustrated on Maps 32 and 33 respectively. SEMTA planners
participated in the generation of the public transportation element of
the SEMCOG plan and SEMTA officially took a major role in publicising
the final transit product.(180)
Giveri the review of transportation planning ·issues which hasbeen
conducted already, it becomes easier to under~tand the marked change
in emphasis between TALUS and the.SEMCOG plan. Whilst formally the
same methodology pertained in both cases (the establishment of goals
and objectives and the evaluation of alternative strategies), the
nature of the situation around which plan making coalesced had
changed. The 13 goals and associated 45 objectives of the SEMCOG
plan; developed by planners and accepted by the SEMCOG General
,Assembl~,(181) express concern for environmental quality, ener~y
conservation and other "ur~n" issues (the transportation needs of the
disadvantaged, economic impact of transportation proposals in spatial
terms, and the minimisation of neighbourhood dislocation). In general
terms, these concerns were rooted in problems associated with the
pertaining model of post-war metropolitan development and were not
developed in isolation from State of Michigan and federal urban
policies in the 1970's. ,The decline in birth rate itself from the
1960's made a TALUS-like profusion of freeways more untenable. (It is
interesting to note here that the director of transportation planning
for SEMCOG - subsequently appointed SEMCOG Executive Director -
maintained in interview that, even after allowing for the higher birth
.
rate assumptions of TALUS, the projections of future traffic volume
used in TALUS to justify such massive freeway expansion, just "did not
stand up when subjected to critical evaluation by SEMCOG". In his
opinion TALUS was a "rationalisation for a compilation of highway
dreams" dominated by a "why not" attitude to construction in the
policy environment of the 1960's).
Returning to the SEMCOG· plan, there is little doubt that the
.
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fundamental conflict around which it was formed was the intensifying
polarity between Detroit and its suburbs, rooted as it was in the
process of accumulation and divisions within the reproduction of
labour power. This was the rock upon which the general land use,
environmental and energy conservation goals of SEMCOG were to
flounder. A basic freeway network already in place and absent any
real regional or state land use policy, .suburban development was to
make such urban goals seem little more than lip service. A degree of
"hedging" or equi vocation in the highway element of the SEMCOG plan
through the designation of controversial potential freeway routes as
"study corridors" (the Northwestern freeway extension and Davidson/
Mound corridor, for example - Map 33) is indicative of the competing
interests which SEMCOG planners had to straddle. The transit element,
through the sheer scale of its proposals, illustrates another
response. While the TALUS transit proposals could be labelled
ma~ginal and unrealistic, the SEMCOG ones fit the description of
integral and still unrealistic. It seems that acceptance of the plan
by the SEMCOG General Assembly was obtained at the cost of the grand
and idealistic nature of the proposals - a massive increase in inter-
mediate and local bus service region wide with no less than 6 high
level transit corridors. The plan noticeably contains no prioritiz-
ation of projects. Suburban interests coul& therefor& presumably vote
for the plan as a whole on the basis that suburban interests were
reasonably represented and that, as the plan itself states: "The 1990
Regional Transportation Plan proposes those facilities which would
provide a desirable level of service." (my emphasis).(182) The
experimentation with idealistic transit futures~.l SEMTA and SEMCOG
planners between 1972 and 1974 (cf. p. 229) in as much as it
encouraged and fuelled Mayor Young's claim to a Detroit subway can be
seen as included almost as a necessity.in the general transportation
plan adopted by SEMCOG in 1975. The structural functionalist under-
pinnings by this stage and associated "extravagency" in the transit
proposals, would seem pressed on planners by the fundamental lack of
cohesiveness in SEMCOG, the regional planning organization. As
opposed to TALUS where there was a strong link between the implici t
structural functionalism and dominant highway interests the link in
the SEMCOG plan, it is suggested, was between a structural
functionalist orientation and the need to paper over the strains and
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cracks in a tenuous status quo. In both cases the selection of
methodology by planners cannot be seen in isolation from the
respective pressures influencing the choice.
In 1981 work began on revising the SEMCOG long range transportation
plan incorporating a year 2000 time horizon. Using the previously
adopted goals and objectives, initial concentration has been on five
major regional transportation corridors converging on the Detroit CBD.
New freeway construction, under the additional pressure of unavail-
ability of finance, was noticeably absent from the preliminary output
of this process (the recommendations endorsed by the SEMOOG Executive
Committee in 1982)(183)with concentration on capacity improvements on
freeways and the use of bus only lanes. It appears that the same
idealistic approach still pertains in the realm of public transport-
ation, however, with recommendations for a major four-pronged rapid
rail transit system terminating in the Detroit CBO (Map 34) when the
city of Detroit would probably settle for half of the route miles on
any of these transit corridors.
Following the early participation by SEMTA in the generation of the
transit element of the SEMCOG transportation plan, SEMTA planners and
officials were hastily brought down to earth by the pressing realities
of regional conflict and their activities have subsequently centred
around efforts to achieve an operational consensus on transit
planning. The deepness'of the divisions, however, go beyond the
ability of planners and other SEMTA officials to reconcile them with
some "magical" transit scenario. The SEMOOG Long Range Transportation
Plan is far removed from the operational day-to-day reality of SEMTA
transportation planners - a reality which has in its t.urnexerted a
major impact on "planning methodology. Planners have been openly
involved in a process of attempted practical conflict resolution
informing that process at the political level through the provision of
a range of options and assessment of their consequences. This would
make an interesting micro level research study in itself. In general
terms what is clear, however, from observation of the neutral tone of
option presentation to the SEMTA board and from interview with the
General Manager of SEMTA (formerly director of transportation planning
for SEMTA), is a recognition by planners of the political nature of
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the transportration choices facing the Detroit region. SEMTA planners
and other officials have to a degree distanced themsel ves from the
conflict recognising that resolution is a matter primarily for
politicians. The SEMTA General Manager, in interview, pointed to his
public statements on the matter which express the opinion that if the
objective of transit planning is the movement of people in the region
then a bus only system is probably best, but that if the economic
revitalization of the city of Detroit is included then a rapid rail
system is required. The choice is left to the Board and the conflict,
ashas been seen, has failed to be resolved. The general methodology
pressed on planners and arising out of the political irresolution
which they face conforms closely to the recent "role of the expert"
which Reade(184) has advocated (perhaps abstracting too much from the
constraints on methodology in practice) as a guide to planning
practice in general. "Experts" as opposed to "professionals"
according to Reade "appreciate fully that the actual decisions made
must rest on political values quite as much as on the technical under-
standing which they themsel ves provide. (They) are more likely to
express their advice in the conditionalfonn - 'if you want X, then it
is necessary to do A, B, and C.'" This is in fact what SEMTA planners
are presently doing.
To complete an understanding of regional transportation policy
formation,one must turn in the remaining two sections of this Chapter
to a general consideration of regional governmental fragmentation in
Detroit and to the economic development agenda of the city of Detroit.
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(g) The Regionalist Dynamic
The period under consideration has in general seen no lessening of
local governmental cleavages within the Detroit metropolitan area and
an intensification, under Detroit's black Mayor, of fracture between
city and suburbs. This it is argued must be seen as linked to the
changing fortunes of the region in the overall process of capital
accumulation which hAs been discussed and associated intensification of
divisions within the reproduction of labour power. I will touch on a
number of factors here which characterise the present situation.
One notesfirstly the intense degree of economic competition among local
governments in the region for "jobs and tax base" using mechanisms
supplied by state government. At the beginning of 1983, in the
absence of any co-ordinated regional economic strategy, there existed
in excess of 100 Economic Development corporations in the SEMCOG
region competing with the City of Detroit (Table 19). This was
supplemented by 17 competing Downtown Development Authorities and 8
Tax Increment FinanCing Authorities. (For the functions of these
bodies and description of their incentives see Fig.1,p.214£). The
degree of competing and extensive use of industrial property tax
abatement (with total number of regional awards standing at 750 at the
beginning of 1983)is illustrated on Table 17. This was supplemented
(also as of January 1983) by 100 regional commercial property tax
abatements of which the city of Detroit accounted for 23. The
intractability of this regional fracture exhibited itself in a number
of other important forms:
(i) The failure of an attempt by Metropolitan Fund to institute
stronger regional governmental structures.
The failure of an attempt by Governor Milliken to achieve
the adoption of a regional property tax sharing plan.
Opposition by Mayor Young to the creation of a County
Executive position in Wayne County government.
A move by townships in the region to protect themselves from
annexation.
(v) And most importantly the record of achievement of SEMCOG
itself.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
I will consider these in turn.
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In the words of the Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund, "SEMCOG
did not complete our work".(185) At the beginning of 1972, M.F.
launched two parallel projects with the ultimate aim of realising more
effecti ve regional government in Detroi t.c 186) The first invol ved
work which led to the "spawning" by M.F. a year later of a group
funded by the parent organisation and called ''Regional Citizens". It
was described by M.F.as "an ongoing citizen organization seeking to
develop a sense of regional consciousness in S.E. Michigan". (187)
Membership of the neworganisation was thrown open to all "regional
ci tizens" of S.E. Michigan whowere "interested in improving his or
her knowledge and understanding about metropolitan issues and in
contributing his or her citizen skills to their solution". The open
invitation to join continued:
"An important ingredient in the regional concept is the creation
of a regional constituency • • • the recognition by individuals
like yourself that they are citizens of a Southeastern Michigan
regional community, in addition to their more local citizenship
alliances. Weinvite you to join with us in this process, by
becominga Regional Citizen.,,(188)
The organisation was basically to be a conscious-raising "talking
shop" with a major emphasis, as the bye-laws indicate, on "television
and mail communication".(189) On the need for a regional
constituency, a Metropolitan Fund report, introducing the "Regional
Citizens" organisation, stated: (190)
"'The city' becamethe 'central city' and it is, even literally,
at war with its suburban neighbours. The central city and
suburbs fight for tax revenue, for the business and industrial
base which produces muchof that revenue, for the population
which provides the very life blood of civic existence. The
suburban citizen views with anger and hostility any attempt by
'the city' to retain claim to his allegiance, or to his bank
balance. Hedenies any need of or for 'the city' and wishes it
would, 'go awayand leave us alone' in suburbia.
Hedenies any part in creating the city's problems. He denies
too, at least in his ownmind, any need for the city • • • despite
his use of its recreational and cultural facilities, its zoo, its
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water system and waste disposal system, its transportation and
traffic systems and the many amenities which exist only because
of the scale of urban development of which it is the core, the
variety of major sports, symphony orchestra, art museum, etc.
The city and its subrban ring are much farther apart than the
thin boundary line which marks their literal separation. They
are apart and growing more so."
The other major M.F. initiative also launched in early 1972 involved
the generation of proposals for strengthened regional government in
Detroit. Research papers on various aspects of the subject were
commissioned which fed into the deliberations of a M.F. "Regional
Governance Policy Committee" drawn from the M.F. Board of Trustees.
In introducing the recommendations of the committee, the president of
M.F. in 1974 stated:(191)
"presently the urban condition of the metropolitan regions of our
nation is critical. The urban condition of Southeastern
Michigan, for example, is characterised by near ly one thousand
murders in the year 1973 • • • with more than seven hundred in a
single jurisdiction; by distressingly high unemployment,
seemingly endemic, particularly in certain groups and locales; by
inefficient use of energy due to ineffective or non-existent
planning; by public transportation inadequate or unavailable at a
time of great need; and by a spread-city continuing unabated
because of a most profilgate use of land."
What comes through strongly here and in the rationale for a "regional
constituency" is concern again (as there had beeQ behind the
establishment of SEMCOG) for regional integration, or more
specifically the deleterious effects of the lack of it, on the
efficiency and stability of the Detroit region as a locus of
accumulation.
The recommendations of the M.F. policy committee called, as an interim
measure, for direct election of half of the SEMCOG representatives in
a much reduced General Assembly (the rest to be appointed by groupings
of cities, townships and counties). This reconstituted SEMCOG would
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serve as a charter commission in drawing up a plan for a much more
powerful regional governmental agency in which local membership would
be mandatory and in which policy decisions would be binding on sub-
regional units of government.(192) Legislation based on the M.F.
proposal was introduced into the State legislature in 1975 and failed
abysmally to gain support. support was forthcoming neither from the
suburbs or from the city of Detroit. As the Detroit Free Press put
it:(193)
liThepoliticians who now control SEMCOG have stuck their heads in
the sand and have issued a knee-jerk statement of opposition to
the idea. True, it may have flaws and perhaps could be revised
but it desreves more serious consideration and support than the
wave-of-the-hand dismissal it has received from SEMCDG."
Of the original M.F. proposal the Chairman of SEMCOG as an M.F. Board
member included a statement of dissent following the recommendations.
It simply stated: (194)
liThecreation of a new level of government is unnecessary and
undesirable. Greater support for the present voluntary
association of managing regional affairs is necessary."
A State Senator from Macomb County bluntly stated:(195)
"• • • residents in my area think regionalism means being sucked
into Detroit's crime, money and racial problems. All I'm saying
is the people I represent don't want it. They're fearful of it.
They're afraid of losing things they've worked hard to get."
(It bears pointing out that in 1975/76 the spectre of cross-district
school busing still hung over the Detroit region.) In a region as a
whole where over 80% of the population was white, a Detroit Councilman
summed up the position of the City:
"It has been the city's experience that in regional authorities
such as the Huron Clinton Metropolitan Authority the people of
Detroit have been getting the short end of the stick.,,(196)
One Marxist writer has seen in the efforts of M.F. an attempt by
corporate capital in the Detroit region to eradicate democracy and to
bring local government more directly under its control:(197)
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"The ruling class has long understood that its capacity to ~
is dependent on its capacity to control those who govern. It is
far easier to control officials who are far removed from local
and direct constituencies (and for whom winning an election will
require thousands of corporate dollars, and obligations, for
campaign expenditures) than it is to control local officials who
more accurately reflect the working class base that elected
them."
This assessment seems much too conspiratorial and certainly over-
romanticises the working class nature of LocaI democracy in South-
Eastern Michigan. The activity of M.F. was rooted in concerns for
stability and efficiency in the region as a locus of accumulation but
is best seen perhaps as involving a somewhat idealistic assessment of
possibilities for change given the competitive economic roots of
regional governmental division in the process of accumulation and the
reproduction of labour power.
In interview the Executive Director of M.F., while expressing
disappointment with the results of "Regional Citizens" (by the late
seventies a "paper only" organisation) and the legislative initiative,
pointed out that membership of SEMCOG did increase by 20% following
the push for regional government and suggested that some local govern-
ments may have seen SEMCOG as a way of warding off that possibility.
He pointed to the value of "extreme positions". Macomb County,
however, has still stubbornly refused to join.
other manifestations of metropolitan fracture are not hard to find.
In 1976 with the support of Governor Milliken a "tax base sharing"
bill was introduced into the Michigan legislature. Based on the st.
Paul/Minneapolis experience,(19B) the bill would have required local
governments in S.E. Michigan to pool and share 50% of future increases
in business property tax receipts,(199) Even this relatively modest
proposal (based on half of an increase and excluding the residential
property tax base) met with the same fate as the proposal for regional
government other than the support in this case from the city of
Detroit.
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Animosity between city and suburbs was again starkly apparent in the
unsuccessful opposition of Mayor Young to the reform proposals for
Wayne County government put to the Wayne County electorate in 1981.
While Wayne County suffered from a severe degree of executive
fragmentation bordering on administrative and financial chaos, Young
objected to the concentration of power and responsibility involved in
the creation of an elected County Executive who would have the
potential to become a powerful political rivalJ200) As the State
legislature's Black Caucus put the matter, "a blue-eyed Caucasian
county manager would rally suburban whites into a political force to
overshadow and oppose the wishes of Detroit's hugh black voting
bloc."(2~1)
On another front was the matter of annexation. Since Public Act 359
of 1947 Michigan townships meeting certain conditions were permitted
to adopt their own local government charter. Prior to 1978 there were
four such "charter townships" in S.E. Michigan. Following legislative
changes in 1978 (PA's 242 and 591) providing such townships with
virtual immunity from annexation, in January 1981, in the space of
little over two years, the number of charter townships within the
SEMOOG region had increased to 19.(202)
Antagonisms have had major impact on the work of SEMCOG. Regional
autonomy and fragmentation during this period has continued to render
SEMCOG relatively ineffectual. In addition to transportation SEMCOG
has prepared regional plans covering land use, housing, water quality,
,
and recreation and open space. It is beyond my scope to review all
of these, but given the important context it provides for the form-
ation of transportation policy, I will focus on land use. SEMCOG's
''LandUse Policy Plan,,(203)as adopted by the General Assembly in 1977
has been ineffectual as a regional plan due both to the nature of its
contents and the lack of a regional means for implementation. The
content is both general and the result of considerable compromise.
The plan emphasises, for example, the need "to strengthen and improve
utilization of the central core and sub-cores of the region,,(204)and
the need to "guide urban development in such a manner as to avoid
unnecessary and excessive utilization of the region's natural resource
potential",(205) However, the document is carefully labelled "Policy
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Plan" and the following disclaimer on the accompanying land use map
indicates a strong degree of indeterminacy:(206)
"This map does not constitute policy in itself, but serves only
as a graphic interpretation of the plan text. Due to limitations
of scale, the map is highly generalized and should not be used
for site-specific determinations of Council policy. For such
purposes references should be made to the relevant portions of
the plan text (equally generalised - my addition), as well as to
the many detailed sources which identify the physical, economic,
and social characteristics of particular areas." (ie always an
examination on a case by case basis - my agdition).
Generalisation itself was a form of compromise, but a more concrete
version of the latter is the opinion expressed in interview by the
chief SEMCOG planner responsible for the sewer policy input to the
land use plan that the SEMCOG sewer proposals (as adopted in 1976)
provided for one-quarter million acres of new sewered land in excess
of population forecasts and in excess of that necessary to remain
within the spirit of SEMOOG's expressed urban policy goals. (207)
It is on the implementation side, however, that the SEMCOG land use
plan falls down entirely. Reliance on co-operation from local govern-
ments is almost total. SEMCOG has had the obligation to comment on a
broad range of projects involving federal funds (the so-called "A9S
review process") but negative reviews have been rare (less than 0.5%
of total projects between January 1974 and June 1979).(208) More
importantly, privately funded development in general is possible any-
where in the SEMCOG region if compatible with state and federal law
and permitted by the constituent local governments in question. The
frustration of the Executive Director of SEMCOG at the inability of
his agency to control development in the absence of a state land use
policy is apparent in the following exerpt from a memo to State
government in 1980:(209)
"prior comments by SEMOOG have raised concern over the lack of a
coherent, comprehensive state land use policy plan which is
essential to rationally guide development in the State • • • To
date, we have not seen development of a state land use policy."
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State ~nd.federal funding suppport for SEMCOG has in recent years
declined considerably. The annual State regional grant to SEMCOG
declined progressively from $215,000 in 1978/79 to $101,000 in
1982/83_(210) A major stable federal regional funding source - the
so-called "HUD 701" comprehensive land use planning programme -
declined considerably under Carter and has been abolished under
Reagan.' The former.federal administrator of HUD 701 funds in Michigan
suggests that regional funding amidst general budget cutting has been
particularly vulnerable because of a perceived lack of "value for
money" and the absence of a strong constituency for such funding.(211)
By 1980,.as described by the now former Executive Director of
Metropolitan Fund, .."things in the organization were at a low
ebb".(212) Some financial contributors were becoming "lukewarm in
their suppore'.(213) The following year actually saw a major
reconstitution of the organisation under the new name of Metropolitan
Affairs corporation. Over 50% of the new and halved Board of
Directors was still drawn ..from major regional capitalist
interests(214) but the scale and.scope of the new organisation differs
from Metropolitan Fund. "MAC" is housed in the same building as
SEMCOGand the.full-time Metropolitan Fund staff (which actually had
been reduced in 1980 to one professional from a previous total of
seven) :has been replaced,by a contractual agreement with SEMCOG. Of
this agreement the new MAC President Ca major regional. retailer)
stated:(215)
"The private"sector of Southeastern Michigan retains its
interests in, ;and participation in, issues and problems of
.r~gional significance. The organization's main goal will be
working with the public sector to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of services at the regional level."
There is no doubt that the new organisation in the face of limited
progress in the 1970's sees itself as fulfilling a more limited role.
The present local'governmental system in S.E. Michigan is tolerated at
.leastfor the moment.
(h) Detroi t •5 Economic DeveloJ!ll€l1t strategy
That the city of Detroit's stance on public transportation issues
(especially its stand on the subway) has been integrated with its
economic development agenda is something which has heen stressed. I
have described already in general terms the deteriorating economic
fortunes of the city during this time and the climate of regional
economic competition in which it took place. Prior to a consideration
of the city's economic agenda itself I. will say something about the
motive force "to do something" provided by Detroit's fiscal crisis and
the federal and state "urban" policy context within which city
economic development policy was formulated.
Detroit's underlying fiscal problem has stemmed from the fact that in
a city dependent for approximately 60% of its expenditure on local
revenue sources(216) and already taxing itself heavily, the base upon
which such taxes are levied has continued to be eroded without
corresponding drop in the need for services. Between fiscal years
1976/77 and 1980/81, a time of major inflation, Detroit's property tax
base remained virtu~lly static(217) and on a per capita basis in 1981
was the lowest in the tri-county region (Map 29). At the beginning of
the 1980's with major restructuring and labour shedding taking place
in the regional economy and hitting Detroit particularly hard, City
income tax receipts, even unadjusted for inflation, began to fall
substantially.(218) Crisis points were reached in 1975/76 and in
1980/81, with a projected city deficit for fiscal year 1975/76 of $103
million(219) and an accumulated deficit in June 1981 of $132
million.(220) The response by the City has been on the one hand to
cut back costs through service reductions, lay offs and attempts to
hold the line on public employee wage demands. (At the end of 1980
the city in fact empLoyed 20% fewer people than when Mayor Young'took
office in 1974.)(221) On the other hand the City has sought
additional revenue sources. In 1976 assistance carnein the form of
the instigation of a yearly state grant or "equity package" to Detroit
- a centre piece of Governor Milliken's "urban policy" - and
permission given to Detroit by the state legislature to levy a special
tax on city garbage collection. In 1981 with federal budgetary cut-
backs and a state budgetary squeeze attendant on the changed fortunes
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of Michigan's automotive economy, assistance came in the form of a 1%
increase in Detroit's income tax for residents and suburban commuters
alike. At time of writing, in early 1985, with the city of Detroit
proposing a major hike in the city's utility taxes to hire back 700
laid off police officers, the signs are that even this major "fix" has
now worn off. This fiscal deterioration has been accepted by
Detroit's Mayor as a major rationale (alongside the need to create
jobs) for the city's economic development agenda. The "Mayor's Task
Force on City Finances" reporting in 1976 on the City's budget crisis
regarded economic development as the long term solution. Itlooked to:
"• • • the revitalization of the City of Detroit, the strengthening
of its economic base, the provision of more jobs for its
citizenry, and a greater realization of its growth
potential". (222)
It recommended the establishment of an Economic Council composed of
"the City's major financial, industrial, commercial, mercantile,
labour and other related organizations working in close concert with
city government" (223) to study the matter. Subsequently formed later
in 1976 this organization spawned the present leading city of Detroit
economic development agency - the Detroit Economic Growth Corporatio~
In this context one must point out the irony of property tax abate-
ments as part of a strategy to combat City fiscal distress.
In turning to an overview of federal and state "urban" policy I
consider federal policy first. In a memo to President Carter in
January 1978 the secretary of the federal Department of Housing and
.Urban Development defined the three major "urban" problems in the u.S.
as:(224)
"...the continued decentralization of population and businesses;
the increasing fiscal and social service disparities between
central cities and suburban neighbours; and the continued
centralization of minorities and the poor in-the central cities."
These concerns for equity (and implicitly stability), and for the
environment and resource utilisation (the waste of energy, infra-
,
structure and farmland inherent in urban sprawl in addition to
aesthetic deterioration) pervaded the "National Urban Policy"
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announced by President Carter in March 1978.(225) They may be seen as
arising very directly out of the particular American model of
accumulation and labour reproduction in Detroit and other older
metropolitan regions of the country. While the administration was not
without some successes in addressing "urban" equity issues,(226)
federal budget problems quickly stifled any hope of major new
expenditures. On the contrary, the following year President Carter's
budget message proposed cuts, for example, of 25-40% in federal
expenditure on housing programmes.(227) Certain federal agencies
under the Carter urban policy did find themselves obliged to conduct
"urban impact assessments" for major new policy initiatives.(228)
Under this concept, finding "especially persuasive expression" by the
Rand corporation,(229} such assessments were to include policy impact
on "population size and distribution" and were to be submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget. While this policy did have some
success in limiting urban sprawl,(230) in the words of one
commentator, "for the big Cities, the federal policy comes about a
quarter of a century and several Administrations too late".(231) Land
use planning responsibility in any,case (whether exercised or not)
still remained lodged at the state level, a fact which in Michigan
gave little solace to the city of Detroit. Neither was solace forth-
coming for Detroit in the urban policy of the Reagan Administration
announced in 1982.(232) Given the administration position that "the
foundation for the Administration's urban policy is the Economic
Recovery program", (233) in the discussion of "Reaganomics" and'
accompanyfnq "New Federalism" I have covered the ground here already.
Urban policy has been incorporated into economic policy in general.
The dramatic impact of Reagan budget cuts on Detroit is shown in Table
20. Perhaps not surprisingly Mayor Young labelled the -Reagan urban
policy as both a "fraud" and "no policy at all".(234)
Reflective of the liberal orientation Michigan politics and not
prepared to leave black voters in Detroit to the Democrats, the
"urban" concerns expressed by the Milliken Administration (and the
Democratic Blanchard Administration which took office in 1983 is of
the same orientation) reflected closely those expressed by Carter.· In
a major policy speech in 1976 Milliken expressed the roots of such
concern. The concern for equity was linked quite explicitly to
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concern for urban stability:(235)
"How many times have I heard it said: 'Let downtown Detroit die.
Let downtown Flint, Saginaw and Bay City die. Let them all die'.
What these people don't understand is that their pleasant suburbs
will be next to die, and the economic and social chaos that would
follow would also jeopardize the quality of life on our farms and
in our resort towns."
On the matter of the environment and imperfections in metropolitan
resource utilisation Milliken stated:
"It seems strange to me that in an era when preservation of our
resources is of such great concern that so many people are
willing to throwaway our most valuable resources - our cities.
We can never afford to build them again, once they are gone. And
I believe that we cannot afford, in this new Age of Limits, to
live in such a decentralised and wasteful manner."
Such policy concerns run through a number of major gubernatorially
initiated reports(236) but while certain achievements on both scores
can be credited to the Milliken Administration, there were important
limitations on what the city of Detriot could expect from state
action. Measures introduced to compensate for urban inequalities
during this period of Milliken's tenure did include state anti-
redlining legislation and a neighbourhood improvement programme of the
State Housing Development Authority. The "Detroit Equity Package", a
major new annual State cash injection to Detroit's treasury,
instituted in 1976 amidst a city budget crisis, illustrated, however,
the constraints on gubernatorial compensatory initiati ves aimed at
Detroit. The measure was deliberately conceived by Milliken not as a
"bailout Detroit" package but as state assistance to Detroit for the
provision of services with regional and even statewide benefit - the
operation of the Detroit Institue of Art, Detroit library and
Historical Museum (a package worth almost $25 million in fiscal year
1983).{237) Suburban Detroit and "outs tate" (non-a.n, Michigan)
support for a diversion of "their" tax dollars on equity grounds to
Detroit alone was judged by Milliken as unlikely.c238) As it was, the
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city of Detroit found itself having to resist pressures for regional
or state administration of such institutions. On this the Mayor was
quite graphic:(239)
"There are those who say the solution to our problem is to turn
over our zoo, our Parks, our Art Institute and Historical
Museums, to some Regional or state Authority. These are the
accumulated treasures of generations of Detroiters. These are,
quite literally, the jewels of our city.
Now it is proposed that we give them away - for free - for the
promise that they will be kept polished. The answer is no.
The answer to Detroit's problems is not the dismantling of the
city."
To put matters in perspective one must point out that at the beginning
of the 1980's welfare payments by the state of Michigan were still
amongst the most generous in the country.(240) State budget pressure,
however, attendant on Michigan's changed economic fortunes was putting
this record under strain. Such problems made Milliken's proposal in
1980 for a state fiscal aid prograrruneto Michigan's most "distressed"
local governments (involving a proposed $30 million to Detroit)(241) a
non-starter and no long term adjustment to the distribution formula of
the State General Revenue Sharing prograrrunewas forthcoming in 1980 as
in 1970 to make up the loss in revenue to Detroit consequent on its
reduced 1980 Census population.(242)
Turning to the matter of metropolitan efficiency and environmental
considerations, the promotion of public transit and dampening zeal for
freeway construction during Milliken's tenure was at least partially
due to these factors (the equity question was also important). But
State government did not grasp the nettle of the assumed prerogative
of local government (tied to ideologies of free enterprise and local
autonomy) in land use planning - a factor which one has seen was not
lost on the Executive Director of SEMCOG and was certainly not lost on
the Mayor of Detroit.
, "
To conclude this chapter one is in a position to consider the economic
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development agenda of the city of Detroit with a particular emphasis
on its relationship to city transportation policy. I will consider
in turn the development of the agenda, the interests behind it and
finally an assessment of its success.
A key feature in the development of Detroit's economic development
strategy under Mayor Young has been the major involvement of corporate
capital. This is something for which the Mayor takes credit in
engineering. The city's first published "Plan for Urban Economic
Revitalization", which appeared in 1975,(243) refers to how "Mayor
Coleman A. Young called together a coalition.of business, labour,
industrial, community and government leaders to develop a program for
economic revitalization of the City.,,(244) It would be more
appropriate to say, however, that the private sector had already
thrust itself full square into the centre of agenda formation. The
key organisation here was the formation in November 1970 of the major
power elite organisation Detroit Renaissance Inc. - an
"• • • organization of top leaders of the top corporations in the
Detroit area pledged to commit their personal talents and some of
their corporate clout to effect a physical and economic
revitalization of the city of Detroit • • • ,,(245)
"The Renaissance members' strategy was this: Concentrate on
developing businesses in downtown Detroit. start on the river-
front, using the most attractive land. Make downtown an
attractive place to work and live. As activity grows, money
would spin out into other areas of the City.,,(246)
The first and by far the major project of Detroit Renaissance has been
the building of the Renaissance Center, which now dominates the city
skyline, on the downtown Detroit riverfront. The ''Rencen'',designed
by the architect John portman (designer of the Atlanta Peachtree
Center), formally opened in April 1977 at a cost of $337 million.(247)
It is 73 storey cylindrical hotel surrounded by four 39 storey
octagonal office buildings. These structures,.with a gleaming glass-
walled exterior, sit on the corners of a four level podium. The
latter contains restaurants, retail and speciality shops. The
President of Detroit Renaissance indicates that when he took his job
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in 1971 a consensus had been reached by the organisation to sponsor a
major project on the riverfront. In his words:(248)
"By the time I arrived it had been decided that the top priority
of Detroit Renaissance would be a project of such scale that it
would change the image of downtown Detroit as a place that had
had a net outflow of investment for 25 years.
Beyond that the project had to be so impressive to the eye that
everyone would say, 'Hey, something important is happening in
downtown Detroit'. Because it was to begin the renaissance of
the city, it had to take place on the riverfront where Detroit
started in the first place. And finally, it had to be of such
magnitude that it would cause other new investments downtown.
We didn't think new office buildings would have great impact if
they were just scattered around downtown along with a new hotel.
We needed to have a physical mass."
Henry Ford II took the leading role in concei ving and realising the
project. Of the total $337 million, $137 million of a direct equity
investment was made by the Ford Motor Company and 50 other partners
and members of Detroit Renaissance. Ford invested $81.6 million,
General Motors $12 million and Chrysler $1.5 million. The vast
majority of the other partners gained all or a substantial part of
their business from the auto industry. The balance of $200 million
for construction was raised by loan from a consortium of seven Detroit
and 21 other banks.' National Bank of Detroit, major Detroit bank for
General Motors, and whose chairman was a co-chairman of Detroit
Renaissance, arranged the loan and committed the largest single
amount. Permanent long-term mortgage financing for the $200 million
came primarily from the Ford Motor Company and the insurance industry.
The bulk of the latter was provided by Aetna Life & Casualty and John
Hancock - both major suppliers of insurance services to Ford.
-.
In putting together the city's economic development agenda Mayor Young
has "courted" the private sector, but Detroit Renaissance amply
illustrates - despite some cajoling by Henry Ford II in pushing the
RenCen project - the willingness of corporate capital to be involved.
Some commentators reviewing the evidence in fact argue that "Detroit
Renaissancehas been the moving force behind much of the planning that
has become City policy".(249) The creation in 1978 of the Detroit
Economic Growth corporation has in fact given the private sector a
very direct and leading role in the devising and implementation of
Detroit's development strategy. Formed as a non-profit but private
development corporation, and drawing its leadership and board of
directors primarily from the private sector and Detroit Renaissance in
particular,(250) the organisation has been charged by the city of
Detroit with "the delivery of 'nuts and bolts' kinds of technical and
financial assistance to existing urban businesses and to devise and
implement a variety of new industrial and commercial economic
development projects".(251) Operational funding of the organisation
is from a combination city of Detroit, state of Michigan and business
sources. Backed up by guarantees, mainly from the larger corporations
on the Growth Corporation board, the organisation has access to a line
of credit ($5 million in 1980) shared by all seven Detroit banks. The
Growth corporation, a private development organisation, actually
provides the staff for the public non-profit city EDC and DDA
organisations established under State enabling law for specific
purposes (Fig.1,p.162) and in which there is major private sector
participation already. While the Mayor of Detroit is chairman of the
Board of Directors of the city EDC and DDA, the chair and vice-chair
of the Growth corporation are filled by major corporate represent-
atives. Through Detroit Renaissance, the Growth corporation and other
subsidiary development organisations, the private sector is at the
very heart of city economic development policy formation - to such an
extent that the boundary between public and private sectors in Detroit
has become blurred.
The broad contours of the economic agenda pursued by Detroit's Growth
corporation and that of the city generally are based on the
encouragement of industrial and commercial development, the promotion
of the city as a residential location for middle and upper income
groups and in particular a focus on "rebuilding downtown". The city
of Detroit's plan for the future of downtown expresses the following
goals: (252)
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"Downtown
will continue to be the financial center for the region
will remain the focus of cultural, civic and convention
activity for the metropolitan region
will continue to grow as an important regional retail center
will concentrate on offering greater employment
opportunities
will have a transportation network which facilitates
movement in and out of the city and permits efficient intra-
city circulation
will concentrate on a variety of activities in one general
locale to create a 24-hour living, working and entertainment
center
will encourage the development of new residential
communities."
The overall strategy indeed does not seem dissimilar from that
expressed in Detroit's urban renewalagenda of the 1950's excepting the
disillusionment with freeways, the greater urgency in the situation,
much greater involvement of the private sector and absence of racist
undertones in the city's housing goals. From the standpoint of
regional Capital, concerns for regional stability, usually described
as the exercise of corporate "social responsibility", are certainly at
work. The protection of investments in, and the functional necessity
of the CBD, are as formerly also at work. Downtown is still a "deal
making" centre where face to face contacts are important.
major law and accountancy firms are still located there.
Banks,
Another
related factor must be seen, however, as corning to the fore during
this time: the symoblic importance of "the city". Here onepicksup on
a thesis advanced by castel Is. ..He suggests that the
"• • • defence of the city centre against the social degradation of
its environment • • • cannot be explained only in functional
terms."
Theatres, concert halls, museums, places of high class commerce and
entertainment in city centres, castells argues
"• • • is a keypoint of the self-definition of (an economic and
cultural) elite. The luxury buildings that rise so full of pride
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in the place of the demolished slums would have no explanation
without this analysis.,,(253)
References to the symoblic importance of the city can be readily found
in federal and state of Michigan pronouncements on urban policy.(254)
At the beginning of the seventies when indeed the question could be
seriously raised whether private capital was prepared to write off the
city of Detroit, the "RenCen" project must fundamentally be seen as a
symbolic committment by regional Capital to the city. When the
Detroit Grand Prix (a venue recently arranged by Detroit Renaissance)
is relayed to international television screens it is the towering
corporate structure of the "RenCen", around which the course is
designed, that forms the dominant symbol for "Detroit".
Against the background of the economic and fiscal deterioration of the
city, which I have described, the pragmatic concerns of the city
administration under Young have been with employment generation and
municipal tax base improvement. In an interview with studs Terkel in
1980, Young put his position on tax concessions to business and the
city's economic policy generally quite plainly:(255)
"Some say this (tax concessions) is subsidizing business. I say
it's the name of the game. As long as we live in a society which
pits workers in Mississipi against workers in Michigan, we have
to make concessions to keep our plants • • •
I realize the profit motive is what makes things work in America.
If Detroit is not to dry up, we must create a situation which
allows businessmen to make a profit. That's their self-interest.
Ours is jobs. The more they invest in Detroit, the more their
interest becomes ours. That is the way the game is played in
America today. I don't think there's gonna be a revolution
tomorrow. As a young man I thought it. I think the revolution's
for someone else."
On the disproportionate amount of public resources devoted to downtown
the Mayor has taken the position that "that's where we are able to get
the maximum investment of private funds for our dollars". (256)
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It would be incorrect, however, to assume total correspondence between
the economic development "vision" for the city held by the city
administration and by the private sector.(257) It is unlikely that
Detroit Renaissance is committed, as is Mayor Young, to a Detroit
rapid transit system to anchor, bolster and serve a downtown commer-
cial resurgence. Here one must take issue with the view expressed by
Hill(258) that rapid transit was, because of the impossibility of
providing requisite parking space, "a key element in the equation
determining the success or failure of Renaissance Center". A large
number of those interviewed were of the opinion that the auto
companies, whose business is selling cars, were either coolon the
idea or downright against it. The leader of the city of Detroit's
downtown development team expressed the opinion that the Big Three and
Detroit Renaissance were "neutral" on the ideaJ259) The director of
transportation planning for SEMOOG summed up the attitude of the auto
companies on the issue as involving "an ambivalence with a conservat-
ism that leans towards the auto".(260) The president of the Detroit
Chamber of Commerce expressed the view that "if the Big Three had been
for a rapid transit system it would have been built years ago".(261)
The director of the Citizens Research Council did not see a subway as
crucial to the downtown development agenda and pointed out that
multi-storey and below-ground parking would amply handle demand.(262)
The director of Civic and Governmental Affairs for the Ford Motor Co.
(the former director of TALUS) regarded a Detroit subway as "excessive
expenditure for the returns".(263) And finally the President of the
Detroit Central Business District Association holds the opinion
that(264) at least one of the Big Three (although choosing not to be
more specific) is emphatically against any subway. This view was
based on the fact that when the CBDA board was voting on the issue the
head of one of Detroit's large banks disclosed to the Association
President that, while supporting a subway personally, he had chosen to
absent himself, rather than register a favourable vote in opposition
to the view of his largest depositor - one of the auto companies.
I conclude with a brief assessment of the prospects for Detroit's
economic development agenda. On the industrial front the general
picture is one of continued concentration of the region's
disadvantaged within the city in the face of the attraction of Capital
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not just to the suburbs but to the Sunbelt and overseas. This is
within the context of the foreign challenge to American capital, the
emergence of new technology industries and the increasing
international division of labour which new technology has made
possible. Divisions within the reproduction of labour power remain
unmitigated as the economic climate in Detroit pits worker against
worker and local government against local government in a frantic
scramble for jobs and tax base. It is a scramble in which other
regions of the u.S. in the present economic recovery are coming out on
top. The North American auto industry is recentralising in the
Midwest but the order of the day is labour shedding and a preference
..in industrial location generally for suburban and exurban locations.
The recent and drastic decline in the city 6f Detroit's industrial tax
base I have commented on already. The equally drastic lengths to
which the city administration was prepared to go to keep jobs and tax
base within the City is revealed in the clearance in 1980/81, at a
cost of $200 million to federal, state and local government, of a 465
acre swathe of land, mostly within the city of Detroit, to accommodate
a new G.M. assembly plant.(265) While the task involved the displace-
ment of a neighbourhood of 3,400 people and demolition of over 1,100
buildings, the offer of the plant to the City was regarded by G.M. as
a "progressive" gesture by a "hometown" company.(266) More generally,
however, Detroit could not hope to be that "lucky". The collective
concerns expressed by bodies such as Detroit Renaissance are strained
by the harsh realities of market forces. In its struggle to survive,
Chrysler's executives, for example, admitted no particular loyalty to
Michigan or Detroit and Chrysler's chairman openly boasted of his
ability to playoff state against state in making investment
decisions. (267)
Turning to the downtown·development agenda the economic "shot in the
arm" which the city has hoped for has fallen far short of expect-
ations. It cannot be disputed that downtown Detroit - in particular
the riverfront area - is more vital and "alive" than ten years ago.
Major public investments financed with City funds have included a $31
million Civic Centre (Hart) Plaza and amphitheatre between the RenCen
and Coho Hall(268) and an investment of $46.6 million in the Joe Louis
Sports Arena west of the Civic Centre and.home of the 1980 Republican
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party convention.(269) The small "Greektown" restaurant district is
thriving and a number of new bars have opened downtown. Yet downtown
Detroit still displays a lack of strength as a location for commerce
and non-rent subsidised private housing - critical elements in the
city's plans for a "24 hour living, working and entertainment center"
and the spin-offs hoped for in terms of jobs and tax base. On the
office front the two major developments within the city have been
completion in 1981 of Phase II of the RenCen, a 21 storey, 580,000
sq.ft., twin tower office building just east of the original complex,
a $65 million project of the Ford Motor Land Development Corporation
and Rockefeller Center Inc., and completion in 1982 of the 385,000
sq.ft. New Center One building in the vicinity of the G.M. head-
quarters a few miles north of downtown and in which G.M. will be a
major tenant,(270) But, as in the past, there has been no major
speculative office boom in the city. Table 14 illustrates the degree
to which office construction in suburban Southfield and Troy out-
stripped that in the city of.Detroit in the 1970's. In the 1980's,
coming on to the Southfield market in 1983 were the 350,000 sq.ft
Travelers Tower and the first phase of the two-building 500,000 sq.ft
Galleria Officenter complex. In 1982 Troy added 600,000 sq.ft of new
office space, half of it in the major new 15 storey City Center tower.
Birmingham and Bloomfiled Hills in 1982 broughtfourth close to 600,000
sq.ft. of office space on to the market.(271) Detroit on the contrary
rather than "ta~ing off" as an office centre, saw in January 1983, the
RenCen (which has been accused of acting as a magnet in drawing
tenants from other downtown office space rather than acting as a
catalyst)(272) default on its mortgage and stop paying property taxes.
Under a rescue plan holders of the mortgage assumed part owner-
ship.(273) And leasing of Phase II of the RenCen in 1982·proceeded at
a "snail's pace".(274) Various obstacles it would seem stand in the
way of the office component of what the former President of
Metropolitan Fund has referred to as the desired "Manhattanization" of
Detroit.(275) Detroit, as opposed to Manhattan or Chicago, and as
indicated before, does not have the same reservoir of businesses to
whom the speCial advantages of city centrality and/or prestige is
important. And lacking the same strong tradition as a prestige office
location it is increasingly difficult to establish it. Southfield is
now a prestige location for office development. TRW Inc., for
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example, taking advantage of information technology, recently
transferred many "back-office" functions (more mundane labour
intensive operations) into cheaper accommodation removed from its
prestigious Southfield building.(276) The RenCen in Detroit, it is
also worth pointing out, has exhibited an obvious physical ambivalence
towards its surroudings. As if hedging its bets a two-storey berm
along the front of the centre creates an air of detached aloofness.
As the dean of the architecture school at the University of Michigan
has commented: "Some think it's a fortress for whites to work in
while the rest of the city goes to hell around them".(277)
Retailing and housing objectives in Detroit's downtown agenda have
been closely related and also the focus of some considerable
disappointment. To convince developers and investors that an
atmosphere of "urban chic" in Detroit, as in Baltimore for
example,(278) will attract shoppers away from suburban shopping malls
and towards a planned downtown "urban mall" has as yet proved
impossible. Establishing downtown apartment living by young urban
professionals (who would make downtown shopping development less of a
risk), in the absence of such a tradition, is equally difficul t. In
.January 1983 Hudson's department store, the existing anchor store in
city plans for its proposed downtown shopping Cadillac Center, closed
its doors.(279) The store had been running at a loss for some time.
Despite the active participation of J.L. Hudson, the company chairman,
in the activities of Metropolitan Fund and Detroit Renaissance, a
market based, hard commercial decision was paramount. Detroit's hopes
in inching towards a "critical mass" of activities which will launch a
downtown "take-off" fall to a large extent back on heavy publicly
subsidised Iuxury apartments - the 350 unit Trolley Plaza -which opened
in 1981(280) and the 700 unit Riverfront West complex (on a prime
riverfront location and still requiring massive public subsidy) which
opened late 1984.(281) Even if the agenda, however, does launch
itself eventually (which seems uncertain), the question raises itself
as to whether the best the more regionally disadvantaged in Detroit
can hope for is greater opportunity to secure low paying service
sector jobs (cooks, waiters, shop assistants, cleaners, etc.)
servicing .sucha downtown revival.
261
Footnotes
1. Brand, H. A Blow to the Welfare State - Carter's Policies and
the Political Business Cycle in Dissent, Summer 1980, New York
p.27S
2. Ibid. p.274
3. Harrison, John Marxist Economics for Socialists - A critique of
Reformism, Pluto Press, 1978, p.143
4. Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Governments Role
in the Market System, A Statement by the Research and Policy
Committee, July 1979, Washington D.C. p.42
5. According to ACIR calculations, in constant dollar "terms,federal
grants-in-aid to states and localities reached their zenith in
1978. They declined by approximately 2.9% in 1980 and 2.7% in
1979. Constant dollar aid had previously risen by an average
annual rate of 8.6% in the 1960's and at an average rate of 8%
per annum from 1969 to 1978. Source: Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovernmental Perspective,
Summer 1980, Vo1.6 No.3, p.19. Also, Winter 1982, Vol.8 No.1,
p.S
6. O'Connor, James, op.cit.
7. Social capital expenditures contribute either directly or
indirectly to profitability. Social expense expenditures are
necessary to maintain social stability.
8. O'Connor, James, op.cit. p.2
9. Ibid. p.2
•
10. Bluestone, Barry and Harrison, Bennett, The Deindustrialization
of America - Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the
Dismantling of Basic Industry, Basic Books, New York, 1982, p.111
11. Business Week, The Second War Between the States, 17th May 1976,
pp.92-114
12. Northeast - Midwest Congr'essional Coalition, The state of the
Region: Economic Trends of the 1970's in the Northeast and
Midwest, Washington D.C.January 1979, p.17, Table 2
13. Ibid. p.1S
14.· Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B., Capital and Communities, op.cit.
pp.23-29
15. Ibid• . p.188
16. Richard Siegal Associates, Issues in Multi-state Economic
Development for the Mid-West, Report submitted to Office of
Michigan's Changing Economy, Michigan Department of Commerce,
June 1977, p.3
262
17. Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B. capital and Communities, op.cit.,
Ch.VI
18. Ibid. p.187
19. Richard Siegal Associates, op.cit. pp.6-7
20. Kanter, Sandra, Another Look at State Business Subsidies,
Economics Department, University of Boston, Mass, 1977, p.1
21. Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B., Capital and Communities, op.cit.
p.180
22. Ibid. p.180
23. M:lrkusen,Ann R. Regionalism and the capitalist state : The case
of the United States, Working Paper No.30S, Department of City
and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley, April
1979
24. Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B. The Deindustrialization of
America, op.cit. pp.4-S
25. Magaziner, Ira, C. and Reich Robert B, Minding America's
Business - The Decline and Rise of the American Economy, Vintage
Books, New York, 1982, p.1
26. Business Week, The Reindustrialization of America, Special
Issue, June 1980, p.S6
27. Ibid. p.SS
28. Ibid. p.82
29. Toffler, Alvin, The Third Wave, Pan Books, 1981, Ch.12
30. Goddard, J.B. Structural Change in the British Space Economy, in
ed. Goddard J.B. and Champion, A.G., The Urban and Regional
Transformation of Britain, Methuen 1983, p.2S
31. Weiss, Marc, A. High Technology Industries and the Future of
Employment, Built Environment, Vol.9 No.1, 1983, p.S~
32. Ibid. p.S3
33. Ibid. p.SS
34. Cohen, R.B. The New International Division of Labor, Multi-
national corporations and Urban Hierarchy in ed, Dear, Michael
and Scott, Allen J. op.cit. pp.288-289
35. Barnet, Richard J and Muller, Ronald E. Global Reach, The Power
of Multinational Corporations, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974
36. Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B. The Deindustrialization of
America, op.cit. p.18
263
37. Ibid. p.18
38. Gough, Ian, The Crisis of the British Welfare state in ed.
Fainstein Norman I and Fainstein, Susan S., Urban Policy Under
Capitalism, Sage Publications, 1982, p.44
39. Ibid. p.53
40. Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B., The Deindustrialization of
America, op.cit., p.188
41. Ibid. p.19
42. Ibid. p.190
43. Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Governments Role
in the Market System, Washington, D.C. 1979, p.10 and p.15
44. Business Week, october 26 1981, p.137
45. Stanfield, Rochelle, L. A Neatly wrapped Package with Explosives
Inside, National Journal 27th February 1982, pp.356-361
46. Guzzardi, Jr. walter, Who Will care for the poor?, Fortune, June
28, 1982, pp.34-42, p.34
47. Business Week, Special Report, State and Local Governments in
Trouble, October 1981, p.137
48. Newsweek, August 2, 1982
49. Business Week, Special Issue, June 30 1980, The
Reindustrialization of America
50. Reich, Robert, B. The Next American Frontier, Times Books, 1983
51. Thurow, Lester C. The Zero Sum Society, Penguin Books, 1980
52. Rohatyn, Felix, G. Business Review, November/December 1979 pp.6-
9. Also interview with Jeremy Bernstein in The New Yorker,
January 24, 1983, pp.45-75
53. For a review of the trends mentioned see in particular:
(a) U.s. Department of Transportation The U.S. Automobile
Industry 1980, Report to the President from the Secretary of
Transportation, Washington D.C. January 1981
(b) Arthur Andersen & Co., U.S. Automotive Industry Trends for
the 1980's, A Delphi Forecast, Detroit, 1980. Also U.S.
Automotive Industry in the 1980's : A Domestic and Worldwide
Perspective. The second Delphi Forecast, July 1981
54. City of Detroit, Department of Planning, Introduction and
synapsis to Detroit Master Plan, March 1983, p.9
55. Wayne State University, Michigan Statistical Abstract, 17th
edition, Table XV-I, p.484'
264
56. City of Detroit, Introduction and Synopsis to Detroit Master
Plan, op.cit., p.9
57. Ross, Irwin, Chrysler on the brink, Fortune, February 9, 1981,
pp.38-42
58. Ibid. p.40
59. woutat, Donald, When Chrysler Hurts, Detroit Hurts, Detroit Free
Press, May 13, 1980
60. These facilities were: Eight Mile/Outer Drive Stamping, Huber
Foundry, Lynch Road Assembly, French Road, Amplex Harper, Mack
Stamping and Vernor Tool & Die. Based on a comparison of Wcutat,
Donald, op.cit. and City of Detroit, Introduction and Synopsis to
Detroit Master Plan, op.cit. p.87 ..
61. U.S. Department of Transportation, The U.S. Automobile Industry
1980, op.cit. pp.4-5
62. Ibid. p.4
63. Ibid. pp.53-58
64. Arthur Andersen & Co., U.S. Automotive Industry Trends for the
1980's. A Delphi Forecast,op.cit. p.2
65. Information supplied by U.S. Department of Transportation,
Transportation Systems Center
66. Dunn's Business Month, Detroit Gets Lean and Mean, January 1983,
p.57
67. Wayne State University, Michigan Statistical Abstract, 17th Ed.
op.cit. p.474.
68. Ibid. pp.472-474
69. Ibid. p.475
70. Ibid. pp.477-478
71. Arthur Andersen & Co. U.S. Automotive Industry in the 1980's : A
Domestic and worldwide Perspective, op.cit. pp.22-25
72. Information supplied by n.s. Department of Transportation,
Transportation Systems Center
73. Stonier, Tom, The Third Industrial Revolution: Microprocessors
and Robots, Paper given at the Town and Country Planning Summer
School, England, 1980, p.9
74. Arthur Anderson & Co. U.S. Automotive Industry in the 1980's : A
Domestic and Worldwide Perspective, op.cit. p.2
75. Quoted in: Wayne State University, Michigan Statistical
Abstract, 17th Ed., op.cit. p.479
265
76. Business Week, July 16, 1984, p.34
77. Ibid. p.36
78. Ibid. pp.36-37
79. Ibid. p.34
80. Ibid. p.34
81. Michigan Economic Action Council, Toward Growth with Stability:
Recommendations for Long Term Action, June 1976
82. State of Michigan, Economic Adjustment Strategy for the state of
Michigan : Final Report. Submitted to the U.S. Economic
Development Administration by the Office of Michigan's Changing
Economy, June 1978, p.l
83. Ibid. Table 1, p.S
84. state of Michigan, Economic Adjustment strategy for the State of
Michigan, op.cit. p.4
85. Hanieski, John F., Diversifying the Michigan Economy, State
Economic Record, Vo1.23 No.2 Graduate School of Business
Administration, Michigan State University, February 1981 p.3
86. Fantus corporation, A Better Business Climate for Michigan,
Prepared for the State of Michigan, Department of Commerce,
December 1982, p.18
87. Business Week, SpeCial Issue, America's Restructured Economy,
June 1, 1981, pp.62-64
88. Berman, Norton, Some Thoughts on Becoming the Commerce Director,
Internal State of Michigan, Department of Commerce memo to
Central Office staff, June 22, 1981
89. In January 1982 the newsletter - Michigan Outlook -'of the
Michigan Department of Commerce announced in bold headlines to
its readership of over 15,000 Michigan businesses: "Workers
Camp. Cost Slashed"
90. In 1982 an Industrial Technology Institute was established at the
University of Michigan for the purpose of nuturing through
research and development the robotics industry in Michigan. Also
in 1982, a Molecular Biology Institute was established at
Michigan State University.
91. In 1982, .for example, the Saunders Bakery in the Detroit Region,
faCing bankruptcy, received a working capital loan from the
Michigan Small Cities programme.
92. Figure for assembly plant construction quoted in: Urban
Development Action Grant application to federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development, November 1980, by City of
Hamtramck for the Central Industrial Park and Adjacent Industrial
266
Parks Project, p.7
93. Herbers, John, Urban Centers', Population Drift Creating a
Countryside Harvest, New York Times, March 23, 1980
94. storper, Michael, Towards a structural Theory of Industrial
Location, in Ed. Rees, John, Hewings, Geoffrey J.D. and Stafford,
Howard A., Industrial Location and Regional Systems, J.F. Bergin
Publishers Inc. 1981, pp.17-40" p.33
95. Rees, John, Hewing's Geoffrey, J.D. and Stafford, Howard A.,
Chapter 1 in Ed. Rees, John et al., op.cit. p.9
96. Ibid. p.9
97. Mattila,John M and Kurrie, James A. Detroit Intra-Metropolitan
Industrial Location study, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1977.
See especially Table 28, page 82
98. Mattila, John M and Moor, ax, James R. The Southeast Michigan
Economy: Past, Present and Future, prepared for Metropolitan
Fund Inc., Detroit, 1977, p.3
99. In 1981 $250 million worth of office buildings were authorized,
under construction or completed in Oakland County. This included
not only construction in Southfield and Troy but also Birmingham,
Bloomfield Hills, Farmington Hills and Novi. See: Clark,
William Commercial Construction in Oakland County, Detroit News,
19th January, 1982
100. Ibid.
101. This reflects national trends. See: Gorwitz, Kurt and Rosen,
Lawrence. Implications of Michigan's Current and Projected
Population Trends, Michigan State Economic Record, Vol.19 No.4,
May 1977, Michigan State University
102. Ibid. p.2. The SMSA designation refers to the 1973 definition:
Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Lapeer, Livingston and st. Clair counties
103. Ibid. p.2
104. Sternlieb, George and Hughes, James W. The Changin~Demography
of the Central City, Scientific American, August .1980, Vol.243,
No.2, pp.48-53, p.48
105. Gorwitz, Kurt and Rosen, Lawrence, S., op.cit. p.2. Also: Brown,
Susan Lure of Country Life is Draining the Big Cities, Detroit
Free Press, 4th May 1981. Between 1970 and 1980 Michigan's
metropolitan areas have increased in population by 0.6% while non
metropolitan areas increased by 20%.
106.'See conunentsby Goldberg and Beale in Brown, Susan, op.cit.
107. The city of Detroit experienced 240,940 births and 163,256 deaths
between 1970 and 1980. The net migration figure was minus
385,827. Source: City of Detroit, Planning Department, Data
267
Coordination Division
108. Mass Transit, September 1978, Vol.V, No.9, p.12
109. Hilton, George, W. The Urban Mass Transportation Assistance
program, in Ed. Miller III, James C, Perspectives on Federal
Transportation Policy, American Enterprize Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 1975, p.133
110. Memorandum of Federal Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administrator, OCtober 11, 1979. Subject: Improving the
Urban Transportation Decision Process
111. Stanfield, Rochelle, L. Hard TImes for the Highway Trust Fund
may mean trouble for Highway Repair, National Journal, 16th
August 1980, pp.1362-1364
112. Wiesie, Arthur, E. Doing Battle with the White House, Mass
Transit, Vol.V, No.12, December 1978, pp.6-49
113. Business Week, Budget-cuttings First Victim: Mass Transit,
December, 29, 1980, pp.45-46
114. Louviere, Vernon, Pay as you go Transportation, in Nations
Business, December 1981, pp.24-30
115. The Reagan administration's Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis
reversed a number of carter administration cuts in new interstate
construction. See: Peters, James, Interstates: Nearing the
End of the Road, Planning, Vol.47, No.12, December 1981, pp.12-15
116. Davies, William G. Transportation Survival Package of 1982,
Michigan MuniCipal Review, March 1983, pp.39-47
117. In 1962 only six U.S. cities, for example, operated subways:
Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia and Pittsburg.
By 1982, Atlanta, San FranCisco and Washington had opened subways
wi th construction proceeding in Bal timore, Buffalo and Miami.
Plans were also well advanced for construction in Honolulu, Los
Angeles, Portland and Sacramento. See: Craft, Ralph, Federal
Transportation Policy and the states, in State Legislatures,
october 1982, pp.11-13
118. In 1977 Michigan had 4,890,094 registered passenger vehicles
rising to 5,075,091 in 1982. The corresponding numbers for
commercial vehicles are 987,822 and 1,095,057. Michigan
Statistical Abstract 17th Ed. op.cit., Table XVII-4 p.521
119. Gongwer News Service Report, Lansing, Michigan, September 26,
1977, p.2
120. Detroit Free Press, Michigan Transportation: Boldness is Badly
Needed, Editorial, January 1', 1976
121. state of Michigan, A Final Report of Recommendations to the
Governor of Michigan by his Special Commission on Transportation,
June 1966, p.1'
268
122. State of Michigan, Urban Growth and Problems, 1968, op.cit. p.6S
123. Milliken, William, G. Toward a Comprehensive Statewide
Transportation Program, in Innovations in State Government -
Messages from the Governors, National Governors' Conference,
Washington D.C., June 1974, p.340
124. Interview with Bill Swanson, State Department of Transportation,
June 20, 1983
125. The "community development" goals announced by the Milliken
administration in November 1980, for example, required energy
conservation implications to be considered in major state capital
expenditure projects including highways. state of Michigan,
Michigan Community Development Objectives, Governors Office,
November 1980
126. State of Michigan, Economic Report of the Governor, 1973, p.S6
127. Milliken, William, G. Towards a Comprehensive Statewide
Transportation Program, op.cit. p.340
128. State of Michigan, Economic Report of the Governor, 1973, p.S6
129. For the 1978 package see: McDiarmid, Hugh, Lobbies Agree on
Transit Package, Detroit Free Press, 10th February 1978. For the
1982 package see: Davies, William, G. Transportation Survival
Package of 1982, Michigan Municipal Review, March 1983, pp.39-47.
The state gas tax was raised to 11c in 1978 and to 1Sc in 1982.
130. The State Highway Commission, for example, in 1977 cancelled
plans for the Northwestern Highway and extension of M27S projects
in the Detroit region. Top priority in the same year was
announced by the Highway Director John Woodford ("once a strong
road building advocate") for "reconstruction and rehabilitation
of existing highways". The prospect of greater gubernatorial
appointive power looming for the following year probably helped
to illuminate the "writing on the wall". See: McDiarmid, Hugh
state Plans Fewer New Roads, Detroit Free Press, 16th November,
1977. .
While the M275 project was subsequently reinstated for
consideration by the Transportation Commission it will probably
never be built. The latest State Transportation Plan prepared by
the Commission in 1982 and with a time horizon to 1990 states:
"The major emphasis must be the protection of the existing system
and users. This can best be accomplished through the retention
of "essential" services, and through the maintenance of existing
facilities". state of Michigan, Department of Transportation;
Michigan State Transportation Plan 1982-1990, Executive SUIlIIIarY,
November 1982
131. Young, Coleman, A. Letter by the Mayor, Detroit Free Press, 30th
September 1975
132. Both of the following projects were either included as
recommendations in the SEMCOG Regional Transportation Plan {March
269
1978) or singled out for further study. While the State
Transportation Commission dropped from its plans the I275 (later
renamed M275) and Northwestern Highway projects in 1977 these
were again being considered under a new Commission in 1980.
133. Interview with Mike Tako, Director of Transportation Planning,
SEMCOG
134. Hennessy, Tom, Freeway Planners Insist on M275, Parkland
Periled, Detroit Free Press, 7th September, 1975
135. Detroit Free Press, M275 and Co., Editorial, August 26, 1980
136. See footnote 130, this chapter
137. Interview with Robert Boatman, State Department of Transportation
138. Interview with Mike Tako, Director of Transportation Planning,
SEMCOG
139. Ibid •
.
140. Castine, John, US OK's last link of I-696, Detroit Free Press,
January 16, 1981
141. Ibid.
142. Peirce Neal, R. and Steinbach, Carol. Cuts in Transit Aid may
Hurt but Could have a Silver Lining, National Journal 4th April
1981, pp.568-571, p.568 and 569
143. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authori ty, Annual Report
1982, p.7
144. Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments, Summary Statement
of the 1990 Transportation Plan for the Southeast Michigan
Region, Revised, June 1976, p.1
145. Gribbin, August. Aging Roads Jolt Suburbs, Detroit News, 27th
November 1977
146. Governor Milliken was accused of conducting a "lackluster"
campagin on this issue. See: Detroit Free Press, Foot-dragging
could kill transit system for State, Editorial, December 31,1975
147. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, The People Mover,
undated, circa 1980, p.1. See also: SEMTA and Federal
Department of Transportation, Downtown People Mover, Detroit,
Michigan Draft Environmental Impact Statement, March 1980
148. Ibid. Also interview with Gary Krause, SEMTA
149. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority and Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, U.S., Department of
Transportation. Public Transportation Alternatives Analysis -
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, October 1979, Table 1-7,
p.1-12
·270
150. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, What are we
waiting for - Proposal for a mass transit system to serve South-
eastern Michigan, 1974
151. Young, David, UMTA: 10 year's later, in Mass Transit, September
1978, Vol.V, No.9, Washington D.C. p.15
152. Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments, Council Opposes New
Transit Board Structure, in the Semscope, Vol.7, No.10, December
1976, p.1
153. Dunn, William, Transit Planners Reject Subways, Favour Trolleys,
Detroit News, 11th May 1977
154. Schabath, Gene, Suburbs may stall Detroit Subway Plan, Detroit
News, May 5, 1977
155. Fireman, Ken, Macomb County's Isolationists Turn Sights to
SEMTA, Detroit Free Press, 16th May 1977
156. Mitchell, William J and Skwira, Gregory, SEMTA Plan Irks Suburbs,
Detroit Free Press, 11th May 1977
157. Fireman, Ken, Oakland County Executive Urges Support for Transit
Plan, Detroit Free Press, 13th May 1977
158. Cheyfitz, Kirk, TUnnel Dispute Could Bury Transit Plans, Detroit
Free Press, November, 21, 1977
159. Cheyfitz, Kirk, Young Threatens to Block Transit Aid, Detroit
Free press, 12th March, 1978
160. McDiarmid, Hugh, Suburban Legislators Fight Young's Subway,
Detroit Free Press, 15th March 1978
161. State of Michigan, Executive Office Press Release, April 7, 1978
162. Cheyfitz, Kirk and Briggs-Bunting, Jane City, State, Oakland
Officials Agree to Save Mass Transit, Detroit Free Press, April
15, 1978
163. Cain, Stephen, Detroit Given New Nudge on Subway, Detroit News,
3rd December 1978
164. Cook, Louis, The Heroes of SEMTA have made a start, Detroit Free
Press, April 5, 1979
165. Detroit Free Press, Transit: SEMTA's Board Comes up with a
Breakthrough Compromise, Editorial, April 5, 1979
166. Gongwer News Service Inc., Tentative Agreement Reached on Subway
Resolution, Report No.17, Volume 19, January 25, 1980, p.1
167. Detroit Free press, Transit: Would Reagan dump the Decision made
by Southeast Michigan?, Editorial, November 23, 1980
271
168. Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments, Minutes of the
Regional Clearinghouse Review Committee Meeting of January 22,
1981
169. McClure, Sandy, Subway 'No' Vote Blamed on Racism, Detroit Free
Press, January 14, 1981
170. Quoted in: Jackson, Luther, SEMTA head leaving as his dreams
fade, Detroit Free Press, 29th September 1981
171. Hammer, Siler, George Associates, Private Investment Generated
by Mass Transit Alternatives, Detroit, Michigan, Report prepared
for the City of Detroit, June 1978. (This reports contains
information on the previous report)
172. McDonald and Grefe Inc., The Economic and Social Impacts of
Transportation Alternatives for Southeastern Michigan, Report
prepared for SEMTA and the Michigan Department of State Highways
and Transportation, October 1977, p.83
173. Quoted in: Peterson, John E., Downtown People Mover: Detroit,
in Mass Transit, Vol.Vi, No.5, May 1979, p.11
174. Quoted in: Hennessy, Tom, Detroit Warned Against a Transit
Mistake, Detroit Free Press, December 20, 1976
175. Gangwer News Service Michigan Report, February 20, 1980, p.2
176. Southeast Michigan Counci 1 of Governments, Reg iona I
Transportation Plan for Southeast Michigan - Highway and Transit
Elements (adopted June 1975) Amended March 1978
177. Ibid. p.20
178. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, A Proposed Highway -
Public Transit Plan for Southeast Michigan, September 1974
(pamphlet)
179. SEMCOG, Regional Transportation Plan for Southeast Michigan -
Highway and Transit Elements, op.cit. Chapters 2 and 3
180. See for example the document: What'are we waiting for? Proposal
for a Mass Transit System to Serve Southeastern Michigan, SEMTA,
op~cit.
181. SEMCOG, Regional Transportation Plan for Southeast Michigan-
Highway and Transit Elements, op.cit., Appendix B.
182. Ibid. p.34
183. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, Technical Development
of the Long-Range Element of the Regional Transportation Plan,
Phase 1, Planning Study Analyses, May 1982
184. Quoted in Blowers, Andrew, The Limits of Power - The Politics of
Local Planning Policy, Pergamon Press, OXford 1980, p17
272
185. Interview with Donn Shelton
186. Metropolitan Fund Inc., REGION, Vol.5, No.3, March 1972, Detroit
187. Metropolitan Fund Inc., REGION, Vol.6, No.4, April-May 1973,
Detroit
188. Metropolitan Fund Inc., Insert to REGION, Vol.6, No.6, July-
August 1973, Detroit
189. Metropolitan Fund Inc., REGION, Vol.6, No.6, July-August 1973
190. Quoted in: Regional Citizens, Regional Citizenship Summary,
Detroit, 1973
191. Mathewson, Kent, ed. The Regionalist Papers, A Research Project
of Metropolitan Fund Inc, 2nd Edition, 1978, p.4
192. Ibid. pp.271-272
193. Detroit Free press, Trying to End Provincialism, Editorial, Sept
26, 1975
194. Mathewson, Kent, The Regionalist Papers, op.cit., p.300
195. Quoted in: Heyboer, Linda Regional Government an Emotional
Issue in Detroit, in: From a Regional Perspective, Vol.2, No.7,
National Association of Regional Councils, September 1976, p.2
196. Quoted in: Tschirhart, Don, Support, opposition to SEMCOG
change voiced at hearing, Detroit News, 27 september 1975
197. Ewen, Lynda Ann, Corporate Power and Urban Crisis in Detroit,
Princeton University Press, 1978 p.243
198. Nye, Peter, Minnesota Helps its Metropolis Share the Tax Base,
Nation's Cities, November 1977
199. State of Michigan, Economic Report of the Governor, 1976, pp.65-
68
200. Montemurri, Patricia, Young opposes creation of a Wayne County
Chief, Detroit Free Press, 24th September 1981
201. Quoted in: Sharp, Eric, Overhaul for county is racist, blacks
say, Detroit Free Press, 12th October 1979
202. Data supplied by Michigan Department of State, Great Seal and
Registration Unit
203. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, 1990 Land Use Policy
Plan for Southeast Michigan, Land Use Goals and Policies, June
1977
204. Ibid. p.4
205. Ibid. p.6
273
206. Ibid.
207. Interview with Dan Synder, SEMCOG
208. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, Regional
Clearinghouse Review Committee Meetings, 1974 through June 1979.
Also: Neill, William J.V., Recission of OMB Circular A-95,
Analysis and Recommendations, Michigan Department of Commerce,
Office of Community Development, 1983, p.8
209. Glusac, Michael, Executive Director, SEMOOG Memo to Ms Linda
Barnes, Director, State of Michigan, Office of Intergovernmental
Relations, re. A-95 Areawide Clearinghouse Review, July 11, 1980
210. Data supplied by Michigan Department of Commerce, Office of
Community Development.
211. Telephone interview with Lester Burman, Federal Department of
Housing and urban Development, Detroit
212. Interview with Donn Shelton
213. Ibid.
214. In.1981 the following individuals were corporate members of the
Board of Directors: James A Aliber, Chairman, First Federal
Savings and Loan, Detroit; Joseph P. Bianco, Jr, Vice President,
Civic and Governmental Affairs, J.L. Hudson Co; Wi 11 M.
Caldwell, Chief Financial Officer, Ford Motor COi Joseph L.
Hudson, Jr., Chairman, J.L. Hudson Co; Robert C. Larson,
president, Taubman Co. Inc.i Walter J MCCarthy Jr., President,
Detroit Edison; Samuel N. Oaks,Manager, Municipal Affairs,
General Motors; E. Harwood, Rydholm, Vice President, Chrysler
Corpi James R. Waterson, Vice Chairman, Detroit Bank Corpi
Stanley J Winkelman, Chairman, Winkelman stores Inci Louis E
Zimmers, Vice President, Michigan Bell Telephone Co. Gerald
Warren, Senior Vice President, National Bank of Detroit. See:
Metropolitan Affairs corporation, Annual Report 1981, Detroit,
p.2
215. Ibid. p.3
216. See for example: City of Detroit, Budget for Fiscal- year ending
June 30, 1981, p.vii
217. Ibid. p.xi
218. City of Detroit, Report of the Budget Planning and Stabilization
Committee, April 1981, Subcommittee report on existing revenue
sources, p.2
219. City of Detroit, Financial Projections 1977-1982, December 1976,
transmittal letter
220. City of Detroit, Report of the Budget Planning and Stabilization
Committee, op.cit., transmittal letter
274
221. Ibid. p.4
222. City'of Detroit, Mayor's Task Force on City Finances, 1976, p.27
223. Ibid. p.27
224. Quoted in: Is the Urban Crisis Over? Hearing before the
Subcomittee on Fiscal and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 96th Congress,
March 20, 1979, U.S. Government printing Office, p.3
225. United states Department of Housing and Urban Development A New
Partnership to COnserve America's COmmunities - A National Urban
Policy, March, 1978, Washington D.C.
226. In particular the introduction of the Urban Development Action
Grant programme to "leverage" with public subsidy job creating
private capital investment in urban areas and the targeting of
the Community Development Block Grant (used largely for housing
rehabilitation and neighbourhood improvement) to "distressed"
cities.
227. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fiscal and Intergovernmental
Policy, Is the Urban Crisis Over? op.cit. p.3
228. See: Ed. Glickman, Norman J. The Urban Impacts of Federal
Policies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980
229. Ibid. p.33
230. See for example: Peirce, Neal, R. and Hagstrom, Jerry White
House Goes Downtown with its Shopping Center Policy, National
Journal, 17th November 1979, pp.1943-1946
231. Ibid. p.1944
232..United states Department of Housing and Urban Development, The
Presidents National Urban Policy Report, 1982, July 1982
233. Ibid. p.3 ..
234. Magnusson, Paul, Presidents Urban Plan itAFraud" - Young,
Detroit Free Press, 15th July, 1982
235. Milliken, William, Co-operation: Key to Saving Cities, Speech
by Governor Milliken to members of the Michigan District Exchange
Clubs, June 1976. Reprinted in Detroit Free Press, 24th June
1976
236. For example, State of Michigan, Cities in Transition, Report of
the Urban Action Group to Michigan Governor William G. Milliken,
December 1977; State of Michigan, Economic Growth and
Development, Report of the Economic Growth and Development
cabinet and Council to Governor Milliken, 1978.
237. Data supplied by State of Michigan, Department of Management and
Budget, Office of the Budget
275
238. Interview with State Representative William Ryan. See also:
Cason David sx., Michigan's State Urban strategies, prepared for
u.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980 p.17
239. Young, Coleman, State of the City Message, City of Detroit,
January 22, 1976
240. Judging a State's concern for its poor by calculating its
contribution to welfare as a percentage of its average monthly
per capita income, a survey based on November 1981 data found New
York State the top performer followed in equal second by
California, Hawaii and Michigan. See: Guzzardi, Watler, Jr.
Who will care for the poor?, Fortune, June 28, 1982, pp.34-42,
p.39. (Welfare payment was defined as the monthly welfare
contribution of each state in November.: 1981 to a family of
three.)
241. McDiarmid, Hugh, Formula Gives City Lion's Share of Aid, Detroit
Free Press, 20 January 1980. Cuts in the State's General
Assistance programme were also made at this time.
242. Although PA275 of 1980 delayed the impact of the new Census
figures for 6 months, Detroit's State REvenue Sharing payment
fell by $20 million to $113 million between fiscal years 1979/80
and 1980/81. Data supplied by State of Michigan, Office of the
Budget.
243. City of Detroit, Moving Detroit Forward • • • A Plan for Urban
Economic Revitalization, 1975
244. Ibid. (June 1977 edition) p.2
245. Graves, Helen, op.cit. p.186
246. Fox, Thomas C and Cheyfitz Kirk, City's Most Exclusive Club
Moulded EconaniC Rebirth, Detroit Free Press, March 14, 1978
247. The most extensive description and analysis of this project is:
McGill Andrew and Young, Barbara, One Man Shakes a City, Detroit
News, October 8, 1978. This was part of a 10 month study by
Detroit news reporters guided by academic consultants into "power
in Detroit". The article upon which we draw heavily here is
reprinted in Detroit News, The Top Forty-Seven who Make it
Happen. A Study of Power. A series of articles reprinted from
the Detroit News, 1979
248. Quoted ibid.
249. Fox, Thomas, C. and Cheyfitz, Kirk, City's Most Exclusive Club
Moulded EconomiC Rebirth, op.cit.
250. Major corporate Board members include: William Agee, Chairman,
The Bendix coroporation; James Aliher, Chairman, First Federal
Savings and Loan; William Bailey, president, First Independence
National Bank; Rodkey Craighead, Chairman, Detroit Bank and
Trust Co; David Easlick, president, Michigan Bell Telephone CO.;
276
MaxFisher, Chairman, United Brand Co; Henry Ford II, chairman,
Ford Motor COi Joseph Hudson Jr, Chairman J.L.Hudson COi Meese,
William, chairman, Detroit Edison COi Paul Mirabito, Chairman,
Burroughs Corpi Thomas Murphy, Chairman, General Motors Corpi
Lynn Townsend, former Chairman Chrysler corpr Dean Richardson,
Chairman, Manufactures National Bank of Detroiti James Roche,
former Chairman General Motors Corpi Arthur Seder, Chairman,
American Natural Resources Co; Robert Surdam, Chairman, National
Bank of Detroit; Alfred Taubman,ChairmanThe TaubmanCo; Stanley
WInkelman, Chairman, WinkelmanStores Inc. In 1979 James Roche
and Lynn Townsendwere Co-Chairmenof the Board and Arthur Seder
(Jr) was Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the Executive Committee.
Information supplied by Detroit EconomicGrowthCorp.
251._City of Detroit EconomicGrowthCorporation, 1980 Annual Report,
p.3. The following information is drawn from this and the 1979
Annual Report
-252. City of Detroit, DowntownDetroit Developnent 19791 Pamphlet
253. castells, Manuel, The Urban Question, op.cit. p.299
254. For example, a quote from a Carter speech to the u.s. Conference
of Mayors, June 1976:
"I think we stand at a turning point in history. If, a hundred
years from now, this nations experiment in democracy has failed,
I suspect that historians will trace that failure to our ownera,
whena process of decay began in our inner cities and was allowed
to spread unchecked throughout our SOCiety.
But I do not believe that must happen. I believe that working
together, we can turn the tide, stop the decay, and set in motion
a process of growth that by the end of this century can give us
cities worthy of the greatest nation on earth".
Quoted as introduction to the White House Press Release on
carters Urban Policy, March 27, 1978. Governor Milliken in a
major speech in 1976 recognised that "our cities have always been
the great centers of our economic and cultural life" (my
emphasis) Milliken, William, Co-operation Key to Saving Cities,
op.cit.
255. Reprinted in: Detroit Free Press, How Mayor Young got
heavyweight status, october 6, 1980
256. Detroit News, Tax breaks for business? october 7, 1979
257. The agenda has not gone unchallenged from the Left • . See:
Russell, Jack and Luria, Dan, Rational Reindustrialization - An
Economic Development Agenda for Detroit, Widgetripper Press,
Detroit, 1981
258. Hill, Richard, Child, At the Cross Roads, The Political
Economicyof Postwar Detroit, op.cit., p.35
259. Interview with Ernie Zackary
. 277
260. Interview with Mike Tako '
261. Interview with Frank Smith
262. Interview with Bob Queller
263. Interview with Irving Rubin
264. Interview with Diane Edgecomb
265. Blonston Gary, Poletown: The Profits, the Loss, in Detroit,
Special Issue, Detroit Free press, November 22, 1981. This is
the most comprehensive account of the project.
266. Ibid. p.6
267. Quoted in: Woutat, Donald, When Chrysler Hurts, Detroit Hurts,
Detroit Free press, May 13, 1980
268. City of Detroit, Many good things happened in Detroit in 1979,
p.1
269. English, Carey, An Arena Grows in Detroit and Trouble BICXllIlS all
Over, Detroit, Detroit Free press, June 29, 1980
270. Weddell, Dorothy, Office Space - Detroit Area Demand is Steady
Despite the Economcy and Rising Rents, Detroit Free press, May
17, 1982
271. Ibid.
272. Fox, Thomas, C. RenCen a Boom - for some, Detroit Free press,
5th March, 1978
273. Wall Street Journal, Four Insurers Assmne 53% Stake in Detroit's
Renaissance Center, February 25, 1983
274. Weddell, Dorothy, Office Space, op.cit.
275. Mathewson Kent, Looking at Regional Reality, Metropolitan Fund
Inc., Detroit, 1975 (pamphlet)
276. Weddell, Dorothy, Office Space, op.cit.
277. Quoted in: Bulkeley, William M. Developers call Detroit Complex
the Renaissance, but there is Skepticism that it signals a
rebirth, Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1977
278. See for example: Breckenfield, Gurney, The Rouse Show Goes
National, Fortune, July 27, 1981. pp.49-54
279. Hansell, Betsey and Jackson, Luther A Look at the Future without
Hudsons's, Detroit Free press, December 5, 1982
280. Jackson, Luther, state Delay May Torpedo Trolley Plaza, Detroit
Free Press, September 17, 1980
278
281. zurawick, David, Power Politics on the Riverfront, in Monthly
Detroit, October 1982, pp.60-64 and 127-128.
279
CIIAP.I'ER 6
aJNCLUSIOO
1. Introduction - Restatement of Research Task
2. Class as an Explanatory Variable - the Dangers of
structuralism
3. Reflections on the Local and Regional state in Detroit
4. Implications for Planning Theory
5. Reflections on the Research
280
1. Introduction - Restatement of Research Task
In admitting that empirical research of a case study nature can be a
chastening experience in dispelling grand theoretical pretensions one
is in good company. The empirical research of Castells in the
Dunkerque region of France was apparently a salutory one(1) and in his
most recent empirical work castells admits of "the reluctance of the
social sciences to accept the reality of their underdevelopment as
sciences" and in comparison with the natural sciences the "primitive
state of our knowledge and of our methods".(2) Castel Is'
reorientation may be declared innocent of the "grotesque intellectual
fashion for self-cri ticism"C 3} which his "intellectual brother"C 4}
Poulantzas so strongly castigated. Rectifications to social theory
Poulantzas argued only make sense in the course of concrete analyses:
"Those who have still not learnt this, those who give themselves
the luxury of continually 'self-correcting' their eternal
preliminary remarks (preambles) without giving themselves the
means to do so, that is,without ever having been capable of
producing even the shadow of a concrete analysis, these people
will never learn anything."CS}
The development of castel Is' theoretical schema has taken place in the
context of empirical research - in the process of confrontation with
case study material. One'sown starting position, drawing especially on
Thompson's critique of Althusserian epistemology, encompassed an
awareness of the pitfalls of structuralist Marxism but was still
centrally concerned with exploring the usefulness of class
relationships as an explanatory variable in understanding
transportation policy formation in Detroit. The conclus-ions of this
research endeavour in which one was theoretically forewarned but not
necessarily forearmed (ie in which theoretical "gaps" often led to
questions rather than answers) is the subject matter of this chapter.
I start by restating again the research agenda and method.
The research tasks were as follows:
(a) To consider the hypothesis that class relationships are primary
(ie of over-riding importance in forming the framework of constraints
within which policy was formulated) in understanding transportation
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policy formation at regional and local governmental levels in Detroit
in the postwar period.
(b) To consider the veracity of relevant existing Marxist
interpretations relating to transporation policy formation in Detroit
with particular attention paid to possible over-theoreticism and
structuralism.
(c) On the basis of the tenability of the hypothesis advanced to
consider the role of physical planners in transportation policy
formation and to consider the implications for a theory of planning.
Physical planners, especially those involved in transportation
planning were defined pragmatically. No attempt was made to lay down
rigid demarcation lines between the activity of planners and other
policy agents and between physical planning and other policy areas.
Such refinements seemed more appropriate to a "finer grained" study
looking at transportation policy over a much shorter period. The
basic starting point in theorizing "the state" was Poulantzas I
characterization of the state as a social relation between classe~)
This view seemed flexible enough to accommodate the notion of class
based constraints and pressures operating upon the state and the
instrumentalist thesis of Miliband:7) Within this perspective the
specificity of the local and regional state in Detroit was approached
in terms of the "uniqueness of local class relations". Three basic
structuring concepts run through the study: accumulation of capital,
class struggle between Capital and Labour, and intra-Labour conflict,
deriving out ,of the basic Capital/Labour antagonism, in the
consumption and reproductive spheres of social life. These ideas were
introduced in Chapters One and Two. In terms of basic research
philosophy, that adhered to cleaves strongly to the ideas articulated
by E.P. Thompson in his rebuttal of Al thusserian Marxiscl~) It is an
approach broadly endorsed now by such as saunders!9Saye~;O~ook~l~nd by
Castells in his most recent work!12)It is a method of conjectual
hypothesis formation brought to "the evidence" tentatively in the
manner of a research question!13tt is a tool with which to interrogate
the evidence. The test of the fruits of ones confrontation with the
evidence is whether ones theory building stands up through not being
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disproved by contrary evidence. Thus conceived, social research takes
on the exploratory nature of a journey with lessons learnt along the
way. The aim of the research is to understand and not necessarily to
predict as is the goal of some positivistic hypothesis testing
approaches. Somewhat ironically given the (on his own admission)
"flawed theoretical formalism,UJe his earlier work, the general thrust
of such an approach has been championed of late by castells. Some of
the language could almost be mistaken for extracts from Thompson's
"Poverty of Theory" essay. To wit:
"the most useful concepts are those flexible enough to be
deformed and rectified in the proce~~ of using them as
instruments of knowledge." (lS)
Castells advocates the asking of "research questions" posed at a "very
general and tentative level". A "provisional theoretical framework"
is modified in the course of the research during which new questions
arise. The result as Castells puts it is that "as in all the best
social research, we cannot say what is true, but what it makes sense
to say without being false".(16~lmostas if apologising for this more
"messy" approach as contrasted with the "artifical paradises of the
grand .theory" in his earlier work(;7~astells adds: . "this research
design is not the rationalization of an accidental experience,,~18~0
this one might add that, given as Castells admits the "under-
development of the social sciences as sciences,,~191n those more
frustrating moments when doubt reigns supreme, it only appears that
way.
The conclusions of the research will be reviewed in'the following
sequence. I will start with a consideration of the general utility
of class as an explanatory variable and the associated dangers of a
"structuralist" interpretation of social events. Through an
appreciation of the limits inherent in such a macro level approach
concerning what we can say about state behaviour this leads on to an
explicit focus on the local and regional state in Detroit itself and
more specifically the role of planners and lessons for planning
theory. The chapter concludes with some self-criticism of the
research and some reflections on the work with the benefit of
hindsight.
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2. Class as an Explanatory Variable - the Dangers of Structuralism
The first comments must be positive ones. Class behaviour arising
quite directly out of divisions and conflict within the "sphere of
production" where goods and services are produced would seem to
explain quite well the '~acro dynamic" of transportation policy
formation in Detroit in the postwar period. By this one does not mean
that all events stand rigidly to attention in the face of the grand
concept of class conflict but there is certainly a discernible class
pattern to the unfolding of the transportation policy agenda looked at
in broad terms. On the one hand the basic notion of capital
accumulation (and various subsets of capitalist interests), on the
other the category of Labour (with intra-Labour conflict including
that of race subsumed under the general organizing concept of "the
reproduction of labour power" - the exact nature of the link to the
sphere of production in the case of race being left albei t somewhat
indeterminant) and the tension of the mutually defining conflict
between them, work reasonably well in organizing the evidence brought
to bear on the investigation. A recap is in order.
Three postwar transportation policy climates were identified. The
first was characterized by general enthusiasm for freeways in the
region. Freeways were seen by city of Detroit politicians and
planners as the solution to important city problems (congestion, lack
of attraction as an economic location) and as complementary to the
city's urban renewal agenda. The period was one of increasing
economic competition between Detroit and the emerging suburban
political jurisdictions, but there was a reasonable degree of regional
consensus on transportation policy issues. The following period,
roughly covering the time from the early 1960's to the assumption of
control by Coleman Young, Detroit's first black mayor in 1974, saw
this consensus begin to break down. The freeway agenda it was argued
was part of a more general dynamic of metropolitan development that in
this period was subject to developing crisis of which the "riots" in
1967 were the most dramatic manifestation. The third period, bringing
one to the present, has been marked by an almost complete absence of
regional consensus on transportation policy. Freeways have been
characterized by politicians and planners as the cause of many of the
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city of Detroit's problems and now public transportation, in
particular a rapid transit system, has been heralded as the key to the
city of Detroit's economic regeneration.
In .presenting this progression of events I have interwoven the
transportation policy agenda itself with what I have called the
"regionalist" agenda (the existence or otherwise of governmental
mechamisms in the Detroit area to deal with issues of a supra-local
significance and the existence in general terms of those issues
themselves) and the economic development issue (primarily local
concern with jobs and tax base).
Using the "tools" identified the bones of the argument have been as
follows:
1. In the immediate postwar period the Detroit region enjoyed a
favoured location with respect to the geographical circulation of
surplus value. The postwar "settlement" between big Capital and
Labour provided a reasonably stable basis for future accumulation in
the region but one in which the rewards to Labour were quite unequally
distributed. In particular blacks bore the brunt of the inherent
instability of the capitalist accumulation process, advantages
undoubted ly accrued· directl y to capi ta 1 through the
"superexploitation" of black labour and it is no contradiction, given
the competitive nature of the capital accumulation process to see
racial discrimination as also rooted in the'short term material
interest of white labour. The dynamic of suburbanization, representing
the increased generalization of capital accumulation in space and
which, facilitated by the freeway agenda, acted as an -"engine" for
expanded accumulation, mapped out divisions within the reproduction of
labour power, deriving very directly from the sphere of production, on
the metropolitan spatial plane. As such the model of metropolitan
development, aided and abetted by the particular interests of property
capital, carried the potential for its own fracture. The recognition
of this potential led to regional Capital (primarily the larger
elements) in general in Detroit becoming involved in the regionalist
issue at an early stage. Given the relative weakness, however, of the
Detroit CBD, to begin with, the response of the private sector to
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Detroit's urban renewal efforts as linked to its transportation plan
in the 1950's, was less than enthusiastic. A rapid transit system for
the city, which might have transformed the future composition of
downtown quite drastically, was virtually ruled out of court in
Detroit in the 1950's, not only because of very lukewarm support if
not outright opposition from the auto companies, but undoubtedly
because the city and region psychologically saw the future of the
"Motor City" as tied to the automobile.
2. The 1960's saw a major push by regional Capital in Detroit for
cohesive regional governmental structures when "metropolitan fracture
was becoming more serious. This bore results in the establishment of
SEMCOG. A working regional consensus, on transportation policy, at
least until the riots of 1967,was still made possible by the
expectations concomitant on the buoyant economic climate and
increasing federal largesse stemming from the "enlightened" big
Capital electoral victory of Kennedy over Nixon in 1960. The
unbalanced nature of the Detroit transportation system with
destabilizing inequities in access to transportation resources and
direct detrimental effects on business efficiency led to the direct
intervention of regional capital in Detroit into transportation policy
formation in the mid 1960's predating a major public transportation
push by federal government in the seventies. The result was the
establishment of SEMTA.
3. Since the assumption of black political control in Detroit in the
early 1970's an outcome of the directly class related nature of
divisions mapped out by the suburbanization dynamic, and consequent
upon capital having a more problematic attachment to the region as a
whole (represented firstly by the new "war between the states" and
latterly by what can be called a new phase for American capitalism as
a whole - intense foreign competition and the breakdown of the "Pax
American'" in the form of Reaganomics, alongside the possibilities
,inherent in the New International Division of Labour) the economic
battlelines have galvanized in Detroit between City and suburbs. In
an atmosphere of intense intra-regional economic competition consensus
on regional transportation policy has almost entirely broken down.
Most significantly, despite a major federal level commitment of
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resources to the Detroit area in the mid-seventies for an upgrading of
the regions public transit system including a rapid rail component
(federal policy at this time informed by an awareness of the
limitations on equity, efficiency and envirionmental grounds of over-
reliance on an auto based system) city/suburban agreement was
impossible to achieve. The city of Detroit has continued to link
economic regeneration and transportation policy, specifically a subway
for the city. Under the Reagan budget cutting axe and free market
ideology hopes for the latter have collapsed. Despite an
organizational commitment by regional Capital to the city's economic
future in the form of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (under-
standable not just in terms of public relations but in terms of the
need for stability in a metropolis where, despite the enhanced
potential for capital mobility, regional Capital still has a major
commitment) and the symbolism o~ the economic albatross of the
Renaissance Center (testimony to the fact that even Capital needs a
sense of place) hard private investment dollars are a rarer commodity.
The city of Detroit is in a competitive struggle for its economic
life. The bulldozing of a neighbourhood of 3,200 people in Poletown
to accommodate a new General Motors assembly plant demonstrated the
lengths to which the city administration was prepared to go to compete
with its metropolitan neighbours. It is an environment in'which
regional Capital has pragmatically decided to "back pedal" on the
issue of stronger regional governmental mechamisms to induce regional
cohesiveness.
Overall then, there is a strong class related pattern to the dynamic
behind the development of transportation policy in the region. Class
would seem to be of over-riding importance. There is a danger,
however, which I: have endeavoured to illustrate, that the type of
processes understood with reference to "class" as the major
structuring concept can be erroneously treated as'reified "structures"
devoid of human agency or become the elements of an idealized
theoretical system. In both cases, whether structuralist explicitly
or implicitly, concepts can proceed in the mind to trace on a life of
their own leading itself to error and into whose assumed unfolding the
complexities of more detailed events are made to fit. The subject of
how far such abstract theorizing as I have discussed can take us in
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understanding more detailed events is one to which I shall return in
a review of state behaviour in Detroit and the role of planners. I.
recap first on some structuralist misreadings of events in Detroit.
standing accused are Markuserl~°kwen~IMollenkop/2iAd Hili~3) Markusen,
for example, noting the effects of home rule legislation, as passed by
state legislatures in the prewar period, in facilitating metropolitan
fragmentation in the postwar period, in a functionalist way attributes
the origin of such enabling legislation, in particular its protection
from annexation provisions, as rooted in the imposition of suburban
interests over and against those of the central 'city:
"• • • it put the decision to join or not to join the central city
in the hands of the residents of the annexable area, leaving the
parent who had spawned the child helpless to participate in
determining their joint future.,,(24)
City incorporations as they took place especially in postwar Detroit
were based on a strong sense of suburban interest versus central city
interest, but incorporating jurisdictions, at least in the 1930's,
could legitimately claim that they needed city status to deal with
problems of urban administration in a situation where the city of
Detroit was reluctant to assume the expense of providing municipal
services to outlying areas through annexation. Detroit was not a
"helpless parent" in 1930 and was content to see some "children" go
their own way (although not all,'as in the costly incorporation of
Dearborn cutting off the tax revenue of the Ford Rouge complex). The
identification of an 'important tendency, in other words, (ie the
balkanized metropolis which did develop at the central city's expense)
is marred by its presentation in an idealized way.
Ewen likewise, would seem to project an overly idealized notion of the
motivations of corporate Capital, as working through Metropolitan
Fund, in pushing for much stronger regional governmental structures-in
the seventies. Ewen sees here a move by Capital to eradicate
democracy and to bring local government more directly under its
control. In analysis she states:
"The ruling class has long understood that its capacity to rule
is dependent on its capacity to control those who govern. It is
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far easier to control officials who are far removed from local
and direct constituencies (and for whom winning an election will
require thousands of corporate dollars, and obligations, for
campaign expenditures) than it is to control local officials who
more accurately reflect the working class base that elected
th ,,(25)em •
I argued that this view seems much too conspirational and certainly
over-romanticizes the working class nature of local democracy in S.E.
Michigan. The activity of Metropolitan Fund in advocating regional
government with teeth in the seventies was rooted in concerns for
stability and efficiency in the region as a locus of accumulation but
is best seen perhaps as involving a somewhat idealistic assessment of
possibilities for· change (even Capital can be naive sometimes) -
albeit based on an appreciation of the value of extreme positions in
forcing more marginal change - given the competitive economic roots of
regional governmental division in the process of accumulation and the
reproduction of labour power. Ewen, in developing her theme of the
assumed need for top down corporate governmental control and planning
of the Detroit region,' is perhaps at her most bemusing in suggesting
that the Doxiadus urban planning project of the late sixties be seen
as possessing fascist undertones. To quote:
"The imperatives of the corporations, which mean rationalizing
markets, controlling labor supplies, building efficient and cheap
distribution and transportation networks, require that their
plans for the next thirty years not be jeopardized by the whims
and wills of local constituencies who just might decide that what
was good for General Motors was not not good for Samia, 'Jackson,
Roseville, Inkster or Ecorse. If a structural characteristic of
fascism is the merger of the state apparatus with that of
monopoly capital on the condition of the .destruction of potential
power exerted by other constituencies, particular ly those
representing the working class, then it is in the planning for
the UDA that the specter of fascism takes on an eerie reality.
The study by Doxiadus a privately financed study for the benefit
of one of the largest corporations in the Detroit area (Detroit
Edison), claims to have laid the plans for electricity in the
Detroit area to the year 2000. Because electrical supplies and
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service can determine to a large extent where and how things do
develop, there is, at a level, a fait accompli invol ved. The
alternatives in the Detroit area are clearly defined by the
agencies of the ruling class and the definition of what is
necessary is clearly that defined by corporate capitalism.'.(26)
A more probable reading of the Doxiadusexercise .aswas suggested,
one that is lost in the quite stratospheric theoretical projections of
Ewen, is that Walter Cisler, chairman of Detroit Edison, considering
himself a social visionary (rather naively setting out to make the
future albeit in the image of corporate capital) indulged the
idealist planning methodology of his friend Ooxiadus whom he had met
during their Marshall Plan days together in Europe, in an exercise
which far from being a corporate Capital blueprint for development in
the urban Detroit area, was never really taken too seriously by those
with an understanding of the actual realities of the operative model
of metropolitan development in Detroit. In the words of Mayor
Cavanagh it was "somewhat of a boondoggle". .
With a similar desire to include everything within a bold theoretical
sweep, Mollenkopf(1~cludes Detroit within corporate led urban renewal
efforts to protect central business districts in the 1950's and
1960's. However, I have argued that this is to grossly over-estimate
the strength and cohesiveness of Big Capital support in Detroit around
the agenda of bolstering the CBD. What is significant in Detroit's
case is the relative weakness, in terms of investment of Big.Capital
attachment to the CBD - an altogether different context for planners
and policy makers. Likewise Hill(2~6cepts Mollenkopf's argument as
applied to Detroit and without seeming to examine the actual detail of
events relating to the Gratiot urban renewal project in Detroit in the
. .
fifties interprets it as "a land grab to provide big business with
subsidized property on which to bui Id"j29~owever, as I ha v~
indicated, there was no pent-up private sector demand for the Gratiot
site as a location for commercial or industrial activity even if the
city of Detroit had been considering the site for this purpose in the
first place (which it was not). The use being considered by the city
was residential. The idea of a corporate logic from which city of
Detroit policy can almost be "read off" is one which also seems to
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infuse Hill's analysis of events in Detroit in the 1970's and 1980's.
Hill's most recent contribution to an understanding of economic policy
formation in Detroit is replete with reference to the term "profit
logic" implying that state policy necessarily has taken the course
which it has!30~hus Hill argues that a Detroit rapid transit system
was not only supported by Detroit's mayor but by corporate capital as
well. The reason given is that rapid transit was, because of the
impossibility of providing requisite parking space, a "key element in
the equation determining the success or failure of Renaissance
(31\__ , '
Center". 'Using extensive interview _sources it was disputed whether
such a total correspondence between the economic development vision
for the city held by the city administration and by the private sector
can be sustained. state policy formation would seem not quite so
simple. A discussion of the local and regional state in Detroit and
the role of planners will provide a forum for consideration of the
more general question of how far abstract Marxist theorizing of the
type I have engaged in, can take onein:understanding concrete events.
3. Reflections on the Local and Regional state in Detroit
In his recent review and assessment of the life's work of Nicos
Poulantzas, Jesso~3~1aces paramount importance on the contribution
which Poulantzas made to understanding the state as a social relation
_ the idea that "the state is the material condensation of a relation
of forces between classes" and that the state "helps to constitute the
balance among class forces and does not simply reflect it"J33~his is
in contra-distinction to "crude instrumentalism which considers the
state as a neutral tool which is equally accessible to all class
forces and equally applicable t~ all purposes"P4>rt is not a view;
however, at variance with the notion of the state as the
crystallization of forces based on past conflict but which can
nevertheless be an "instrument" subject to "capture". It is such a
notion of the state as a class relation as was,used in the present
consideration of transportation policy formation in Detroit. It is
one which has stood up well. The fragmented governmental form of the
Detroit region maps out very explicitly impor~ant intra-class
divisions revealing that the state certainly does not exist passively
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to be captured. Important class relations of the state are "given
away" by geographical boundaries rendering an ''unpackingfrom within"
that much easier. The long standing activities and primary role of
regional Capital in Detroit in working for the establishment of
regional governmental structures is testimony to how instrumental
pressures in one time period can become embodied in the institutional/
structural woodwork of another.
The criticism of saunders(¥Hat Poulantzas presented a reductionist
view of the state in which everything was reduced too directly to
class relations and in which the concept of "relative autonomy of the
state" was in fact a cover for a crude functionalist reductionism to
class interests~3~as been addressed by writers endeavouring to build
upon the fundamentally sound insight (the state as a relation) which
Poulantzas still has to offer. As a backdrop to one'sresearch
conclusions on how planning intervention by the state might be
theorized one notes in particular the recent work of Cook~71n the
planning literature who endorses Urry's projection of a mediating role
for a Gramscian concept of civil society operating between the state
and productive relations. It is not incidental that one commentator
on Gramsci claims that "perhaps he went further than any other Marxist
thinker in recognising the force of ideas in producing historical
change, as well as seeing the impossibility of establishing any
precise correlation between economic circumstances and intellectual
developments'\38)AS the editors of Gramsci "Prison Notebooks" point
out, Gramsci "did not succeed in finding a single, wholly satisfactory
conception of 'civil society' or the state" but there is an important
usage in his work where he puts the position that "between the
economic structure and the state with its legislation and-its coercion
stands civil society" with the state as "the instrument for conforming
civil society to the economic structure"P9tooke, taking this as a
starting point, .generalizing across "civil society" divides it into
the spheres of circulation, reproduction and popular struggle. The
sphere of circulation is very directly linked to the sphere of
production. It is the realm of market exchange and distribution
incorporating most importantly conflict over wage levels in the labour
market!40~he sphere of reproduction covers issues pertaining to the
reproduction of both Capital and Labour. On the former score are
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included decisions such as whether capital should divest itself from a
particular region or sector and the matter of the maintenance of
capitalist social relations generally. The reproduction of labour
power subsumes "that area of daily life outside the workplace,,~41>rt
involves actual consumption decisions, for example, and pulls in
conf lict over the provision of collective consumption goods. The
sphere of popular struggle involves "state versus people struggles".
It groups together "those struggles, which were previously squeezed
uncomfortably into class analyses of social conflict or ignored
altogether" (ego ecological movementsin Marxist analysis). Popular
struggle, Cooke argues "is linked with struggle in the sphere of
reproduction in the final analysis, but is characterized by its
defensive, non-class basis rather than the more traditional offensive,
class-based political struggle in the sphere of reproduction"i42) The
essential point to grasp, with implications for a theory of planning,
is that any simple characterization of the relationship between the
state and class is considered invalid. Cookeconceives of "individual
subjects in civil society who may mobilize around a variety of
collective interests and bases of identification such as: status,
occupation, gender, religion, language, region, ethnicity or
nationality as well as class relations of production,,~43~hespheres of
reproduction and popular struggle are seen as "both expressive of the
attempts of individuals to find bases of collecti ve identification
which are not co-terminous with their position in the relations of
production"J44>rhis would seem to strike a note of harmonywith the
work of the mature Poulantzas whohaving broken before his death with
the Althusserian notion of structural class causality conceded "that
the state is not exhausted by its class significance and political
forces are not exhausted by class movements".(45)
This problematising of state actions in relation to class is something
to whichI. return in the context of recent reformulations of Marxist
research methodology and the limits of such "grand" theory itself.
Concerningone's ownapproach, however, towards the local and regional
state, while not articulated within a concept of civil society it has,
nevertheless,centered on the spheres of production, circulation (the
market) and reproduction (capital concern for continued accumulation
and Labour consumption cleavages). These I. have tied very directly
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to class and the model at a general level does, I have argued,
explain the macro dynamic of transportation policy formation. If one
had been studying, however, the introduction of handicapped provisions
on SEMTA buses, for example, this might more appropriately have
belonged in the sphere of popular struggle. It is clear, however,
that one's subject matter has not revolved around pluralistic
. (46)
consumpt10n conflicts suggested by Saunders as forming the basis for
study of the local state. Yet even given the class based nature of
local and regional process with which I have grappled, the
specificity of the local state in terms of "the uniqueness of local
(47) .
class relations" proved difficult to tie down• ..Where does local and
regional process stop and state and federal process begin? This is,
(48) .
of course, the comment of Martlew an his criticism of a "layer cake"
view of the state. Thus, for example, it is difficult to disentangle
the role of federal government (and the activities of the Committee
for Economic Development), state government and the ro~e of
Metropolitan Fund in the creation of SEMCOG (although the "spade work"
of M.F. appears crucial). While federal and state process can be
theorized at an abstract level certain interventions crucial to
regional and local process (the pledge of $600 million by President
Ford, for example, to the Detroit region for public transportation)
have to be introduced almost exogenously without full explanation of
their origin. That said, it still does seem meaningful to talk in
terms of a certain unifying distinctiveness to local and regional
process based not on a preponderant concern with labour reproduction
issues to the neglect of accumulation a la Saunders but on the
particularly internecine nature of the conflicts over both these
issues. One related point is in order before moving on to a
consideration of the role of planners and implications for planning
theory. Tb wit, it was not always a clear cut matter in deciding what
to include and what to exclude in dealing with local process itself.
A decision had to be made as to what appeared to constitute the most
pertinent factors relevant to understanding transportation policy
formation at a certain level of abstraction - a choice between
pursuing the dominant theme and getting lost in detail - detail,
however, which may well be necessary to understand policy at a greater
level of specificity. Thus, for example, the administrative
rationalization of Detroit city government and the "strengthening of
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the mayor's role as chief administrator and policy leader,,(4JAich
became operational in 1974 subsequent to a charter revision was not
considered, even though, for example, it did create a consolidated
city transportation department (merging the Detroit street Railways
Commission, the streets and Traffic Commission, the Aviation
Commission and the inactive Rapid Transit Commission). One was
conscious in other words of prioritizing and being selective in
looking for a class pattern to events within the "complexity of the
(SO)
concrete".
4. Implications for Planning Theory
The focus has been upon a substantive area of state policy, namely
transportation policy formation, rather than upon a search for
planning as a distinctive mode of decision making. Nevertheless, I
have not ignored the role of physical planners - individuals working
for or in government and bringing amongst other things, including
prescriptive ideas, a certain substantive knowledge to decision making
concerning the production, design and spatial articulation of the
built environment - within this broader state process. Given the
still ubiquitous use of the term "planning" it is important in other
words to be clear on the nature of the object one is ' trying to
theorize. I will order the conclusions around the following themes:
(a) The robustness of the notion of "physical planning" intervention
by the state and the associated input of planners, as an object for
theorization.
(b) The ideological content of planning activity which has been.
considered.
(c) The strengths and limitations of the approach, based as it is upon
a macro approach to theorizing, for the construction of a more
adequate theory of planning and future research directions indicated
by the analysis.
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One must conclude that the term "physical planning" risks an overly
narrow identification of the terrain with which planners have been
involved and have grappled. Planners to a greater or lesser extent
(and in regional and city of Detroit government to a greater extent)
have been oriented towards influencing urban and regional social,
economic and political processes over space. The terms urban or
regional development planning (with transportation planning as one
component part) probably better reflects the expansive nature of the
social reality with which planners have been engaged. I. have linked
transportation planning intervention to the politics of the economic
..
development and regionalist dynamics in particular and to the work of
planners involved with these issues. Class conflict has been the
over-riding integrative concept. Such a Marxist analysis which has
ta~en a historical and contextual approach to understanding planning
action suggests that as an object for theorization urban planning
intervention by the state must be seen as a contingent intervention.
Its form is changeable and related to changes in the wider political
economy. Such a view contrasts sharply with the idealistic strain
still strong in urban planning thought which sees certain rationally
arrived at princip~es as having an eternal character.(5lrhrough the
case study it is clear that planning intervention has changed in
Detroit and been modified drastically contingent upon class
relationships as they have developed and changed. One has described,
for example, the demise of public transportation in Detroit, its
revitalization in the form of SEMTA and the present financial
predicament under the Reagan administration; likewise the switch from
a freeway agenda by the city of Detroit to a downright hostile freeway
stance and the advocacy of sub surface rail; likewise the move towards
at least some attempt to control urban sprawl by SEMCOG. (That
planning actions within a Marxist perspective cannot equa~ly be seen
as simply derivative of "immanent laws of capitalist deveLopment;"or
of certain "class conjunctures" is a subject to which·I will turn
shortly.)
Turning.the_ attention now to the "ideological wrapping" in which
planning intervention has been presented in Detroit this has in
general been some variant of the rational generic planning model.
This model, in relation to the underlying dynamic of transportation
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policy formation which has been discussed, would seem to be
debilitating in terms of enabling planners to understand critically
the nature of their role and the nature of their scope for independent
manoeuver. It would seem to facilitate the rationalization of the
status quo at snap shot instances of time in the process "buffeting"
planners around in the general dynamic of process without adequate
theoretical moorings in terms of understanding their own intervention.
What Paris calls the "central ideology of planning,,(S]>thatwithin the
context of its application, rationality is deemed capable of arriving
at "correct" planning decisions thus obscur Lnq the real workings of
the space economy - has been powerful in Detroit. Even Mayor Young in
1978 felt compelled to appeal to a "scientific determination"C13;om
SEMTA to prove the case for a Detroit subway rather than basing the
claim simply on grounds of fairness and equity. At the regional
transportation level in Detroit "the central ideology" has presented
itself in a structural functionalist guisejS4~y this one means it has
been implicitly based on a theory of society which regards all sub-
system parts, even if appearing to be in conflict, as, nevertheless,
related to the continued survival of the system or structure as a
whole. The continued functioning of parts of the social system, even
if appearing to be in conflict is, therefore, a starting point for
prescription, not something subject to seriousinterrogatian. One must
concur with Cooke that this approach towards understanding society
cannot avoid conferring legitimacy and can lead to "unreflective goal
settingl~S~bstituting for analysis as divergent interests are sweeped
into the harmonious whole of a planning document. Cooke labels
structural functionalism as an "inappropriate vehicle for city and
regional planning,,~56)To tht"s one must reply that ;; structural
functionalist outlook may be a very appropriate vehicle of planning
intervention (for certain interests) if it also serves the function of
containment of conflict and legitimation for the intervention. This
has been so in Detroit. COoke bypasses the difficult question of how
far planners are free to choose in different circumstances their own
methodology. There have been important pressures on planners in
Detroit to adopt such an approach irrespective of their own
prescriptive professional leanings. There can be no doubt that the
Carroll and Talus regional transportation plans in the fifties and
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sixties played a major role in legitimating an agenda of extensive
freeway construction as the backbone of transportation policy for
Detroit city and region. A structural functionalist outlook in
planning, perhaps not unrelated to the climate of the times - the
postwar settlement between capital and Labour - was a useful vehicle
in this regard. Just how far this outlook was determined by class
factors is another matter raising the question of the autonomy of
planning methodology from class pressures but the analysis leads oneto
stress the importance of contextual factors in shaping methodology.
The taken for granted nature of the Carroll highway goals(~~d the
decision to go with the trend echoes Cooke's charge of "unreflective
goal setting" attendant on a structural functionalist outlook. But
the reason for this must be sought first and foremost, it would seem,
in the ability of highway interests, rooted in a class dynamic, to
appear as generalizable ones rather than in the adoption by planners
of an "inappropriate vehicle".
The TALUS report, published in 1969 when the cracks in any notion of
regional harmony were all too apparent still clung to a structural
functionalist approach. Goals such as the following were typical:
"• • • achievement of an integrated society, which provides
residential opportunities throughout the region for people in
differential racial, social and economic groups".
"The general goal is 'to improve the quality of the environment'.
Somewhat less generally, it is our goal to enable the individual
to fulfill himself, to enable individuals and households to
select from a variety of residential locational and housing type
alternatives, to provide a region which is characterized by
diversity, difference, opportunity; a region which increasingly
becomes a more attractive and satisfactory place in which to
live, work, recreate and visit.,,(58)
As :<;>ne_has.argued the report assumed that with enough resources and
will (although not specifying where they were to come from) the
interests of Detroit and suburbs were reconcilable in a consensual
whole which included first and foremost a major expansion of the
regiona I freeway agenda. The report contained no fundamental
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reappraisal of Detroit's relationship to the suburbs in the actual
model of development which was unfolding, as opposed to an idealized
one which planners held up as possible" but without specifying the
concrete steps to getting there. The plan, however, I. have suggested
provided convenient "packaging" for a strong hLqhwa y agenda the
resources for which were available. The structural functionalist
underpinning of TALUS it was argued must be sought not in any
deliberate attempt to deceive but in the ability of dominant interests
to present themselves as generalizable ones thus framing the context
for.planning action and secondarily in the idealist strain in planning
which lends itself,to an uncritical acceptance of such gene'ralization.
One suspects on the basis of interview evidence that the director of
the TALUS project indulged the idealism of planners and did not
himself have a commitment to the plan's rapid transit proposals.
In the present public transportation proposals of the SEMOOG Regional
Transportation Plan 'onefindsstructural functionalist idealism, at
least on the surface,(5~tits most extreme. Superficiality of analysis
(avoidance of dealing head on with conflict in an openly conflict
laden situation) and the projection of an unrealistic harmonious whole
(a massive increase in intermediate and local bus service region wide
with a major four pronged rapid rail system terminating in the Detroit
CBD when the city of Detroit would probably settle for half of the
route miles on any of the transit corridors) would seem forced upon
planners in an effort to achieve some degree of compromise or working
consensus, however illusory, acceptable to the SEMCOG General
Assembly. The methodology of SEMTA planners, however, in response to
the problem of obtaining a more short term workable an? practical
consensus on transportation policy in the face of bitter conflict, has
been one of explicitly recognising the political nature of the
judgements involved and seeking to aid the process (so far
unsuccessfully) of political resolution.
At the present time when Marxist analysis is undergoing critical
reappraisal, the case study of Detroit using Marxist categories
supports the usefulness of class in understanding the relationship
between planning intervention (and the ideological nature of its
severely circumscribed rational presentation) and changes in the wider
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political economy. It is important to insist, in other words, on not
throwing out the baby with the proverbial bathwater. This is a
strength of the research contribution. But there is a danger to which
the analysis has been sensitive through its suspicion of
structuralism, that broad or macro concepts can be expected to do too
much in explaining the detailed nature of concrete events. This is a
limitation of ilie-approach in terms of the construction of a fuller
theory of planning, including a normative aspect, within a Marxist
perspective. The analysis suggests that while the broad contours of
transportation policy formation in Detroit fall into a class pattern
(ie class conflict has primarily influenced·t~e configuration of
choices facing planners), the implementation of specific policy
choices even at the level of the broad dynamic of policy and certainly
at the level of less strategic interventions cannot always be reduced
to a rigid determination by class. That the city of Detroit adopted a
freeway agenda as the key element in its strategic transportation
policy in the fifties seems very directly determined by the
considerations of class which havebeenreviewed. The fixation by Mayor
Coleman Young on a subway for Detroit in the seventies and eighties
would appear more difficult to regard as so determined. I have
disagreed with Hill who takes such a deterministic view.(606ne is
compelled to ask the question, for example, whether Mayor Young would
have latched onto the sticking point of a Detroit subway so quickly
and steadfastly if the idea of a regional rapid transit system had not
been touted so strongly by SEMCOG and SEMTA planners in the early
seventies~6l)Ata less than strategic 'level it seems quite certain, for
example, that planners possessed a fair degree of influence or
discretion over the Gratiot urban renewal project in the 19S0's562~hus
the question presents itself whether more market realistic design
standards early on would have made an integrated housing development
on the site more likely instead of the upper-middle income project
which finally emerged. Or, with the recent Poletown project in
Detroit~63justhow much discretion did planners have in selecting the
site and in the subsequent relocation the outcome of which was the
displacement of 1,300 families? While the research agenda limits us
to being speculative on such issues what is clear is the need for
planning theory construction at various levels of analysis. While
Marxist grand theory is useful it can be but one element (albeit a
crucial one) of a planning theory which informs practice. The
critique of structuralist Marxist approaches (not negating, however,
the strength of macro Marxist concepts) leads one to agree with
saunders(61ln the necessity of recognising that state actors in
mediating structural influences behave in ways that are meaningful to
themsel ves and with Dunleavey who points to the need for "mediating
. .(65)frameworks to connect macro-theory with specific policy issues~
Likewise Ham and Hill call for "good empirical studies to link the
macro and micro levels of explanation,l6'£hrelation to state policy,
drawing in relevant work from organization theory and public
administration to throw greater light upon.the micro -level in
(67) (6B)particular. Recent research work of Healey and Underwood has
incorporated such a view in the attempt to develop "middle range"
theory to explain the operation of the British land use planning
system. The signs are that a revised "Marxist" approach to analysis
is emerging which carries the possibility of producing a fuller
developed theory of planning which can also guide practice. While
this is in its early stages there is no doubt that the climate of
Marxist scholarship has changed radically in the eighties d~ring the
period when the work. here was conducted. The general approach
(although not always with adequate acknowledgement of its source)
around which a coalescing seems to be taking place is the empirical
tradition of British Marxist historiography - an approach to under-
standing "real" processes in the social world involving retrospective
conjectural hypothesis formation, accepting that while evidence is
theory laden it is not theory determined, that as Castells' puts it
"the most useful concepts are those flexible enough to be deformed and
(69)
rectified in the process of using them as instruments of knowledge",
and which seeks to produce knowledge which accepts lack of
falsification as the condition of its validity. It is a humbler
(70)
approach. Andrew Sayer in formalizing such a revised approach to
Marxist research in general conceives higher and lower orders of
process which are subject to theorization. Lower level process is
conceptualized as working within the constraints of more macro and
dominant process and its'theorization is treated as "not the sole
prerogative of Marxism"Fl)such theory is, however, needed to explain
\
the "concrete" form which the working out of higher level process
takes. The parallel to Saunders' call for the specification of
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"counterfactuals" is obviously strong. All levels of theory are
needed to understand "the muddy waters of the concrete • • • the
combination of many diverse forces or processes"F2>rn fact a Gramscian
approach towards the capitalist state is not incompatible with the
theorization of macro level process influencing state behaviour at
arms length from class factors. While the danger exists for the
uncritical importation into a Marxist framework of what may be without
some re-evaluation incompatible theory construction, as applied to
planning theory,planning intervention can no longer be dismissed as
simply derivative of the balance of class forces as expressed through
the state. It becomes a subject for theorization in its own right.
Ole'sown research points to the continued strength of macro Marxist
concepts in this endeavour but I have not always been able to deal
with the crucial question for planning theory construction of just how
far, by class and other factors, the intervention of planners has been
constrained. The task for planning theory construction within a
Marxist perspective would appear to be, through research at various
levels of theory, the development of the ability to generalize across
different planning interventions in order to throw light upon
expectable constraints on planners action (including methodological
constraints) and planners relative freedom for manoeuvre in the
pursuit of certain ethical objectives. In relation to the latter, the
American planning theoretician Forester(?~~commends that the activity
of planners should be a "democratizing practice" - that while "at
every level we find a political economy of attention • • • a dynamics of
power and distortion jeopardizing democratic participation and
autonomy" planners should nevertheless "point to, anticipate and work
to counteract such influences • • • clarify, reveal and communicate to
citizens actual possibilities of life-enhancing,emancipatory
actions,,?(74~uch exhortations, ,however, to be useful in guiding
practice, must be coupled with more sophisticated theory dealing with
the constraints on planning intervention recognised as a contingent
intervention. As such planning theory itself, it seems should be a
contingent body of theory, reviseable in the light of the changeable
nature of practice.
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5. Reflections on the Research
Two maj or criticisms could be made of the research: that it has not
sufficiently considered the more micro level aspects of policy
formation with their importance for a theory of planning and that it
has not developed counterfactuals in the manner thought appropriate by
Saunders. Considering the former, there seems little doubt that if a
theory of planning (including a prescriptive component) is to be
developed within a Marxist perspective this is a direction in which
research is needed and indeed in which research of late has proceeded!75)
The underdevelopment of this aspect here must be accepted as a
limitation (although one which was recognized) inherent in the task
attempted. The recent study by starkie!7~or example, of road and
traffic policies in post-war Britain, in analysing the role of
politicians, civil servants and interest groups in policy formation
explicitly takes as given "secular trends in the economy" and "forces
of circumstance"P7>Starkie's approach, in other words, is limited by a
cursory examination of macro factors which I have endeavoured to
bring under consideration in the case of Detroit and which onemust
conclude are of the utmost importance in theorizing planning
intervention provided that they are not expected to stand alone in
explaining the "complexity of the concrete". More serious perhaps is
the possible accusation that one has not always stopped to develop
counterfactual statements - to elaborate disconfirming instances which
would enable falsification of the research. In defence one must say
that theory building must start somewhere. One's focus was on the broad
nature of the postwar dynamic of transportation policy formation in
Detroit (ie. involving the pitching of the analysis at a certain level
of abstraction). To explicitly and consistent-ly develop
counterfactuals of the sort thought necessary by Saunders would have
invol ved so many excursions into the realm of the "concrete" as to
make the original research task impossible. The theoretical arguments
are in other words provisional pending supplemental research. It is
difficul t to image how it could be otherwise. To say this is not to
admit to the possession of a licence for whimsical theoretical
invention. There is an empirical, observable basis to the theoretical
ideas put forward (even if not always descending to the complexity of
the most concrete) and in the confrontation between theory and "facts"
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a sensitivity to the dangers of structuralism ensured an awareness of
the limitations on what could be said with confidence.
Another matter deserves mention. Recent criticisms of structuralist
Marxism have been primarily in the realm of theory. The research
presented here is best conceived as an attempt to bring macro Marxist
theorizing to bear as an understanding of transportation policy
formation in Detroit (ie in a case-study context) with a realization
of the dangers inherent in structuralism. Macro theory, in other
words, most certainly has a place in the construction ofa theory of
planning and in explaining other phenomena if it's limitations are
recognized. The corollary, of course, is that more micro level theory
must also be approached within an awareness of its explanatory
shortfalls. An explicit recognition of the limitations at both levels
of theory construction would seem-necessary to enable dialogue to take
place between them.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED
INDUSTRIAL GROUPS FOR
US, MICHIGAN AND DETROIT REGION 1960-1980
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
% % % % %
U.S. . Manufacturing 31.0 29.7 27.3 23.8 22.4.
Mich: Manufacturing 41.2 41.0 36.0 31.4 29.0
Detroit SMSA: Manufacturing 43.0 42.1 36.7 32.3 29.3
Mich: Motor Vehicles & Equipment 13.2 13.6 11.2 10.2 9.7
Mich: Metals (p~imary& fabricated) 14.1 14.7 13.2 10.7 10.1
and non-electrical machinery
Detroit SMSA: Motor Vehicles & 16.2 16.2 13.5 12.7 11.3
Equipment
Detroit SMSA: Metals (primary & 15.9 16.2 14.7 11.9 11.1
fabricated) and non-electrical
machinery
The 1973 definition of the Detroit SMSA is used for years 1970-80 (ie
Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Lapeer, Livingston \and st Clair counties)
For 1960-65 the present SEMCOG area is used (ie all the previous
counties, excluding Lapeer and including Washtenaw and Monroe.
Source:
(1) Michigan Employment Security Commission - Research and Statistics
Division
(2) Mattila, J.M., Moor, J.R. Jr., The SeE. Michigan Economy: Past,
Present and Future Study prepared for the Detroit Metropolitan
Fund, August 1977, Table 6 p.21
(3) "Employment and Earnings", U.S. Department of Labor, April 1982
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TABLE 3A
CITY OF DETROIT SHARE OF TRI-COUNTY REGIONAL
EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED EMPLOYMENT SECTORS
1948-1977
Year Manufacturing Retail Services Wholesale
1948 60.3 72.6 N/A 90.1
1954 53.5 63.3 N/A 76.8
1958 50.5 54.4 75.3 .. 74.1
1962 40.6 43.4 65.8 68.6
1967 35.8 38.2 60.5 57.9
1972 33.4 28.5 46.7 44.5
1977 27.9 19.1 33.3 32.3
Source: U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Retail, Services and Whole-
salers, various years.
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TABLE 3B
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN DETROIT CITY
AND DETROIT TRI-COUNTY REGION
1958-1977
Manufacturing Retail
Trade
Wholesale
Trade
Services
Detroit Region
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
City of Detroit
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
Balance of Region
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
6,468
7,023
7,100
7,126
7,524
30,742
29,337
26,534
28,885
28,277
5,231
5,643
5,644
6,027
6,019
3,806
3,628
3,095
2,392
1,657
1,425
2,015
2,549
3,635
4,362
17,921
19,925
19,581
21,156*
23,895*
10,627
10,233
8,815
7,336*
5,243*
7,294
9,692
10,766
13,820*
18,652*
3,363
3,370
2,947
2,398
1,954
16,942
14,206
11,496
9,768
6,914
*Legal services, dental laboratories and architectural, engineering,
land surveying services subtracted out for comparability with previous
years' totals.
3,105
3,653 .
4,153
4,728
5,570
13,800
15,131
15,038
19,117
21,363
Source: City of Detroit Planning Department, Data Co-ordination
Division, Report No.315A, May 1980; US Census of Manufacturers,
1977
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TABLE 3C
NUMBER OF PERSONS WORKING IN DETROIT CITY
AND DETROIT TRI-COUNTY REGION
1958-1977
Source: City of Detroit Planning Department, Data Co-ordination
Division, Report No.315A, May 1980; U.S. Census of
Manufacturers, 1977
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TABLE 5
PLACE OF WORK BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE
DETROIT REGION 1960-1980
Living in City of Detroit
Working in Detroit
Working outside Detroit
Place not reported
1960
%
460940
102283
33388
77.3
17.2
5.6
317421
167492
4744,.
1970
59.6
31.4
8.9
1980
% %
214762 54.4
115641 .29.3
64304 16.3
Living in Suburbs*
Working in Detroit
Working outside Detroit
Place not reported
1960
230997
446973
21357
%
33.0
63.9
3.1
160374
711012
46400
1970
%
17.4
77.5
5.1
1980
%
198634
949908
110391
15.8
75.5
8.8
*Balance of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb
'j
,
Source: Southeast Michigan Community Profiles: 1980 Census. SEMCOG
January 1983; Michigan Employment Security Commission, Annual
Manpower Planning Report Fiscal Year 1975. Table 10
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CITIES IN THE TRI-COUNTY AREA BY INCORPORATION DATE
·TABLE 7
Year of
Incorporation
Year of
Incorporatio
Detroit
Pontiac
Wyandotte
Mount Clemens
Highland Park
Hamtramck
Royal Oak
River Rouge
Lincoln Park
Farmington
Dearborn
Ferndale
Pleasant Ridge
East Detroit
South Lyon
New Baltimore
Plymouth
Berkley
Huntington Woods
Garden City
Melvindale
Birmingham
Bloomfield Hills
Grosse Pointe
Center Line
Utica
Clawson
Ecorse
Hazel Park
Oak Park
Belleville
Sylvan Lake
Grosse Pointe Farms
Grosse Pointe Park
Grosse Pointe Woods
Livonia
1806
1861
1867
1879
1918
1921
1921
1922
1925
1926
1927
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1932
1932
1933
1933
1933
1933
1934
1936
1937
1940
1942
1942
1945
1946
1947
1949
1950
1950
1950
Harper Woods
st Clair Shores
Lathrup Village
Memphis
Walled Lake
Northville
Keego Harbour
Madison Heights
Northville
Troy
Fraser
Allen Park
Trenton
Warren
Southgate
Southfield
Wixom
Roseville
Riverview
Wayne
Gibraltar
Dearborn Heights
Inkster
Rockwood
Orchard Lake Village
Flat Rock
Woodhaven
Westland
Richmond
Rochester
Taylor
Sterling Heights
Novi
Romulus
Farmington Hills
1951
1951
1953
1953
1954
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1956
1957
1957
1957
1958
1958
1958
1958
1959
1960
1961
1963
1964
1964
1964
1965
1965
1966
1966
1967
1968
1968
1969
1970
1973
Source: Data supplied by Michigan Department of Commerce, Office
, of Community Development
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TABLE 8
Semcog Cities with population greater than 10,000 in 1980:
form of Government (as of feb. 1978)
Allen Park
Dearborn
Dearborn Heights
Detroit
Ecorse
Garden City
Grosse Point farms
Grosse Point Park
Grosse Point Woods
Hamtramck
Harper Woods
Highland Park
Inkster
Lincoln Park
Livonia
Melvindale
River Rouge
Riverview
Romulus
Southgate
Taylor
Trenton
Wayne
Westland
Woodhaven
Wyandotte
Berkley
Birmingham
Clawson
farmington
ferndale
Hazel Park
Madison Heights
Novi
Oak Park
Pontiac
Royal Oak
Southfield
Troy
farmington Hills
East Detroit
fraser
Mount Clemens
Roseville
St. Clair Shores
Sterling Heights
Warren
Ann Arbor
Ypsilanti
Port Huron
Monroe
Mayor/Council
X
X
X
X
X
Council/Manager
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SOURCE: Michigan Municipal League. Technical topics No32
(revised). Appendices A & 8. feb. 1978.
,
321
TABLE 9
SEMCOG CITIES WITH POPULATION GREATER THAN 10,000 (1980)
CLASSIFIED IN DESCENDING ORDER ON THE BASIS OF 1969
PER CAPITA INCOME
HIGH INCOME (> $5550)
Grosse Pointe Farms
Grosse Pointe Park
Birmingham
Grosse Pointe Woods
Southfield
UPPER MIDDLE INCOME (>$3770)
Farmington
Farmington Hills
Troy
Oak Park
Dearborn
Harper Woods
Royal Oak
Allen Park
Ann Arbor
Trenton
Livonia
Berkley
Novi
st Clair Shores
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME (>$3200)
Ferndale
Sterling Heights
Woodhaven
Warren
East Detroit
Riverview
Lincoln Park
Southgate
Melvindale
Mount Clemens
Monroe
Madison Heights
Frazer
Wayne
Clawson
Wyandotte
Westland
Hazel Park
Roseville
Hamtramck
Garden City
Taylor
LOWER INCOME (>$2800)
Detroit
Romulus
Inkster
Highland Park
port Huron
Ypsilanti
River Rouge
Pontiac
Ecorse
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Series P-25, No.670, May 1977
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TABLE 10
1973 Production of Motor Vehicles (cars. trucks & buses) in
North America and Detroit - Selected Locational Data
~
....
-os:: s::
--0 0
0"'-0 S- .... <-QIQI 0 ..... Vl .....s, __ u
~u ::l UQlU::l ::l ::l
.c''''' -c ....-0 ....-0§.s:: 0 00 00a QlS- S- s...
z>c.. 1t'I c.. 1t'I c;
World Production 39.159.751 100 .-
U.S. Production 12.681.513 32.4 ' 100 .
Michigan 4,287.709 10.9 33.8
..
Missour; (a) 1.405,677 3.6 11.1.
Ohio 1.318,848 3.4 10.4
California 1.103.158 2.8 8.7
New Jersey 1.267,505 3.2 10.0
Wisconsin 637.499 1.6 5.0
Georgia 734,658 1.9 5.8
Delaware 429,286 1.1 3.4
.
Illinois 432.100 1.1 3.4
Maryland 359.215 * 2.8
Texas 239.842 * ** s::10
.,....
-0 s::Kansas 218.09l * ** 100 s::e .... 10
10..... 0\
New York uu .... s::204,383 * ** ::l .s::o....-0 u .... .....
00 ......... ....
Canada (b) S- ::£u o c:1.430,084 4.0
--
.-c.. ::l s...o
--
....-0 .........
00 QI .....
Ontario s... ou1.427.300 4.0
--
99.8 1t'I Cl.. ::l
--
......-0
00
De,troit (c) 3.106.331 S-7.9 24.5
--
72.4 .-c..
-
Detroit - G.M. production: 1.097.669
-- -- -- --
35.3
(Detroit. Pontiac 2 plants.
Ypsilanti) .
-Detroit - Ford production: 780,217
-- -- -- --
2511(Dearborn, Wayne 2 plants,
Wixom)
Detroit - Chrysler production: 1.228.445
-- -- -- --
39.5
(Detroit 2 plants. Hamtramck,
Warren) .
(a) Data for Missouri and the remainder of U.S. states combines the 1973 model year
for cars with the 1973 calender year for buses and trucks.
(b) Canadian and Ontario data are for 1972. Percentages are calculated accordingly.
(c) Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties.
• Less than 1% ** Less than 2%
Source: 1. Michigan Statistical Abstract. 15th Ed. 1980. Graduate School of
Business Administration. Michigan State University. pp·s 561-563.
2. Bloomfield. Geraldi "The World Automotive Industry." David & Charles
1978. p. 168. Table 26.
3. Data supplied by Wards Communications. Detroit. Michigan.
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TABLE 12
% Unemployment in US, Michigan & Detroit SMSA - selected years
Year .. % Unemployed
U.S.
% Unemployed
Michigan
% Unemployed
Detroit SMSA
(a)
% Unemployed
Detroit City
1949 5.9 7.3
1950 5.3 4.0
51 3.3 4.0
52 3.0 4.1
53 2.9 2.7
54 5.5 7.1
55(b) 4.4 3.7
56 4.1 6.9 7.4
57 4.3 6.6 6.6
58 6.8 13.7 15.2
59 5.5 8.4 8.9
60 5.5 6.7 6.8
61 6.7 10.1 1100
62 5.5 7.0 7.0
63 5.7 5.6 5.2
64 5.2 408 4.3
65 4.5 3.9 3.5
66 3.8 3.5 3.2
67 3.8 4.5 4.1 5.2
68 3.6 4.3 3.9 5.1
69 3.5 4.0 3.6 6.6
70 4.9 6.7 6.4 8.1
71 5.9 7.6 7.5 9.4
72 5.6 7.0 6.9 8.9
73 4.9 5.9 5.4 6.9
74 5.6 7.4 6.8 8.5
75 8.5 12.5 11.8 14.5
76 7.7 9.4 9.0 11.1
77 7.0 8.2 7.8 9.9
78 6.0 6.9 6.6 8.3
79 5.8 7.8 7.8 10.1
80 7.1 12.6 13.1 16.5
81 7.6 12.3 12.8 15.7
82 9.7 15.5 15.9 20.3
83 10.1 14.2 14.6 18.~
84 (March) 7.4 (July) 12.5 12.3 ~5.5
(a) 1956-1969- Wayne Oakland & Macomb counties.
1970 - 1981 - Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Livingston " Lapeer
& st. Clair COs. (1973 Census definition).
(b) for Michigan there is a br~ak in the comparaibility of the data in 1956.
SOURCE: (1) Michigan Employment Security Commission
(2) Michigan Statistical Abstract 16th Ed. 1981, Bureau of
Business Research, School of Business Admin Wayne State
Univ. Detroit. p. 138.
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TABLE 13
Assessed Valuation of Taxable Property. City of Detroit and Rest of
Wayne County. 1959, 1959 (adjusted) and 1969 (in millions of dollars)
1959 Value
(1959 dollars)
1959 Value
(1969 dollars)
1969 Value
(1969 dollars)
% increase or
decrease in 10
year period in
real terms
DETROIT 5486.5 7560.4 5188.2 -31.4
Rest of 2243.,3 3091.2 5629.5 82.1Wayne County
SOURCE: Urban Incentive Tax Credits - A Self-Correcting Strategy to rebuild
central cities. Detroit City Plan Commission. April 1972. p.37 (The
table presented in this publication contains an error in the city of
Detroit data for 1959 which has been corrected based on: City of
Detroit budget, tiscal Year ending June 30, 1981, Budget Dept.
City of Detroit. p XI.)
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TABLE 15
Number of motor vehicles (cars, trucks, buses) produced in U§
Michigan & Detroit(a) 1978 and 1982
1978 1982 Change
Production Production 1978-82
U.S. PRODUCTION 12,899,202 6,986,018 5,913,184
MICHIGAN 3,995,560 2,395,076 1,600,484
DETROIT(a) 2,793,812 1,439,898 1,353,914
GoM. (DETROIT): Detroit City; Pontiac, 1,122,754 620329 502425
2 plants; Ypsilanti.
(G.M. will shortly be commencing
production at 2 new assembly
plants in Detroit City and
Orion TWP).
FORD (DETROIT): Dearborn; Wayne, 888628 541733 346895
2 plants; Wixom.
CHRYSLER (DETROIT): Detroit City, 782430 277836 504594
Jefferson Ave, Lynch Road (closed
1981); Hamtramck (closed 1980);
Warren
(a) Wayne, Oakland & Macomb counties.
SOURCE: Michigan Statistical Abstract. 17th edo 1982-83. June 1983.
Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration,
Wayne State University, Detroit. Adapted from TABLE XVI-3
p.488.
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TABLE 18
SELECTED TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS FOR S.E. MICHIGAN
(a) Total Number of Bus Passengers Carried by SEMTA and Detroit
Department of Transportation for Fiscal Years 1978-1982
SEMTA* D-DOT
1978
1979
1981
1982
9,059,909
10,790,796
14,072,503
13,689,244
65,354,000
77,231,600
65,677,000 ..
77,394,000
*This excludes commuter rail passengers carried by SEMTA which
totalled 367,912 in 1978 and 349,887 in 1982.
(b) Total Number of Buses (Large and Small) Operated by SEMTA
and Detroit Department of Transportation 1978-1982
SEMTA SEMTA D-DOT*
(large bus) (small bus) (large bus)
1978 241 111 830
1979 285 157 870
1981 376 266 807
1982 317 282 800
*Detroit does not operate a small bus service
Source: South-Eastern Michigan Transportation Authority, Annual
Reports, various years.
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TABLE 18 (cont.)
(c) Percentage of Workers by S.E. Michigan County Using a Car, Truck
or Van, or in Car Pools as a Means of Transportation to Work:
Census 1980
County Using car, truck
or van
In Car
Pools
Wayne
Oakland
Macomb
st. Clair
Livingston
. Washtenaw
Monroe
89.0
94.9
95.4
92.2
94.5
81.2
94.2
17.2
15.0
17.0
20.5
21.8
17.0
17.5
Source: Michigan Statistical Abstract 17th Ed. 1982-83. Bureau of
Business Research, School of Business Administration, Wayne
state University, Detroit. Table XVII-21 p.546
(d) Selected Travel Characteristics for Wayne, Oakland and
Macomb Counties
1965 1970 1975 1980
Autos per capita
Daily transit trips
0.374 0.460 0.501 0.594
Daily vehicle miles
of travel
452,000 430,000 290,000 358,330
43,000,000 59,000,000 89,000,000 74,000,000
Daily person trips 9,832,000 NA NA NA
Source: Technical Development of the Regional Transportation Systems
Management Plan. SEMCOG 1979, Table 3; and Technical Development
of the Long Range Element of the Regional Transportation Plan,
Phase 1, Planning Study Analyses, May 1982 SEMCOG Table 3
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TABLE 19
EDC's, DDA's and TIFA's in SEMCOG REGION
(January 1983)
EDC's DDA's TIFA's
Wayne 31 6 5
Oakland 25 7 3
Macomb 20 1 0
st Claire 8 2 0
Washtenaw 11 1 1
Livingston 9 0 0
Monroe 10 1 0
114 18 9
Source: Data supplied by State of Michigan, Department of Commerce,
Office of Community Development
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TABLE 20
MAJOR FEDERAL REVENUES AS PROJECTED IN CITY OF
DETROIT BUDGETS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1979/80 TO 1983/84
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
$
364,004,000
336,165,000
266,699,000
236,669,000
200,331,000
Source: City of Detroit Annual Budget, various years
-334
APPENDIX II - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
335
The following individuals were interviewed between mid-1980 and mid-
1983. Most interviews were conducted face to face. Those conducted by
telephone are marked (ph). Details of the interviewing procedure are
given in Chapter One. Interviews vared in length between one and
three hours.
The following symbols indicate additional relevant background of those
interviewed:
T - Top level involvement in government
M - Middle level involvement in government
PT - Primary responsibility transportation
e Experience of 20 or more years of the Detroit scene
E - A subset of e. 'Top level governmental invol vement in the
1950's and 1960's
PL Primarily a planning role
Martin Anderson (ph)
Transportation Systems Center, u.S. Department of Transportation,
cambridge, Mass (T, PT)
Tariek Ataman
Engineer, Route Location, state of Michigan, Department of
Transportation (e, PL, M, PT)
Robert Boatman
Director, Metropolitan Regional Planning Division, state of Michigan,
Department of Transportation (e, PL, T, PT)
Don Burton (ph)
Assessor, Finance Department, City of Detroit (M)
J Dobbs (ph)
Property Manager, First Federal Savings and Loan, Detroit
Diane Edgecomb
President, Detroit Central Business District Association (e)
Philip Essig (ph)
Vice-President, Michigan National Holding Company, Detroit
Sheldon Friedman
Director of Research, United Auto Workers, Detroit
Jim Gallagher (ph)
Architect, Smith, Hinchman and Grylles, Detroit (e)
Jim Hyde
Executive Secretary, Michigan State Boundary Commission (e, M)
Al Jacoby (ph)
Former Co-ordinator of Mayor Cavanagh's Committee on Commercial and
Industrial Development (E, T)
Janet Kintzer
Legislative Liaison, Office of the Budget, State of Michigan (M)
336
Dr Bernard Klein
Former aide to Mayor Cavanagh, now Professor at University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor (E, T)
Gary Krause
Director of Transportation Planning, SEMTA (PL, T, PT)
John Lowe
Principal Social Planning and Development Assistant, Department of
Planning, City of Detroit (e, PL, M)
Denise Mazur
Senior Social Planning and Development Assistant, Department of
Planning, City of Detroit (PL, M)
John O'Donnell (ph)
Transportation Systems Center, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Cambridge, Mass (T, PT)
Dr John Perentesis
Former Director, Detroit Rapid Transit Commission (E, Pt, T, PT)
Robert Queller
Director, Citizen's Research Council of Michigan (e)
Edward Rago
Administrative Analyst, Budget Office, City of Detroit (M)
Irving Rubin
Director of Civic and Governmental Affairs, Ford Motor Company; former
director of TALUS (E, T, PT, Pt)
Representative William Ryan
Detroit Representative in Michigan House (E)
Donn Shelton
Executive Director, Metropolitan Fund Inc., Detroit (E)
Frank Smith
President, Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce
Harold Smith
Director, Social and Economic Division, Department of Planning, City
of Detroit (M, PL)
Jack Steiner
Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce (e)
Bill Sutherland
Director of Transportation, Wayne County Road Commission (PT, PL, T,
e)
Dan Synder
Land Use and Energy Programs Manager, SEMCOG, Detroit (M, PL)
Marv Tableman
Former aide to Governors Swainson and Williams (E, T)
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Mike Tako
Director of Transportation Planning, SEMCOG, Detroit ePL, T, PT)
Grant Trigger
Director, Michigan Environmental Council (PL)
Professor Kenneth Verburg
Institute for Community Development, Michigan state University, East
Lansing ee)
Dr Richard Willites
Analyst, Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis, state of Michigan CM)
Ernie Zackary
Business District Development Team Leader, Community and Economic
Development Department, City of Detroit (PL, M)
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